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Summary 
 
During its lifetime, the League of Nations aspired to gather reliable facts and produce accurate 
knowledge that could transform the conduct of international politics. Inquiry was one of many 
techniques the League actively deployed to find more rational means in which diplomacy was 
conducted and political decisions were made in Geneva. Truth Seekers or Power Brokers 
investigates the purpose and significance of international inquiry commissions in the inter-war 
years and asks to what extent they lived up to the high expectations of impartial knowledge 
created in a politicised environment. The thesis takes four thematically different case studies, 
concerning opium production in Persia, slavery and forced labour in Liberia, the Manchurian 
crisis that took East Asia by surprise, and the territorial dispute that emerged between Bolivia 
and Paraguay over the Chaco Boreal, to argue there is both coherence and reason behind the 
League’s repeated reliance on the inquiry technique. 
The thesis situates international inquiry and the League ‘experiment’ in a wider frame of imperial 
internationalism, which aids to explore a scientific cosmology of developmentalism underscoring 
the various fact-finding methods, as well as a civilisational lens and imperial modes, idioms and 
repertoires that are prevalent in the case study material. The imperial internationalist framework 
is explored by means of three dimensions, namely the ad hoc institutional setting in which inquiry 
was embedded, the multi-level context of competing powers, contestation and rivalry in which 
investigations took place, and the myriad manifestations of personal and state agency, by way of 
truth seeking, technical innovation and the defence of national sovereignty, against attempts of 
foreign tutelage and territorial expansion. The thesis explains how inquiry, as a technique, 
brought about a softer face of empire in the inter-war years, through Western expertise and 
assistance, but equally was meant to preserve and reinvigorate the imperial hierarchies that 
underscored the post-war international system. 
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1: Introduction 
 
‘Looking back to-day over ten years of development in international organisation, we can 
see that there has come into existence a new machinery of government, in which the 
most important work is done, not, as in our own country and in all the old-established 
states, by the Civil Service, but by Advisory Committees of Those Who Know, 
 operating without legislative authority and imposing their will  
“by the mere weight of expert agreement.”’ 
(Alfred Zimmern, “Democracy and the Expert”, 1930) 
 
‘I can imagine [the League] supplying experts, administrators, advisers, and advisory 
commissions; they would be free from the kind of suspicion which naturally attached  
to similar “advisers” provided by the great imperialist Powers.’  
(Leonard Woolf, Imperialism and Civilization, 1928) 
 
 
During its lifetime, the League of Nations turned to inquiry commissions as a technique to collect 
facts about issues of international importance. On nine occasions that merited international 
attention, the League appointed a group of persons to gather relevant facts and provide advice in 
the form of a report. For the League, inquiry meant a set of methods to obtain information, ‘for 
whose accuracy it can vouch’.1 There was a held belief that reliance on appointed experts would 
guarantee the impartial acquisition of reliable knowledge, which in turn would aid the Council or 
Assembly to decide on politically sensitive matters. The inquiry technique was used and adapted 
throughout the inter-war years to suit a diverse number of themes, from territorial disputes to 
international cooperation in the fields of health, trade and social issues. The investigations were 
a central point of attention for the press, since they personified – by means of a group of 
commissioners – the League’s dealings with world affairs. For instance, the Lytton inquiry into 
the Sino-Japanese dispute over Manchuria was extensively documented in the daily press, 
captured in photographs as well as the subject of film reporting.2 
                                                             
1 Discussion at the 65th Session of the League of Nations Council, September-December 1931, 1A-31334-
31349, R1865, League of Nations Archives (hereafter LONA). 
2 For example, see the Heidelberg project: “Global Politics on Screen: A Japanese Film on the Lytton 
Commission in 1932,” University of Heidelberg, accessed 16 November 2018, http://kjc-sv013.kjc.uni-
heidelberg.de/gpos/. 
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Despite their attention-grabbing character and sizeable role in the organisation’s endeavours to 
preserve peace, inquiries are little understood as a fact-finding technique in this international 
environment.3 Contemporary observers disputed inquiries’ overall contribution to the activities 
of the League of Nations.4 In recent decades, League scholars have mentioned them chiefly in the 
context of territorial disputes: F.S. Northedge considered them ‘a well-established League 
technique’ that helped to reduce tensions between states, whereas Martyn Housden praised the 
Lytton commission for its ‘diligent approach’ in elucidating the facts of the Manchurian crisis.5 
However, inquiries were also used in contexts not directly related to inter-state conflict.6 
Rational aspirations 
Why did the League of Nations rely on inquiry commissions as a means to gather information on 
a range of international subjects? In multiple ways, these commissions appeared to embody the 
League’s aspiration to transform the conduct of international politics. From its establishment the 
organisation was preoccupied with the means to organise peace, in part through collective 
security and disarmament. Yet, the aim to render war between states impossible was 
underpinned by a belief in rational means to achieve this.7 Through expert committees, 
investigative teams, statistical yearbooks and intellectual cooperation with other agencies, the 
                                                             
3 This mostly concerns the League’s usage of the inquiry technique (and to some degree the UN inquiries 
organised by the Human Rights Council), since its legal counterpart embedded in The Hague international 
court system has been examined in more detail. See: Herik, L. J. van den. “An Inquiry into the Role of 
Commissions of Inquiry in International Law: Navigating the Tensions between Fact-Finding and 
Application of International Law.” Chinese Journal of International Law 13, no. 3 (September 1, 2014): 
507–37. Also see the upcoming symposium in the European Journal of International Law on ‘International 
Commissions of Inquiry: What Difference Do They Make? Taking an Empirical Approach’. 
4 In the words of one Chilean diplomat, League inquiries appeared to be a form of ‘expensive political 
tourism’. Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Count Luigi Aldrovandi, 10 October 1933, in private 
papers of Luigi Aldrovandi-Marescotti, Busta 22, Archivio Storico Diplomatico del Ministero Affari Esteri 
(hereafter ASD). 
5 F.S. Northedge, The League of Nations: Its Life and Times 1920-1946 (Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1988), 112. Martyn Housden, The League of Nations and the Organisation of Peace (London: 
Routledge, 2014), 100. 
6 For examples of recent research regarding non-dispute related inquiries: Paul Knepper, “The 
Investigation into the Traffic in Women by the League of Nations.” Law and History Review 34, no. 01 
(February 2016): 45–73. Cristiana Schettini, “Between Rio’s Red-Light District and the League of Nations,” 
International Review of Social History, January 10, 2018, 1–28. 
7 Alternatively, Allan has labelled this ‘a scientific spirit’. See: Bentley B. Allan, Scientific Cosmology and 
International Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 183. 
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League sought to gather facts on the socio-economic conditions of populations across the globe.8 
Reliable information and the production of knowledge could support the political decision-
making process and, in turn, the improvement of well-being and the development of peoples 
could preclude the emergence of new conflicts. Therefore, inquiry commissions were one of 
several techniques to put the rationalisation of international politics into practice.9 
Back in its day, the critics of the League of Nations had observed how the peaceful principles upon 
which the organisation was founded, were fused with a belief in scientific progress and a 
technocratic manner to conduct politics. For E.H. Carr, the League was an ‘attempt to standardise 
international political problems on a rational basis’, in what he considered an infinitely complex 
world, whereas Hans Morgenthau questioned its ‘confidence in the power of reason’ to solve the 
social problems of the period.10 Robert Dell, a long-standing sceptic of the League, acknowledged 
that some of the technical activities supported by experts at the League had led to ‘good work in 
the non-political field’.11 Yet, for a long period of time, much of the League scholarship had focused 
only on the organisation’s core area of peace-building, such as collective security and 
disarmament. Geneva’s incapacity to preclude the eruption of conflicts in Manchuria and 
Abyssinia – provoked by expansionist powers such as Japan and Italy – and the rapid rearmament 
of countries in the 1930s were taken as evidence of a general failure by the ‘ill-fated’ League of 
Nations.12  
                                                             
8 Daniel Laqua “Intellectual Exchange and the New Information Order of the Interwar Years: The British 
Society for International Bibliography, 1927–1937.” Library Trends 62, no. 2 (2013): 465–77. Rodogno, 
Struck, and Vogel, Shaping the Transnational Sphere (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015). 
9 It is perhaps unsurprising that the League’s ambition to gather information intersects with parallel 
developments towards universalist documentation during this period. See: Rayward, The Universe of 
Information: The Work of Paul Otlet for Documentation and International Organisation (Moscow: All-Union 
Institute for Scientific and Technical Information VINITI, 1975). Also see: Wertheim, Tournès, and 
Parmar, “The Birth of Global Knowledge,” International Politics 55, no. 6 (November 2018): 727–33. 
10 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939 (London: Papermac, 2001), 28. Hans J. Morgenthau 
Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (London: Latimer House Limited, 1947), 8. 
11 Robert Dell, The Geneva Racket, 1920-1939 (London: R. Hale Ltd., 1941), 23. 
12 The expression originates in: Elmer Bendiner, A Time for Angels: The Tragicomic History of the League of 
Nations (New York: Knopf, 1975). Norman A. Graebner and Edward M. Bennett, The Versailles Treaty and 
Its Legacy: The Failure of the Wilsonian Vision (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). This 
assessment also touches upon the origins of International Relations, namely the ‘first debate’ between 
idealists and realists: Peter Wilson, “The Myth of the ‘First Great Debate.’” Review of International Studies 
24, no. 05 (December 1998): 1–16. 
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In recent years, however, scholars have found new ways to reappraise much of the ‘technical’ 
work undertaken by Geneva’s advocates of internationalism, in fields such as humanitarian relief, 
public health and intellectual cooperation.13 In 2007, this led Susan Pedersen to move away from 
the question of failure and towards a better grasp of what the organisation did during its 
existence: she identified multiple legacies of the League, concerning both its role as peace-keeper 
but also as agent in managing state power and authority at the international level.14 According to 
Pedersen, it was within this second area, concerning the boundaries between the national and the 
international, that the importance of the League became palpable: the sphere of socio-technical 
activities, with its expert involvement, was gradually being reassessed and marked as both an 
important and foundational legacy to nascent forms of cross-border cooperation and global 
governance – carried across and further developed after the Second World War.15 
Since then, the historiography of the League of Nations has been guided by this legacy centred 
upon socio-technical activities, which puts the emphasis on the League being both a crucial actor 
in the development of global norms and standards as well as an agent for the transition from a 
world structured around empires to one chiefly comprising sovereign states.16 As a result, much 
of this literature is built around a narrative of legacy that considers the League as a decisive step 
(or an experimental laboratory) in the institutionalisation of a liberal international order during 
the twentieth century.17 In contrast, the League’s legacy that revolves around the more 
                                                             
13 Iris Borowy, Coming to Terms with World Health: The League of Nations Health Organisation 1921-1946 
(Bern: Peter Lang, 2009). Daniel Laqua, “Transnational Intellectual Cooperation, the League of Nations, 
and the Problem of Order.” Journal of Global History 6, no. 02 (July 2011): 223–47. Davide Rodogno, Liat 
Kozma, and Magaly Rodriguez Garcia, eds. The League of Nations’ Work on Social Issues (Geneva: United 
Nations, 2016). 
14 Legacies or sometimes described as ‘narratives’, see: Susan Pedersen, “Back to the League of Nations,” 
American Historical Review, 112, no. 4 (2007): 1092. 
15 Daniel Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 12-13. 
16 Pedersen, “Back to the League of Nations,” 1092. The case of mandates is explored in detail in: Susan 
Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), 404-406. 
17 Francis Anthony Boyle, Foundations of World Order: The Legalist Approach to International Relations 
(1898-1922) (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999). Simon Jackson and Alanna O’Malley, eds. The 
Institution of International Order: From the League of Nations to the United Nations (Abingdon, Oxon; New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2018). 
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conventional aspects of peace-keeping, through collective security, disarmament and public 
diplomacy, rarely tends to be perceived or formulated along similar ‘foundational’ lines.18 
Moreover, a historical binary of success and failure to describe the aims and activities of an 
organisation has not entirely disappeared within the subject area.19 To some extent the debate 
about the multiple legacies of the League has widened the gap, especially when assessing the 
organisation in more holistic terms. Although international historians of the past two decades 
have increasingly refrained from using unequivocal criteria of judgment when discussing the 
League – to appraise some of its work without turning celebratory – the language used to describe 
and frame its activities and impact differs according to the legacy in which it is situated.20 Put 
differently, the specialisation within international history and the focus on one thematic subset 
of the League’s activities has served as a constraint on observing and addressing the overlaps and 
entanglements of (seemingly) separate legacies.21 Whereas Pedersen’s distinction serves a 
historiographical – even revisionist – purpose, it also draws boundaries between aspects and 
areas of activities that cannot be easily placed within one legacy, as they blend matters of security 
or sovereignty but can also be situated in the sphere of ‘technical work’. Inquiry is one such 
example of a phenomenon that cuts across the multiple legacies of the League. 
                                                             
18 One exception to this: Erin K. Jenne, Nested Security: Lessons in Conflict Management from the League of 
Nations and the European Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015). On a more conceptual level, the 
legacy of peace-keeping has been framed as one of ‘institutional replacement’, see: Patrick Cottrell, The 
Evolution and Legitimacy of International Security Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2016). 
19 See Clavin in reference to claims of success and failure and the importance of not completely 
sidestepping this historical framing of the League: Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy: The 
Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 10. 
20 Arguably it was different for League contemporaries, such as Alfred Zimmern, Frank Walters and H.R.G. 
Greaves, who could approach the subject from a near-universalist perspective, rather than the 
specialised, thematic focus common for today’s historical research. The latter did so when it pertained to 
the issue of committees and expertise: H. R. G. Greaves, The League Committees and World Order: A Study 
of the Permanent Expert Committees of the League of Nations as an Instrument of International Government 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1931). On appraisal, see Susan Pedersen’s foreword in: Jackson and 
O’Malley, eds. The Institution of International Order, ix-xvi. 
21 For example, see: Ludovic Tournès, “American Membership of the League of Nations: US Philanthropy 
and the Transformation of an Intergovernmental Organisation into a Think Tank.” International Politics 
55, no. 6 (October 12, 2017): 852–69. Leonie Holthaus and Jens Steffek. “Experiments in International 
Administration: The Forgotten Functionalism of James Arthur Salter.” Review of International Studies 42, 
no. 01 (January 2016): 114–135. 
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Imperial internationalism 
This thesis takes imperial internationalism as a framework in order to grasp the League’s use of 
the inquiry technique that often saw the entanglement of different legacies. Imperial 
internationalism can be defined as the coalescence of the aspirational politics of inter-war 
international organisation with the continued existence of imperial interests and colonial politics. 
The League of Nations organisation, with its international expertise, technical cooperation and 
pioneering work in the institutionalisation of global order, cannot be seen as separate from the 
ideational and political tenets of the historical context in which these developments took root. 
Previously, Daniel Gorman has utilised the framework in discussing the British Empire and its 
Dominions during the 1920s, but the framework has a wider applicability and can illuminate the 
interaction between international organisation and imperial politics for the wider League 
experiment.22 Mark Mazower’s work on empire, civilisational hierarchy and internationalism 
reinforces the fact that the international order created after the First World War was less linked 
with liberalism and progress than with ‘the question of empire and the visions of global order 
that emerged out of the British Empire’.23 
The imperial internationalist framework contextualises the inquiry technique within this multi-
faceted historical context of the organisation. The League of Nations’ formal adherence to 
progressive ideals, such as ‘New Diplomacy’, rational and transparent means to conduct 
international politics is set against the imperial interests of major powers and the Victorian 
norms that prevailed among the League’s representatives.24 For instance, the international law 
                                                             
22 Gorman, The Emergence of International Society in the 1920s, 11, 50-51. 
23 Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United 
Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 14. Mark Mazower, “An International Civilization? 
Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis of the Mid-Twentieth Century.” International Affairs 82, no. 3 
(May 2006): 553–66. Also see Zimmern’s depiction of the League as the ‘third British Empire’: Alfred 
Zimmern, The Third British Empire: Being a Course of Lectures Delivered at Columbia University (New York, 
London: Oxford University Press, 1926). 
24 Although Victorian bears a distinctly British stamp, it is meant here to signal a set of moral codes and 
views shared with other European representatives. These comprised strict social rules, a condescending 
attitude towards non-European cultures and races and the view that liberalism could go together with 
colonial and imperial rule. Duncan S. A. Bell, “Empire and International Relations in Victorian Political 
Thought.” The Historical Journal 49, no. 1 (2006): 281–98. 
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that underscored the political order was permeated by a civilisational hierarchy: the architects of 
the League had envisioned it as a type of commonwealth adapted to the world stage, yet 
characterised by a structural inequality identical to one that had existed before 1914 in relations 
between the European powers and the rest of the world.25 Although the League represented a 
step away from direct imperial exploitation and colonial rule – palpable in the mandates system 
– that had marked the previous century, much of the organisation’s workings and modalities were 
still conditioned by an imperial, even racialised order.28 Recently, Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo has 
accentuated the centrality of the League in imperial internationalism that characterised the inter-
war period: ‘The League of Nations and its institutional regime constituted, promoted, and 
continuously conditioned a new imperial geopolitical landscape. The League also fostered 
renewed idioms and repertoires of imperial legitimacy, a renewed imperial moral economy.’29 
Because of its belief in the technocratic potential to change the conduct of international politics 
and the introduction of a scientific spirit in international administration, the League of Nations 
was by some measure a transformational actor for inter-war internationalism. Yet many of these 
innovations and attempts to introduce objective knowledge and a greater degree of impartiality 
in diplomacy and the means to create a more closely knit global community, took root in ideas of 
civilisational progress and scientific methods developed in the context of colonial administration, 
which through evolutionary developmentalism also sought to prolong the existence of imperial 
political structures through international cooperation.30 How sincere was the adherence to 
impartial fact-finding if it was not equipped with the procedures and means to achieve it? For 
                                                             
25 Jennifer Pitts, Boundaries of the International: Law and Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2018). Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of 
International Law 1870 - 1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Also see: Mark Mazower, 
No Enchanted Palace, Chapters 1 and 2. 
28 This also concerned its ‘investigative modalities’ as per: Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of 
Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 5. 
29 Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, “A League of Empires: Imperial Political Imagination and Interwar 
Internationalisms.” In Internationalism, Imperialism and the Formation of the Contemporary World, eds. 
Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) 87–126. 
30 For evolutionary developmentalism see: Allan, Scientific Cosmology and International Orders, 181-183. 
Helen Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge, 
1870-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: 
Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). 
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instance, a discursive adherence to national sovereignty, rational politics and scientific progress 
did in practice not always extend to matters of international administration and engagement with 
the non-Western world. Hence, the gap created between, on the one hand, the potential of rational 
international politics and truth seeking, and on the other hand, the reality of power politics based 
on imperial and civilisational hierarchies, makes it crucial to the study of the League’s 
engagement with its contemporary world. Arguably, the overlaps and fusions between 
imperialism and internationalism structured the activities and outcomes of the organisation. 
Within this gap, inquiry commissions appear as particularly relevant to grasp the prevalence of 
imperial internationalism and how the multiple legacies of the League, as identified in the 
historiography, have fluid boundaries and even appear as intertwined: elements of ‘technical 
work’, expertise and rational fact-finding present part of the inquiry technique grew entangled 
with issues of high diplomacy, imperial modes, idioms and language repertoires as well as a far-
reaching civilisational standard.31 
The wider history of international organisation and League historiographical context is therefore 
relevant to the subject at hand: it exhibits inquiry commissions’ significance in the relationship 
between knowledge and politics, meanwhile placing them on the fault line between scientific 
progressivism and a Victorian (by extension European) notion of a civilised international society 
that was prevalent during the inter-war years. The League’s outlook constituted an amalgam of, 
on the one hand, technocratic means to transform politics and society and, on the other hand, a 
belief that empires still provided the fabric through which development could be achieved – 
thereby surpassing the apparent duality of imperial internationalism. Empire, both in a political 
and economic sense, was evident in the way in which the world was kept divided between strong 
and weak powers. The League was envisioned as a global commonwealth – with the European 
‘civilised’ states at the core of this international society – and even in the individual agents that 
                                                             
31 Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 
Andrew Linklater, Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016). Martin Thomas and Richard Toye, eds. Rhetorics of Empire: Languages of Colonial 
Conflict After 1900 (Manchester University Press, 2017). 
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populated and worked in the international realm – with attitudes steeped in a strict morality or 
gained by work experience in colonial administration and other imperial fields.32 
Imperial internationalism was prevalent and part of the League’s fabric; its ambiguities 
conditioned the use of the inquiry technique to investigate inter-state issues but also were 
reproduced in the practices by the commissioners on the ground. For inquiry, imperial 
internationalism meant a source of tension that pitted quixotic declarations of impartial fact-
finding against both the diplomatic exigencies of major powers and the structural limitations of 
these nominally independent international investigatory bodies. Overall, despite their perceived 
status in dealing with issues of war and peace, moments of crisis or scandal, inquiries were largely 
left as flexible instruments, ad hoc in nature, with little of a procedural blueprint, sometimes at 
the will of the League’s political organs and member countries, but also dependent on the 
individual qualities of the recruited commissioners. Was the flexible character of inquiry a 
deliberate choice or did it fit a precedent set in previous times? To explain and contextualise such 
characteristics of inquiry commissions, i.e. the discrepancies, requires an understanding of their 
historical origins, at the domestic and international level, and their distinctive position within the 
institutionalised structure and ideational thinking about the League of Nations.33 
Structure and aim of the thesis 
The thesis proceeds in studying the development of inquiry under the auspices of the League and 
examines its use in several, thematically distinct case studies, to demonstrate inquiries’ work and 
overall effectiveness in dealing with inter-state disputes and other issues of international 
concern. This cross-thematic focus on institutional factors, fact-finding agents and the historical 
context through distinct case studies is chosen deliberately, as it enables a comprehensive grasp 
                                                             
32 Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge. Michael D. Callahan, A Sacred Trust: The League of 
Nations and Africa, 1929-1946 (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2004). Jackson, Peter. “Pierre Bourdieu.” 
In Critical Theorists and International Relations, eds. Jenny Edkins and Nick Vaughan-Williams, (New York, 
N.Y: Routledge, 2009), 102–13.. 
33 J. H. Leurdijk, “Fact-Finding: Its Place in International Law and International Politics.” Netherlands 
International Law Review 14, no. 02 (June 1967): 141-161. Christian Henderson, ed., Commissions of 
Inquiry: Problems and Prospects (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017). 
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of inquiry as a technique, i.e. whether any coherent facets can be drawn from the League’s 
examples and what inquiry signifies for the relationship between knowledge and international 
politics (and how it developed throughout a period when empire coincided with the growth of 
international organisation).34 Whereas domestic and colonial examples of inquiry commissions 
have been studied in detail, with explicit attention to inquiry’s relationship vis-à-vis the (colonial) 
state, no similar work has been undertaken for its League counterparts.35 Domestic inquiries had 
an intricate relationship with the state, whereas international inquiries were constituted in a 
multi-level field of competing political interests.36 What place was there for inquiry in an 
international arena composed of international bodies, member states and local agents? Unlike 
inquiry that was part of a judicial dispute settlement process at The Hague Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, the elaborate use of fact-finding methods by the League of Nations was created to 
interact with a political decision-making process.37 Structural and contingent constraints 
emanated from the choice to politicise the use of inquiry within international organisation, which 
opens the example of the League up to a range of crucial questions of historical relevance, that 
address the nature of truth and the role of expertise within international politics. 
Therefore, the general aim of the thesis is to comprehend the tensions that were replicated within 
inquiry commissions and what these tensions convey about the League’s transformative 
aspiration for international politics. Thereby, imperial internationalism is taken as a frame to 
                                                             
34 Although long-term perspectives on this relationship remain understudied, there are contemporary 
examples such as: Thomas Pfister and Anna Horvath. “Reassessing Expert Knowledge and the Politics of 
Expertise.” Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research 27, no. 4 (October 2014): 311–16. 
Regarding the interaction between knowledge and the field of International Relations from a historical 
perspective, see: Bentley B. Allan “From Subjects to Objects: Knowledge in International Relations 
Theory.” European Journal of International Relations, November 23, 2017, 841–864. 
35 See the next chapter. Also: Adam Ashforth, The Politics of Official Discourse in Twentieth-Century South 
Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). B. Lauriat, “‘The Examination of Everything’: Royal Commissions 
in British Legal History.” Statute Law Review 31, no. 1 (April 1, 2010): 24–46. Berber Bevernage, “The 
Making of the Congo Question: Truth-Telling, Denial and ‘Colonial Science’ in King Leopold’s Commission 
of Inquiry on the Rubber Atrocities in the Congo Free State (1904–1905).” Rethinking History 22, no. 2 
(April 3, 2018): 203–38. 
36 Here I refer to Sandrine Kott’s notion of international organisations being heuristic objects, to talk 
about ‘tensions at work between the international, national, and local scenes and frames of reference’: 
Sandrine Kot. “International Organizations – A Field of Research for a Global History.” Zeithistorische 
Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary History, Online-Ausgabe, 8, no. 3 (2011): 449. 
37 van den Herik, “An Inquiry into the Role of Commissions of Inquiry in International Law.” Chinese 
Journal of International Law 13, no. 3 (September 1, 2014): 507–37. 
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comprehend how its characteristics and effects were perceptible at the granular level, namely 
within the League’s fact-finding bodies. The tensions are identified here as structural factors 
related to three dimensions: institutional, contextual and agential. First, the League’s inquiry 
technique had patchy institutional underpinnings, with few guidelines and standardised 
practices, outcomes that were difficult to measure, and no means to directly enforce 
recommendations. Second, the historical context of inter-war international politics, with its 
multi-level power dynamics and competing interests, both enabled and constrained softer forms 
of tutelage that were tried through international expertise. Third, commissioners had a crucial 
role as both subjects and agents in the knowledge production process, which in turn could drive 
forward or hamper the assignment. Agency played a part, as commissioners’ attitudes, choices 
and backgrounds informed the fact-finding assignments, although, as the case study chapters will 
show, this capacity to act was also found in how local and national actors in countries responded 
to and gamed international inquiry initiatives.38  
These dimensions, set out in more detail in the next chapter, explore to what degree inquiry was 
significant as an instrument in introducing a more rational approach in the political decision-
making process of the League – its significance touching upon formal aspects (i.e. whether its 
tasks and general ambition of truth seeking were met). Equally, these dimensions identify the 
impact that inquiry had on shifting international politics away from power brokering between 
multi-level actors towards ideals of truth seeking and good governance. The thesis not only seeks 
to understand the conditions of knowledge production on the ground, but also how inquiry 
sought to use gathered facts to mediate and recast discussion within the League’s political organs. 
The League of Nations’ inquiry commissions sought to achieve impartial fact-finding and a wider 
transformation of international politics through rational means, but were constrained by the 
institutional, ideational and political context in which they operated. The thesis argues that some 
                                                             
38 On countries gaming the international system, one should note the similarities with other historical 
periods. See for example: Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and 
the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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of its unachieved potential may have been because of a disconnect between fact-finding and 
decision-making, arguably one that was created for intentional purposes: it is observed in the fact 
that inquiries were established and retained as a flexible technique throughout the League’s 
existence, with few procedural guidelines developed over time. Inquiries almost always targeted 
countries that fell outside of a core group of ‘civilised’ European states – fact-finding was 
primarily a tool to expose failure of governance in weak states or in geographical areas that were 
contested by multiple nations and empires. When inquiry reports were submitted to Geneva for 
consideration and deliberation, the recommendations and solutions identified by commissioners 
were often side-lined by the League’s political bodies. Rather than uncovering ‘the truth’, the 
inquiry technique was relied upon because it gave additional time for diplomatic consultation or 
helped to avoid a direct clash between major powers. In these instances, the imperial horizon 
with its civilisational hierarchy and power dynamics remained fully in play. 
However, the case studies that are explored in this thesis indicate that in addition to a set of 
constraints on its transformative capacity, in its means inquiry appears as a hallmark for attempts 
to introduce technocracy as an important cornerstone to international politics during this period. 
The usage of fact-finding methods, with experts sometimes serving as incidental diplomats or 
performers looking for ‘knowledge authenticity’ on the ground, coincided and reinforced a long-
term development that replaced direct imperial influence through military and economic means, 
with ‘soft power’ tools that more readily encouraged development and reform – modelled as 
‘civilised’ tutelage over the non-Western world.39 In this sense, League inquiries helped to pacify 
domestic and cross-border conflicts, but indirectly also provided agency to weaker states to 
defend their case (and their precarious sovereignty) on the international stage. As regards 
knowledge production, some of the language of impartiality only went surface deep; underneath, 
                                                             
39 See for example: Sean Andrew Wempe, “From Unfit Imperialists to Fellow Civilizers: German Colonial 
Officials as Imperial Experts in the League of Nations, 1919–1933.” German History 34, no. 1 (March 
2016): 21–48. With regard to politics and performance, see: Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, “Intervention 
Theatre: Performance, Authenticity and Expert Knowledge in Politicians’ Travel to Post-/Conflict Spaces.” 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, December 5, 2016, 1–23. 
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it reinforced the idioms and registers of imperial imagination and continued the use of a 
civilisational standard in international politics. Yet, the case of League inquiries aids to retrace 
the origins of scientific discourse within the liberal international order and to uncover its 
ideological underpinnings.40 
The novelty of the thesis is first of all found in its cross-thematic approach to the League of 
Nations. It focuses on the practices and outcomes of inquiry commissions as an expression of 
knowledge production within international politics, framing it as a structural phenomenon 
embedded in a highly politicised context, which helps to further disentangle the wide scope and 
range of activities conducted by the League during its time and existence. Through a broad case 
study selection, it seeks to overcome existing historiographical and thematic barriers in the 
academic scholarship on the League – and to present a multi-level perspective on the organisation 
and its engagement with world politics that is not dependent on source material originating from 
one League section (for example, disarmament or mandates), level of analysis (local, national or 
international) or type of international action. An additional contribution can be identified in the 
fact that it shows with the use of empirical evidence the myriad entanglements and ambiguities 
of imperial internationalism during the inter-war period. In other words, it confirms the view that 
‘technical work’ can never be taken for granted as free from value-laden idioms and repertoires. 
The imperial context and civilisational thinking at the origins of inquiry at the international level 
shaped long-term patterns of socio-political change and has ongoing implications for 
international expertise and intervention in the present day – as human rights’ inquiries by the 
United Nations (UN) demonstrate.41 
                                                             
40 Berit Bliesemann de Guevara and Roland Kostić. “Knowledge Production in/about Conflict and 
Intervention: Finding ‘Facts’, Telling ‘Truth.’” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 11, no. 1 (January 
2, 2017): 1–20. Henderson, Christian, ed. Commissions of Inquiry: Problems and Prospects. 
41 Andrew Linklater. “The ‘Standard of Civilisation’ in World Politics.” Human Figurations 5, no. 2 (July 
2016). Harwood, Catherine. “Navigating between Principle and Pragmatism: The Roles and Functions of 
Atrocity-Related United Nations Commissions of Inquiry in the International Legal Order.” Doctoral 
Thesis, Leiden University, 2018. 
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The structure of the thesis is organised as to provide a thorough understanding of inquiry as a 
technique, its historical origins at the domestic level but also within colonial settings, before its 
adaptation by international bodies, as a means of dispute settlement and subsequently a wider 
array of subjects under the auspices of the League of Nations. A general chapter sets out the 
framework of inquiry, to understand its meaning and purpose – how and why the League relied 
upon it – and relevant conceptual approaches that enable a comparative perspective of the case 
studies. This chapter also describes in more detail the rationale behind the case study selection 
as well as some methodological considerations. The next four chapters deal each separately with 
a case study of a League inquiry commission that explores the historical context of each 
international issue that gave way to an investigation. The following cases are presented in a 
chronological order: opium production in Persia, slavery and forced labour in Liberia, the Sino-
Japanese dispute over Manchuria and the conflict fought by Bolivia and Paraguay over the Chaco 
region. The four case studies were chosen on a representative basis, covering a longer temporal 
range (from 1925 to 1934), different geographical areas (Central Asia, West Africa, East Asia and 
South America), discrepancies in size and thematic focus (most importantly, the inclusion of non-
dispute related issues). The representation of four relatively distinct case studies permits the 
tracing of institutional and methodological developments across time and between regions, as 
well as to examine whether ‘technical’ investigations were subjected to a different degree of 
politicisation and diplomatic pressures. For the purpose of comparison, each case study chapter 
has an identical structure, comprising the origins of the issue, the catalyst(s) for the investigation, 
the establishment of the commission, the investigation on the ground and the report-writing, with 
a consideration of the aftermath – the impact of inquiry on the political decision-making process 
– at the end. Despite the specificity of each historical case, this facilitates the identification of 
elements of similitude and difference between the four inquiry commissions, and structures the 
empirical material drawn out in support of the thesis’ argument and the three dimensions 
through which the argument is explored in detail. 
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Approach and sources 
International history represents the dominant disciplinary approach in the conduct of the 
empirical research that underpins the findings of the thesis. However, for its exploration of 
questions of knowledge production, the thesis has also explored International Relations (IR) 
literature and relevant articles from cultural anthropology.42 Within IR, most writing on conflict 
and expertise has been framed around case study examples from the 1990s and onwards, 
whereas this thesis has deliberately chosen to address similar questions using a more historical 
setting.43 The framework of imperial internationalism only emerged after an inductive analysis 
of the source materials and could not have been sharpened without extensive reliance on the 
excellent work published in the fields of international law and (process) sociology.44 Many 
different types of scholarship have therefore inspired and influenced the questioning and scope 
of the research, including their corresponding methodological toolkits. They have helped to 
conceptualise the subject and argument of the thesis but remain encapsulated within a historical 
approach. 
The research for this thesis is primarily built upon the rich primary sources left by the League of 
Nations organisation and which are available for on-site consultation at the UN Library in 
Geneva.45 In addition, archival research was conducted at multiple sites of ministries of foreign 
affairs, to gain a better sense of the role of former diplomats on inquiry commissions and the 
national interests at play within the League’s fact-finding investigations. In addition, private 
papers and published materials were consulted for a majority of the people that were chosen to 
represent the League and conduct inquiry within the various commissions. Both the official and 
personal writings have provided an insight into the diplomatic exigencies of the task as well as 
                                                             
42 For an anthropological perspective on inquiry, see: Lori A. Allen, “Determining Emotions and the 
Burden of Proof in Investigative Commissions to Palestine.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 59, 
no. 02 (April 2017): 385–414. 
43 Guevara, Berit Bliesemann de, and Roland Kostić. “Knowledge Production in/about Conflict and 
Intervention: Finding ‘Facts’, Telling ‘Truth’,” 1–20. 
44 Adam Ashforth, “Reckoning Schemes of Legitimation: On Commissions of Inquiry as Power/Knowledge 
Forms.” Journal of Historical Sociology 3, no. 1 (March 1990): 1–22. Koskenniemi, Martti. The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations. 
45 An overview of all consulted archives can be found in the bibliography of the thesis. 
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the emotional and bodily experiences of the protagonists – detached from home for a longer 
period of time.46 Diaries were a fruitful source of information to draw out insights structured 
around questions of body, race and gender.47 Taken together with the relevant historiographies 
on the League, international narcotics regimes, forced labour and humanitarian imperialism, 
Sino-Japanese relations and border disputes in South America, these depict a rich, often multi-
layered and complex scene where the League’s international raison d'être, as the main authority 
for matters of war and peace, collided with national and imperial interests, domestic forms of 
political contestation and commissioners’ personal agendas that contradicted aspirations of truth 
seeking and impartial fact-finding.  
                                                             
46 For this particular reason, the ‘cultural turn’ and its aftermath has been of importance: Patrick Finney, 
“Narratives and Bodies: Culture beyond the Cultural Turn.” The International History Review, February 27, 
2018, 1–22. Zara Steiner, “On Writing International History: Chaps, Maps and Much More.” International 
Affairs 73, no. 3 (July 1997): 531–46. 
47 Tracey Rizzo and Steven Gerontakis. Intimate Empires: Body, Race, and Gender in the Modern World 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). Elizabeth Prevost, “On Feminists, Functionalists, and Friends: 
Lobola and the Gender Politics of Imperial Trusteeship in Interwar Britain.” The Journal of Modern History 
89, no. 3 (September 2017): 562–600. Madeleine Herren, “Gender and International Relations through 
the Lens of the League of Nations (1919-1945).” In Women, Diplomacy and International Politics since 
1500, eds. Glenda Sluga and Carolyn James (London: Routledge, 2016), 192–201. Robert Vitalis, White 
World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2015). 
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2: The League of Nations and its Commissions of Inquiry 
In search of a purpose and an approach 
‘The inquiry of truth, which is the love-making, or the wooing of it, the knowledge of 
truth, which is the presence of it, and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it,  
is the sovereign good of human nature.’ 
(Francis Bacon, “Of Truth”, 1625) 
‘Public inquiries are intrinsically controversial.’ 
(Jack Simson Caird & Mark Sandford, Public Inquiries, 2016) 
 
In politics of the modern era, fact-finding has played its part in decision-making and governance, 
whether at the level of the state or in an international environment. The League of Nations, as an 
experiment of a universalist organisation for the preservation of peace and the support of 
international cooperation, was no exception to this. However, the League would give 
development to its own form if inquiry as a technique, in form and functioning different from its 
precedents, embedded in an aspirational agenda to transform the conduct of international 
politics. To grasp these developments at the international level and before exploring inquiry 
through a number of empirical case study chapters, this section sets out the main characteristics 
of inquiry in the sense of a fact-finding investigation, what role it has played in the past and how 
its practices correspond to the political and ideational context of the time-period. 
The domestic origins of inquiry and its application in imperial and colonial contexts will help to 
elucidate the question why inquiry became such a popular and often used tool by state authorities 
and administrations to tackle the failings of policy and investigate societal problems. The 
characteristics, value and limitations of inquiry are explored through a number of categories 
identified in the legal scholarship on fact-finding investigations, a discipline that has taken a 
closer interest in inquiry’s unique position, neither legal nor political, and nominally independent 
from courts and government. In contrast, innovations of inter-state dispute resolution at the 
international level placed inquiry closer into the remit of courts – in both form and procedures – 
although it generally retained its flexible character. When the League joined the cause of 
international inquiry after the First World War, a great number of precedents and forms were 
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available upon which it could base its technique, although the organisation refrained from clearly 
choosing one blueprint. Rather, it adjusted inquiry to suit a wide range of international issues, 
such as disputes, trade and trafficking, social relations and border delineation. 
Inquiry became a regularly used tool for the League because, on the one hand, it both matched 
the aspirational agenda to introduce a greater role for expert knowledge in international politics 
and on the other hand, it was flexible enough to meet the pragmatic needs and interests of 
officials, diplomatic representatives and major powers, to protect the status quo of the 
international system, to appear as taking decisive action but in practice to buy additional time in 
coming up with solutions. The chapter paves the ground for an in-depth exploration of inquiry in 
different thematic contexts, by elaborating on the conceptual underpinnings of the three 
dimensions by which the technique of the League can be understood and its use can be explained 
in the context of inter-war imperial internationalism: it addresses the clash between the 
transformative aspirations and tensions reproduced in the institutional limitations, contestation 
and power politics as well as the role of agency within international politics. These conceptual 
explorations are coupled with a brief treatment of commonalities and differences identified in the 
case study chapters and result in a brief reflection on the place of inquiry within the wider history 
and narratives of the League experiment. 
Origins and development of inquiry 
History and inquiry have a long-standing relationship. The Greek word for history (ἱστορία) may 
be translated as inquiry, and the act of inquiring – a search for information through questioning 
and interrogation – often lays claims to historical truth. Inquiry as a form of investigation 
predominantly is concerned with facts and events that occurred in a recent past.48 Although 
history and inquiry are a closely interested pair, a general history of inquiry is yet to be written. 
This is neither for lack of forms of inquiry nor a small number of case studies; inquiry has 
                                                             
48 A broad but practical definition of inquiry can be found in Théo Boutruche’s work: ‘a “method of 
ascertaining facts” through the evaluation and compilation of various information sources.’ Quoted in: 
Harwood, “Navigating between Principle and Pragmatism,” 6. 
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appeared in ancient and contemporary times, both in the domestic and international realm, as a 
term to signal the investigation and collection of information about a specified problem. Inquiries 
are established because they serve a purpose; their ability to frame societal problems means they 
should be considered as knowledge producers in their own right. However, inquiries take many 
official forms: for instance, in a domestic setting, they could be royal commissions, public 
inquiries or parliamentary tribunals.49 The sheer abundance of investigations has hindered a 
comprehensive and longitudinal study of the inquiry phenomenon. As Lauriat observed, ‘their 
very diversity and complexity render generalisation, or even comparison, challenging.’50 Their 
diverse appearance, whether intentional or not, provides a reason to study them in their detail. 
To comprehend the League’s use of the inquiry technique, it is crucial to look at examples set 
before its existence and producing knowledge in different contexts, to categorise and draw out 
inquiry’s characteristics, remit and matters it is concerned with. 
Historical sources have little to say about inquiry in ancient times, but the notion of inquiry in an 
institutional sense, as a commission or investigative body, appears in medieval and early modern 
Europe.51 Royal commissions of inquiry are the oldest known examples: they were created by the 
executive branch of government as ad hoc and independent bodies to investigate and report on 
issues of public concern.52 The commissions were used first in England, even though there is little 
agreement about their age and early development: some scholars go back as far as the Doomsday 
Book as an example of an ‘information gathering exercise for taxation’ that would strengthen the 
authority of the king, while others situate the first commissions in the sixteenth century.53 At 
times, inquiries took the shape of a court, although their function was inquisitorial rather than 
                                                             
49 For reasons of brevity, this thesis does not touch upon cases of truth and reconciliation commissions, 
which also relate to issues of fact-finding but are more geared towards past events as well as questions of 
memory and transitional justice. See: Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, Truth v The Morality of 
Truth Commissions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
50 Lauriat, “‘The Examination of Everything’,” 24. 
51 In some circumstances they are also known as inquests or enquête in French. 
52 Macdonald, Roderick Alexander. “An Analysis of the Forms and Functions of Independent Commissions 
of Inquiry (Royal Commission) in Canada.” Montreal: McGill Faculty of Law, 2011, 5. 
53 Citation from: George Gilligan. “Royal Commissions of Inquiry.” Australian & New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology 35, no. 3 (December 2002): 290. Thomas J. Lockwood, “A History of Royal Commissions.” 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 5, no. 2 (1967): 172–209. 
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adversarial: the aim was to conduct an investigation and settle matters of fact, rather than act as 
a referee between parties presenting their own evidence. 
Notwithstanding precedents during the ancien régime, the widespread use of inquiry as an 
instrument of (state) authority is a distinctly modern phenomenon: in the nineteenth century, 
nation-states and empires increasingly relied upon investigative bodies to study questions of a 
socio-political and societal nature. This trend continued in the twentieth century, although the 
work of inquiry shifted increasingly from royal commissions to departmental and parliamentary 
committees.54 For the United Kingdom, David and Gareth Butler compiled a list of royal 
commissions, tribunal inquiries and ‘an arbitrary selection from the 1,000 or so ad hoc and 
statutory Committees of Inquiry appointed since 1900’ which takes up several pages.55 The 
overview confirms how at each year of the twentieth century, there was some form of inquiry 
underway in the UK, investigating and reporting on issues related to unemployment, civil service, 
the press, standards of conduct in government and the police. Scrutiny also extended itself to the 
British empire and all overseas territories, as the government appointed inquiry commissions to 
study subjects such as hospitals in South Africa, opium in India, political unrest in Palestine and 
the possible union between Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Thus, inquiry turned into a facet of imperial 
and colonial administration; it became a prevalent technique to interact and structure the 
relationship between the imperial rulers and the subjected populations.56 In general, 
investigative bodies permeated modern politics and were a vital component in the governance 
and administration of society as well as the imperial polity.57 
                                                             
54 Jack Simson Caird and Mark Sandford. “Statutory Commissions of Inquiry: The Inquiries Act 2005.” 
Briefing Paper. London: House of Commons Library, January 30, 2018. 
55 David Butler and Gareth Butler. Twentieth-Century British Political Facts: 1900 – 2000 (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 2005), 315. The entire list can be found on pages 316-319. 
56 See for example: Ronen Shamir and Daphna Hacker. “Colonialism’s Civilizing Mission: The Case of the 
Indian Hemp Drug Commission.” Law and Social Inquiry 26, no. 2 (April 2001): 435–61. 
57 Ann Laura Stoler argues that inquiry commissions enjoyed popularity among colonial authorities, as 
instruments to frame societal issues, sometimes to distract and delay, but in general to control the 
circulation of knowledge. From: Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common 
Sense, 30. 
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In the United Kingdom legislation was enacted to regulate their practices, methods, and output 
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. For instance, the Tribunals of Inquiry Act 
(1921) and the recent UK Inquiries Act (2005) are major pieces of legislation regarding inquiries. 
At some point, even the idea of inquiry was subjected to its own inquiry, as the Royal Commission 
on Tribunals of Inquiry report from 1966 bears witness.58 Contemporary legislation has 
increasingly separated statutory inquiry (related to law) from non-statutory inquiry (based on 
precedent), although both forms are commonplace in the UK.59 Despite the surge of public 
inquiries in recent years, royal commissions still retain their function and are therefore used as a 
common example here. Although the thesis only takes a partial perspective, primarily focused on 
the consulted literature from the English-language world, it is important to note that inquiry has 
been adopted and maintained in other countries.60  
In 1967, the Canadian scholar Thomas Lockwood noted that commissions were probably ‘one of 
the most used but least understood phenomena’.61 Since then, the historiography on domestic 
inquiry commissions has steadily grown, yet some of the basic questions about their formats, 
methods and purposes remain unresolved.62 As Rowe and McAllister have noted, ‘there are 
difficulties establishing a firm typology’ when it comes to inquiry commissions, because the 
ubiquity of investigatory commissions, committees and reviews ‘makes rigid categories of such 
inquiries relatively unhelpful.’63 If neither a definitive history of inquiries is at hand, nor a firm 
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typology64 that breaks apart their activities, methods and outcomes, then how can the subject of 
inquiries be engaged with? In other words, how to investigate the role of the investigators?  
The following paragraphs lay the groundwork to clarify why inquiries have been transformed 
into an often-used instrument by government, despite tensions that appear in their establishment 
and functioning. They are framed around often-cited categories of analysis in the scholarship, 
such as inquiry’s independence, its ad hoc nature, the appointed membership, the role and 
reception of the report, the temporality and the durability of the phenomenon. These widespread 
characteristics pave the ground for a debate on investigative commissions, not limited to a formal 
description but also addressing inquiry’s role as broadly as possible, with attention to purpose, 
impact and evaluation. Because the following section is meant to provide an initial frame of 
understanding for the League inquiries, the characteristics and examples introduced here are 
compared and juxtaposed to the League’s use of the investigative technique – a more detailed 
framework is explored later in the chapter. 
Among legal scholars there is general agreement that inquiry commissions have an independent 
character: although the executive branch of government may initiate it, an inquiry acts with a 
degree of autonomy from state authorities – arguably to strengthen their impartial credentials. 
Independence is often associated with impartiality, in the sense of being understood as a 
disinterested approach that is free of bias and based on objective facts.65 This nominal 
independence is a straightforward principle that could explain why the idea of inquiry gained its 
popularity, as it allowed to investigate practices of government by persons detached from the 
work under scrutiny (i.e. acting in a personal capacity). However, legal research into royal 
commissions also has laid bare other aims that occasionally ran opposed to the principle of 
independence. In his evaluation of royal commissions, Gilligan emphasises the fact that they were 
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‘interwoven with constitutional struggles centred upon the royal prerogative’.66 In other words, 
the upper echelon of power relied upon inquiry to protect and further its interests. 
Monarchs used royal commissions to cement their authority over the population, although in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries parliamentary supremacy curtailed this centralisation of 
power. In the nineteenth century, the popularity of royal commissions coincided with the system 
of modern cabinet government, when ministers found the autonomy of a commissions preferable 
over working through a parliamentary committee. Even though inquiries were supposedly kept 
at arms’ length from the executive, tension is evident from the fact they were reactively used to 
respond to crisis situations that could damage state legitimacy. In other words, their work sought 
to re-establish government authority over public controversies.67 In the past, these weaknesses 
regarding independence have led to the critique that inquiries are bodies to mask government 
failure. Or, in the case of South Africa, Ashforth has suggested that inquiries were devices to 
express official discourse and legitimise the state.68 
The League’s fact-finding missions shared a similar adherence to independence in their 
establishment and practices. League inquiries were created upon request by representatives of 
member states to respond to situations of crisis and issues of international concern. A 
commissioner generally was designated by a country but expected to act in a personal capacity. 
Contrary to domestic inquiries, the relationship with a central authority was more diffuse. The 
investigations were organised under the auspices of the League and supported by the Secretariat 
but in practice were highly dependent on state cooperation and local agents to be allowed access 
and gather information. Similarly, League inquiries were not autonomous from the organisation’s 
political bodies: inquiries reported back to the Council or Assembly, who then decided whether 
and how to act upon the findings. 
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A second characteristic is palpable in the ad hoc nature of inquiry commissions. An inquiry 
requires an identifiable problem or a crisis in government; an investigation is only set up when 
the need for one is warranted. Although the whole process of inquiry may take several years, 
eventually it is expected to report back and disband itself after the work is deemed to be 
completed. Because inquiry commissions are issue-based and ephemeral, they may reinforce the 
immediacy and urgency of a problem, steer public attention and controversy towards it, but also 
buy the government time to come up with solutions.69 One tension that arises from this ephemeral 
nature is in the fact that inquiries rarely are masters of their own time: investigators have no 
control over the time-frame and are generally subject to instructions by the organising authority. 
When initial crisis recedes, the impetus and support for an ongoing inquiry may also diminish. 
Nevertheless, Gilligan argues that inquiries can also be established in ‘a calm political 
environment’, meaning they are more than simply ‘crisis aversion’ tools of government.70  
The ad hoc nature of inquiries implies that there generally are questions over the degree of 
control these bodies have over the assignment. As non-statutory bodies with no elaborate legal 
framework, the terms of reference are rarely negotiated and decided in public and do not involve 
the future members of a commission. Taking shape outside of the investigation, these terms can 
either liberate or restrain the ability to perform the task at hand. Different sets of terms of 
reference have created a major degree of disparity in terms of rationale, practices and outcome, 
much of the academic work has been on particular commissions rather than their general 
character. Although Rowe and McAllister note, ‘the very appointment of a commission opens the 
possibility of the unexpected or the unwanted’, the external negotiation of the terms of reference 
and the time-limited nature means that surprises are less likely.71 Moreover, inquiries retain little 
control over the issue they studied once they have submitted a report. Dust may quickly settle on 
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their findings or they are routinely ignored in the policy process by those who instructed their 
establishment. 
Because the ad hoc nature of inquiries touches upon many fundamental aspects of their 
functioning, it is a key feature to understand their work and impact on the decision-making 
process – with significance to the precedents set at the international level. In the case of the 
League, inquiries were ad hoc in the sense that there were no standardised guidelines: terms of 
reference were set with regard to the issue at hand. Moreover, they were set up when needed (i.e. 
a crisis or major cross-border issue) and disbanded when the assignment was deemed to be 
completed (i.e. the report submitted) – with little or no continued input by the commissioners in 
subsequent decision-making process. 
Apart from the decision to organise an inquiry, the appointment of its members is a crucial 
decision to be taken by government or any other public authorities. Tensions surrounding the 
independence and ephemeral nature are reproduced here, as the search for appropriate 
candidates with a degree of expertise on the subject can yield different outcomes. At best, the 
organising authority would identify clear criteria for the membership, consider factors such as 
representation and detachment from politics and state authorities. At worst, it might seek to 
minimise political risk, try to steer the nomination process and ensure the ‘right’ findings through 
the selection procedure.  
Inquiry commissions may carry a veneer of expertise but in reality, political considerations, 
practical concerns and contingency planning can guide the appointment process – a major cause 
for discrepancy between investigations. Scholarly voices have extensively questioned 
appointment processes for inquiries, perhaps best expressed by the view that ‘a government 
never holds an inquiry unless it knows what it is going to find’.72 In the case of royal commissions, 
lawyers and judges have predominated due to their legal background and intricate grasp of 
domestic law. Governments have generally opted also for former politicians or ‘men of stature’ 
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(perhaps in the mirror image of the organising authority), who are past their career peak but 
familiar with the higher echelons of power.73 Case studies reveal that carefully scrutinised 
investigators can still surprise authorities and expose systemic failures of government.74 While 
impartiality, representation and expertise may not always be primary considerations, candidates 
can make use of the relative degree of autonomy provided during the assignment and continue to 
pursue their subject with vigour after the publication of a report.75 In contrast, as paymasters the 
government authorities retain control over the entire process, including the powers assigned to 
the investigators, and are able to use financial arguments (cost control, expenses) to exert 
pressure on commissioners.  
For the League of Nations, the question of appointment was complicated by the fact that 
nationality was a crucial factor to be considered, next to the appropriate experience and 
professional expertise of the candidate commissioners. The case studies will show how these 
could be weighed differently depending on the subject of the investigation. Because League 
appointments chiefly took place in negotiation or with the support of national authorities, the 
picture is once again complicated: while there was less scope for one authority to steer 
nominations, the composition of a commission was seen as one of diplomatic importance. While 
the League was driven by genuine concerns for accurate fact-finding, political considerations 
could play their part when the assignment was established to confirm what was already known –
using inquiry as a means of pressure on a chosen country. 
Inquiries also have to mediate between expectations and outcomes, turn their fact-finding 
potential into evidence of impact on the decision-making process, which is inherently linked to 
the reception of the findings. In almost all cases, inquiries disclose their conclusions in the form 
of a non-binding report, which is written on the basis of a consensus between the different 
members of the inquiry but has no direct legal effect. Internal disagreements may affect the 
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findings: they can alter or dilute the identified problems and suggested solutions. Compromise or 
minatory views may ensue. Since inquiries have no coercive powers, there are no guarantees of 
political resolution after the report has been published. This is similar for domestic inquiries and 
examples at the League of Nations, although at the international level there are cases where an 
investigation is part of an arbitration ruling.76 In general, however, inquiry is not meant to act like 
a court, it does not decide on binding measures nor does it render a judgment in the report. For 
these, inquiries are entirely dependent on the political will of the instituting authorities. 
The limitations of implementation of inquiry’s findings are most evident with regard to the public 
reception of an inquiry report: expectations are high, because of the possible condemnation of 
government policy and the apportion of blame. However, inquiries also risk confirming the 
government’s actions. While they collect evidence and may give clarity over decision-making, 
they refrain from presenting the public with a clear verdict or any attribution of guilt. Despite 
inquiries’ limited role as fact-finding bodies, hopes are raised that their reports will offer some 
form of justice and retribution, especially when it concerns delicate matters or in the aftermath 
of state failure. The Chilcot inquiry on the invasion of Iraq is a clear example of an investigation 
that created disparate expectations, from government responsibility to the question of war 
crimes. The Iraq inquiry, however, only investigated the case for war (including its legal basis), 
its preparation and planning, and abstained from any judgment of individual action.77 
In the past, domestic inquiries have created a set of expectations which led to major disparities 
in reception of the report. The perennial difficulty to meet these expectations may be due to 
improper communication about the assignment, the inquiry process and the possible outcomes. 
Nevertheless, there is a more general question of evaluation when addressing inquiry 
commissions: despite an extensive number of precedents and the growth of legal guidance, 
scholars rarely agree about common standards to evaluate the work and results of inquiries. 
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Should standards be narrow, to the extent they only include measurable criteria, or should they 
seek to address the wider importance of an investigation? Is it sufficient to evaluate the quality of 
the work, both the investigative methods as the results, or does the value of an inquiry revolve 
rather around the impact it produces on the decision-making process and the incentive provided 
for reform? In one example, Lauriat suggests that the quality of the terms of reference, the 
suitability of its members, the effectiveness of procedures, the rigour of data collection and the 
impact of a commission are possible angles to evaluate an inquiry.78  
This thesis considers that the criteria suggested by Lauriat may fail to address other important 
questions: what motivated the establishment of an inquiry, how was its independence and 
impartiality guaranteed, and what transformative capacity did the produced knowledge have on 
politics and society? These questions touch upon the institutional position and roles assigned to 
inquiry, conditioned by historical factors – namely its relationship with the state, the structure of 
power and representation of interests. League inquiries were confronted with similar issues of 
evaluation, concerning the quality of the investigative reports and the impact they had on the 
decision-making process. As highlighted in the introduction and developed in the case study 
chapters, the imperial internationalist framework will aid to explain under what circumstances 
inquiry was organised, how questions of independence and impartiality were addressed and to 
what extent the League inquiry technique could live up to its potential to have a discernible 
influence on the decision-making process of the League’s political bodies. 
Consideration should also be given to the time perspective inherent to inquiries. Domestic 
inquiries are different from truth and reconciliation commission because of a temporal 
dimension. In recent decades, ex post facto investigations have appeared in the context of regime 
changes and crimes against individuals and groups of people. In the case of victims and 
unresolved crimes, there is a perceived need for a commission to decide on a historical truth that 
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may help a process of national reconciliation.79 In contrast, inquiry commissions in their original 
form are created to investigate ongoing, sometimes urgent issues. In such cases, a sense of 
temporal detachment is not available, and questions of memory are not addressed. The purpose 
of inquiry is to expose continued failure and to inform and encourage better decision-making. 
While inquiry brings immediacy and urgency to the assignment, it can also render a commission’s 
work sensitive if it risks a crisis of government or a diplomatic rupture at the international level.80 
Finally, arguably the most striking characteristic of domestic inquiries is the fact that a great 
number of them have been established in the past and hitherto continue to be created to address 
societal problems. While there is hardly unison on a fixed approach to research the inquiry 
phenomenon, most if not all scholars seem to agree on the durability of the use of investigations 
by states.81 Conventional causes cited are linked to the contribution they make to policy 
processes, outcomes and societal demands but this sits uneasily with the many tensions and 
shortcomings identified in the same scholarship. A similar observation about inquiry’s ubiquity 
can be made about the international organisations, the UN in particular, which has continuously 
relied on fact-finding missions to bring violations of international humanitarian law to 
attention.82 Hence, this reinforces the question: why are inquiries an often-used technique, at the 
domestic level and replicated in the international realm, despite their somewhat opaque 
functioning and shortcomings in meeting the public’s expectations? Tension regarding their 
independence, ephemeral nature and limited impact have not hindered their ubiquitous use by 
political agents. 
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On the one hand, it appears their ubiquity is rooted in the transformative potential they offered 
to state authorities to modernise, increase transparency and manifest executive action to address 
problems and societal failings – in theory, inquiry held the prospect of greater scrutiny and 
interaction between the public and its representative bodies. However, on the contrary, several 
of the tensions identified in the inquiry technique perhaps point towards a more salient reason 
for its continued existence: namely the fact that inquiry presented a convenient excuse to 
authorities not to address issues of administration in a direct manner. Inquiry was a means for 
the state to postpone decision-making: to create the impression of addressing public concerns, 
without having to take immediate action. By outsourcing the matter to an independent body, 
there was no immediate pressure to find an agreement or provide a list of solutions. 
Following this line of interpretation, it becomes evident why it was beneficial for state authorities, 
especially in the early twentieth century, to have extensive control over the remit of an 
investigative process (through the terms of reference and the appointment of its members) but 
not to spell out clear procedures and fact-finding methods, nor to equip its commissions with any 
strong mechanisms of enforcement.83 Governments could enjoy the advantage of additional time, 
without being burdened with any of inquiry’s modalities nor having to accept its conclusions. 
Hence, the flexibility as a technique was both a blessing and a curse, as it rendered inquiry a 
popular tool but kept it closely knit to the upper echelons of power. Since then, both the guidelines 
and transparency of investigative bodies has been improved, to address some of these past 
failings but also to shift responsibility back to the authorities.84 
Inquiry at the League of Nations was confronted with a similar pattern of transformative potential 
and structural tensions that inhibited it from being a fully independent and strong mechanism to 
address inter-state dispute and failings of an international nature. In the choice of the subject of 
inquiry, the unwritten procedures and the limited input on the decision-making process, the 
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architects of the League’s inquiry technique may have equally perceived the same benefits as their 
state counterparts – the appearance of greater objectivity and rational inquiry but in practice not 
adequately supported to perform a detailed investigation. Before exploring this in more detail, 
however, other institutional dynamics are to be considered. From the international courts, a 
different type of inquiry came to be established – one of importance to both international law and 
world politics. 
Inquiry and international law 
The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 generated the first attempt to insert the idea of an inquiry 
commission at the international level. Older, sporadic examples of international inquiry are 
mentioned in the context of Latin America, namely the treaties concluded between states in the 
aftermath of the break-up of the Spanish Empire.85 However, these treaties between American 
states only refer directly to reconciliation and mediation in relation to territorial demarcation 
and disputes.86 Reconciliation and inquiry are both concerned with questions of fact, rather than 
questions of law: while they are considered as alternatives to (court) arbitration in the case of 
interstate disputes, they represent two different methods at resolving a disputed issue of fact. 
Although the American treaties are significant in their own terms, it is likelier that the inspiration 
for international inquiry has come from domestic precedents. In fact, at the Peace Conference it 
was the Russian delegation that suggested to replace national inquiry commissions by an 
international, impartial body as to avoid future conflicts over the interpretation of evidence.87  
Hence, The Hague Convention of 1899 is the first that clearly sets out inquiry’s role as a system 
to settle disputes between states: the third part of the Convention, covering Articles 9 to 14, is 
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dedicated solely to the organisation of an investigatory body ‘to facilitate a solution of these 
disputes by elucidating the facts by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation.’88 The 
investigation was restricted to international disputes over questions of fact that involved ‘neither 
honour nor vital interests’, this to avoid the use of an inquiry commission to justify foreign 
intervention. For this mechanism, The Hague Convention rightly may be called ‘the genesis of 
international commissions of inquiry as a new construct of dispute settlement.’89  
The Convention’s provisions were applied for the first time after the Dogger Bank Incident of 
1904, which took place during the war between Russia and Japan. An international commission 
of inquiry was established in Paris to investigate whether the Russian fleet’s use of fire upon 
British vessels – supposedly mistaken for attacking Japanese torpedo boats – comprised a 
legitimate act of defence. The commission ruled after an investigation of the facts that the 
responsibility for the action had to be assigned to Russia – it was instructed to pay compensation 
for the victims. The Dogger Bank inquiry was significant because it served as an exemplary case 
of inquiry, even though in practice it combined the investigation with arbitration, as the 
commission expressed its opinion about the responsibility of the actions.90  
The second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 further developed inquiry as a dispute mechanism, 
with elaborations on the organisation and powers assigned to the commissions: the number of 
articles expanded from five to twenty-seven. The Dogger Bank incident had shown a degree of 
overlap with the role of an arbitration court, which required clarification. Although inquiry kept 
a number of institutional similarities with arbitration, for instance commission members were 
chosen in a similar manner, the 1907 Hague Convention clearly distinguished the inquiry 
technique from its alternatives (i.e. negotiation, arbitration and reconciliation). It specified that 
inquiry commissions would present a statement of facts and could not act as an arbitral ward. In 
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addition, the report was not binding upon the concerned states, although the commission was 
obliged to make its report public.91  
Attempts to downplay the legal dimension of inquiry did create some tensions in practice, as case 
study material after 1907 has revealed. In the years and decades following the Convention, there 
were four more inquiries92: in some of these, the commission went beyond its fact-finding 
mandate and presented legal conclusions regarding the investigated facts. Likewise, in the 
example of the Tiger inquiry, a naval navigation dispute between Spain and Germany, the 
outcome was accepted as binding – contrary to what the Convention had prescribed. The case 
study material confirms that in effect inquiry served as a precursor (or in tandem) with 
arbitration. To add to the confusion, The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration administered 
and supported the majority of these fact-finding inquiries (through what is known as ‘Optional 
Rules for Fact-Finding Commissions of Inquiry’). As van den Herik rightfully has argued, despite 
its autonomous statute ‘inquiry thus formed an inseparable element of the arbitration 
procedure’.93 
Outside of the field of international law, the significance of The Hague Conferences and its court 
system for the institutionalisation of international politics tends to be underestimated.94 It 
created a permanent machinery in the arbitration of disputes but also shaped much of the 
discussion about peace and disarmament in the next decades and laid the groundwork for future 
international courts. It was also significant for inquiry: The Hague’s investigatory commissions 
exhibited a close alignment with the format and rationale of a judicial proceeding. This 
encroachment of the legal sphere onto fact-finding bodies has been the subject of intense 
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scholarly debate: whereas Ralston saw the importance of inquiry to act as a ‘safety valve’ and give 
states time to regain composure and settle a dispute, others felt the quasi-arbitral function was 
inherently problematic.95 Different from its domestic counterpart, inquiry in an international 
context was clearly intended to defuse situations that could escalate into inter-state hostilities. 
For Politis, this made it a ‘parasite institution’ that had the semblance of independence but 
effectively meant arbitration with a higher degree of flexibility.96 According to Politis, this was 
due to the weaknesses present in other procedures; however, by aligning itself with judicial 
means and court proceedings, inquiry risked succumbing to similar problems that had plagued 
arbitration and mediation, namely limited flexibility and questions of independence.97 
Since the disputing parties could nominate part of the commissioners, complete neutrality was 
never a guarantee: political loyalties risked determining the outcome when an inquiry 
commission had to vote by majority for any decision.98 Moreover, as Tanaka has noted, there was 
no certainty that the outcome of an inquiry commission would be accepted by the disputing 
parties and thus could lead to resolution.99 Also, while the fact-finding and report-writing process 
may have acted as a safety valve, it slowed down the proceedings and the prospect of a swift 
agreement. Merrills concluded that inquiry’s contradictory tendencies result in a ‘worthwhile yet 
curiously ambivalent record’, in his view because states were less interested in dispute settlement 
than winning the argument.100 
Even though The Hague’s court system only produced a few cases of inquiry commissions, all of 
them on the narrow subject of incidents at sea, it set a direct institutional precedent for future 
international organisations. The Hague Conventions created a sense of familiarity with the use of 
inquiry as a mechanism to settle disputes in international politics. During the twentieth century, 
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many other regional and international organisations as well as specialised agencies would 
implement a form of inquiry procedure, loosely informed by The Hague’s system.101 Also non-
governmental organisations engaged with the idea of inquiry commissions, such as the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace that launched an investigation into the causes and conduct 
of the Balkan wars.102 However, the picture for international inquiry remains incomplete: apart 
from domestic precedents and the Peace Conferences, there was another development at the 
international level that constituted a relevant part to the League’s future use of inquiry: bilateral 
and multilateral arbitration treaties that relied upon inquiry as a permanent dispute-resolution 
mechanism.  
Across the Atlantic, the American states had continued with their own experiments of arbitration 
agreements and mixed commissions, to settle disputes in the Western hemisphere and also with 
other countries.103 This led to institutional developments such as the Central American Court of 
Justice concluded between seven American states in 1907. Of relevance to the history of inquiry, 
however, was the role played by the future President Howard Taft. The Taft presidency was 
instrumental in the negotiation of a set of arbitration agreements between 1909 and 1913 that 
would spur new ideas for international inquiry. Legal scholars, such as Van den Herik, have 
assumed that the Taft arbitration agreements of 1911 and the later Bryan treaties of 1913 were 
built upon The Hague’s blueprint, however, this view overlooks an evolution of the inquiry 
mechanism that took place in the United States (US).104  
William Howard Taft had a legal career as lawyer, judge and solicitor general before he was 
elected President in 1908. He was a strong believer in the potential of international law and the 
settlement of disputes through arbitration. Before the first Hague Peace Conference, Taft was part 
of a committee for American Conference on International Arbitration that was instructed with 
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the creation and promotion of a permanent system of arbitration between the US and Great 
Britain.105 The early twentieth century, during the Theodore Roosevelt presidency, would see 
several attempts at negotiating bilateral arbitration treaties between the US and third countries. 
The Taft presidency, however, introduced a set of new ideas for the role of inquiry in the 
negotiation for arbitration agreements which palpably departed from The Hague’s pre-existing 
model. In case there was a disagreement between parties over the justiciability (i.e. capable of 
being decided by legal principles) of a dispute, a joint high commission of inquiry would be 
established to investigate it.  
The initially proposed treaties (known as the Knox Arbitration Treaties) expanded the scope of 
investigation to all types of inter-state disputes, including those that touched upon vital national 
interests (The Hague Conventions had left these out). The inquiry mechanism included the 
possibility to find facts but also make recommendations to the disputing parties. Finally, an 
inquiry would be able to force referral to arbitration upon the parties.106 Another set of treaties 
(known as the Bryan Treaties, which were negotiated under the later Woodrow Wilson 
presidency) went further in some regards: although the treaties dropped the power of 
recommendation, they contained the suggestion to create permanent investigatory bodies to 
inquire into an unrestricted subject matter of inter-state disputes.107 Wilson would later become 
one of the architects of the League, and although it is unclear to what extent the Bryan treaties 
inspired the League’s use of inquiry as technique, it foreshadows the belief in the rational 
potential of fact-finding to transform politics. 
At the time of the Bryan negotiations, in 1913, a sense of great expectations prevailed for the 
potential held by inquiry commissions in the settlement of disputes. Fact-finding was believed to 
be the missing step (or ‘brake’), that would stop the immediate descent from peace into war. 
Although the possibility of conflict was not excluded, it would be based on the knowledge of what 
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was disputed, as one contemporary described while using a medical analogy: ‘the commission of 
inquiry may be held similar to the friendly consultation of the family physician, who tells the 
patient the facts in his case and leaves it to his good judgment whether or not he will call in the 
specialists.’108 In the importance attached to facts in order to improve the conduct of international 
politics arguably lies a similar frame of thinking that would also inspire the League’s agenda to 
put inter-state affairs on a more rational footing. Both the Knox and Bryan Treaties were never 
tested in practice: in the case of Knox the US Senate found the wide scope of the treaties to be 
unacceptable, for the Bryan treaties it was the lack of implementation after agreement that sealed 
their fate. However, several of the legal innovations had an influence on other arbitration treaties 
concluded in this period, between third countries, although there is no case material to 
substantiate how the treaties may have worked in practice.109 
The First World War meant a temporary setback for the many legal and institutional 
developments with regard to dispute settlement that had developed in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. After the war, the establishment of the League of Nations would present itself 
with another opportunity to (re)imagine instruments for the better conduct between states and 
the coordination of cross-border disputes. For now, it is useful to take stock of the developments 
relevant to inquiry as an institution and mechanism in domestic and international settings.  
By the early twentieth century, governments and publics had grown familiar with the notion of 
inquiry, resulting from their regular appearance to investigate domestic issues and their use to 
elucidate the facts in high-profile incidents between states. Inquiries extended their remit with 
time: they opened up to virtually all matters of public concern within a domestic context. At the 
international level, after initial hesitation and a focus on disputes that involved neither honour 
nor vital interests, inquiries were adapted to address all types of incidents and causes for 
diplomatic frictions between states. Its potential for success was deemed to originate from its 
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apparent rational approach to international politics: to settle matters of war and peace strictly on 
the basis of facts. 
However, the reality of inquiries proved to be more complicated than originally anticipated in 
those agreements that described their function as well as the commentaries lauding their bright 
prospects. Inquiry was not a legal device, yet it had a close relationship with the judicial branch 
of government or the international court system. Especially with international disputes, there 
was a strong temptation to link inquiry to existing procedures for arbitration. Alternatively, it was 
perceived as a catch-all mechanism to overcome deficiencies in other tested methods (such as 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration). The still developing inquiry technique risked losing its 
own identity in the institutionalisation of dispute settlement. 
Tensions were exhibited in the way its nominally independent and ad hoc role was described but 
also in the appointment of commissioners and the granting of specific powers to make 
recommendations or referral cases to other bodies. By the time the League of Nations was 
established, there were different ‘models’ of inquiry to choose from, each with precedents, 
institutional overlaps, unresolved questions of remit and autonomy in practice. Rather than 
follow or copy a prescribed model, the League encouraged its own approach to the investigation 
of international issues but would be confronted with similar challenges and tensions that had 
plagued inquiry’s precedents. 
Inquiry and the League of Nations 
Between 1921 and 1935 the League organised nine110 inquiry commissions to investigate an issue 
of international concern and report back to the organisation. Although a couple of League 
inquiries received considerable press exposure, they take up less space and attention in 
international law than the precedents set by The Hague’s court system. Van den Herik only 
mentions the ‘territorial’ commissions that were organised as fact-finding missions for border 
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disputes, while Henderson’s general overview of international inquiry commissions in 
contemporary times ignores the League precedents.111  
Within the field of international law, the League’s inquiry commissions have often been side-lined 
for their apparent departure from The Hague’s model. These inquiries took on larger issues of 
fact with major political dimensions – rarely isolated incidents that could be settled by a court. 
Moreover, the League commissions were in most occasions not restricted to pure fact-finding 
missions and could engage with conciliation and the formulation of recommendations, if these 
were deemed appropriate by the authorising League organ. For Merrills, this created a 
‘diversionary effect’ away from pure fact-finding and inquiry.112  
Issue Place Time 
Border delimitation Albania 1921-22 
Territorial Mosul 1924-25 
Women trafficking 30 countries 1924-26 
Opium* Persia 1925-26 
Border incident Greece-Bulgaria 1925-26 
Opium East Asia 1928-30 
Forced labour* Liberia 1929-30 
Territorial* Manchuria 1931-32 
Territorial* Chaco Boreal 1934-35 
Table 1: International inquiries organised by the League of Nations – cases studies marked with*113 
Leagues scholars have fixated on the outcomes of inquiries, rather than practices and meanings 
attached to fact-finding at the international level. The limited scholarship on the League’s use of 
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inquiry suggests it has not been identified as a coherent technique in the past – due to a lack of 
legal and organisational blueprint. 
The Covenant of the League of Nations made mention only twice of the word inquiry, in the 
context of a dispute that could arise between states, without any specification how to organise an 
investigation.115 Inquiry may have been a familiar concept by then and it is possible that the 
authors of the Covenant had The Hague Convention of 1907 in mind when they drafted the 
articles on the prevention of international disputes.116 Nevertheless, none of the main League 
bodies (Council, Assembly, Secretariat) settled on a blueprint as to how these investigatory 
bodies could operate in practice. Was inquiry perceived as sufficiently self-explanatory?  
The archival collections held in Geneva and the official journal of the organisation have left no 
trace of procedural matters and criteria set for the establishment and functioning of inquiry 
commissions. In a procedural sense, an early mention of inquiries occurs in a note from 1921: the 
Board of Directors realised that the League’s myriad commissions rapidly were becoming ‘the 
most important phases’ of organisational activity, insofar as they permitted continuity of work 
between the more sporadic Council and Assembly meetings. The note’s author, Frank Walters, 
felt that all these commissions, from ad hoc inquiries to permanent commissions, each needed ‘a 
real personality and life of its own’.117 Walters thought it welcome to have the Assembly look into 
ways to address the problem but also suggested minor changes in procedural practice, with 
regard to regular communication and the organisation of meetings. From the source material 
there is little indication that after the circulation of the note there was a sustained discussion 
about inquiry commissions. Rather, the League’s inquiry technique appears to have been 
                                                             
115 Articles 12 and 17 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. In the case of art. 17 the wording is 
ambiguous with regard to powers, practices and outcomes: ‘Upon such invitation being given the Council 
shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action 
as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.’ From: “The Covenant of the League of 
Nations,” Avalon Project, accessed 14 April 2017, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp. 
116 Mary Florence Wilson, The Origins of the League Covenant: Documentary History of Its Drafting 
(London: Leonard and Virginia Woolf, 1928), 196. Charles Howard Ellis, The Origin, Structure & Working 
of the League of Nations (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928), 61. 
117 All quotes from: League of Nations Commissions: Note discussing the methods by which the Secretariat 
may assist these commissions, May 1921, 40-12894-12894, R1584, LONA. 
41 
 
developed through individual cases of a commission being organised. However, this was not 
common practice at the international level.118 
The manifest absence of detail on inquiry in the League’s legal statutes and procedural documents 
is puzzling if one considers that one of its agencies, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
had separate articles on inquiry in its constitution right from its establishment. Agreed as part of 
the 1919 Peace Treaty, the ILO’s provisions detailed that an inquiry commission could be 
organised to confirm whether ratified conventions are being observed by their members.119 
Equally, the document specified the appointment, information-gathering and reporting processes 
as well as institutional oversight and referral to the Permanent Court of International Justice.120 
The ILO’s inquiry mechanism was specific in the sense that it directly referred to any conventions 
agreed between members and would act as a verification tool for observance – the League’s 
intentions for inquiry would turn out to be broader in scope. Although the ILO was made part of 
the League’s organisational structure, it acted with a degree of autonomy and organised its own 
fact-finding missions.121 None of the League inquiries made concrete reference to the ILO’s 
statutes, suggesting there was little direct overlap between the respective models of inquiry. 
Contrary to the ILO, the League organised a number of high profile inquiries in the context of 
inter-state disputes that received public attention. The League’s unspecified procedures to 
conduct investigations represent an anomaly that is worthy of scrutiny: similar to domestic 
inquiries, this seems to have been instilled by a desire to keep inquiry as flexible and ad hoc as 
possible. Why may this have been the case? Overall, the major powers that negotiated the 
League’s Covenant during the Peace Conference were adamant to keep it a ‘disappointingly short 
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and vague document’.122 They instructed the first Secretary-General and the main League bodies 
to flesh out most of the procedural details once the organisation was set up. For instance, the 
founding document had little to say about staff recruitment and therefore gave a great deal of 
discretion to Eric Drummond and his small group of directors to determine criteria for 
recruitment and shape the Secretariat in their own vision.123 All of this suggests that inquiry’s 
procedural anomaly was deliberate: to keep the technique as flexible as possible, in order to give 
maximum autonomy when an issue would arise, and a response was required. In institutional 
terms, this meant that the League’s Council and Assembly could spell out specific guidelines for 
each inquiry: their involvement increased their authority over each matter, allowed for a tailor-
made approach to the issue, but also extended the deliberation process and establishment of a 
commission.124 In practice, negotiations that preceded the establishment of an inquiry, took place 
in small, private gatherings, received little public scrutiny and were therefore easily subjected to 
diplomatic interests and power politics.125 
When considering the case for omission, it is feasible to assume that during the League’s 
formative years the specific procedural issues of inquiry may have been overlooked among other 
pressing subjects. In the line with its international precedents, incidents often had a spontaneous 
nature which left little time to come up with carefully crafted guidelines. There were no easily 
available criteria to decide on what was a sufficiently international issue to be investigated or 
whether all countries could be subjected to the same degree of scrutiny. Yet, the absence of 
detailed guidelines was never rectified throughout the years. As the case studies reveal, the 
inquiry commission became a ‘well-established League technique’ and yet there was no review 
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process or identification of best practices that would reinforce a future inquiry.126 Each 
commission remained remarkably ad hoc in character, with only brief allusions to precedents set 
in the past. 
The absence of shared procedures touches upon the question of coherence. In a formal sense, the 
League inquiries followed similar patterns regarding the terms of reference, an international 
composition of commissioners, a fact-finding basis to the inquiry and with a report to describe 
the outcome of the investigation. Overall, the main League bodies provided the institutional 
continuity and support required when inquiries completed their assignments. Nevertheless, each 
inquiry had its own accentuations: the selection of inquiry members could follow different 
procedures and selection criteria, depending on who was instructed to take the lead. In some 
instances, the appointment process occurred outside of the League, when the Council President 
took the initiative or when countries discussed composition in a bilateral manner.127 
The formal coherence did not always extend to the ground, when commissioners could use varied 
means of collecting evidence, ranging from hearings and witness statements (Liberia) to direct 
negotiations with political actors (Chaco). This was the result of a large degree of autonomy 
awarded to the League’s Council and Assembly to determine the most suitable mandate: in the 
Chaco dispute, the commissioners were given a fact-finding task combined with the express 
desire to find a way to end hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay. The topic of the inquiry and 
the composition of the team could also have an impact on the style of the report, which ranged 
from technical fact-finding (Persia) to a form of socio-political narrative (Manchuria). However, 
all inquiries dedicated time to the historical background of their subject and they never refrained 
from providing a set of suggestions and recommendations. Finally, there was a commonality 
among League inquiries because all of them had to achieve compromise among a diverse group 
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of individuals: reports were composite documents that either reflected a consensus or the lowest 
common denominator of agreement.  
The overview of League inquiries (Table 1) shows how the organisation gradually broadened its 
investigatory scope, from minor incidents to issues of major international concern, thereby 
departing from the thematic coherence that characterised international inquiries into inter-state 
disputes under the auspices of The Hague court. As a result, the League’s use of inquiry resembled 
more the inquiries organised in a domestic context, with a broad spectrum of issues and a high 
degree of flexibility, than any judicial precedents set at the international level. Matters of fact 
constituted the basis for all inquiries, however, domestic examples were geared more towards 
matters of law and policy reform, which rhymed with the League’s emphasis on the implantation 
of international law and the identification of necessary reforms in the investigative reports.128 
League inquiries touched upon many international legal conventions and policy issues related to 
trade, agricultural cultivation, social relations and the coercive exploitation of people. The 
League’s experimentation with international inquiry roughly corresponded with the moment 
when the United Kingdom started to regulate the activities of its investigatory bodies through the 
Tribunals of Inquiry Act (1921), hence the lack of standardised procedures was not a complete 
anomaly.129 
The issues addressed by the League’s inquiries often went beyond the technicalities of border 
delimitation and took on a politically sensitive character because they touched upon the balance 
of power or vital economic interest of League member states. The thesis suggests that the 
inquiry’s engrained flexibility was intentional because it favoured many of the larger member 
states, particularly the European powers: by way of their political weight and extensive 
diplomatic networks, they dominated the League’s institutions and were therefore decisive in all 
decisions to establish an inquiry commission. Their benefit from a flexible technique is reflected 
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in the fact that inquiry was often applied to countries and regions of the world that were 
considered as undeveloped or not having achieved a civilised status yet. The general picture that 
emerges from the League’s inquiries is of a technique that scrutinises countries that failed to 
respect the unwritten norms and rules of international society, because of illegal trade, conflict 
or a public scandal. Rarely were European imperial powers directly implicated, although many of 
the investigated issues touched upon their vital economic (and to some extent colonial) interests. 
The imperial internationalist context is one reason to question the supposed incoherence of the 
League’s inquiry technique, beyond a degree of commonality identified in the previous 
paragraphs. Following Merrills, their importance of inquiry may lie elsewhere, as form and status 
within the organisation are subordinate to their function and value.130 If their function and value 
were built around the use of investigative modalities to preserve an international civilised society 
and to underpin imperial hierarchies within a new geopolitical landscape, this would be of greater 
importance than their thematic discrepancies. Inquiries were employed to deescalate crises, raise 
pressure on countries that risked stepping out of line or, alternatively, their creation permitted 
League members additional time to bring forward a diplomatic response to a severe international 
crisis.  
The investigative bodies were situated within an organisation created in the aftermath of the First 
World War and the Paris Peace Conference and destined to condition and preserve the status quo 
of the pre-existing international order.131 The inter-war political landscape comprised a world of 
hierarchies, of large and small states, empires and colonial dependencies, with significant 
discrepancies in economic and military power, where civilisational standing mattered to the 
international society.132 Inquiry was a mechanism deployed in parallel to others, such as minority 
rights and mandates regimes, to deal with and maintain past legacies and the existing status 
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quo.133 This context can be extended to modes of knowledge production, scientific expertise, 
rational norms and civilisational claims, part of the League’s institutional fabric and the inter-war 
socio-political lifeworld. In short, inquiries were not operating in an organisational and historical 
void: they were composite bodies that interacted with people, ideas, organisms, states and 
communities of the period, but also mediated between levels and power relations. 
The previous sections have highlighted the popularity and flexibility of inquiry as a technique, 
particularly at the domestic level. Although the form and dispute-related precedents at the 
international level go some way to explain how the League’s use of investigations would be 
embedded in its organisational structure, overall, domestic examples appear to be a more 
prevalent inspiration – due to their thematic variety, ad hoc rules and nominal independence 
from a political authority. The scholarship on domestic inquiries has highlighted how inquiries 
could benefit the state because it offered an escape from direct action and could help to preserve 
the status quo through the voice of appointed experts – characteristics which are of relevance to 
the League examples. The next section will explore in more detail the coherence in purpose and 
practice of League inquiry, which is connected to the institutional dynamics and imperial 
internationalist context in which commissions operated. The aim is to frame the phenomenon in 
analytical terms, to demonstrate how inquiry provides a view on the relationship between 
knowledge and international politics in the inter-war period. 
The purpose and value of League inquiries 
Of the nine international inquiry commissions organised by the League of Nations, four are 
chosen as case studies to reflect upon the purpose of the investigative technique within the realm 
of inter-war international politics. As explained before, the case study chapters were selected to 
test to which extent there is a coherent inquiry technique palpable within the institutional fabric 
of the organisation and what this presence reveals about the League’s wider aspiration to 
transform international politics in a context of imperial hierarchies and power struggles. The 
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cases on opium in Persia, forced labour in Liberia, the Sino-Japanese dispute over Manchuria and 
the Chaco conflict offer sufficient variety in terms of geography, temporality and theme to test 
this notion.  
By 1925, when the opium inquiry was being prepared, League officials and representatives had a 
clearer understanding of what inquiry comprised and there was a growing awareness of 
institutional precedents set in the first years of its existence: commissioners in their personal 
documents make the occasional reference to previous League inquiries, for instance the Mosul 
Commission which investigated the rivalling claims over the city; equally, their correspondence 
with the Secretariat marks a desire to learn about the formatting standards of the inquiry 
report.134 Although a few of the inquiries directly touched upon European politics, the overview 
confirms a clear tendency for investigative modalities to be used in a non-European context – 
hence the avoidance of a Eurocentric focus in the case study selection. 
The previous discussion about the main characteristics of domestic and international inquiries 
has provided a range of terminology and concepts to frame the League’s approach to fact-finding 
missions in international politics. It has also given examples of relevant precedents, involving the 
upper echelons of power in relation to inquiry (from monarchs in the early-modern period to 
colonial administrations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) and the semi-judicial format 
in which fact-finding was embedded in international law and its corresponding institutions. To 
establish a direct link between inquiry and the League’s historical context, as a framework for the 
thesis, the next paragraphs address the technique’s purpose within the organisation and its socio-
political environment. Finally, the chapter develops into a discussion of the empirical evidence 
that is tied to institutional, contextual and agential-related factors, in support of the imperial 
internationalist argument set out in the introduction. 
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The overall image of the League of Nations that appears from its principles and spheres of 
activities, and to some degree was also reproduced in the self-image, is one of the League as peace 
organisation, but linked with the notion of ‘New Diplomacy’ that arose during and after the First 
World War. The argument goes that ‘New Diplomacy’ was not just a set of aspirations with regard 
to political principles (such as self-determination), the engagement of public opinion, but also a 
grander ideal to rationalise of the conduct of international politics, through impartial fact-finding, 
dispassionate decision-making and ‘the organised moral force of men throughout the world’.135 
The language of the ‘League experiment’, with its legal principles, scientific terminology and 
formal adherence to ‘technical work’, would permeate all layers of the organisation; equally, it 
would come to dominate the way in which contemporaries and to some extent successive 
generations would view the aspirational climate of internationalism and organised 
universalism.136  
The purpose and value of inquiry, as part of the ‘League experiment’ and ‘New Diplomacy’, was 
characterised by repeated references to the notion of ‘impartiality’, whether in the context of the 
appointments or the overall work of inquiry.137 For instance, League Secretary-General Eric 
Drummond was adamant that an inquiry’s ‘members and staff should be known to be impartial’, 
which for the appointment process meant, ‘to select persons not only distinguished for their 
expert knowledge but recognised as having unbiased judgment.’138 There were similar 
expressions of faith in the impartial value of international inquiry during the public sessions of 
the Council: at the outbreak of the Manchurian crisis at the end of 1931, the Spanish 
representative Salvador de Madariaga stressed that inquiries were ‘the surest guarantee we have 
today that difficulties will be settled in the fairest manner and in the interest of peace. A 
                                                             
135 J. D. Armstrong, The Rise of the International Organisation: A Short History (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1982), 9. 
136 Allan, Scientific Cosmology and International Orders, 187. 
137 This was in spite of the rigorous procedures that had been developed to ensure impartiality. Reference 
to impartiality was often lip service before and after an investigation. See for example the Chaco 
Commission being thanked for its ‘energy, impartiality and wisdom’: Chaco Dispute: Committee of Three 
Proceedings, 20 January 1934, 1-343-9062, R3616, LONA. 
138 Letter from the Secretary-General to Frederic A. Delano, 23 December 1925, 12A-45255-46885, R801, 
LONA. 
49 
 
Commission provides guarantees of knowledge and impartiality.’139 In addition, French Foreign 
Minister Aristide Briand gave arguably the best expression of what purpose an inquiry could 
serve to the League of Nations. In 1932, during a Council session on the Sino-Japanese dispute 
over Manchuria, as Council President he underlined ‘the importance to the League of obtaining 
information by its own methods, by methods for whose accuracy it can vouch’.140 The testimony 
of the League’s approach to inquiry -seen through the eyes of some of its interlocutors and agents 
– speaks mostly of principles and aspiration, despite the bleak outlook of events on the ground. 
They are striking because they either reveal a strong sense of rhetoric about the League 
experiment or a perhaps naïve belief in the solely technical means to address a major crisis of 
international politics. 
In practice, the League’s inquiries could look very different from the aspirations political leaders 
referred to. When it concerned first-hand information, commissioners were strongly reliant on 
European help on the ground, coming from embassies, associations and large corporations, but 
also dependent on translators to reach out to the local populations.141 With regard to the 
composition of the commission, it was believed that a multinational composition would be 
sufficient to obtain greater impartiality; in practice, it often meant a balance between diplomatic 
interests, with the majority of commissioners coming from European countries (and imperial 
powers).142 The necessity for relevant expertise was identified as choosing ‘men of stature’ with 
long careers in politics, the military or sometimes a professional background on a relevant 
(technical issue), to take a disinterested view in the investigation.143 Women were never 
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Normative Statehood.” The American Historical Review 115, no. 4 (October 2010): 982. 
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considered for such a role and commissioners often lacked specific knowledge about the 
geographical region they would stay and investigate an issue. 
Although fact-finding was the main purpose and some commissioners aspired to a form of truth 
seeking, in practice an inquiry could also interpret its assignment as one of diplomacy – to reduce 
hostilities and reconcile views, thereby blurring the original purpose of fact-finding. In theory, 
the report had to reflect the information gathered on the ground but could touch upon wider 
issues the commission chose to address – such as the necessary reforms a country had to take to 
develop itself as a more civilised state. Nevertheless, the highly anticipated report could result in 
very little action being undertaken on the basis of the facts encountered by the commission – to 
the frustration of its members, who would express their disappointment with the League in the 
years after the inquiry. Therefore, the impact of an inquiry could be wildly varying, from cabinet 
changes and new legislation in some countries, to the absence of any international action against 
military hostilities and territorial expansion in other regions.144 
A gap between the potential and practice of conducting international affairs through technocratic 
means was not an uncommon phenomenon in Geneva. A source of continued tension in the inter-
war period was that ideas to revamp international relations and introduce rational means clashed 
with engrained forms of diplomacy, prevailing hierarchies and existing practices and beliefs. For 
both contemporaries and scholars, the League suffered from a ‘clash between aspirations and 
reality’ in the application of its lofty principles into the diplomatic practice of dispute settlement, 
disarmament, minority questions, territorial mandates and the technical cooperation between 
member states.145 Inquiry, as the aspiration to speak truth to power by means of fact-finding, 
faced numerous obstacles due to the way in which League investigations were organised and the 
context in which they operated.  
                                                             
144 These observations are taken from the four case study chapters. 
145 Alan Sharp. “The New Diplomacy and the New Europe, 1916–1922.” In The Oxford Handbook of 
European History, 1914-1945, ed. Nicholas Doumanis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 119. 
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Investigations neither had the legal mechanisms nor the clear political support to enforce their 
findings. Moreover, commissioners were individuals who in most cases had lived through the pre-
war era, that was distinguished by strict social and moral codes, a condescending view on other 
cultures and races, meshed with a belief in progress that saw no contradiction between liberalism 
and empire.146 Commissioners figured in a world of socio-political hierarchies, with power 
asymmetries that structured the foreign policies of large and small states, legally codified and 
embedded in an international society that was constructed around a notion of a civilisational 
standard.147 The agents of ‘New Diplomacy’ within the League aspired to produce impartial 
knowledge but were often blind to the tense coexistence between expertise and the exercise of 
power, or put differently: the role of ideology in epistemic practices.148  
Hence, the League’s aspirational agenda to remake the conduct of international politics through 
scientific advances, objective fact-finding and dispassionate decision-making, which was the 
subject of myriad declarative statements, should be set against a reality of diplomatic interests, 
imperial competition and ideological struggles. The disparity between aspirations and reality is 
adequately exemplified in the conventional approach taken after the submission of an inquiry 
report: discussions of the findings by the Council and Assembly were steeped in congratulatory 
language for the ‘thoroughness’ and ‘scientific method’, lip service was paid to the diligent work 
done by the commission, however, leaving little time for a detailed deliberation of the facts and 
recommendations in the report.149 Critiques of the report were rarely raised in public sessions 
and deferred to a specific committee, or even an additional investigative committee to follow up 
on the initial report.150 
                                                             
146 Bell, “Empire and International Relations in Victorian Political Thought.” 281–98. 
147 For its legal origins, see: Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 132-135. Arnulf Becker Lorca, 
Mestizo International Law: A Global Intellectual History 1842-1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014). 
148 Mazower, Mark. No Enchanted Palace, 23. For an example of a detailed study of ideology in 
investigative practices, see: Andreas Glaeser, “Power/Knowledge Failure: Epistemic Practices and 
Ideologies of the Secret Police in Former East Germany.” Social Analysis 47, no. 1 (January 1, 2003). 
149 Examples taken from: Discussions at the 8th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, September 1927, 12A-
45255-61816, R803, LONA. 
150 See the example of the Brunot Committee in chapter 4 about the Liberia inquiry. 
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Inquiries, as ad hoc and nominally independent bodies, did not have a clear institutional 
mechanism that permitted them to ensure the impact of their investigations. Tensions like these 
that were implicit in domestic inquiries were met by new challenges specific to the international 
level: the time-consuming process to establish an international commission composed of multiple 
nationalities, the ad hoc negotiation process to settle on the terms of reference, and the unclear 
ownership of the issue to be investigated – which respective League body would act upon the 
findings. 
The seemingly contradictory stances between, on the one hand, declarations of impartial inquiry, 
and, on the other hand, the intentional absence of clear procedures and mechanisms to support 
investigatory practices, raises the question whether a genuine belief was held by League officials 
and representatives in Geneva that an aspiration to seek truth through scientific means and 
impartial methods would bring about a transformation of international politics. Or, to the 
contrary, was it eloquent hyperbole and lip service that employed a scientific cosmology as a veil 
to continue the exercise of imperial power and uphold a civilisational hierarchy through a new 
type of international organisation? This palpable clash between aspiration and reality, principle 
and pragmatism appear not to have been an inconsistent duality, but created a modus vivendi that 
ran through the League’s institutional fabric and structured the fact-finding missions on the 
ground. To appreciate the extent to which the ‘League experiment’ overlapped with an imperial 
frame and civilisational hierarchy, requires an exploration of the political and epistemological 
dimensions in which inquiry was being practiced but equally conditioned by institutional 
constraints of the League, a context of multi-level power relations and individual agency. These 
dimensions are accompanied by an outline of the empirical evidence that materialises from the 
case study chapters. 
An imperial internationalist framework 
The League of Nations’ use of inquiry in international politics can be framed using three distinct 
dimensions, that touch upon the organisation’s transformative aspiration through investigative 
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modalities in circumstances forged by inter-war imperial internationalism. This framework 
evolved from the case study work in the subsequent chapters, using an inductive approach. 
First, the League as an institutional development in the organisation of peace, was both rooted in 
ideas of ‘New Diplomacy’ and the moral force of public opinion, as well as ideas about the British 
Empire and the reimagination of a (global) commonwealth. Inquiry was anchored to the League 
as a technique developed in other contexts – directly related to the state or to an international 
court – and adapted to suit a wide range of inter-state disputes and cross-border, international 
issues. This created a number of design flaws that inhibited inquiry, as a flexible and ad hoc 
technique, from having a strong impact on the decision-making process. 
Second, the imperial context was palpable in the civilisational hierarchy that prevailed in the 
international system, multi-level forms of political contestation and unequal distributions of 
power in international relations. The prospect of inclusion or threat of exclusion from 
international society, the rivalry of political and economic interests, created tensions that touched 
upon the investigative modalities of fact-finding missions as well as the support to act upon their 
findings. 
Third, the agency of commissioners counterbalanced the institutional and contextual constraints 
of the other dimensions. Yet, in search of rational fact-finding and the objective validation of 
knowledge in a politicised setting, commissioners were also confronted with their personal 
limitations, such as physical strain and emotional duress experienced on the assignment. 
Moreover, their ‘civilised’ attitudes were tainted by imperial idioms and repertoires, originating 
from their Western, socio-professional background. In other instances, agency was found in the 
actions of local and domestic players, seeking to defend their peripheral region or country at the 
international stage against the weight of foreign expertise and the spectre of intervention. 
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These three dimensions are conceptually explored and coupled with evidence151 of the case study 
chapters; they reveal the fault lines between the League’s belief in the transformative capacities 
of its instruments and the tensions that arose from its institutional imperfections and the imperial 
internationalist structure of inter-war politics. 
The institutional dimension of the League touches both upon the structural and historical 
origins of inquiry as well as the ways in which the organisation was thought and designed in the 
years during and after the First World War. Much of this has been elaborated upon in the earlier 
sections of this chapter but a brief recap is in order here to link the institutional dimension to the 
practical and organisational constraints faced by inquiry during its fact-finding missions. Inquiry 
had originated both in domestic bodies that were instructed by state authorities to gather 
information on societal issues, as well as in a flexible international mechanism to resolve 
narrowly focused types of inter-state disputes (as an alternative to arbitration, negotiation or 
reconciliation). One resemblance between these precedents and the League’s use of inquiry was 
that they all considered the technique as more flexible and nominally independent, than the older 
administrative or diplomatic means to address problems. However, by applying inquiry to a wide 
range of international issues, the League pulled the technique out of its original spheres of 
government or the international court system and embedded it in a diplomatic environment. 
The procedural process of inquiry at the League remained vague at most, with no detailed status 
and enforcement mechanism provided for in the Covenant and no attempts to address this 
deficiency over the following years. To some degree, the Secretariat remedied this with a closer 
scrutiny of the candidate-commissioners (P), partnerships with specialised bodies or agencies (P, 
L) and a precise definition of tasks (L, P, M) although it often had to respond to contingency and 
only played a limited role in the establishment and agenda-setting of inquiries. The imprecise 
position of inquiry, palpable in a broad mandate given by the Council (C) or the lack of 
                                                             
151 For the purpose of clarity, these will be labelled in-text with a letter, referring to the relevant case 
studies as follows: opium production in Persia (P), forced labour in Liberia (L), the Sino-Japanese dispute 
over Manchuria (M) and the Chaco war between Bolivia and Paraguay (C). 
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enforcement of its findings by any of the League’s political organs (L, P, M), certainly clashed with 
the League’s overall aspirations at the ideational level, to bring about greater impartiality in 
diplomatic affairs and rationalise the conduct of international politics.  
Perhaps it was thought that the simple act of inquiry would be sufficient to raise pressure on 
governments, to expose aggression (M, C) or misadministration (L), and use the weight of public 
opinion to enforce reform. To some extent this worked: inquiry certainly disposed of a capacity 
to lessen hostilities, while commissioners were working on the ground (C, M), its findings were 
taken into consideration by national actors (L, P), but had limited means of support when 
countries refused to sincerely cooperate or simply ignored its findings (C, M). As a consequence, 
the rhetoric of impartial fact-finding would not be matched by international action, nor by strong 
League authority to further its agenda of peace and cooperation. At most, inquiry as truth seeking 
appears as an interim measure rather than an end in itself, to buy additional time before taking a 
decision, to exert public pressure on countries or to avoid taking any action at all. 
The contextual dimension considers the imperial hierarchies, the standard of civilisation and 
the multi-level power dynamics that resulted from the inter-war political environment. The 
connection between empire and inquiry has been established by scholars of international history 
and cultural anthropology, considering their role in the functioning of imperial administration. 
Studies within this field have focused on the high-point of colonial domination, around the second 
half of the nineteenth century and pre-war years of the twentieth century, when imperial 
peripheries served as laboratories for governance and modernity and were subjected to different 
forms of investigative modalities – including inquiry.152 The First World War and eventual 
creation of the League of Nations tends to blur the degree to which world politics still had an 
imperial character, although structural continuities in how the pre-existing order was maintained 
and reproduced can be identified. European maritime empires still had an economically 
                                                             
152 Bevernage, “The Making of the Congo Question,” 203-238. Zoë Laidlaw, “Investigating Empire: 
Humanitarians, Reform and the Commission of Eastern Inquiry.” The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 40, no. 5 (December 2012): 749–68. 
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predominant role in international politics, despite talk about ‘New Diplomacy’, support for 
national self-determination and greater autonomy through indirect rule. Meanwhile, new 
imperial powers such as the United States and Japan did not seek to radically overturn the existing 
hierarchy – rather to continue many of its practices.153 In general, the inter-war years were 
characterised with a softer face of imperialism, such as the ‘sacred trust’ with the African 
continent and a subtler use of a pre-existing civilisational standard (not reliant on military 
conquest) to regulate relations between a European-led international society and the rest of the 
world.154 Yet to Mazower, newer notions of sovereignty and the liberal principles embedded in 
the League’s Covenant ‘still depended on the same civilisational hierarchies that had underpinned 
so much pre-1914 liberal thought.’155 
The language of internationalism suggests that imperial hierarchies were on the way back by the 
time the League came into existence, however, the organisation’s activities in the non-European 
world indicates a continued influence of an imperial framework. Mazower and other scholars are 
sceptical of the rapid transition from empire and civilisation to a statehood and a rights-based 
international system.156 Jerónimo has noted how idioms and repertoires about the sacred trust, 
race and the colour line, good colonial government, colonial developmentalism, normative 
standards of imperial civilisation – fostered through the League – gave empires a renewed sense 
of legitimacy after the First World War.157 This line of argument finds an echo in the League’s 
inquiry commissions. Many of the investigated issues and disputes took place in the context of 
contested regions or fragile states, where imperial powers had economic and political interests 
(P, L, M, C). A sizeable part of the commissioners appointed by the League had a professional 
experience working in colonial administration or in technical fields that had required exposure 
                                                             
153 Although the US did not join the League, they actively cooperated with the organisation in its technical 
activities (which touched upon inquiry) with the help of US philanthropic organisations. Its 
representatives shared similar views with regard to hierarchy and the standard of civilization in 
international politics. See: John A. Thompson, “American Power and Interwar Internationalism.” The 
Historical Journal 61, no. 04 (December 2018): 1137–48. 
154 Callahan, A Sacred Trust, 52-62. Koskenniemi. The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 132-135. 
155 Mazower, Mark. “An International Civilization?,” 559. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Jerónimo, “A League of Empires,” 88-89. 
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to imperial peripheries (P, L, M, C). From the case studies arises the general observation that 
many of the reports entailed far-reaching recommendations and specific suggestions for the 
development of the state or region in question (M, C), which implied thorough changes in the 
administration and even the reliance on Europeans to oversee the process (L, P).158 The literature 
on imperial hierarchies supports the argument that a ‘standard of civilisation’ was still intact in 
the League’s sphere of activities, even though its use and consequences were subtler – through 
the use of international standards, for example around slavery (L) and narcotics (P), early forms 
of humanitarian investigation (L), and development work as well as a system of mandates that 
could manage the transition towards nominal independence.159 
Power unmistakably presents itself as a crucial concept to elucidate the inter-war imperial 
hierarchies in more detail, especially in connection to inquiry’s activities in the field of knowledge 
production, because of the many political tensions and forms of contestation that appear in the 
case studies.160 The environment in which inquiry commissions operated was marked by rival 
players in competition with each other, to extend their civilisational tutelage over territories, seek 
economic gains from the ‘sacred trust’ but were also confronted with local resistance to their 
attempts at undermining national sovereignty (Table 2). Existing conceptualisations of power 
have often failed to capture these dynamics of continuous competition, instead of fixed relational 
distributions; also, they do not extend beyond one chosen frame of reference.161 However, from 
power relations and political contestation it is evident that ‘tensions at work between the 
international, national, and local scenes and frames of reference’, complicated the League’s role 
                                                             
158 It is noteworthy that the League’s administration of European territories (Danzig, Memel, Saarland) 
was not part of the Mandates section but was placed under a different supervisory regime. In contrast, 
many of the Liberian affairs were dealt with by the Mandates section, even though the country had gained 
independence in the 19th century and was accepted as a full member of the League. 
159 Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society, 76-81. 
160 See Table 2 for an overview of each case study, organised according to the frame of reference. 
161 For example: David A. Baldwin, Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
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as aspiring international authority, in bringing its expertise and international activities to the rest 
of the world.162 
 Manchuria Chaco Liberia Persia 
Local Unanimity for 
chairmanship 
but different 
views on 
treatment of 
Japan 
Rivalry for 
chairmanship and 
ideological 
differences 
Rivalry 
between 
commissioners 
over task and 
conclusion of 
inquiry 
Differences over 
interpretation of 
terms of reference 
National Conflict between 
China and Japan 
over status of 
Manchuria 
Dispute between 
Bolivia and 
Paraguay over 
ownership of 
Chaco 
Conflict 
between 
Liberian 
Government 
and hinterland 
population 
Power grab by 
Reza Khan Pahlavi 
and conflict with 
tribal populations 
International Expansionist 
ambitions, 
League 
framework and 
non-member 
interests (US 
and USSR) 
American and 
neighbouring 
states (Pan-
American 
Conference) and 
League: 
hierarchy? 
Liberia as a 
League 
member but 
US semi-
protectorate 
Efforts for 
international 
regulation of 
drugs, 
disagreement 
between 
abolitionists and 
pragmatists 
 Table 2: Power and political contestation in a multi-level field163 
Within the case studies, power and contestation find myriad expressions, arising in internal 
disputes between commissioners (C, M, L), to domestic rivalries between social and economic 
groups (L), open hostilities between countries (C, M), attempts to further national interests, 
consolidate imperial rule or gain greater economic control (L, P, C), to competition at the 
international level over the most appropriate body to arbitrate a conflict (M, C). In most cases, 
there is a strong interplay between these tensions, either transferred or exacerbated, due to the 
interaction between local, national and international scenes, thereby constraining inquiry’s 
effectiveness on the ground as both a diplomatic and fact-finding body. The multi-level field of 
power and political contestation touched upon the establishment of the commission (terms of 
                                                             
162 Kott, “International Organizations,” 449. 
163 Source and overview: own. 
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reference, choice of commissioners), practices on the ground (support by the host countries), and 
the outcome of investigations (the frequent delays in the process; degree of international support 
to act upon findings). The overall image that appears is not one of a hegemonic apparatus of truth 
regime, or an uncontested League authority, but one constrained by the actions and unequal 
power distributions in a multi-level field. As such, the League’s inquiry technique partly 
reaffirmed imperial hierarchies, but could act as a constraint on more expansionist desires by 
major foreign powers – although it disposed of no coercive powers (M, C). It opened weak and 
fragile states to soft tutelage and political pressure through expertise, but meanwhile offering 
them a platform to reject foreign intervention (L) or turn the exposure to their advantage (P). 
The third dimension of agency serves as a counterweight to the previous, more structural 
dimensions, which have mostly identified institutional and contextual constraints in the way 
inquiry functioned as part of the League of Nations. Personal agency played an important role, 
most visible in the people that were chosen to be part of an investigation, their attitudes, frames 
of mind and methods they used for fact-finding, which can be ascertained from their diary entries 
and written correspondence with the League, relatives and more distant acquaintances. These 
help to establish how the individuals as a component of inquiry reflected on truth and politics, 
how their racial, gender and civilisational biases shaped and conditioned fact-finding within the 
League and the inter-war political environment. While the exploration of fact and impartial 
methods was often the subject of lip service within the political bodies of the organisation, how 
was it experienced by its agents on the ground? These questions touch upon the nature and limits 
of rational fact-finding, the capacity of individuals to act according to their ideals or pragmatic 
views, in an environment that both enabled and constrained their assignment. 
Contemporary research on investigative missions at the international level has emphasised the 
importance of ideology, research bias, the aesthetics of evidence, how commissions are conscious 
of the presentation of their findings, and the performative aspect of truth seeking in an 
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institutional setting.164 Few of these insights have been explored in a more historical context. But 
in one instance, Lori Allen has explored investigative commissions to Palestine during the 
twentieth century, through an analysis of the ‘burden of proof’ as an overarching concept. She 
dissects the performative and aesthetical aspects of evidence, the formulation of an inquiry report 
but also scrutinises the fallacy of ‘rational’ fact-finding. Allen zooms in on the inter-war era of the 
League and sees a trajectory of ‘emotion as the evidentiary ground of testimony’.165 This 
conclusion strengthens the need to take the personal seriously, in establishing scientific 
credentials, impartial objectivity and search for the truth. This is of importance in the diagnosis 
of inquiry as a technique, because it demonstrates how ‘reading’ emotions in the choices and 
claims made by individuals, as part of a commission, can help to uncover forms of political 
legitimacy and subjugation. Thus, the emotional becomes another frame, next to gender, race, 
civilisation, through which the inquiry phenomenon can be analysed.166 
Race appears as a consideration in the selection of candidate-commissioners, their scientific 
credentials but also in assigning credibility to (expert) witnesses (P, L). Gender is equally of 
relevance in the appointment of people, as women were never actively considered for the position 
of commissioner, supporting expert, and in one case even discouraged – given the psychical strain 
and risks involved (P).167 The standard of civilisation shines through in the perceptions of the 
non-European world (P, L), the historical ties with peoples (C) and the perception and 
stereotypes of national groups (M). Emotions present themselves in the archival sources in 
                                                             
164 Saida HodžIć, “Ascertaining Deadly Harms: Aesthetics and Politics of Global Evidence.” Cultural 
Anthropology 28, no. 1 (February 2013): 86–109. Anne Orford. “Commissioning the Truth.” Columbia 
Journal of Gender and Law 15 (2006): 851–83. 
165 Allen, “Determining Emotions and the Burden of Proof in Investigative Commissions to Palestine,” 412. 
166 Prevost, Elizabeth. “On Feminists, Functionalists, and Friends,” 562–600. Musab Younis, “Race, the 
World and Time: Haiti, Liberia and Ethiopia (1914–1945).” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
46, no. 3 (May 27, 2018): 352–70. Glenda Sluga. “Women, Feminisms and Twentieth-Century 
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Clavin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 61–84. 
167 The League inquiry organised to investigate women trafficking explores questions of gender in more 
detail. This example of an investigation was omitted from the case study selection because of the large 
number of countries that were researched for the report and the extensive team of investigators that were 
hired for the work. See: Rodríguez García, “La Société Des Nations Face à La Traite Des Femmes et Au 
Travail Sexuel à l’échelle Mondiale.” Le Mouvement Social, no. 241 (2012): 105–125. 
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myriad forms, through the description of physical strain, tiring travel and homesickness as a state 
of mind (P, L, M). In other examples, the personal views of a commissioner (P, L, M, C), such as 
suspicions toward a group of people (P, L, M), and ideological convictions (C), frame the mindset 
and conclusions drawn from the gathered evidence. Likewise, social bonds and most of all 
personal rivalries (C), may cloud the object of the assignment. In terms of rationality, it is 
noteworthy how the main protagonists of inquiry showed very little consideration for sources of 
bias and other factors that potentially can cloud their judgement. The position as ‘outside’ 
investigator and how it frames the inquiry received no scrutiny. Although there are signs of 
scientific innovation (L), reflections on the nature of truth (M) and attempts to introduce scientific 
standards in the presentation of information (P), overall there was no palpable ethical framework 
that accompanied the practice of inquiry, 
Agents of inquiry, however, played a sizeable role in how investigations were conducted and facts 
were represented. They decided on whether an issue would be framed as one of failure of 
individual officials or rather a case of general maladministration that required intervention (L). 
Likewise, they considered whether a technical issue such as opium had to be addressed in a 
narrow sense of crop substitution or a broad overhaul of state governance (P). Inquiry reports 
went beyond the narrow scope of the facts of a dispute: they addressed causes, identified failings 
and background factors that contributed to the outbreak of hostilities (M, C). Thus, their agency 
can be identified in their role as shaping the perception and views of these countries and regions 
of the world – even though their recommendations were not always followed. However, agency 
was not limited to inquiry commissions – it was also found in local actors that acted as a catalyst 
to bring an issue to the international stage (L) or in the form of country officials that seized the 
League platform and the discussion of an inquiry report to defend their sovereign actions (P, L, 
M, C). 
In the last two decades, the renewed interest in many of the League’s spheres of activities, 
previously ‘overlooked or underestimated’, has led to a reassessment of the organisation’s role in 
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inter-war international politics.168 Research interest in subjects such as intellectual cooperation, 
health, refugees – often described under the denominator of ‘technical work’ – has shifted the 
emphasis on the innovative character of the organisation.169 Susan Pedersen identified this 
‘technical League’ in her book The Guardians, with its steady expansion of activities in the areas 
of international standards and cross-border cooperation as ‘the foundation for the institutions of 
global governance’. In her view, this League is distinct from two others, one that dealt with issues 
of war and disarmament, while the other compromised topics such as sovereignty, territorial 
administration, minorities and mandates.170 
As argued in the introductory chapter, much of the League historiography continues to follow 
these engrained narratives (with ‘failure’ and ‘foundational event’ at the outer edges), depending 
on the research subject they primarily address. If one follows this approach, then the ‘technical’ 
perspective would most likely situate inquiry as one of the developments that amplified the 
growth of global governance as well as the progressive diffusion of international standards with 
regard to fact-finding missions. In contrast, to approach inquiry only from the results and impact 
it produced, is to overlook the importance of the technique as an expression of the League’s 
rational aspirations and its underlying scientific cosmology. The four case studies highlight the 
limitations of a singular narrative for the institution’s legacy, either as a development towards 
global governance or as a tool at the will of imperial powers, especially when it concerns the case 
of inquiry. In other words, the entrapment in the language and institutional memory of the 
League, whether it is a binary of success and failure or the frame of ‘technical work’, risks 
preserving much of new recent research within existing silos of League historiography.171 
                                                             
168 Laqua, “Transnational Intellectual Cooperation, the League of Nations, and the Problem of Order,” 224. 
169 Ludovic Tournès, “American Membership of the League of Nations,” 5. 
170 Pedersen speaks about three different Leagues (referring to William Rappard): a League to outlaw 
war, a technical League and a League for the adjudication of sovereignty. This echoes the different 
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171 More than the League, this is the case for the UN. See: Elisabeth Roehrlich, “H-Diplo Diplo Review 
Essay 153 - State of the Field Essay on the History of the United Nations and Its Organizations,” accessed 
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Since the League deployed its investigations across a range of topics, there were inevitable 
overlaps between these ‘different Leagues’ identified by Pedersen: technical activities and cross-
border cooperation became enmeshed with issues related to sovereignty and power, 
international standards were elaborated within the same diplomatic circles that handled 
disarmament and territorial disputes. As such, fact-finding cut across the ‘different Leagues’ and 
had an impact on anything from high politics to the fulfilment of statistical work – stretching 
beyond what can be covered by the label of ‘technical work’. To treat inquiry as a technique 
deployed across the League organisation, tempers the usage of existing frames that only consider 
a fraction of the League’s activities and equally brings critical distance to the ‘global governance’ 
turn of the recent historiography. Moreover, it places investigative modalities such as inquiry and 
the role of international expertise on a much longer time-frame and contributes to a clearer 
understanding of the political and ideological underpinnings of impartial fact-finding missions. 
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3: The Inquiry Commission for Opium Production in Persia 
A matter of control 
‘It is true the ryot [peasant] would have his savings derived from opium wherewith to 
buy food, but it must be remembered that the absence of good roads and the utter 
apathy and helplessness of the Government render the transport of food grain from one 
province to another in time of dearth a matter of difficulty, so that a man may have 
money, but still may not be able, in many districts, to buy food. Peoples may, in fact, be 
starving in Shiraz while there is plenty in Tabriz and vice versa.’ 
(Walter Baring, Trade and Cultivation of Opium in Persia, 1882) 
 
‘Opium is not something to be tried out.  
It is not a distraction, an affair: opium marries you.’ 
(Jean Cocteau, Opium: The Diary of His Cure, 1930) 
 
Introduction 
The League of Nations’ establishment of an opium inquiry in 1926 was a watershed moment in 
the institutionalisation of inquiry at the international level. Before that, international inquiry 
commissions had solely been used for the judicial resolution of political disputes and border 
issues between two or more countries. The League’s first opium inquiry172 in 1926, a three-man 
investigation in Persia supported by the Social Section of the Secretariat, was an unprecedented 
move, to tackle Persia’s ‘opium problem’ on grounds of social, health and overall humanitarian 
concerns.173 The decision to set up an investigation had sprung from the two International Opium 
Conferences held in Geneva between the autumn of 1924 and the spring of 1925, to discuss ways 
in which to control the supply of narcotics. In the latter conference, the Persian delegation had 
suggested the appointment of a commission to visit opium-producing countries and study all 
problems pertaining to the limitation of opium production. The suggestion brought about an 
investigation into Persia’s opium situation in the spring of 1926. 
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When one country’s efforts to combat the illicit production of opium is taken as a prism for the 
larger international problem of narcotics trade, the inquiry reveals a political salience that 
extends beyond social or even humanitarian concerns. Greater state control over the trade was a 
desired outcome for many of the European and Asian countries that participated in the Opium 
Conferences. The League discussions therefore concentrated on the supply-side of the opium 
trade, that would permit to bring production and manufacturing under a state monopoly, and 
side-lined the question of general prohibition. ‘Supply-control' as a paradigm did not mean a 
reduction, simply a shift from the black market to state-owned monopolies. The chapter uses the 
history of the creation of a narcotics control regime at the international level to explain why 
Persia came under attention for an issue that concerned many of the League’s member states – 
56 countries eventually signed and ratified the Opium Convention agreed in 1925 in Geneva.174 
Although the inquiry commission’s work on the ground in Persia is of primary importance to 
understand how the League resorted to fact-finding and international expertise to enact 
regulatory change in a member state, the domestic and international political contexts merit 
equal attention – effectively the imperial internationalist framework helps here to examine how 
politics may have been a driving force behind the discussion of a social and health issue. 
As William McAllister notes in Drug Diplomacy, the narcotics question cannot be considered an 
apolitical matter, as it is ‘intertwined with issues of national security and economic growth, 
competing policy objectives, manoeuvring for bureaucratic position, defence of cultural 
prerogatives, and the vicissitudes of personality’.175 For this reason, political developments such 
as the rise of Reza Khan, his efforts to remove domestic opposition, and the instauration of the 
Pahlavi dynasty in Persia are of considerable relevance to the Persian Government’s dealings with 
the opium question and its degree of cooperation with the League’s inquiry commission. 
Arguably, the intertwining of the narcotics question with politics is also visible at the 
international level, by way of the League’s efforts to devise a supervisory regime to stem the 
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supply of illicit drugs, underscored by disagreements between abolitionist and (more) permissive 
countries. In addition, Persia’s historical foreign policy of balancing itself between the rival 
interests of Great Britain and Russia will be of significance to understand the country’s opening 
towards the United States and its search for a distinct, sovereign voice in the international arena 
in the 1920s, when opium became a means of diplomacy. The larger web of competing political 
interests, over the levers of power in Persia and the growth of narcotics trade in the twentieth 
century, forms the imperial internationalist background to the narrative of the Persian inquiry 
presented here.  
The case study chapter does not only touch upon the historical change in the use of the inquiry 
method, the entangled multi-level fields of local, domestic and international politics, but also 
structural and epistemological questions. Although most of the League’s inquiry commissions 
were set up on an ad hoc basis, the support by the League’s Social Section for the Persia 
Commission will distinguish it from the other case study chapters. This chapter addresses to what 
extent the inquiry could rely on the continuity and expertise developed and retained within the 
Secretariat, as a solution to offset the chosen commissioner’s limited exposure to Persian 
conditions. Similarly, the inquiry into a more technical subject, pertaining to agricultural 
production and crop substitution, suggests a different role for expert knowledge and the scientific 
language used in the inquiry’s report to discuss the facts and conclusions of the opium problem. 
Did the technicality of the subject make diplomacy less of an obvious factor or is it possible to 
identify continuities in the politicised context surrounding inquiry? The chapter will elaborate on 
the tensions that arise from the League’s expected impartiality, because of a reliance on foreign 
expertise, as well as imperial repertoires in preparation and execution of the investigation. 
The chapter is organised in a structure that reflects the chronology of the inquiry, namely the 
origins, catalyst and preparatory steps to the commission, including its composition, followed by 
investigation on the ground, the report-writing and the aftermath of the inquiry. This structure is 
retained in the subsequent chapters to give both a familiar sense and advantage of comparison to 
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the thesis. The Persia chapter commences with the multi-layered origins to the inquiry, focusing 
on the growing dominance of opium in the Persian context, the efforts at international 
cooperation to combat illicit narcotics beginning from the early twentieth century and the 
political upheaval in Persia after the First World War, three facts which coalesced into the Persian 
suggestion at the International Opium Conferences in 1925. It goes into some detail to describe 
the international diplomatic climate at the Leve in the run-up to the Conferences, with particular 
reference to imperial interests and the Persian stakes in the set-up of an international control 
regime. 
The origins 
By the year 1925, a letter-writer to the British Times newspaper noted that ‘signs of the opium 
habit are to be seen all over the country’.176 It was one response in a series of articles that 
discussed whether consumption of the narcotic drug was common in Persia. Although opium had 
been introduced to the country centuries before, its cultivation and consumption was not 
widespread until the second half of the nineteenth century. To understand how opium developed 
from a minor domestic issue to a subject of international attention – an agenda item for the 
League of Nations – consideration is to be given to opium’s role in the changing agricultural and 
economic outlook of Persia. 
‘Flowers of evil’177 
The origins of opium cultivation in Persia cannot be precisely dated, but the medicinal purposes 
to the latex of the opium poppy (papaver somniferum) were known for several centuries to 
Persian society. It was only in the nineteenth century that the country significantly expanded its 
cultivation of the opium poppy. Gerald McLaughlin, a seminal author on the history of opium in 
Persia, lists four reasons to explain this expansion: medical factors, economic factors, the role of 
foreign powers and traditional Persian characteristics. For example, McLaughlin notes how 
Persians turned to ‘home remedies for relief of pain and disease’ at a time when they were lacking 
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adequate medical facilities.178 However, some of the reasons McLaughlin cites, including the 
emphasis on national characteristics (such as the Shiite branch of Islam which is characterised as 
more mindful than its Sunni counterpart), and the role of British officers in introducing the 
practice of smoking (rather than eating) opium, are questionable: they show neither a convincing 
causal relation (in the case of religion) nor fully explain the scale of the spurt of growth in opium 
production and consumption (in the case of medicinal reasons and foreign powers). 
In contrast, contemporary scholars see economic reasons as predominant to explain the story of 
opium’s advance in Persian agriculture in the second half of the nineteenth century.179 For 
Bradley Hansen, an economic historian, the Persian experience was special because unlike most 
countries it not only consumed but also produced and exported the product.180 In particular, it 
was the growing demand for opium from Europe and South East Asia that made cultivation of the 
opium poppy a lucrative affair for Persia’s landowners and export merchants. Hansen also asserts 
that ‘opium production was reputed to yield a profit for landowners about three times that of 
grain, and laborers who worked on opium fields were said to receive higher wage’.181 As such, it 
was the increase in export revenue that encouraged the gradual switch from food to opium 
production, even though this could exacerbate the risk of famine (when a failed grain harvest 
would not provide enough food stock).182 As Ahmad Seyf notes, opium became a ‘cash crop’ that 
helped to pay for increasing imports of consumer goods that were produced elsewhere, but did 
little to improve agricultural productivity in the country.183 In fact, the appetite for cash crops and 
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high earnings drew attention away from investment in local transport, agricultural 
manufacturing and other types of development that could have helped the Persian population 
and economy, as well as decrease the perpetual risk of food shortage. 
By the late nineteenth century, opium cultivation had successfully pushed out rival production 
processes, most notably the cultivation of silk and cotton after they had suffered price collapses 
on the international markets, respectively due to a silk worm disease and the decrease in demand 
for cotton after the end of the American Civil War. Coupled with Persia’s growing trade deficit this 
meant that the country was increasingly reliant on a sole cash crop to support its foreign trade 
imbalance. Yet, opium cultivation was not without risks: over-cultivation and adulteration of the 
raw product were responsible for a gradual deterioration in the quality of Persian opium. This 
would eventually lead to a financial squeeze in the agricultural sector, particularly those working 
on the poppy fields. Opium cultivation was a time-consuming and difficult occupation, reliant on 
large supplies of labour, a stable climate and regular care throughout the autumn, winter and 
spring. The harvest had to be carefully timed and could easily be disrupted by bad weather 
conditions.184 
Despite the substantial revenues for those who owned the cultivated lands and the merchants 
who exported to Europe and East Asia, as part of a blossoming global network in narcotics trade, 
the opium farmers at the origin of the production process saw little of the trade revenue and did 
not dispose of a stable source of income. Equally, the sheer scale of illicit opium trafficking meant 
the central authorities could tax only a part of the entire trade. Statistics on government revenue 
for the period before and after 1900 are lacking, but the trade statistics offer some indication of 
opium’s palpable importance in the Persian context: around 1900 the annual average of licit 
opium traded was around 300.000 metric tonnes with a value ranging from £300,000 to 
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£350,000. By this time the value had begun to drop because of the poor quality of Persian opium. 
However, the illicit trade easily surpassed the legal channels with estimates ranging from 400.000 
to 600.000 metric tonnes. Despite the drawbacks of a singular attachment to the production of 
opium, trade continued and expanded unabatedly into the new century.185 
Raising the international stakes 
Persia’s transition from small-quantity production to large-scale international exportation did 
not occur in a vacuum but had international repercussions. By the start of the twentieth century, 
Persia had established itself as the leading player of what came to be known as the Golden 
Crescent, a region in Asia of opioid producing countries (also comprising Afghanistan, India and 
to some degree Turkey). The Golden Crescent countries were the principal exporters of opium to 
colonial territories in South East Asia but also found a growing demand in European markets. 
Whereas the export trade within Asia was often meant for immediate consumption, the use of 
opium in Europe was linked to the production of morphine by pharmaceutical companies. A 
major part of opium trade, however, occurred through clandestine trade and therefore escaped 
levies imposed by the government. Reliable data for the period are unavailable, but it is suggested 
that the majority of opium revenue evaded taxation in Persia. This was largely due to structural 
factors, such as a weak state, inefficient institutions, high levels of corruption, few adequate 
means of transport, and lack of authority over rural areas in the Golden Crescent area.186 
The unfettered development of an international trade in narcotics did not pass unnoticed. The 
second half of the 19th century saw American and British individuals raise their misgivings about 
the flourishing trade and its moral repercussions on society; also, the first organisations were set 
up to draw attention to free flow of drugs in an interconnected world. In 1907, a first agreement 
was concluded between two countries, China and India (under British control), to voluntarily 
restrict the supply and subject the trade to government control. Moral concerns in the United 
States about opium’s effects on the productive parts of society were an important drive for joint 
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initiative with China to organise an international gathering to discuss all problems related to the 
narcotics trade. In 1909 the Shanghai Opium Commission prepared a report in anticipation of the 
meeting of thirteen countries (including Persia) in Shanghai later that year. It supported a gradual 
suppression of opium-smoking and suggested initiatives to end the illicit trade of narcotics.187 
Although the Shanghai meeting offered a blue-print for future gatherings, its immediate 
consequences were limited. This was largely because the majority of participating countries 
remained wary of the overtly prohibitionist agenda pushed for by the United States and China. 
The European imperial powers saw no reason to pursue a full ban on the smoking and eating of 
opium, while producing states such as Persia did not wish to give up a substantial source of 
government revenue nor step in to control the market – despite the significant scale of the illicit 
trade. As a compromise, all thirteen participating countries agreed in principle with the opium 
commission’s non-binding recommendations, but they stopped short from enforcing the report’s 
proposed measures. The Shanghai gathering did not produce an effective narcotics control 
regime because, as McAllister suggests, countries ‘demonstrated their inclination to protect 
interests at the expense of pursuing moral objectives.’188 
In the build-up towards an international regulatory regime for narcotics trade, another step was 
taken three years later at The Hague Opium Conference of 1912, a plenipotentiary meeting which 
resulted in a convention that reinforced the message of gradual oppression of opium abuse in the 
world. The Hague Convention of 1912 also referred to other types of drugs, such as cocaine and 
heroin, and stipulated for the first time there was a clear distinction between legitimate 
(medicinal) and illegitimate (clandestine trade; criminal use and abuse) drug usages. Unlike the 
Shanghai gathering, the conference held in The Hague produced an international legal agreement 
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although it outlined domestic enforcement mechanisms to separate the trade, rather than a type 
of international supervision. Additionally, The Hague Convention was not helped by the fact that 
the First World War broke out soon after, which delayed ratification and its entry into force until 
1919.189 
What position did Persia take during the deliberations at The Hague in 1912? According to 
McLaughlin and Quinn, Persian representative to the Conference Mirza Mahmoud Khan stressed 
the fact that excessive curtailing of opium exports would damage government revenues gained 
from the trade. The delegation was adamant to avoid the immediate prohibition of opium exports, 
as this would hit disproportionally farmers and merchants.190 For the Persian Government, the 
opium trade represented at the same time a source of strength (revenue from the licit trade) and 
a perpetual headache (over-reliance on an unproductive cash-crop and the size of the illicit 
trade), however, it did not desire to gamble with its economic interests. Persia signed The Hague 
Convention of 1912 but its National Assembly (majlis) failed to ratify the agreement. For the time 
being, the implementation of trade restrictions could be held off, although international pressure 
was set to rise in the future. 
In 1919, the Paris Peace Conference created an opportunity to put the subject of drugs control 
back on the discussion table. The United States strived to make The Hague Convention of 1912 
part of the Peace Treaties, to ward off a growing drugs problem at home. The renewed American 
initiative was aided by the fact that a change of personnel at the Home Office had made the British 
Cabinet open to the idea of a stronger international control system. The automatic accession to 
The Hague Convention, as part of the 1919 Peace Treaties, resulted in a sudden increase of 
ratification and the convention’s entry into force. Also, the newly created League of Nations would 
take over the responsibility for administering The Hague Convention. In its Covenant, the League 
was entrusted with ‘the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to (…) 
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the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs.’191 Persia became a founding member of the 
League, however, it failed to ratify The Hague Convention. Its role in the narcotics trade would 
come under closer scrutiny, as the League established an Opium Advisory Committee in 1920 
with regular meetings to discuss problems related to opium. From this moment onwards, ‘all 
paths to drug control passed through Geneva’, although its strongest supporter, the United States, 
was not going to be a part of it.192 Yet, drugs control would be one of the few areas where the 
United States as non-member would decide to closely cooperate with the League of Nations. 
Drugs control fell under the purview of the League’s Social Section, a team of twelve officials in 
the Secretariat that was given responsibility for much of the humanitarian work initiated by the 
international organisation. This humanitarian work included, for a large part, women and 
children trafficking and drugs-related questions, subjects that encompassed some of the unique 
challenge of international cooperation. Dame Rachel Crowdy, head of the Social Section, 
considered opium to be a problem ‘among the most difficult with which the League deals’ because 
of the size of illicit trade, the lack of effective coordination between states, and the absence of an 
effective control mechanism that could gradually suppress the production and consumption of 
opium.193 The Social Section had feeble means to address its field of activities. As Carol Miller 
observes, the Section was ‘limited by budgetary and staffing constraints’ and for this reason could 
not hire ‘experts on subjects examined by the social committees’.194 Furthermore, Crowdy and 
her small team faced competition from the Health Organisation in matters public health and social 
medicine. However, the League’s Health Organisation did little to advance a cause: it avoided to 
discuss the nature of opium consumption and addiction and did not agree on a medical definition 
of what constituted legitimate use.195 
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Despite the ongoing machinations at the international level, Persia’s opium situation after the 
First World War did not see a rupture from the pre-war years. The War had damaged farmland 
and irrigation systems, making the cultivation and trade of the opium poppy vital for the 
regeneration of the agricultural sector. To avoid poverty in Persian households, the government 
actively supported farmers in the production of opium. In just a couple of years, export recovered 
and surpassed previous record numbers. As James Windle succinctly lays out, by 1920 Persia ‘had 
captured 30 percent of the global pharmaceutical market and opium was the third most 
importance source of expoBrt revenue’ with up to a quarter of households ‘directly or indirectly 
reliant on the trade’.196 The share of opium production that was exported through licit channels 
acted as a boon for government: opium represented 9 percent of total government revenue – 
despite the inefficient tax collection. The government tolerated illicit trade, because it had led 
Persia to take a larger share of the overall international opium trade. This irked the European 
imperial powers, as production and trade shifted away from their colonial and other territorial 
possessions.  
In the coming years, Persia would commence a trial and error approach towards revenue-
maximalisation and a stronger role for the state in the opium market. To understand how Persia 
went about the learning process to achieve a more effective opium policy, however, it is necessary 
to look at the political turmoil from the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century and how 
the rise of a new dynasty put levers of administrative change in place.197 
The rise of Reza 
What had permitted the widespread clandestine trade of opium in the first place? As previously 
noted, landowners considered cultivation of the opium poppy as a cash crop that increased 
revenues and could buy foreign imported goods. However, opium’s uninterrupted expansion was 
also aided by the characteristics of the Qajar monarchy (1789-1925) that ruled Persia since the 
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late eighteenth century. The first Qajar rulers (shahs) asserted strong political and military 
authority in the Persian plateau, a region connecting Anatolia in the west and the Hindu Kush in 
the east. However, the dynasty proved unable to retain control over the growing expenditures for 
its court and army, leading to widespread corruption. This created a perennial lack of treasury 
funds, despite several attempts to reorganise the state’s finances. Rather than invest in the 
country’s own industrial and commercial capacity, successive Qajar rulers opted to rely on 
foreign powers to invest in the Persian economy – through railway and oil concessions. The 
rivalry between Great Britain and Russia over imperial dominance in Central Asia meant that 
Persia was of some importance to the ‘Great Game’ – which weakened the Persian Government’s 
independence of action.198 Yet, the competing British and Russian interests and their involvement 
in Persia did not produce drastic change; rather, it led to decade-long political stagnation, as 
neither power was willing to see the other pursue a reform agenda that could strengthen its 
imperial position in the country.199 
The regime’s incapacity to enact administrative innovations in the late nineteenth century 
increased popular demands for changes to the distribution of power. In 1906, protests came out 
in favour of a constitution that would impose restrictions on the shah’s right to decide by divine 
authority – although foreign interventions had already greatly diminished it. In the constitution, 
the Persian majlis (or assembly) was recognised as representative body of the people and 
additional source of sovereignty. Constitutional provisions also outlined basic individual rights, 
the creation of civil law and a division of the branches of government. Although this meant a 
continuation of the Qajar dynasty in a nominal sense only, the constitutional revolution of 1906 
was not a radical break with the past. Rather, it was ‘an intermediate period between an old order 
which was passing, and a new one which had yet to emerge’ that revolved around repeated 
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clashes between dynastic, legislative and local agents over the direction of new constitutional 
monarchy.200 This was evident in 1907, when a dispute erupted between the shah and the majlis 
over a treaty agreed by Great Britain and Russia to divide Persia into zones of influence. The 
imposition of an agreement by the two foreign powers produced a rebellion, between central 
authorities in Teheran, loyal to the shah, and a coalition of revolutionaries and local chieftains, 
that would drag on into the 1920s.201 
The First World War, as noted before, had a damaging effect on Persia. In diplomatic terms, the 
country pursued a position of neutrality but was unable to stop foreign powers from infiltrating 
the country. For example, the Persian Cossack Brigade, an elite unit commanded by Russian 
officers (and modelled on the Imperial Russian Army) but mostly made up of Persians, had to 
fight off Ottoman troops in the north to safeguard Russian interests. Previously, the Cossack 
Brigade had played a significant role in supporting the shah during the rebellions that followed 
the constitutional revolution. After the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the Brigade’s Russian 
nationals were removed and replaced by British officers. The Cossack Brigade’s strength lay in its 
capacity to shift the political balance within Persia, between the shah and its rivals, depending on 
which it favoured. After the war, it was an officer named Reza Khan who rose through the 
Brigade’s ranks: he spotted an opportunity – a weak government and ongoing societal divisions 
– that could be exploited to his own benefit with the help of the elite horseback men.202 
The prevailing anarchy during and after the First World War was largely caused by a steep loss 
in trade with Russia (and to some extent Germany). Despite the quick recovery of the opium trade, 
overall agricultural production had fallen and created temporary food shortages. The erosion of 
central authority and the Russian retreat following the Bolshevik revolution, meant that Great 
Britain could try and accomplish a more ambitious agenda in the region (‘a chain of vassal states’ 
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from the Mediterranean to India).203 British interest to increase its tutelage over Persia led to an 
agreement in 1919 that would bring in additional British advisers and army officers as well as 
British loans for infrastructure investments. The majlis and public perceived the treaty as a step 
towards the creation of a British protectorate, and vehemently opposed the government’s 
handling of the matter. As Gavin Hambly suggests, this was ‘an expression of broad-based 
disillusion with the general mismanagement of the country, and of economic and other 
grievances.’204  
The shah tried to ward off criticism with the replacement of his Prime Minister, the latter who 
then tilted towards Bolshevik Russia in search of a similar treaty. Eventually the shah had to 
postpone all plans for an agreement with a foreign power, again due to public backlash. Teheran’s 
series of reactive moves failed to dissipate the rebellion and, in 1921, a coup-d’état led by Reza 
Khan took place without bloodshed, due to the weakness of the Qajar dynasty and the resolute 
non-interference on the part of the British.205 In the years before, Reza Khan had quickly risen 
within military ranks and found himself at the head of the Cossack Brigade. Rather than 
immediately seizing power, he made himself the indispensable leader with a series of political 
promotions: first, as Commander-in-Chief of the army, then Minister of War, and eventually as 
Prime Minister in 1923 while retaining his other posts. Before 1926, the year he was coronated 
as shah and adopted the name Pahlavi, Reza Khan pursued a cautionary agenda of cooperation 
with the majlis and a reorganisation of the army and security forces. Investment in new 
equipment and better pay for the military troops allowed Reza Khan to build a strong power base 
that would help him in his future skirmishes with recalcitrant landowners and local chieftains.206 
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Persia’s de facto leader had ambitious plans for the country: he desired to strengthen its 
sovereignty, centralise political power in Teheran and force through a rapid modernisation of the 
economy.207 When it came to decreasing Persia’s dependence on Great Britain and Bolshevik 
Russia, the domestic and foreign policy agendas neatly fused together. Reza Khan encouraged the 
search for new allies abroad: in 1922 Persia opened talks with the United States government 
about closer cooperation and the possibility of foreign assistance in the area of administrative 
reform. The United States were perceived as a disinterested player, with no major economic 
interests in Persia at the time; they could serve as a counter-weight to Great Britain and the Soviet 
Union. An American financial mission under the leadership of A.C. Millspaugh was brought in, 
soon after, to reorganise Persia’s finances and to improve its tax collection system. To make Persia 
less reliant on foreign concessions and reduce the need for a loan, the team of financial advisers 
were instructed to find ways to increase the government’s income. A major source of export 
revenue, opium was bound to be a point of contention for the Persian tax administration. In 1923, 
the government trialled an experiment to control the raw opium supply by having farmers deliver 
to state-owned warehouses; yet, it still faced problems with improving taxation of the black 
market.208 However, the efforts to increase the role of the state in opium production was set in 
motion. 
At this point in time, the parallel histories of Persia’s opium production, the political turmoil that 
resulted in a new dynasty and its search for independence from foreign powers, and the 
international attempts to stimulate cooperation around illicit drugs, increasingly became 
intertwined. Within an imperial internationalist context, the developments described in this 
section created the conditions for a catalyst at the League of Nations that would induce Persia to 
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welcome an inquiry commission to investigate the problem of opium poppy cultivation and 
gradual limitation to legitimate needs, resulting in a set of recommendations to change the 
country’s approach to opium. 
The catalyst 
The Hague Convention of 1912 had left the work on international narcotics control unfinished. 
The provisions had suggested the gradual control over the manufacturing, importing, selling, 
distributing, and exporting processes of drugs, however, there was no agreement found about a 
comprehensive control mechanism at the international level to oversee countries’ endeavours to 
reduce profits from the narcotics trade. The Hague had failed to meet expectations because of the 
disagreement over the extent to which the convention should promote the gradual suppression 
of (illicit) drugs manufacture and trafficking. Particularly for opium, a moral vanguard including 
the United States and China had favoured strong restrictions on its trade and consumption, while 
other powers (France, The Netherlands, Portugal, Japan) were hostile to an immediate 
suppression of the trade – and opted for a gradual limitation to allow some (medical and 
scientific) needs. Despite the increased awareness of the drugs problem after the First World War, 
there had been little change in country overall positions. Great Britain, which was slowly moving 
in favour of stronger international control system, was put in the position of having to achieve 
international consensus that would lead to the conclusion of a new set of agreements. Like the 
League, Britain was keen to have the United States as a participant in a new international regime, 
although its inclusion risked cumbersome negotiations.209 
Malcolm Delevingne, the British Deputy Undersecretary of State for the Home Office and the Great 
Britain’s representative to the Opium Advisory Committee, led the initiative to edge the League 
and its member states towards a plenary discussion of the opium question. According to 
McAllister, Delevingne pursued a ‘doubled-pronged’ approach whereby he suggested two 
international conferences, one dedicated to the problem of opium trade in East Asia, another one 
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that focused on the output of manufacturing states. After the League’s agreement, the two 
conferences were scheduled to follow each other during the last months of 1924 and first months 
of 1925. Delevingne’s reasoning was that dividing the issue would increase the chances of 
success: the first conference would seek the end of colonial trade in opium in East Asia (as 
prescribed by The Hague Convention) whereas the second required an agreement between 
manufacturing states to control the production of opium to medical and scientific purposes – 
thereby tackling the problem of excess supply.210  
François-Xavier Dudouet has noted a paradigm of ‘opium supply-control’ in the agenda-setting 
for the League’s opium conferences that would turn out to be the fundamental characteristic of 
the inter-war international opium mechanism. Supply-control was a political agenda that aimed 
to control (but not suppress) opium commerce by moving it into the hands of the state and large 
manufacturing enterprises. In other words, the creation of state monopolies for licit trade would 
assure a fairer competition between opium-producing countries. The European imperial powers 
were keen to crack down on those countries – such as Persia – that had sought to exploit the 
clandestine trade to enlarge their total share of production. This was seen as a higher priority 
than the US-backed request, to crack down on opium use and abuse by end-users (putting 
limitations both supply and demand). As Dudouet points out, the discussion about opium was less 
about the activity itself but more about the actors (authorities, suppliers, manufacturers) and 
share of government revenue involved in the process. The introduction of ‘opium-supply-control’ 
coincided with a development towards the creation of state monopolies in manufacturing and 
trade but had clear political implications, as a future international agreement could be 
instrumentalised to single out disreputable countries.211  
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Delevingne had limited the United States’ participation to the Second Opium Conference (17 
November 1924 – 19 February 1925), to avoid a clash with the gradualist stances of the European 
powers. Britain’s representative reasoned that an agreement on the curtailment of the supply of 
manufactured drugs during the Second Opium Conference would be sufficient to stymie American 
demands for a grand opium suppression scheme. This careful deliberation was a consequence of 
the British Cabinet’s hopeless division on the issue of opium: Delevingne and his Home Office 
favoured vigorous international action that would amount to suppression of the illicit opium 
trade, including the quasi-legitimate use of opioids. In contrast, the Colonial and India Offices 
desired to tread carefully with any sudden suppression of illicit trafficking. For the Cabinet, the 
situation in India presented a thorny issue: its continued role in the clandestine opium trade was 
a blemish on the Government’s reputation abroad, however, an excessive reduction risked further 
shifting the illicit trade elsewhere – notably to Persia. The British example marks both the difficult 
negotiation process at the domestic level and the fixation on the supply-side of opium – a focus 
on supply that was shared by all European powers with a seat on the League’s Opium Advisory 
Committee.212 
The Second Opium Conference commenced on 17 November 1924, right after the First Opium 
Conference had concluded with significant delays. The First Conference had seen a series of 
diplomatic clashes but eventually led to a regional agreement on the restriction of opium trade 
through the means of government-run monopolies (and the reliance on import/export 
certifications). The First Conference, however, had set no clear roadmap for production 
limitations, which allowed countries such as Japan to develop their pharmaceutical industry 
rather than move towards the gradual repression of its manufactured opium supply.213 Due to its 
general scope and wider participation – including Persia and the United States – the Second 
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Opium Conference was to be of greater significance to the international opium control regime. 
The conference’s chance of success was immediately put into question when the United States 
representation seized the initiative with a proposal to limit the production and trade of opium 
whilst cracking down on (domestic) consumption. This went far beyond what was agreed upon 
by the League’s Opium Advisory Committee, a body that comprised chiefly European imperial 
powers. Although there was general support for the requirement of stronger control (with 
government import/export certifications) and some type of information-sharing and reporting 
mechanism (the future Permanent Central Opium Board), any notion of general prohibition – 
whether gradual or sudden – risked an end to the diplomatic proceedings. Lacklustre support for 
the American proposal resulted in the withdrawal of the United States from the Conference, but 
improved prospects for a final agreement, albeit of more limited scope.214 
What was the Persian attitude towards the Second Opium Conference? The recent historiography 
stresses the diplomatic wrangling between the United States and Great Britain, with some role 
granted to other European imperial powers, but is hushed when it pertains to the position and 
agenda of a producing-country such as Persia. At the conference, the Persian delegation presented 
a memorandum which described the opium situation in Persia, its significance to the agricultural 
sector and economy as a whole, and suggested that any curtailment of production and exportation 
of opium would have to be accompanied with international financial assistance. Furthermore, the 
Persian memorandum suggested the need for tariff and customs duties’ autonomy – which was 
restricted by existing treaties. These, however, were country-specific measures that fell outside 
of the scope of the conference. Contrary to the European powers, it did not find the American 
suggestions unacceptable but set the discussion of a loan-programme and a consideration of crop 
substitution as conditions before its approval.215  
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In addition, the American proposal kindled the Persian delegation towards the suggestion of an 
international inquiry into the situation of opium-producing countries. The Persian memorandum 
as well as documentation from other countries (Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece and Egypt) had 
demonstrated the need to verify the reported facts, a general study of all aspects of production 
and traffic related to opium, and a consideration of the opium poppy replacement by other 
agricultural crops. Despite the eventual American withdrawal, the Persian suggestion found 
agreement within a sub-committee and the idea was moved forward as a resolution into the Final 
Act of the Second Opium Conference. This read:  
‘The Conference asks the Council of the League of Nations to examine the suggestion 
which has been made in the course of its proceedings, in particular by the Persian 
delegation, that a commission should be appointed to visit certain opium-producing 
countries, for the purpose of making a careful study (…) of the difficulties connected with 
the limitation of the production of opium in these countries and advising as to the 
measures which could be taken to make it possible to limit the production of opium in 
these countries to the quantities required for medical and scientific purposes.’216 
The resolution indicates a general desire for an inquiry into the situation in opium-producing 
countries, however, the proceedings of the Second Opium Conference also reveal that the 
suggestion was primarily interpreted as one being about Persia. Another resolution, that was 
withdrawn from inclusion in the Final Act, dealt with the required measures for a reduction and 
control over opium production in Persia. The withdrawn resolution stressed that the conference 
did not have the discretion to decide on the matter of financial assistance, but stated that: 
 ‘a case for inquiry has been made out and therefore recommends to the Council of the 
League of Nations that a Committee of Experts with the necessary qualifications be sent 
under the auspices of the League to make a full inquiry into the facts as stated in the 
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memorandum as well as into the practicability of the proposed measures and their 
suitability for the attainment of the end in view.’217 
The Persian delegation, however, considered it was not able to accept a resolution which 
specifically concerned their country, without the agreement of Reza Khan’s cabinet. Although the 
Persian resolution was withdrawn, the more general resolution for an inquiry into opium-
producing countries was maintained and would be taken up by the Council in the September 
session of that year. On the 2 September 1925, the Council requested the Assembly to place the 
issue on its agenda for further deliberation. The Assembly instructed its Fifth Committee 
(responsible for social questions) to examine the suggestion and draw up a set of 
recommendations. On the 25 September, the Fifth Committee reported that inquiry could be 
organised for the study of the production and export of opium production, after a request from 
the Persian representative had been submitted. Since the Fifth Committee had not received a 
similar request from other countries, it concluded that the inquiry should limit itself to the 
situation in Persia.218 
Since the Second Opium Conference laid the foundations for the opium inquiry into Persia, it is 
worth reflecting on how it came into existence. Specifically, what considerations moved the 
Persian delegation towards its suggested inquiry into opium-producing countries and ultimately 
a separate investigation into the situation in Persia? The delegation came to the Second Opium 
Conference with the expectation that under American and European pressure some measures of 
control on opium production would be agreed upon, however, it desired to make the case of a 
gradual implementation process as to avoid an immediate shock to the agricultural sector and the 
peasant population. The participation of the United States in a control scheme was of vital 
importance, as Persia looked at the Americans for the provision of financial assistance and 
expertise – a disinterested and reliable player as it had demonstrated with the Millspaugh 
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financial mission. Due to the United States’ withdrawal from the Conference, a trade-off between 
gradual production curtailment in return for financial aid was no longer on the table and a sub-
optimal alternative had to be pursued. At this stage, it becomes increasingly difficult to gauge why 
the Persian delegation persisted with the suggestion of an inquiry. There are three scenarios that 
can explain the decision-making process and why the Persians considered it the next best 
outcome: 
First, the possibility that the Persian suggestion would find general acceptance among other 
producing countries (Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece and Egypt). In other words, the prospect of an 
inquiry into all opium-producing countries would put no country at a disadvantage. 
Second, a consideration that the establishment of an inquiry would require a large amount of time 
and potential delays which Persia could exploit to prepare for a gradual curtailment of illicit 
opium cultivation in the domestic market. 
Third, the Persian Government’s experiments with government warehouses and stronger state 
control could be further legitimised by way of the recommendations of an international inquiry 
commission. 
The first scenario was difficult to achieve as few countries desired to take the initiative and invite 
an inquiry: it was more advantageous to protect the status quo than risk being singled out because 
of illicit opium production. The second and third scenarios, perhaps combined, make sense when 
the historical context is considered. Reza Khan’s modernisation plans in the 1920s relied to a 
large degree on the state taking a more active role in the economy and therefore cracking down 
on the illicit production and clandestine trade of opium.219 Given the consensus view that took 
root at the League’s Second Opium Conference, which favoured greater (state) control rather than 
complete suppression, there was a potential alignment of political interests that could come to 
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fruition with the help of the League’s commissioners.220 The imperial internationalist context 
suggests that Persia’s large share in (illicit) opium trade was unsustainable because it touched 
upon competing political and commercial interests: international pressure from imperial powers 
steered the country towards an investigation and a future reform-agenda, however, these 
outcomes would be concluded on Persia’s own terms. 
The composition 
The League Assembly accepted the Fifth Committee’s report on the Persian inquiry and adopted 
on 26 September 1925 a resolution that specified the object of the study, i.e. to examine the 
existing situation of opium cultivation and to consider how other crops could replace a proportion 
of the opium cultivation. More interestingly, the Assembly specified a three-person commission 
and their ‘necessary qualifications’: an individual to act as chairman (or president), ‘an expert on 
the agricultural side of the problem’ and a ‘person having experience of business conditions and 
markets in the East and knowledge of transport problems.’ The agricultural expert was to be 
appointed after consultation with the International Institute of Agriculture (IIA) in Rome.221 
The Assembly’s resolution is worth picking apart, because of its idiosyncratic character that 
would set it apart from other (future) resolutions adopted by the League in the context of inquiry 
commissions. First, the resolution called for a study of the situation – a familiar phrasing for this 
type of resolution – but then imposed a precisely defined question about the type of knowledge 
to be gathered on the ground: ‘the replacement of a proportion of this [opium] cultivation by other 
crops.’222 This implied that the three-person inquiry would need to identify suitable crops and 
provide (statistical) data or present a reasoned argument to make a recommendation. In its 
application of knowledge and expertise, the commissioners appeared to have little discretion to 
set their own agenda. 
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Second, the Assembly’s suggestion for an agricultural expert and someone familiar with business 
and transport, is indicative of the technical expertise it considered as necessary to address the 
question of crop substitution. Such a consideration was uncommon for political inquiries (i.e. 
related to inter-state or territorial disputes), which would see a preference for a diplomatic 
representation. Perhaps it was due to the existence of the Opium Advisory Board, which gathered 
and discussed information on conditions in Persia, and the organisation of the Second Opium 
Conference, which had led to regular exposure and a better understanding of the local conditions. 
Yet, a better understanding of conditions in Persia did not stop the Assembly from using an 
oriental frame (a person with experience ‘in the East’) that masked the particularities of Persia. 
Third, the consultation with an external body, the IIA, conveys self-awareness about the League’s 
limitations in finding suitable expertise in certain fields. Although it would not be uncommon for 
the institution to rely on outsiders to suggest names of commissioners, chiefly government 
departments, the explicit mention of one (international) institution in a resolution is 
unconventional for an inquiry resolution. In the Assembly’s view, the League possessed no 
sufficient agricultural expertise in-house; its reliance on another international organisation 
shows the expanding supranational network and the corresponding inter-institutional exchanges 
that occurred during this period.223 
Finally, the Assembly’s resolution made no reference to gender although it was taken for granted 
that only men could be considered for any of the three prescribed roles. This rationale would be 
extended to any of the supporting personnel. In a later communication, on 21 December 1925, 
this was seen as justified because it would be ‘extremely inadvisable to take a woman into some 
parts of the country’.224 Ironically, it was Dame Rachel Crowdy, the head of the Social Section, who 
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cautioned against the inclusion of any female staff. Thus, in theory nothing prohibited a female 
from taking part in the inquiry as commissioner, a designated expert or additional staff, however, 
in practice the idea was given no serious consideration. 
On the 28 September 1925, two days after the Assembly meeting, the Council examined the 
resolution and made two important additions to the procedure. It identified the League’s 
Secretary-General as the person tasked with the provision of a list of suitable candidates to serve 
on the inquiry – to be presented at the Council’s December meeting. This meant the selection 
process would be handled by the Secretariat rather than the Council President – who effectively 
would have had to rely on his own diplomatic staff to piece together the inquiry team. 
Additionally, the Council suggested to approach the Persian Government concerning the expenses 
that would be incurred for the undertaking.225 
Eventually, the financial burden would be carried in part by the United States, which had political 
implications for the inquiry’s organisation. Before the Assembly meeting of September 1925, the 
United States representation to the Opium Advisory Committee226 had dropped a hint about the 
willingness of the US Government ‘to pay at least some of the expenses’ if in return it could have 
an American member on the commission.227 Rachel Crowdy, who at the time was already keen to 
have the Social section deal with the inquiry, saw a financial opportunity for her small Social 
Section: the American help could lessen the burden of what may ‘be rather an expensive’ 
inquiry.228  
United States involvement, however, could not take place in an overt fashion. To this effect, the 
Social Section opened a line of communication with the Social Hygiene Bureau, an American 
organisation set up by John D. Rockefeller Jr. that funded social and public health research. The 
Bureau was part of a myriad of philanthropical work instigated by the Rockefeller Foundation; it 
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had already set up cooperation with the League and the Social Section for women’s and children’s 
welfare. One of the Rockefeller Foundation’s trustees, Raymond B. Fosdick, was a former 
Undersecretary of the League and had continued as an unofficial American liaison after the United 
States had failed to become a member. Fosdick secured the Bureau’s financial participation but 
would also be instrumental in the search for an American individual to serve on the Persian 
inquiry.229 
The search for three commissioners took place between late September and mid-December of 
1925. The Social Section’s involvement in the Persian inquiry, including its recruitment process, 
means there is ample archival information available, which helps to reconstruct the search for 
candidates and the considerations that were given to their expertise and overall professional 
suitability. Whereas selections handled by the Council President generally left little to no paper 
trail in Geneva, the Social Section’s and by extension the Secretariat’s thinking is palpable from 
the internal discussions concerning individuals that could serve on the Persian inquiry.  
The Secretariat encountered no major hurdle in finding an agricultural expert to serve as one of 
the commissioners, after contact with the IIA. After a written request, Secretary-General 
Drummond had received two names of possible candidates from Rome: Professor Fridiano 
Cavara, an Italian botanist who had worked on the extraction of opium from the poppy and was 
familiar with colonial agriculture in Libya, and Mr Dascher, a Belgian engineer and agronomist 
who had spent several years working in Persia. The IIA’s letter with recommended candidates 
did not indicate a preference but rather stressed the ability of both men to successfully conduct 
the chosen mission. Although the Secretariat favoured Mr Dascher’s practical rather than 
botanical experience, Dame Rachel Crowdy cautioned that his ongoing work as ‘a Government 
servant’ made him a less suitable candidate.230 The Secretariat wanted someone with a practical 
approach to agriculture in Persia, however, without any direct government connections to a third 
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country. Eventually, Professor Cavara was approached and accepted the assignment as 
agricultural expert.231 
In parallel, the Secretariat pursued a search for a transport expert. Ideally this commissioner 
would also dispose of knowledge about business conditions in the region. After a 
recommendation of the League’s Transit Section, the Secretariat approached a British Major-
General Candolle, who had had the opportunity to study transport problems in the Persian Gulf.232 
For the Secretariat, Candolle’s professional background in railway development and exposure to 
the Persian Gulf region made him a suitable candidate. A possible drawback was the fact that he 
had performed aspects of his work in service of the British Government. The Secretariat showed 
caution to any candidate with strong British connections or being of British nationality – given 
British economic interests in Persia this could suggest partiality to outsiders. The caution did not 
refrain the Secretariat from approaching Candolle, although ultimately the candidate had to 
decline the invitation due to other engagements. The Secretariat briefly pursued a second option, 
a Canadian Brigadier-General and Chief Engineer of the Canadian National Railways, but the 
possibility was abandoned after progress had been made in the choice of the commission’s 
chairman.233 
The Assembly’s resolution had not specified any specific skills for the commission’s chairman, 
apart from having the capability to lead the inquiry. Since American financial involvement had 
been confirmed, only US citizens were approached for the task – with Raymond Fosdick at the 
Rockefeller Foundation arranging the initial contact. During November and December 1925, 
Fosdick pursued several avenues, including Norman Davis, who chaired a commission 
responsible for the Memel question, and Frank McCoy, who would later serve on the Manchurian 
inquiry. These initial attempts depict no detailed consideration given to the profile of the 
commission’s chairman. However, a clearer image emerged by the beginning of December 1925, 
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as the Secretariat noted that the ‘the Americans would nominate a civil engineer’ or someone 
qualified as a railway expert. This meant the Secretariat could begin to look for a third candidate 
with ‘a knowledge of irrigation, if possible, with a knowledge of world markets’.234  
Shortly afterwards, a railroad engineer and former vice-governor of the Federal Reserve Board, 
Frederic A. Delano, had accepted the nomination as chairman of the Persian inquiry. The 
Secretariat’s attempts to find a third commissioner came to fruition when it found Mr Victor 
Cayla, a French agronomist who had worked on irrigation and cotton cultivation in North Africa. 
The three appointments enabled the Secretary-General to inform the Council’s December meeting 
about the establishment of the inquiry, although the preparatory work was far from done.235 
The above selection process of the three commissioners helps to the bring together the 
Secretariat’s approach towards expertise and knowledge. The Secretary-General’s note to the 
Council emphasised the ‘special’ and ‘expert’ knowledge of the chosen candidates, as well as their 
suitability to study the opium situation in Persia.236 A Secretariat note stated the task of finding 
out ‘the actual truth’ and how the problem had to be handled with ‘a scientific method’.237 What 
did this mean in practice? The Secretariat showed careful thought about the profiles as 
determined by the Assembly, a president (or chairman), agricultural expert and someone with 
knowledge of business and transport conditions, but also their character: ‘to select persons not 
only distinguished for their expert knowledge but recognised as having unbiased judgment’.238 
However, it quickly saw the limitations, in terms of available candidates and the division of roles 
between the three commissioners. There were no perfect candidates: those with the right 
professional (often colonial) background lacked sufficient exposure to prevailing conditions in 
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Persia. Alternatively, candidates who had spent time in Persia had generally done so in service of 
a government – which jeopardised the Secretariat’s idea of an ‘absolutely impartial’ team.239  
If a candidate’s knowledge of value to the inquiry was obtained in a context of imperial and 
colonial administration, this could create a tension between expertise and impartiality. Given 
Persia’s past encounters with foreign powers, a candidate commissioner with strong ties to an 
imperial administration (particularly British) was to meet resistance by the Persian delegation – 
a situation the Secretary-General was keen to avoid. The Secretariat’s challenge in finding the 
right technical expertise coupled with a sufficient knowledge of the country was unlike any 
inquiry into political disputes – where the need of impartial expertise could be overlooked and 
replaced by representation on the basis of nationality. Finding a difficult balance also accounts 
for the fact that profiles remained changeable in the search for the right candidates. The 
Secretariat lived up to the Assembly resolution’s expectations in a nominal sense, regarding 
required profiles, although the team lacked experience with working conditions in Persia.240 
The inclusion of additional staff was beset with difficulty. Upon his acceptance of the assignment, 
Delano had emphasised the necessity of additional staff to complete the assignment. In a letter 
from 28 December 1925, he wrote: ‘I would wish to surround myself with very competent aids, 
qualified to deal with different aspects of the problem.’ Delano was eager to have at least two 
additional experts, even though he eventually settled for a ‘specially trained agricultural 
economist as own personal assistant’ who he was willing to pay for himself.241 Although the 
Secretariat initially tried to bury the request, pointing out that the provision and choice of staff 
and experts was at the League’s discretion, under some pressure of the Social Hygiene Bureau it 
eventually accepted the inclusion of an additional member.  
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After agreement of the other commissioners, Mr Jewell B. Knight was appointed as Delano’s 
personal agricultural expert – with the help of Raymond Fosdick.242 A member of the US 
Department of Agriculture’s scientific staff, Knight’s expertise pertained to India rather than 
Persia; yet, his inclusion assuaged Delano’s fears of insufficient staff and technical advice to 
complete the assignment. Delano’s insistence may seem peculiar at first sight: did he hesitate over 
the other commissioners’ expertise? In fact, he never doubted their ability but was directed with 
a ‘sense of responsibility’ and the desire to finish the inquiry within reasonable time: ‘I think if 
each Commissioner has on his staff two or three high grade men, we shall not be over-supplied 
with intelligence in solving our very difficult problems.’243 
The supporting staff was composed of a secretary to the commission (Chester Purves), who was 
sourced from the Secretariat, and a short-hand typist (Leslie H. Finden), a temporary employee 
who was appointed with the help of a personal recommendation. In addition, Frederic Delano had 
obtained agreement from the Secretary-General to employ a personal private secretary, although 
he was suggested to find an ‘impartial’ individual who had ‘not been involved in any way in any 
of the controversies’ concerning opium.244 Delano’s view on the role was specific and not devoid 
of expectations: ‘I am very short on the agricultural side, and I feel that I must have on my staff, 
first, someone who will fill the dual or triple capacity of counsellor, private secretary, legal 
adviser, preparer of a report, or at least the basis of a report, and considerable of a linguist’.245  
Through Dean Acheson, an American lawyer and later Secretary of State, Delano found Archibald 
MacLeish, an American poet who was living with his family in Paris. MacLeish did not fit the 
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conventional profile of a personal secretary. He considered himself ‘not an expert linguist’, ‘a very 
poor lawyer’, and someone with no diplomatic experience.246 In a letter to Delano, MacLeish was 
candid about his lack of suitable skills and voiced strong opinions on a range of subjects, including 
opium: ‘I am not interested in the suppression of the opium trade. I see no reason why Persia 
should sacrifice a lucrative income because persons in San Francisco are unable to smoke in 
moderation. And the English and American position seems to me to substantiate all that has ever 
been said about Anglo-Saxon hypocrisy.’ MacLeish went as far as saying that ‘I accepted, quite 
frankly, because I should like to see Persia’ and felt ‘a more devoted and a more skilled aid would 
better assist you in what will certainly be a most trying experience’.247 MacLeish made no attempt 
to present himself as the ideal candidate; yet, his atypical profile had the potential to jolt the 
inquiry team and bring unexpected outcomes. Delano provided no rationale for his choice of 
personal secretary, but his later diary entries imparted a strong appreciation of MacLeish’s 
outspokenness. 
The inquiry was scheduled to start with a series of initial meetings in Geneva and continue with 
travel to Persia and a stay of several months. Because of the temporary nature of the assignment, 
most of the inquiry commission’s staff had to face difficult arrangements, such as obtaining 
agreement to take an absence of leave or leaving their family behind for a long period of time. As 
several examples demonstrate, this could have serious ramifications for the inquiry. Frederic 
Delano’s wife suffered from a long-term illness which made him hesitant from leaving the United 
States. In early January 1926, Delano professed serious doubt to Fosdick about his participation 
in the inquiry and informed with regret Secretary-General Drummond about a possible delay to 
the work: ‘I understand fully that you will not only be annoyed at this new turn of events.’248 
Although Mrs Delano’s health improved over the month, Delano’s travel to Europe was postponed 
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for several weeks, which meant there would be less time to inspect Persian farming during the 
poppy season.249 
The appointment for the Persian inquiry was far from a standardised procedure, despite the 
Secretariat’s involvement and the criteria laid out by the Assembly from the outset. The League 
Secretariat gave serious consideration to the professional background and impartiality of 
candidates, the latter to avoid proximity to a government with interests in Persia. However, in 
practice the recruitment process was determined by compromises over relevant expertise and 
the availability of people. Financial considerations limited the possibilities for staffing, but also 
permitted that external actors (particularly the Social Hygiene Bureau) to have significant 
influence on the process. Lastly, the ad-hoc and temporary nature of the task meant that personal 
and professional motivations were drivers in the process: staff members had to consider the 
unique circumstances (distance; communication with family; disruption of work) before 
participation. 
The inquiry 
The first meeting of the Persia Commission was planned to take place in Geneva on 9 March 1926. 
In the weeks beforehand, the Secretariat and its Social Section worked hard to gather relevant 
literature, maps and any type of documentation that could be handy for the commissioners to 
examine the opium situation in Persia. This information-gathering from internal and external 
sources did not occur without its own challenges. As one contact with the Royal Geographical 
Society revealed, there was ‘next to nothing likely to be of use’ because many of the reports were 
‘locked up for official use only.’250 If any information existed about the country, for example 
railway schemes, it was in the hands of British authorities. Even if documents were available, 
those had to be handled with care because of British imperial interests in Persia: British plans 
were not necessarily aligned with the needs expressed by the Persian government, although the 
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Secretariat gave no explicit consideration to source bias. The Social Section, however, pursued 
multiple avenues to obtain information about Persia, from learned groups, scientific reviews and 
magazines in the West.251 
In the end, much of the information gathered originated from internal sources, such as the Opium 
Advisory Committee. For instance, from the Japanese Committee delegate it obtained a Survey of 
the present economic situation in Persia, that gave indications of water availability and cultivation 
of various crops. The League’s Persia Bureau could offer detailed information about travel 
conditions, the expected amount of work and liaison with local individuals. The Bureau’s Director 
cautioned that local contacts were important, to avoid giving the impression ‘the Commission 
went on behalf of foreign powers’.252 The Secretariat had the additional advantage of having 
organised an inquiry in the region before: it could make use of the expertise gained from the 
Mosul Commission to inform commissioners about suitable clothing and vaccination.253 In 
general, the Secretariat was ‘anxious to collect documents which may be of interest for [the 
commission’s] preliminary work’ but how important was this for the inquiry?254 Obtaining 
reliable sources of information was part of the League’s overall aspiration towards knowledge 
production. However, none of the inquiry members had had the chance to study or visit Persia 
before, they were largely unaware of local conditions – a knowledge gap that could be partly 
resolved before the inquiry set off to Persia. 
The first meeting in Geneva offered the Persia Commission an opportunity to meet its 
interlocutors at the Secretariat and the Persian delegation. On the 9 March 1926, the commission 
sat together to discuss a plan of work, while gathering impressions of the individuals on the team. 
Since no minutes of the initial meetings have been archived, the journals of Delano and MacLeish 
are a prime source of information here – albeit they are written from their subjects’ point of view. 
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The commission’s chairman, Delano, offers a succinct and descriptive account of the days spent 
in Geneva, dwelling over the people he met, and the food he consumed. He speaks positively about 
people on the team, including MacLeish (whom he’s ‘delighted’ with), Mr Cayla (a ‘vigorous’ man; 
‘impresses me favourably’), but also the Secretariat’s staff, including Dame Rachel Crowdy (‘a 
most charming woman, who has a wonderful war record’). Delano is more reserved about his 
Italian colleague Professor Cavara, who appears as ‘rather frail’ and ‘I don’t think will bear much 
hard usage’. For Delano, the first meeting was an uneventful affair: it started with the discussion 
of a comprehensive syllabus compiled by Cayla and concluded with the reflection that a lot of 
work was to be done in Persia: ‘As it looks to me, we are dealing with a people several hundred 
years behind the times (speaking agriculturally), and we must teach them to walk before they can 
enter a foot race.’255 
In contrast, MacLeish offers brief but impressionistic bursts of writing about the people he 
encountered, with little attention to the contents of what was discussed in Geneva. This entry 
covers the (entire) day of the first meeting:  
‘The Commission is amusing. Add to Delano and Knight a sharp, practical, much travelled 
little Frenchman of forty-five, and a wizened, goat-bearded little old Italian (Cavara), with 
a whinny for a voice. If he can stand the sun, I’ll eat him! Purvis is very practical, too. In 
fact, we are all practical. We are all wonderfully ready to accomplish nothing.’256 
MacLeish’s initial scepticism about the inquiry and the international opium situation shines 
through in his account of the days spent in Geneva. Although Delano did not share this exact view, 
there was perhaps common ground in the way they perceived the immense scale of the task 
ahead. From the start, Delano felt his job ‘will be to pick out the essential high spots and leave the 
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other points for those who can take years to it’, thereby acknowledging that a stay of several 
months in an unfamiliar country could only achieve limited results.257 
A ‘reconnaissance’ 
The Persian inquiry departed on the 12 March 1926, travelled eastwards to Trieste and then by 
boat towards Egypt. After stops in Cairo, Haifa, Beirut and Baghdad, the entire team crossed the 
Persian border in cars on the 24 March. In the following months, the League commission would 
visit all the major Persian cities including the opium production sites spread throughout the 
country. Apart from several stays in Teheran, the inquiry team visited Isfahan, Shiraz, Resht, 
among others, to meet with government representatives, merchants, landowners, peasants and 
villagers. Interviews and government statistics were two main sources of information, although 
commissioners would also collect their own data and work out plans (for example, related to 
future railway lines).258 
In regions with extensive poppy cultivation, the commission met with opium dealers and 
inspected (government) factory sites where the drugs were prepared for sale and consumption. 
The inquiry split up in two groups, respectively travelling to the Western and North Eastern 
provinces of Persia, to cover as much ground as possible and inspect sites of cultivation in the 
span of a couple of weeks. In addition, the commissioners also had extensive meetings with the 
American financial mission led by A.C. Millspaugh as well as encounters with representatives of 
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) – two major foreign representations in the country.259 
Leisure was also part of the League commission’s programme. For instance, the commissioners 
noted that on their visit through Abadeh and Sivand a stop was made at ‘the ancient monuments 
of Achaemenian glory at Pasargadae and Persepolis’.260 Part of the inquiry team also witnessed 
the coronation of Reza Shah Pahlavi on the 25 April 1926. By late May, after excursions to the 
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North Western parts of the country and visits to cultivation sites around Teheran, the commission 
had completed its practical work and could leave Persia by the 6 June and via Alexandria return 
to Europe a couple of days later. On the 16 June, the inquiry team arrived in Marseille and 
travelled northwards to Geneva for its final deliberations and submission of the report.261 
The next paragraphs will explore the work and travel conditions of the League’s commission, to 
examine in some detail which aspects influenced the fact-finding practices and the conclusions 
drawn out in the report, and link to the overarching imperial internationalist framework. These 
include, the relationship with the Persian Government, contacts with foreign governments and 
representations, the logistical and personal challenges faced while travelling in Persia, and the 
affinities between commissioners and staff.  
First, the Persian Government displayed no signs of hostility towards the presence of the League’s 
commission in the country. As part of the inquiry’s overall expenditure, the government proposed 
to accommodate and nourish the inquiry at its expense, although the commissioners would have 
to make their own travel and luggage arrangements. There were no restrictions put on visits, and 
the commission was free to visit all centres of poppy cultivation and government factories. If 
needed, armed guards could be provided in regions deemed necessary. Moreover, the Persian 
delegation at the League suggested for the authorities ‘not to draw up a programme, in order to 
leave the commission completely free as regards its inquiry’.262 Consequently, the team never had 
any doubt about Persian goodwill, nor the impression it would interfere with the fact-finding 
process. This was evident from the fact that the Persian Government supplied the commission 
with various types of documentation and statistics, although the commissioners questioned a lot 
of the data for being incomplete or unreliable – no foul play was assumed.263 
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Second, the commission had regular encounters with foreign delegations, representatives, and 
private individuals – people who provisioned the inquiry with an outsider albeit not disinterested 
perspective. In truth, these encounters already started before the departure – as Delano’s 
meetings with people from the Social Hygiene Bureau demonstrate.264 During the visits in Persia, 
the commissioners held talks with members of the American financial mission and regularly 
participated in dinners organised by the British Legation in Teheran. Employees of APOC came 
across as valuable sources of information, as a Delano journal entry shows: ‘I soon learned that a 
Mr. Mayo, the geologist of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, was on board. I met him and found him 
delightfully alert and direct young fellow. He promises to help us greatly with maps, information, 
etc., a splendid chance I think and a most fortunate rencontre.’265 From this and other encounters, 
there is evidence that the commission felt reliant on foreign representation and citizens to obtain 
information or insider knowledge it deemed reliable to grasp the situation in Persia. Although 
this fell short of direct interference, the perception of outsiders (nationalist of countries with 
foreign interests) meant that problems and solutions to the opium question could be informed by 
them instead of the Persian interlocutors. For instance, after its consultations the commission 
considered that Persia needed extensive infrastructure investments, including in railways to 
transport agricultural goods. Much of the infrastructure was in the hands of British companies; 
they stood to benefit from any recommended increase of public investment.266 
Third, the travel and journey in Persia was not without risks, as well as logistical and personal 
challenges. A fire at the commission’s residence in Teheran destroyed personal and League 
property, including a typewriter which created delays in the provision of a draft report.267 The 
car transport regularly suffered from breakdowns, so it took the commission a lot longer than 
anticipated to reach destinations. Persia had a history of cross-cultural interaction, even though 
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the country itself was largely impassable.268 On most days there was little time for much else than 
the inquiry, as Purves wrote to Rachel Crowdy: ‘Wherever the Commission makes a halt in a town 
or village, the whole of our time is occupied either with the hearing of persons interested in the 
opium question or in visiting the fields and inspecting the crops.’269 The intensive programme 
combined with the climatic conditions led to frequent sickness and disease for staff members. For 
instance, Delano’s agricultural expert, Jewell B. Knight, was unable to work for most of the 
assignment: ‘he is a dead load instead of being a help to me and the commission.’270 Apart from 
the strenuous bodily experience, the occasional spell of homesickness cropped up. Delano’s 
occasional correspondence with his wife made him long for a return: ‘My spirits rise as I get 
nearer the end of this job interesting though it has been, on account of the many anxieties it has 
involved. I have hardly dared to count too confidently on the days but now I feel I am really “over 
the top” and see the end in sight.’271 Meanwhile, MacLeish was ‘getting a bit fed up with the 
diplomatic world – the world in which a man is a suit measured by his relation to the other similar 
units and not an individual under distant stars.’272 
Finally, the strenuous working conditions could provoke tense relations between commissioners 
and staff. The productive dynamics of an inquiry could suffer under personal rivalries and open 
conflict between members, as future investigations would experience; however, neither the 
League archives nor journal entries suggest any such issues transpired in Persia. Problems 
presented themselves with regard to travel and weather conditions, rather than political 
disagreements and differences of personality. Delano’s referral to a ‘council of war’ for discussing 
important decisions appears as a figure of speech, not grounded in facts.273 Discussion arose 
about the future agenda of the commission, but overall things took place in a cordial working 
environment. The commission’s chairman mentioned how he and Cayla privately exchanged war 
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experiences, whereas MacLeish referred to the delightful time he passed with commission 
secretary Purves.274  
The most peculiar relationship was between Delano and MacLeish, as the former described the 
latter as ‘a wonderful fellow and loveable, but very temperamental and at times difficile.’275 This 
had perhaps to do with MacLeish’s frequent demarches and candid articulation of thoughts. In 
one letter to Delano, the poet spoke ‘frankly and faithfully’ about his views on the task, i.e. his 
worry that the commission might overstep its assignment and focus on the general economic 
conditions of Persia rather than the problem of opium production as defined by the Assembly. 
MacLeish feared that ‘there should be persons in Persia who desire to use you for their own ends’, 
referring here to foreign representations and imperial agents, and was adamant the inquiry 
should stick to a ‘narrow and legalistic’ interpretation of the problem, and ‘a full statement of 
fact’.276 In a second letter he summed it up as follows:  
‘The League is interested in the solution of the opium problem and only very distantly in 
the Persian trade balance. If we present a report which is primarily concerned with 
Persian internal economy using our mandate merely as a point of departure for an attack 
on that problem our report will lose most of its international value.’277 
MacLeish showed concern over the interests of imperial powers, such as Great Britain, that were 
eager to see the inquiry turn in a direction of general recommendations about Persia’s 
administration, rather than restrict itself to the issue of crop substitution. Unfortunately, Delano’s 
reaction to the frank expression of views by MacLeish cannot be surmised from the written 
correspondence, nor from the journal he kept. The only certainty is that the two Americans did 
not fall into a lasting disagreement over the issue; they retained a close working relationship until 
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the end. However, MacLeish’ demarche is an apt illustration of the imperial internationalist 
context in which the inquiry operated and how competing interests are a factor to be considered 
in the frame of the investigation. 
The decision to end the inquiry and return to Geneva was taken in early May 1926. Delano noted 
with satisfaction that his colleagues ‘unanimously agreed’ to leave Persia by early June the latest, 
even though privately Cavara had expressed his disappointment with this decision. A minor 
friction perhaps, but one that did not upset the commission’s internal dynamics.278 At this point, 
Delano felt that the inquiry had done all it could feasibly achieve during its time in Persia, to 
provide a general assessment of the country’s capacity to undertake reforms in the agricultural 
sector. In truth, other reasons may have played an important part as well: the hot summer climate 
drawing nearer, the distance from his wife, and the Secretariat’s desire to end the expedition 
before funds ran out. By that time, the League’s Secretary-General had already inquired with the 
Social Hygiene Bureau to increase its contribution, so any expenses made while the commission 
resided in Geneva could be fully covered.279 
The report 
The inquiry adopted a framework for its report during one of its last meetings in Persia, before 
travelling back to Geneva to do the lion’s share of the work. Earlier, Delano had asked the League’s 
Secretariat to provide him with copies of the Mosul and Rumbold Commission reports, League 
inquiries which had taken place in the previous years. According to Purves, ‘his idea trying to use 
them as a sort of model for the drafting of our own effort.’280 This request was unusual, as most 
League inquiry reports relied upon their own structure and contents depending on the subject 
matter. Most likely, Delano wished to acquaint himself with the writing style and to meet the 
                                                             
278 Log entry for 16 May 1926, from: Delano’s logbook of the Persia trip, Series 3-19, Folder V, FDR. 
Telegram from Professor Cavara to Delano, 5 May 1926, Frederic A. Delano Papers, Series 3-19, Folder III, 
FDR. 
279 Commission of Inquiry into opium production in Persia: Expenses of the Commission, R801, LONA. 
280 Note from Chester Purves, 13 March 1926, 12A-45255-50384, R801, LONA. 
104 
 
League’s expectations – however, it also makes a rare example of a learning experience between 
inquiry commissions, an experience that would seldom if ever be repeated. 
On the 30 May 1926, the commission discussed a draft scheme and suggested outline of the 
report, prepared by Delano but also relying on work done by his secretary MacLeish, which 
included descriptions of individual chapters but was incomplete on the recommendations of the 
commission. Delano’s draft papers, however, suggested an extensive programme for the rapid 
reduction of opium cultivation, as well as recommendations for the improvement of economic 
policy. This broad focus on Persia’s future economic development came under criticism by 
MacLeish – as indicated in the previous section.281 
Generally, Delano’s private secretary MacLeish played a palpable part in the preparatory work of 
the commission. He provided the President with his personal draft report, as ‘an attempt to fix 
the limits’ of the inquiry.282 This was the point where the two Americans had disagreed about 
before: how broadly should the mandate of the commission be interpreted? MacLeish raised the 
issue of limiting the mandate once again – a section of the draft which Delano struck through – 
but also reflected on the broader nature of the opium problem: 
‘The question presented, as the Commission reads its mandate, is much broader. It is the 
question whether physical and social conditions in Persia are such that those elements of 
the population which are now supported in whole or in part by the cultivation of opium 
could be supported by the cultivation of other crops and whether, with the cultivation of 
such other crops the Persian Government could make good any part of its present income 
lost through the limitation of the opium crop.’283 
Delano underlined this section of the text and included a note about industrial processes to 
complement the cultivation of other crops. He found himself in agreement with the section but 
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also considered this a concession made by MacLeish from his earlier, narrower approach to the 
commission’s mandate. In his handwritten comments, Delano concluded that the report needed 
a study of the economic life of Persia, to provide a detailed picture to the League of Nations. 
MacLeish continued to offer his reflections on the drafting process of the report – Delano’s notes 
confirm these were taken into consideration and may have been important to sharpen the 
President’s thoughts in the preparatory process. It is therefore unsurprising Delano felt 
disappointment at having to release MacLeish from his duties by 1 July 1926 – so he could return 
to his family in Paris.284 
Delano’s private papers offer a detailed insight into the working process that led up to the 
publication of the report. Yet, the exact contributions of the other commissioners and staff 
members – except for MacLeish – are hard to gauge from both the private papers and Secretariat’s 
files. The draft scheme from mid-May that was discussed in Persia, notes that the commission’s 
secretary Chester Purves drafted the introduction, Archibald MacLeish wrote the part that 
explained the commission’s interpretation of the mandate, and Victor Cayla prepared a section 
on irrigation. Cavara’s input is only implied in the section on crop substitution, where all 
commissioners have contributed to the overview of the agricultural situation. Sections on the 
general economic situation in Persia and the transport question, including roads and railways, 
appear to be drafted by Delano.285 Due to his illness, Jewell B. Knight’s contribution was restricted 
to a separate, albeit detailed report on Persian agriculture; nevertheless, his writings were 
deemed as too ‘extensive’ to serve as a short technical document and were neither part of nor 
annexed to the final report.286 
Although the source material suggests an imbalance of participation in the writing process, this 
cannot be taken as a definitive view on the overall discussion and influence on the final version 
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of the report. In fact, the example of Cayla demonstrates how each commissioner had the 
opportunity to provide input until the last moment: the French member worried about statistical 
errors in the report and he could not settle his view on the effects of crop substitution for the 
financial position of peasants. In a letter to Delano, the commission’s secretary Purves testified to 
this: ‘I had a great deal of trouble with the final edition, as Cayla kept it a long time and raised a 
lot of objections to the French version.’287 The Secretariat, however, reassured Cayla stating there 
is no personal responsibility for the commissioners regarding the form of the report: since all 
personal contributions were discussed, accepted or changed, inquiry reports (‘une sorte de 
mélange’) never reflected an individual view.288 This view was also voiced by Delano, after 
publication of the report, when he described it as ‘a composite product of three men of widely 
different experience’ – perhaps overlooking the palpable contributions made by the other staff 
members.289 
The report, submitted by the commission in July 1926, has four chapters which describe the 
geographical characteristics and economic history of Persia (chapter 1), the present economic 
conditions regarding the environment, agriculture and commerce (chapter 2), the situation of 
opium cultivation and its possible substitutes (chapter 3) and an overview of conclusions and 
recommendations (chapter 4).290 The next paragraphs examine the contents of the report, not in 
a detailed description of the four chapters, but by way of a closer analysis of the themes that 
connect to imperial internationalist context set out in the thesis. Therefore, the emphasis lies on 
understanding the role of agency, commissioner’s choices made either through consensus or 
compromise regarding structure and language of the report, but also how opium is framed as an 
issue within a multi-level field of competing interests. The analysis consists of four parts, 
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beginning with an examination of how expertise and judgement are expressed in the report, 
followed by the commission’s relation to facts and statistical evidence, then the commissioners’ 
interpretation regarding the general economic conditions, and finally how the recommendations-
section juxtaposes all the previous elements. 
First, the commission’s desire to appear scientifically rigorous is displayed in its preference for 
hard factual data and methodological guidelines. Unlike inquiry reports on political disputes, the 
Persian report commenced with a detailed note on weights and measurements as well as a section 
that explains how the commission went about its task: therein, it stresses the large collection of 
official and statistical data, the consultation of books and reports. Also the report mentioned a 
‘particular care to obtain information from and to consult the views, in all cities, villages and 
districts which it visited, of those best qualified to give an opinion and to furnish data on the 
problem of opium production.’291 In the chapters of the report, expertise is represented in the 
many tables and statistical overviews, but also palpable from the language employed by the 
authors: the desire for ‘precise data’, a degree of ‘accuracy’, statements of ‘facts’ and an emphasis 
on the ‘technical’ study of the subject.292 Additionally, the report reveals the commission’s 
tendency to rely on foreign experts for the provision of information. The introduction specifically 
mentioned those foreign residents who ‘furnished all possible information on matters political, 
economic, industrial and agricultural’, but within the chapters there are also references to 
unnamed foreign experts.293 In all instances, these foreign nationals in the country were identified 
as experts, unlike their domestic counterparts – a clear sign of hierarchy at play. This showed the 
limitations of an investigation on the ground, if the inquiry chiefly restricted itself to interactions 
with outsiders, who could frame the problem from their (Western) perspective rather than a 
Persian one. 
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Second, the relationship with the myriad of facts and statistics published in the report is more 
complicated than meets the eye. Despite the strong reliance on factual data in the report, the 
commission expressed doubts about the accuracy of its information. Regularly, the report 
concluded there is ‘no information’ available, because the commission was ‘unable to obtain exact 
figures’.294 This is visible in the example of cotton, where the commissioners acknowledged they 
did not have any information regarding the crop yield but suggested a few pages later that an 
increase of cotton cultivation would be desirable. Although the commission doubted much of the 
Persian statistical data, it remained at pains to give a comprehensive and detailed picture of its 
proposed solutions to the agricultural situation in Persia.  
The reasoning behind this choice can be distilled from the minutes of a commission meetings in 
July 1926, when the team discussed the problem with unreliable estimates. Cayla and Cavara 
expressed a worry that figures were based on estimates for which the commission could not 
accept any responsibility: the commissioners did not wish to lend authority to false information. 
Delano, however, defended the view that it ‘was for the Commission to form an opinion on the 
basis of those estimates, but they could not take the responsibility of publishing them.’295 Tension 
arises from the fact that the inquiry felt obliged to make recommendations based on what it 
considered as flawed (and unpublished) data. A draft version in the Delano papers explained that 
‘the statistical data supplied were in almost all cases either so inexact or so contradictory’, forcing 
the commission to rely on official publications and foreign sources.296 Much of the commission’s 
conclusions on the agricultural situation were based on a limited amount of data gathered on the 
ground. 
Third, the commission looked at the opium question from the point of the view of the whole 
Persian economy, as it felt the ‘factors involved are too complex and too general for a solution 
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restricted to local production’.297 This view regarding opium as a comprehensive issue is present 
throughout the text, with broad recommendations on issues such as land titles, which are meant 
to improve ‘the lot of the peasant’ rather than immediately tackle the issue of poppy cultivation.298 
Additionally, the commission framed these issues as ones pertaining to the modernisation of 
Persia: the criticism of ‘primitive devices’, the introduction of new measures ‘in conformity with 
modern methods’, but with the caution that ‘Persia cannot hope to compete industrially with 
modern Europe and America’.299 As such, the inquiry sought to give a broader, civilisational 
argument as to why Persia should seek reforms beyond the substitution of crops. Within the 
binary of primitive and modern, the latter associated with Western civilisation, there is also a 
usage of language that indicates orientalism and racialised views. This is exemplified with the 
commissioners ‘following in the steps of Alexander the Great, Marco Polo, Chardin and many 
other inquisitive European[s] [who] were privileged to undertake this voyage’ and a discussion 
of physical appearances, labour quality according to race in Persia.300 In addition, a moralising 
tone can be identified in the report’s disapproval of opium abuse, that brings ‘moral damage’ to 
communities.301 
The final chapter, with conclusions and recommendations, tied all the elements of the report 
together, with the suggestion that Persia should adopt a programme of gradual diminution of the 
opium poppy cultivation. In terms of language, there is noticeable rhetorical shift from suggestion 
to belief and conviction, that guised the underlying doubts over reliable data: the commission 
‘believes that’ the development of certain industries will help to adjust the overall trade balance 
deficit, and is ‘convinced that’ better agricultural methods will be beneficial to the cultivation of 
other crops. Its ‘reasonable programme of progressive curtailment’ leaves no room for 
uncertainty: The commissioners suggested a preparatory programme of three years, to be 
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followed by the start of a yearly reduction of 10% in opium production and accompanied by a 
general programme of road construction, irrigation projects and farm demonstration work. The 
report expressed the assumption that during the first five years there should be no decrease in 
government receipts, but it also acknowledged the illustrative nature of its suggestions – it was 
given as an example rather than calculated plan. Without a detailed costing of the suggestive 
programme, the commission’s wording appeared as one of presumption and conjecture.302 
In other words, the conclusion amplified the tension demonstrated in the previous paragraphs, 
between a commission keen to be taken as scientific and rigorous, but constrained by limited 
information and the speculative nature of its suggestions. Moreover, the recommendations were 
largely written devoid of the Persian context, i.e. a general plan for an opium-producing country 
– precisely as intended by the commissioners. Despite the extensive description of the Persian 
situation in the preceding chapters, there was little reference to the country’s specificity in the 
final chapter – which read more as a general plan to modernise and reach a certain standard of 
civilised society. The inquiry had been established to investigate conditions on the ground, but 
personal agency, hierarchy and the political context had driven it to an examination of Persia’s 
capacity to transform its economy. In the imperial internationalist frame, the inquiry had become 
an attempt by international actors to prompt Persia’s actions both in the narcotics trade and its 
economic relations with the rest of the world, by way of statistics and a ‘reasonable programme’. 
Persia’s compliance, however, was not set in stone. 
Aftermath 
The Persian Government did not hold off its response to the League inquiry. In letter dated 1 June 
1926, while the commission was still present in the country, it expressed appreciation to Delano 
for the execution of the task and the ‘open-minded attitude’ of the commissioners.303 The 
government indicated that it would take immediate measures to reduce the opium production to 
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legitimate requirements – like the three-year programme eventually proposed by the commission 
– extend highway and railroad construction and support the substitution of crops. The letter was 
communicated before the commission had ended its work in Persia and started the final work on 
its report, which suggests it was meant as a pre-emptive and autonomous move by Persia to enact 
reforms and show compliance with the international regime. However, the letter also highlighted 
that the government and the people ‘desire no foreign loan for the eventual completion of this 
program’.304 This had been a request at the Second Opium Conference, but the change of the 
Persian view shows to what extent the government agenda (set by Reza Khan) had shifted 
towards national sovereignty and far-reaching state control over the economy: the reform 
programme was conceived as part of a larger modernisation plan for Persia that would occur 
without any external aid, to keep foreign influence at bay. While the government was keen to 
receive a draft report of the commission before official publication, it had already decided on a 
course of action, even before the League would consider solutions to the situation in Persia.305 
The League’s Council came to consider the report only in March 1927, after the French translation 
and printing of the report had caused several delays. In early March, the Persian Government 
submitted a more detailed analysis of the inquiry’s report, that would inform the upcoming 
Council discussion. In its communication and during the Council session, the Persian 
representation repeated its appreciation for the commission’s work and expressed its overall 
agreement with the view that a reduction in production was necessary, but questioned some of 
the calculations and reasoning provided by the commissioners. In brief, one critique was targeted 
at (moralising) statements in the report on opium production ‘unsupported by figures’, another 
questioned the lack of attention to the international scope of the problem – production in other 
countries but also Western demand.306  
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The government stressed the pressing nature of the problem at an international level, i.e. the 
current level of production in the world greatly surpassed medical requirements and could not 
be immediately halted even if all producing countries imposed restrictions. Persia showed 
willingness to control its supply through a restriction on production and the implementation of 
an opium import certification system. However, it cautioned about major reforms due to limited 
room in the government budget. Additionally, the government asked for an assurance that it 
would receive greater tariff autonomy, which would enable the country to develop its industry. 
The latter request was indicative of Persia’s agenda vis-à-vis the League and other countries: 
more than a curtailment of opium production, it sought to strengthen its national sovereignty and 
implement changes that primarily would be to the benefit of the Persian economy.  
The Council discussion was cut short as its President suggested that the Assembly meeting of 
September 1927 would offer a better platform to discuss the pursuit of Persia’s reform 
programme and the overall situation of opium production. Nevertheless, the Assembly gathering 
did little more than provide lip service to the ‘valuable work’ of the commission: The Assembly’s 
Fifth Committee suggested attention to the ‘principle of curtailment’ for all producing countries 
and praised the experiment of sending a League inquiry to Persia but offered nothing in terms of 
an elaborate policy in response to the report.307 In other words, Persia was given a free pass to 
pursue its own agenda regarding opium production – there was no palpable pressure from the 
League to impose any of the specific recommendations made by the commission. Persia’s pre-
emptive acceptance of a curtailment was considered as a sufficient step and perhaps served as a 
distraction from a thorough consideration of the situation in the country. Likewise, the League’s 
Opium Advisory Committee only scratched the surface of the issue – it noted some regret about 
the limited reduction in the preparatory programme suggested by Persia but was pleased with 
the government’s plan to ratify the 1925 Geneva Opium Convention – one outcome of the Second 
Opium Conference. The committee’s emphasis lay on a formal adherence to general restriction of 
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the illicit production and trade of opium; this meant a supply-side focus with little regard for the 
reforms that would be undertaken by the Persian Government.308 
How did the opium situation in Persia change in the following years – and to what degree did the 
inquiry provoke a change in the government’s policies? There is general agreement in the 
scholarship that Persia took several steps towards closing legal gaps, notably with legalisation 
that required state licenses and penalised the smuggling of illicit opium products. However, the 
government monopoly that was created through licenses and additional bureaucratic control did 
not directly serve the purpose of supply control – as desired by the League and a number of 
imperial powers. Rather, as McLaughlin and Quinn have argued, ‘the history of this period shows 
revenue production gradually emerging as the dominant purpose’ through the state monopoly on 
opium.309  
There is no indication that Persia’s opium cultivation significantly decreased in real terms in the 
following years. Rather, the improved control system meant that previously clandestine 
production and trade now passed through the hands of the state – consequently with an increase 
in government revenue. This was a welcome development for the Reza Khan Pahlavi regime, since 
the improved tax collection and state monopolies on agricultural products (including opium and 
some of its substitute crops) furthered the étatist agenda – not requiring a foreign loan to make 
investments. More than anything else, the Persian Government sought to strengthen its security 
and independence vis-à-vis outsiders. Road construction and industrialisation were pursued to 
the extent they served this agenda, kept foreign commercial actors at bay, and helped to eliminate 
any domestic opposition. For K.S. Maclachlan, ‘[i]t has been suggested with some truth, that Riza 
Shah's concern with the economy arose solely from his preoccupation with military 
requirements.’310 As a result, opium production was moved into licit trade but largely left 
unbridled, in Persia but also elsewhere, despite the international control regime instituted by the 
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League. Supply control had achieved no change in actual production curtailment, only a shift from 
illicit to licit trade, which caused problems with excessive stock through the 1930s and was 
mirrored in other opium-producing countries. In fact, the unbalanced focus on supply-control had 
done little to decrease opium demand, nor stop manufacturers from moving their drugs 
production elsewhere – a development which was recognised at a League Opium Conference in 
Bangkok in 1931 although no solution would be found during the next decade.311 
In light of the developments after the inquiry’s visit, Rachel Crowdy’s mention in a 1927 
publication of ‘an amazing offer was made by the Persian Government’ towards the reduction of 
opium production, following the inquiry, may have been too optimistic a statement.312 The 
country pursued the reforms desired by the League only to the extent these were aligned with its 
domestic agenda of national revitalisation – for Reza Khan Pahlavi a return to ‘former 
greatness’.313 Since the inquiry only constituted a brief assignment in the careers of the 
commissioners, their views on the aftermath of the inquiry are hard to obtain. Delano’s archives 
reveal some correspondence with the Council of Foreign Relations regarding a talk he gave after 
his trip to Persia, but few of his later writings explicitly refer to his time spent working for the 
League. In relation to the inquiry, Delano only noted (consistent with his previous views) that the 
work ‘was intended evidently as an economic study of Persia, but became more in the nature of a 
reconnaissance or preliminary survey rather than a complete investigation’, thereby 
acknowledging the limited potential of the study as well as ‘inadequacy of definite data’.314 
The aftermath shows how the League inquiry had provoked a discussion about opium production 
but failed to materialise into a sustained effort to tackle the problem of excess production in 
Persia. From an imperial internationalist perspective, competing interests had raised pressure on 
Persia to step in line with an international regime, but failed to impose their will on Reza Khan’s 
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domestic agenda. The inquiry had led to a brief discussion about opium trade, focused on one 
country, but did not provoke a wider consideration of the inadequacies of a supply-control 
regime. A second inquiry into opium, organised in 1930 to underpin the Bangkok Opium 
Conference one year later, investigated a wider range of countries in East Asia but similarly did 
little to change the international legal framework for narcotics.315 As a result, the establishment 
of the Persia inquiry in 1925-26 should be considered as timely at most, in the context of the 
political configurations at the domestic and international level. In hindsight, it took place because 
the Persian Government wanted a form of international legitimacy for its wider agenda of 
national revitalisation; from the League’s perspective, it created the verisimilitude of genuine 
efforts to combat illicit production and trading of narcotic drugs. In practice, the quest for 
knowledge and truth about opium production in Persia may have been exclusively driven by 
political calculations in Persia and abroad. 
Conclusion 
The League inquiry into opium production in Persia came into existence due to a coalescence of 
historical developments during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Contingencies and 
the financial appeal of a cash crop made opium into a widely cultivated and exported product – 
to the detriment of investments in more intensive parts of the agricultural sector. The opium 
poppy became a symbol at the forefront of politics when Persia sought to regain its standing at 
the regional and international level – marked by the rise of Reza Khan Pahlavi – and reduce the 
influence of foreign powers on its domestic and foreign policy. Through the imperial 
internationalist framework, this chapter has concentrated on examples of political contestation 
and diplomatic bargaining at both the domestic and international level.  
Reza Khan’s plans for national revitalisation and silencing domestic opposition were reliant on 
additional government revenue gained from opium – through the monopolisation of agricultural 
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crops. In the 1920s, the strengthening of national sovereignty was pursued through a dual policy; 
on the one hand strengthening ties with the United States (as a counter-balance to a century of 
British and Russian influence) and on the other hand finding a distinct voice in the international 
arena (most notably through the League of Nations). Power relations and political contestation 
were essential in the creation of the international narcotics regime from the early twentieth 
century onwards, the result of a diplomatic struggle between abolitionist countries such as the 
United States and the more permissive European imperial powers. The outcome was an 
international legal framework that focused on the supply control of illicit narcotics drugs; through 
the League, pressure was raised on opium-producing countries to crack down on the black opium 
market, but little was done to tackle the wider problem of excess (licit) production. Quite the 
reverse, the succession of international conferences and conventions strengthened the hold of 
state monopolies over the production process of narcotics drugs. 
Opium served as a diplomatic tool for Persia in the 1920s, a means to let its voice be heard in the 
international arena. Although the Persian suggestion for inquiry into opium-producing countries 
was initially made to attract financial help from abroad, instead, it became a mechanism to 
legitimise a domestic reform agenda. The pressure to cut back on illicit production, resulting from 
the powers that made up the international narcotics regime, was kept at bay. Instead, Persia’s 
cooperation with the League through an inquiry gave it the autonomy to set its own agenda in the 
aftermath of the investigation, no longer dependent on financial assistance. The individuals on 
the Persia Commission, chosen by the League’s Secretariat, remained unaware of the complex 
diplomatic game they were thrown into. Only MacLeish took a critical approach to the outside 
interests that were being served in the inquiry. 
The League’s Social Section and to some extent the wider Secretariat supported the inquiry in its 
establishment and preparation for travel. The League’s search for commissioners was a process 
of compromise but followed criteria of profession and expertise that were set out by the 
Assembly. However, the Social Section was a minor part of the Secretariat and the ad-hoc 
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recruitment of individuals meant there was little in terms of continuity – although the inquiry 
was to inspire a second inquiry in East Asia several years later. In the end, working conditions on 
the ground were to a large extent conditioned by the specificity of the country and the agency of 
the chosen candidates. League interests in the inquiry were complicated because of American 
financial interests in the success of the undertaking – although it is unclear how the Social Hygiene 
Bureau evaluated the results of the cooperation. 
The inquiry’s findings revealed a tension between the precise mandate set by the League’s 
Assembly and a larger desire expressed by the commissioners to address Persia’s economic and 
societal problems. A civilisational standard was palpable in the report, by way of linking the 
ubiquity of opium with moral and racial deficiencies of the country and its population. The 
commission’s report was a composite document, built upon the expertise gained from previous 
work in the colonies and foreign expertise in Persia, that reflected imperial idioms, modes and 
repertoires but was based on a limited amount of statistical evidence. Its conclusions were a 
compromise to the extent that commissioners as agents on the ground – particularly Delano and 
MacLeish – may have differed over the extent to which the commission should recommend an 
economic transformation of the country. The inquiry settled on a gradual reform programme 
which earned the consent of the Persian Government. The commission’s fact-finding mission as 
well as its recommendations were to be taken as a blueprint for other countries. 
The report never turned out to be crucial to the entire undertaking, as Persia had agreed to a 
reform programme before the findings were written down and made public. The pre-emptive 
move by the Persian Government gave it agency over the outcome of the inquiry process. Was the 
commission’s presence sufficient to put pressure on Persia? Although the report sparked some 
international attention, it mostly served to legitimise a Persian reform agenda. Rather than crack 
down on the production and consumption of opium, the reform agenda was made a cornerstone 
of the state-led development of the economy and infrastructure. While the inquiry may have 
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instigated a number of legal changes, related to narcotics, its largest effect was perhaps 
unintended: it strengthened Reza Khan’s grip over revenues gained from the cash crop.  
The mixed outcome of the League efforts to curtail the production and trade of opium make it 
hard to determine the place and legacy of the inquiry. Delano rightly and consistently perceived 
the investigation as a limited reconnaissance rather than an exhaustive study. The Persia 
Commission lacked the knowledge of local conditions and the time to commit to a study that could 
paint an accurate picture based on a variety of local sources. The general blueprint served a 
political purpose of highlighting Persia’s need to modernise, but did little to change domestic 
policy or strengthen restrictions on narcotics supply. The League’s mechanisms, legal and 
investigatory, provided no means to stop the excesses in production that would be created under 
a state monopoly in the 1930s. Its actions were constrained by domestic agency as well as 
competing interests at the international level over the type of international narcotics regime, 
developments that gave rise to League action in the first place. 
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4: The Inquiry Commission for Slavery and Forced Labour in Liberia 
Opening the closed door 
“It is one of the ironies of history that Liberia, which was established nearly a hundred 
years ago as a haven for the Negro race, should now be found guilty of the most 
distressing traffic in human beings that has been revealed in recent years.” 
(Raymond Leslie Buell, “The Liberian Paradox”, 1931) 
 
“I had been afraid of the primitive, had wanted it broken gently, but here it came on us in 
a breath, as we stumbled up through the dung and the cramped and stinking huts to our 
lampless sleeping place among the rats. It was the worst one need fear,  
and it was bearable because it was inescapable.” 
(Graham Greene, Journey Without Maps, 1936) 
 
Introduction 
In 1929 the recurring allegations of forced labour and practices analogous to slavery in Liberia 
pushed the independent black republic towards international scrutiny in the form of an inquiry. 
A commission was established with the participation of Liberia, the United States and the League 
of Nations to confirm on the ground whether rumours about the transport and abuse of labourers 
as well as slavery were true. Allegations had surfaced in several publications written by European 
and American travellers, academics and the British Anti-Slavery Society in the 1920s but the 
matter gained importance when Thomas Faulkner, a former presidential candidate for Liberia, 
claimed there was ongoing and wide-spread abuse of labourers for private profit, a system 
sanctioned and encouraged by government officials.316 Under pressure of the US State 
Department and with eventual participation of the League of Nations, the Liberian Government 
conceded to the organisation of an international inquiry composed of three men. 
Although the scandal that erupted over slavery and forced labour had a domestic character, it 
became internationalised for three distinct reasons. First, part of the allegations concerned the 
export of labourers to the Spanish-controlled island of Fernando Po, therefore another country 
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was affected by the matter.317 Second, leading black intellectuals in the United States, among 
others W.E.B. Du Bois, Georges Schuyler and Marcus Garvey, showed strong concern with the fate 
of Liberia, a rare example of an independent black republic governed by a group of descendants 
of American slaves.318 Third, Liberia as a member of the League of Nations had signed up the 
Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery of 1926, although it had refrained from 
ratifying the agreement until the labour scandal broke out.319 
The convention was a fruitful outcome of a League initiative to gather more information over the 
treatment of the native labourers in Africa, particularly for public purposes, although the 
European colonial powers lobbied to have all enforcement mechanisms scrapped. However, the 
watered-down convention still had consequences, albeit uneven, as it strengthened the League’s 
hand to keep the forced labour question ‘before the public’ and forced colonial administrations 
and governments to legally abolish all forms of slavery.320 Forced labour and practices analogous 
to slavery still existed in many parts of Africa, but when it came to an actual investigation to collect 
evidence, this only occurred in Liberia, a display of the inequal treatment of an independent 
republic as opposed to the surrounding mandates and colonial territories controlled by major 
European powers.321 
The internationalisation of the Liberian scandal, aided by external public and diplomatic pressure 
as well as international law, also had profound domestic consequences for the ruling political 
class and the administration of the country. As this chapter will show, it resulted in high-level 
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government resignations and spurred a discussion about foreign supervision of reforms of 
interior administration in the aftermath of the commission’s report. The League investigation laid 
bare an extensive system of forced labour for public and private purposes that provoked outrage 
upon the publication of the report; apart from the Italian campaign in Abyssinia in the late 1930s, 
this made it a major example of a labour scandal in the twentieth century.322 While the Abyssinian 
case is well documented by major scholars working on the history of slavery, there remains a 
palpable gap when it concerns Liberia.323 It is treated as a separate subject, encapsulated in the 
historiographical writings on the African-American diasporic community. Yet, many of the case’s 
characteristics, the civilisational discourse and the investigative and supervisory modalities 
pursued by the League, speak to the literature on slavery, but equally the League’s ‘sacred trust’ 
with Africa and the international governance of mandates. As such, the Liberian case should be 
considered as a logical connection between the discussions concerning the 1926 Convention and 
the Italian invasion of Abyssinia.324 
While the labour scandal forms the main focus on the chapter, there is a longer history of Liberia 
that created conditions of multi-level political contestation, encountered by the League’s inquiry 
commission when it undertook its investigation in the spring of 1930. In a first part, the chapter 
will elaborate on how the young republic fell victim of tensions between the American arrivals 
who settled on the coastal lands and the native interior population. The young republic had few 
means for (industrial) economic development and limited resources it could process and export. 
During the early twentieth century, Liberia encouraged the export of its labourers: by way of a 
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legal agreement the hinterland population could go to neighbouring countries and take up 
temporary employment. 
Many years later, when Francis Walters described Liberia as a ‘poor and neglected African step-
child of the United States’ during this period325, he overlooked the assertive policies the US 
conducted in the 1920s and the intensity of diplomatic contacts, related to sanitary help, financial 
administration, communication technology and economic enterprise.326 Rather, as Hassan Sisay 
has argued in his book and this chapter will demonstrate, the US State Department regularly 
engaged with Liberian affairs in a way which can be described as active and paternal – which left 
it exposed to criticism from the African American press at home.327 
The United States had taken a more pro-active foreign policy (‘the open door’) and encouraged 
its private companies to invest in Liberia, to the detriment of European trade interests. In an 
example detailed in this chapter, the United States Firestone Company gained a foreign 
concession on rubber in the 1920s, in return for extending a private loan to the Liberian 
Government. Firestone’s activities in Liberia boosted demand for domestic employment; this 
competition and allegations of abuses (concerning forced labour) necessitated the government 
to end its legal agreement for the export of labour to neighbouring countries. However, 
government officials and private individuals kept a lucrative, clandestine system running to 
forcibly export labourers to other parts of West Africa.328 
Domestic tension was a consequence of Americo-Liberians who took advantage of native 
labourers but was aggravated with the involvement of the United States, because of the open door 
policy and the Firestone investments. Allegations of forced labour and conditions analogous to 
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slavery led the US Secretary of State to act – partly out of protection of economic interests. The 
Liberian Government initially refused all claims but eventually caved in to the suggestion of 
organising an international commission, formally under the auspices of the League with the 
participation of the United States and Liberia. In the US, the prospect of an investigation sparked 
a wider debate over the black republic’s capacity to organise its own affairs and its future as an 
independent country. The internationalisation of the labour scandal through the League of 
Nations created an additional source of contestation, between a small republic trying to preserve 
its autonomy and major foreign powers keen to extend their authority under the veil of 
administrative reforms. As W.E.B Du Bois summed it up: ‘[Liberia] needs expert advice; but expert 
advice from white men, accompanied by invested capital, means loss of political power. And 
Liberia is jealous of her independence – jealous and proud.’329 
This chapter on the League’s involvement in Liberian affairs through inquiry elucidates how the 
dispatch of the inquiry commission occurred in an imperial internationalist context dominated 
by multi-level power entanglements: on the local level, the competition between Liberian elites 
and the hinterland population over who should rule, on the national level the pressure exerted 
by the Unites States on the republic, through economic and diplomatic means; and finally, the 
League that questioned Liberia’s capacity to manage the administration of its interior territories. 
The inquiry and its aftermath turned into a debate hinged upon a standard of civilisation: whether 
white supervision was deemed as necessary, through technical assistance or a rumoured 
mandate over Liberia. Although forced labour and practices analogous to slavery were not 
restricted to one country, it was the fragility of the Liberian state, with unstable finances and 
surrounded in West Africa by imperial powers and mandated territories, that steered 
international scrutiny and diplomatic pressure towards it. 
Tensions at the domestic, national and international level were reproduced at the heart of the 
commission, as it pursued its assignment to gather facts and seek truth about the forced labour 
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and slavery allegations. From an institutional perspective, the protracted negotiations between 
the United States and Liberia over the terms of reference of the commission, outside of the 
League’s organisational structure, resulted in a broad mandate for the commission to investigate 
all labour relations in the country and the power to make recommendations to the government. 
The team, made up of a British medical physician, an American sociologist and a former Liberian 
president, was given personal agency to decide upon the investigatory means and the precise 
interpretation of the terms of reference, particularly whether the matter of foreign assistance 
could be discussed. In turn, the commission’s report would have an impact on prevailing power 
relations, as Liberia sought to fend off foreign actors’ accusations of uncivilised practices. The 
United States kept the pressure on its government to remain amenable to open trade, whereas 
the League discussed technical assistance to achieve administrative reform under the guise of 
Western experts. This chapter shows a unique case of a League inquiry, on an issue which may be 
regarded as proto-human rights and therefore a historical precedent to the increasing reliance 
on humanitarian interventions in international politics after the Second World War.330 It testifies 
how the League at the same time could act as an enabler of international agreements, investigate 
and pressure into reform, but was also restrained by the interests of its larger member states and 
outside powers. International public opinion was a means to extend scrutiny, but equally for 
Liberia to defend itself in Geneva against the accusations. 
The origins 
On 19 September 1929, the Government of the Liberian Republic informed the Council of the 
League of Nations that the matter of slavery and forced labour would be put ‘into the hands of an 
International Inquiry Commission, which shall meet on the spot and, by means of an impartial, 
serious, and detailed investigation, to find out whether slavery and forced labour are or are not 
practised in Liberia.’331 The call for an international inquiry into alleged conditions of slavery and 
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forced labour appeared to be initiated by the Liberian Government, however, the idea to launch 
an inquiry did not come out of the blue. The inquiry was the outcome of a long and sustained 
diplomatic tussle between the United States and Liberia in which the League did not take part. 
Liberia’s unique relationship with the United States is inherently linked to the domestic tensions 
that led to allegations and scandal over forced labour and conditions analogous to slavery. 
Liberated captives and descendants of freed slaves from America had come to the shores of West 
Africa in the early nineteenth century. These Americo-Liberian coastal settlers monopolised 
political power and declared the independence of a free and sovereign republic named Liberia in 
1847. Within the new republic, they quickly dominated the government in the capital of 
Monrovia, situated on the coast, and tried to subject the large number of native tribes living in the 
hinterland to direct control – a structure of colonial rule similar to elsewhere in Africa.332 This led 
to regular clashes between the Americo-Liberian settlers and the native population, as the former 
sought to interfere with the long-held customs and practices of the latter. Threats to the Americo-
Liberian rule did not only come from within the country, but also from European imperial powers 
such as Great Britain and France that sought expansion of their colonial possessions in the region 
and had their eyes on the young and fragile republic. This motivated the Liberian leadership to 
remain, at least for some time, suspicious of European traders and keep its economy protected 
from foreign interests (i.e. a closed door policy).333  
The power of the Americo-Liberians consolidated itself during the second half of the nineteenth 
century, through the establishment of the True Whig Party that dominated the political system 
from 1878 until 1980. Despite the stability of rule, Liberia proved unable to develop the 
infrastructure and labour skills required to adequately exploit the country’s resources. The 
republic repeatedly ran into financial difficulties and was forced to find foreign creditors to pay 
its debts – help which came with increased calls for a more effective administration of the 
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territory. The Americo-Liberian elite in Monrovia undertook several attempts to rein in the 
indigenous tribes living in the hinterland. Attempts to extend administrative control and turn the 
population into labourers were met with suspicion and rebellion; they also came with the first 
rumours of abusive exploitation. Hence, domestic contestation between the Monrovian elite and 
the hinterland in this period sowed the seeds of future allegations concerning forced labour.334 
The Liberian Government rethought its protective economic policy in the early twentieth century, 
when it began to experiment with an open approach to the domestic economy. The presidency of 
Arthur Barclay (1904-1912) created momentum for change, with a series of ‘open door’ economic 
reforms, modelled on policies introduced by the US with regard to China, aimed at establishing 
indirect rule over the hinterland, improve local tax collection and attract foreign investments – 
for commerce and banking, but in particular for the production of rubber.335 In 1906, Liberia 
negotiated an agreement with British investors to establish a rubber plantation near Monrovia, 
as well as a private loan to repay outstanding government debts. However, two years after the 
agreement the partnership would come to a halt as Liberia tried to renegotiate the conditions of 
the British loan. The Liberian Government, fearful of increased British control over its economy, 
sought to check the British investors by establishing closer relations with the United States.336 
During the nineteenth century there was initial reluctance from the US Government to engage 
with Liberian affairs, in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine. However, by the turn of the 
century support grew within political circles to strengthen American influence abroad through a 
foreign policy that promoted ‘open door’ economic policies. After Liberia, the ‘off-shoot’ West 
African republic created by descendants of American slaves, had sent out a call for assistance, the 
US was ready to play a role of protector and patron.337 In particular, the Roosevelt (1901-1909) 
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and Taft (1909-1913) presidencies favoured closer ties with Liberia. Although there had been 
murmurs within the State Department of turning Liberia into a ‘quasi-protectorate’, there was 
hostility in both countries to the idea of Americanisation.338  
The US Government chose to tread carefully before committing any assistance to Liberia; it 
decided to send out an inquiry commission to investigate the problems faced by the republic. In 
May 1909, a three-man commission visited Liberia, according to commissioner Emmett J. Scott, 
‘to ascertain what measures of relief were needed to enable [the Liberians] to preserve their 
government as an independent one.’339 Scott, a black educator and close friend to President Taft, 
was sent to Monrovia together with two white colleagues and encouraged to find a way to end 
Liberia’s (financial) dependence on the European colonial powers. In his recollection, Scott was 
referring to evidence of the continued existence of slavery, an issue that troubled the Liberian 
republic. After one month, the inquiry commission returned homed and urged the US to offer 
substantial assistance to Liberia, including the provision of a private loan, training of the military 
and aid in the collection of customs. A new loan was provided in 1912 but no action was taken 
when it came to the issue of slavery.340 
After the outbreak of the First World War, the Republic of Liberia ran again into financial 
difficulties, due to a steady withdrawal of foreign investments in the country. Before the war, 
Germany had become a significant trading partner of Liberia, serving as an export market for local 
products. The First World War caused a cataclysmic economic shock, rendering Liberia 
increasingly dependent on the United States. From 1918 to 1921, it made attempts to obtain a 
new American public loan to repay its debts, however, a loan proposal did not pass through the 
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US Congress – as the Senate was hesitant to extend a new loan to the African nation. Desperate 
for alternatives, the Liberians sought to further open the hinterland to foreign investment and 
stimulate trade with other countries. In addition, there were plans to encourage capital injections 
from black Americans from the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA, led by Marcus 
Garvey), although these plans were abandoned later out of fear for an influx of black Americans. 
Also, the steady improvement of the world economy after 1923 dissipated the immediate need 
for a loan for the country to remain solvent.341 
Despite the setback of the public loan programme, the questions of financial assistance and the 
‘open door’ economic policy were kept on the table by the US Government. The Coolidge 
administration (1923-1929) favoured close but informal ties with the Liberian republic, 
conscientious of the Congress’ tendency towards isolationism. While the State Department 
endeavoured for a closer involvement with Liberia, it relied on private citizens to act as 
representatives of the United States. In the inter-war period, ‘foreign policies were mainly shaped 
by missionaries, explorers, foundations and corporations informally representing the federal 
government’.342 Making use of private corporations and foundations the US could pursue its 
expansionist economic policies, seeking raw materials and export markets abroad, while 
retaining the perception of a being a humane state rather than a colonial player. Moreover, 
indirect involvement meant it could turn its back on insupportable practices such as corruption, 
slavery and forced labour. 
The interest and involvement of the US Government in Liberian affairs are best demonstrated 
with the example of Firestone, a major American tire company that sought to gain access to 
rubber plantations in the West African republic. The story of Firestone is of relevance here, since 
it provides evidence for the way in which the US State Department facilitated contacts with the 
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Liberian Government. Moreover, several years later the Firestone concession came under 
scrutiny, for its alleged participation in the abuse in a forced labour scheme. In 1926, the first 
contacts were established between the Liberian Government and Firestone, as the latter sought 
to increase rubber production to supply a booming US economy. The US Chargé in Monrovia, 
Clifton Reginald Wharton, wrote to US Secretary of State Henry Stimson in support of a 
concession, as ‘no better opportunity is available than Liberia’ and ‘American influence should be 
felt in Africa.’343 In other words, American foreign policy interests coincided with the Firestone 
agenda: rubber was a strategic economic resource and a Liberian concession, if gained, would 
provide the US economy with its own supply and end the overdependence on European 
producers.344 
Harvey Firestone Sr., Firestone Company’s owner, suggested to tie the rubber concession, i.e. a 
long-term lease of plantation grounds, to a private loan extended to the Liberian Government – 
similar to the public loan requested years before.345 For the US Government, a private loan had 
the advantage of bypassing a reluctant Senate while taking a tangible economic stake in Liberia – 
through the Firestone concession. In return, it was believed that the Liberians would favour 
American protection ‘to secure the nation’s borders from French and British encroachments.’346 
However, the negotiations that took place between Firestone and the Liberian Government ended 
up being more protracted than anticipated. The Firestone negotiators proposed to make the loan 
conditional upon the inclusion of a (foreign) financial adviser and an extensive dispute-
settlement procedure. The Liberian Government, led by President Charles Dunbar King, showed 
division over these issues and feared that Firestone (and the US) would gain too much control 
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over the financial and economic levers of the country.347 For instance, King’s Secretary of State, 
Edwin Barclay, who had a powerful voice within the cabinet, was known to the State Department 
as someone hostile towards the US and anxious to preserve Liberia’s sovereignty and 
independence.348 
The State Department took no official part in the negotiations but allowed the US Legation in 
Monrovia to play a mediating role in the background. 349 The US Chargé notified the Secretary of 
State about the stance taken by President King, as someone who ‘is in favour of American interests 
in Liberia’ but who could also adopt a hostile tone to accommodate the Liberian legislature.350 
Despite prolongations of the negotiations, the Firestone concession and loan agreement was 
ratified by 1927. Up until this point, the State Department’s strategy consisted of a backseat 
approach to Liberian affairs, to exert American (economic) influence without being perceived as 
too interventionist. The ratification of the agreement appeared to vindicate the approach, 
however, a series of events in the following years would call this into question. Particularly, the 
implication of the Firestone Company in a forced labour scandal risked raising pressure on the 
US Government. 
The catalyst 
The first trembles were set off by the 1927 presidential elections in Liberia, when Charles King 
(representing the True Whig Party) ran against Thomas J.R. Faulkner of the People’s Party. Both 
candidates campaigned for an ‘open door’ economic policy, although Faulkner accused the 
incumbent of not having done much to make the Liberian economy accessible to additional 
foreign investment. Despite the critique, King won a stunning victory with more than 240,000 
votes, while his opponent garnered a meagre 9,000 votes. It was a victory too good to be true. 
Since Liberia only had an electorate of 15,000 registered voters at the time, the 1927 elections 
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were decisively rigged in favour of the incumbent and later came to be known as ‘the most 
fraudulent election’ in recorded history.351 Faulkner refused the accept his defeat and continued 
over the next years to criticise unabatedly the Liberian Government for the fraudulent elections 
and other woes. 
The rigged elections of 1927 failed to provoke strong international condemnation, except for the 
African American press in the United States.352 The State Department took no issue with the 
Liberian Government’s conduct of the election; most likely, it considered that another cabinet led 
by King was a reasonable interlocutor and would uphold the Firestone agreement. Therefore, the 
Liberian President did not seek to offset the growing US economic interest with other foreign 
investors. For a brief period, it appeared the election issue could be overlooked, but Liberian 
affairs returned to the front stage as new stories were published, both from academic and press 
circles. 
Allegations of slavery and forced labour were longstanding and had occasionally resurfaced in 
the previous decades. However, during the second half of the 1920s, they took on a more 
prominent role in the American and European popular imagination of Liberia. Published studies 
and travellers accounts of the region, such as The Black Republic by H.F. Reeve and Slavery by 
Kathleen Simon, presented anecdotal evidence of abysmal labour conditions.353 Most of these 
publications only dealt with the past, not with the present, and provided a personal, often 
hyperbolic view of the situation. One publication, however, stirred up more than the usual 
sentiment. Raymond Leslie Buell, a Harvard Professor, spent fifteen months in Liberia collecting 
evidence on working conditions in Africa, which led to the publication of The Native Problem of 
Africa in 1928. Buell revealed a system of procurement in Liberia that closely resembled 
conditions of compulsory labour and accused the Firestone Company and Liberian government 
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officials of their involvement. According to Ibrahim Sundiata, Buell’s book was harder to dismiss 
as fragmentary evidence and constituted an ‘immediate catalyst’ for international action, as it 
contained an attack both on Firestone and the US State Department, ‘for callous economic 
imperialism in Africa.’354 Buell, however, did not constitute the only critical voice and the catalyst 
was manifold. 
As mentioned before, the American press kept an eye on Liberian affairs. There was the occasional 
mention of Liberia in the local newspaper. For example, the Chicago Tribune of 27 March 1928 
ran a story on ‘American negroes and Liberia’, describing the disappointment of black American 
named Arthur Sewell who moved to the country in search for betterment but only found appalling 
conditions of life: ‘Slavery, he found, had been left behind there, but not far behind.’355 
Nevertheless, the general press did not cover Liberia as closely compared to the Afro-American, a 
leading newspaper of the black community in the US. Based in Baltimore, the newspaper was one 
of the earliest supporters of Marcus Garvey and his UNIA – that had encouraged black investment 
and migration to Liberia. For Garvey, the independent republic, as an example of black self-
government, played a major role in the development of the idea of Pan-Africanism.356  
From 1926 onwards, however, the Afro-American began to critically report on events in Liberia; 
it denounced the Firestone concession and allowed Thomas Faulkner to substantiate claims about 
the rigged presidential elections and the working conditions of native Liberians. Faulkner 
received wide coverage in the newspaper and could freely criticise the King administration for its 
involvement in corruption and the illicit recruitment of labour. Increasingly, the Afro-American 
turned from critical reporting on the US Government and its economic interests in Liberia, to the 
abuses perpetrated by the Americo-Liberian elite. The abandonment of support by the King 
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administration for Garvey’s UNIA explains the change of tone in the reporting by the Baltimore 
newspaper.357 
Initially, the State Department only chose to respond to the charges made by Buell in his 
publication and ignored the critical views expressed in the Afro-American. The US Secretary of 
State suggested the Legation in Monrovia to have the Liberian Government prepare a press 
statement to deny all accusations related to the Firestone concession.358 Shortly thereafter, 
President King delivered a statement that refuted all claims made by Buell, whether they related 
to the concession, the loan agreement or Firestone’s involvement in a coercive labour scheme. 
King had little to say about the general labour conditions in Liberia but welcomed ‘an 
investigation on the spot by an impartial commission’ to assess whether the allegations were true 
or false.359 Although no specifics were provided, this was the first mention of an inquiry. However, 
the Liberian Government did not make a start on the organisation of a commission, as it hoped 
the statement would end the matter. After King’s response to the allegations, the US Secretary of 
State cabled the President of Liberia, to confirm that the statement ‘should effectively dispose of 
any erroneous or misguided impressions which may have been created in this country or 
elsewhere by Professor Buell’s statements.’360  
In 1929, new evidence emerged that reaffirmed there were serious deficiencies in Liberian labour 
conditions. A report prepared by the Bishop of the Episcopal Church in Liberia, Dr Robert Patton, 
acquired by the US Legation in Liberia in March 1929, led to sudden alarm at the State Department 
– and was a stronger catalyst for action. More than Buell, the Bishop’s report was perceived as a 
dispassionate investigation by the State Department: ‘from several sources reports bearing 
reliable evidence of authenticity’, it confirmed the existence of a system of forced labour export 
between Liberia and the island of Fernando Po, an island off the African coast under Spanish 
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administration.361 Soon after, the US Secretary of State requested a copy of the report, which the 
Episcopal Church had previously prepared, and warned for the risk of being criticised over a 
possible leak to the press:  
‘If it should get into the papers and the country believed that we had known all about it 
and had done nothing, we should be terrible criticised. […] if the story gets out in this 
country and there is a row in the press, we should be able to say that we have acted and 
what we have done.’362 
The State Department’s switch towards action suggests it was caught off-guard by the report and 
did not carefully check whether allegations expressed by Buell and reports in the press were true. 
The Episcopal Church report shifted the emphasis away from Firestone, towards the matter of 
labour export, the exploitation of the native population by Americo-Liberian elites, which made 
it easier for the State Department to increase pressure on the Liberian Government, rather than 
the Firestone Company. 
US Secretary of State Stimson was aware that time was of the essence if new evidence would leak 
to the American press. Hence, he prepared a note for the Liberian Government that set out the 
serious nature of the Patton report, summarising its findings and specifying the involvement of 
high-ranking government officials in the labour export system.363 The Liberian response, through 
its Secretary of State Edwin Barclay, was a denial of all allegations: he imparted that they were 
based on older, recurring charges and specified that the labour shipments to Fernando Po were 
based on a voluntary system. Although there was a categorical refusal to accept any facts, the door 
was left open for ‘an impartial investigation’ to disclose the facts of the matter.364 The suggestion 
for an inquiry into forced labour may have been another bluff, however, one that the US Secretary 
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of State took up with eagerness. In subtle terms it proposed what the Liberian Government should 
consider: 
‘the Liberian Government will no doubt in the exercise of its sovereign rights desire to 
appoint an investigation committee with full powers to determine the truth or falsity of 
the accusations which have received such wide credence as no longer to be ignored […] 
the Liberian Government will doubtlessly desire to appoint an impartial committee made 
up of Liberians and non-nationals of Liberia”365 
In using language of encouragement and friendly instruction, Stimson had framed the possibility 
of an inquiry according to an approach favoured by the United States, namely an international 
team of impartial investigators. The organisation of an international investigation would give the 
US Government leverage over the Liberians to act upon the allegations. Moreover, an inquiry 
would absolve the United States from its earlier inaction (before the Patton report). A row in the 
American press was now less likely. 
The negotiations over the terms of reference commenced soon thereafter, after the US had 
secured the Liberian Government’s acceptance of an international commission at the end of June 
1929.366 The timing appeared to be favourable: former presidential candidate Thomas J.R. 
Faulkner had continued to stir the discussion about Liberia with several interviews on the subject 
of the fraudulent elections, slavery and forced labour in The Crisis, a monthly paper founded by 
W.E.B Du Bois.367 Faulkner was also set to travel to Geneva in order to have a meeting with Eric 
Drummond, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.368 Up until then, the affair had only 
gained traction in the African American press and Buell’s publication but now risked exposure in 
political circles – Liberia as a signatory to the 1926 Convention was subject to scrutiny by the 
League’s institutional bodies and risked a clash between American and European interests. To 
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recall, European traders had seen their (economic) influence in Liberia diminish in the previous 
decades. 
Before turning to the establishment of the inquiry commission, it is worthwhile to revisit the 
strategies pursued both by the United States and Liberia with regard to the allegations. The State 
Department raised pressure on its Liberian counterpart to appoint an international investigation, 
however, only after a long period of denial and inactivity. The State Department feared 
implications for Firestone and by extension US economic interests in Liberia but kept the belief 
that allegations by Buell and the Baltimore Afro-American would quickly be forgotten if 
disavowed by the Liberians. It was only with the continued threat posed by Faulkner travelling 
to Geneva, and more importantly mounting evidence from other sources, that the Department 
began to proactively handle what was turning into a public relations disaster and could still have 
ramifications for the Firestone investment. The sequence of events suggests that US pressure on 
Liberia was a consequence of improvisation rather than strategic management. 
The Liberian stake in the affair is harder to decipher, because a strong denial of all allegations 
was turned into a suggestion for an international commission. The Liberian cabinet had always 
been deeply divided, because the dominance of the True Whig Party had created internal factions 
vying for power. These internal dynamics played a role in shaping the outcome: a part of cabinet 
members had knowledge of the forced labour scheme and were complicit in its continuance, while 
others were not involved but felt they could strengthen their political hand through an exposure 
of the affair. Secretary Barclay’s bluff – to put the idea of an investigation on the table again – 
should be seen in this light, although Liberia would soon lose any advantage at the negotiation 
table by accepting suggestions from the US. The cabinet may have considered that the chances for 
an actual investigation taking place in Liberia were slim.369 
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In short, the inquiry commission into Liberia was not driven forward by a single catalyst but a 
series of events that revealed the complicated imperial internationalist context in which the 
allegations of forced labour had come to light. The continued scrutiny on the affair instilled 
worries at the State Department that more details would be leaked to the press and the United 
States could be accused of abetting the Liberian Government. Moreover, allegations of slavery and 
forced labour implied the involvement of other, potentially rival, actors – the League and its ILO 
– external meddling that could jeopardise the close economic relationship between the United 
States and Liberia. In turn, State Department pressure forced Liberia to accept some form of 
action to address the issue, while trying to give it a beneficial spin. Liberia would claim it was a 
voluntary decision – whereas excerpts of the negotiation show otherwise. In the end, power 
inequality and competing interests at the domestic and international level had increased the 
prospect of an investigation. 
The composition 
Liberia’s ‘voluntary decision’ before the League 
On 19 September 1929, the Permanent Delegate of Liberia Dr Antoine Sottile informed the 
Secretary-General of the League of Nations that the Liberian Government, in order to refute any 
statements with regard to slavery and forced labour, had ‘decided to put the matter into the hands 
of an International Inquiry Commission’.370 Earlier in September, Sottile had told the Sixth 
Committee of the Assembly of the League of Nations, that Liberia would be the first country to 
voluntarily organise an inquiry commission to investigate the allegations. As shown before, 
Liberia’s decision was not a voluntary one; rather, it was provoked by diplomatic negotiations 
with the United States.371 
The League’s involvement with the Liberian inquiry was late in comparison to other commissions, 
where it generally had instigated the establishment and the agreement of the terms of reference. 
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By the time the League participated in the negotiations, the United States and Liberia had already 
agreed on the specifics of the inquiry – which will be discussed below. For now, it is relevant to 
ask why the League’s involvement was required at only a late stage and how it subsequently 
shaped the organisation of the investigation. The United States initiated the first contact, when it 
notified the League’s ILO with a memorandum at an international conference in Geneva, of certain 
problems that had emerged with regard to forced labour in Liberia.372 The Liberian Government 
received a note from the ILO asking for more information concerning the allegations, after the 
United States had begun to exert pressure. Yet, Secretary of State Barclay told the US Legation he 
would not reply to the League, which effectively left the organisation in the dark about the 
ongoing discussions.373  
Neither country was willing to give the initiative to the League, to negotiate the terms of reference 
under the auspices of Geneva. Perhaps they feared intrusion, as the United States was not a 
League-member and Liberia remained reticent of European imperial interests. Yet, the two 
countries agreed that the inquiry commission needed an international composition and see some 
involvement of the League through the selection of a commissioner. The League would not reject 
an official request for help and its involvement could bring additional reassurances as to the 
impartiality of the investigation.374 The League’s support would signal to the outside world a 
dispassionate recognition of any facts found on the ground and the possibility to claim innocence 
in light of international public opinion – if the allegations were found untrue.375  
Terms of reference 
During the summer of 1929, the United States and Liberia discussed the terms of reference of the 
inquiry, a document that laid down the scope and limitations of the investigation. Similar to the 
Firestone concession, it took a considerable amount of time before the details were fleshed out. 
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This time, the State Department pursued a more assertive role in determining the framework of 
the inquiry. The terms of reference were set through direct negotiations between the United 
States and Liberia – the League remained on the side-lines until September. 
The Secretary of State stated in a communication on 22 June 1929 a desire ‘to have this question 
investigated on the spot by a competent, impartial and unprejudiced commission’ with ‘full 
powers’ to investigate the situation. 376 But what did this mean in practice, a competent, impartial 
and unprejudiced commission? And how would the extent of powers be determined? 
Additionally, the Secretary suggested that a Liberian, an American and European member, 
‘representative of general international interest’, would take part in the investigation.377 The 
United States had suggested a commission of an international character in the hope that the 
Liberian Government would find it harder to create obstacles to the investigation. On 4 July 1929 
Secretary of State Edwin Barclay gave notice of acceptance of the suggestion and informed that 
the Liberian Government would soon come up with a proposal for the terms of reference.378 
While the composition of the commission is inextricably linked with the terms of reference, this 
part of the negotiations will be addressed in the next section. Here, the focus is on the steps taken 
towards a general outline of the commission’s powers. The United States continued its pro-active 
stance over the next weeks, to shape the terms of reference so it would have a broad scope and 
give leeway to the commission to decide on which paths to pursue – particularly questions related 
to general labour conditions in Liberia and shipment of workers to other (colonial) territories.379 
This approach was meant to guarantee that all aspects of the labour scandal could be uncovered, 
however, it also provided cover in case the inquiry turned out to be a failure and the US was 
accused of negligence.380 
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The Liberian response was a draft of the terms of reference that was much narrower in scope 
than the United States had desired. For instance, the terms excluded forced labour for public 
purposes, a major component of the allegations, but included specific references to Firestone and 
the Spanish-held island Fernando Po. Nevertheless, no mention was made of other colonial 
territories implied in the export of Liberian labourers. Moreover, the inquiry was instructed to 
conclude its work within two months, with an additional month to prepare the report – a short 
time span for a thorough investigation.381 The draft was found as heavily deficient by the US 
Chargé in Liberia, who considered that the inclusion of labour for public purposes and shipments 
to colonial territories were key elements of a future investigation. For the Chargé, the legal 
framework had ‘no teeth and [left] the Commission powerless.’ This was an attempt by the 
Liberian Government to limit the investigation’s impact, as some high officials were anxious to 
conceal their role in the affair: ‘It is felt by the [Liberian] Cabinet to be unwise for the President 
and the Secretary of State to bluff by offering a commission of inquiry. The Cabinet is now seeking 
the best way out.’382 
The dispute over the terms of reference was resolved over several weeks in August, when ongoing 
pressure by the United States led the Liberian Government to concede on several points in favour 
of a broad scope for the inquiry. The commission received the power to investigate all aspects of 
labour relations in Liberia and had more time to undertake the assignment and prepare its report. 
On the surface it appeared the forceful negotiations by the United States had been successful, 
however, the Liberian side of the negotiations reveals a dynamic that better explains why the 
broad scope was quickly accepted. The suggestions made by the United States were agreed upon 
by the Liberian Secretary of State Edwin Barclay, who stood to gain most from a detailed 
investigation into the affair. After initial disagreement in the cabinet, Barclay gained the upper 
hand when it was increasingly evident that a number of his colleagues, such as Vice-President 
Allen N. Yancy, were implicated in the exploitation of Liberian labourers. If the labour scandal 
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would compromise the Vice-President, and even blemish President King, the way was open for 
Barclay to extend his power over the party and the cabinet. Hence, the Secretary of State 
overcame his hostility towards the United States, because it favoured his position in domestic 
politics.383 
Apart from the acceptance of the broad terms of reference, the Liberian Government also pledged 
to work towards the ratification of the 1926 Convention, whose protocols would serve as the 
standard for the commission to ‘judge facts’.384 Although the League was excluded from the 
negotiations, its importance for international law was considerate: the convention underscored 
the understanding of concepts such as forced labour and slavery. It is necessary to underline the 
importance of precedent here: the Liberian issue around allegations of forced labour and slavery 
became framed as a matter of international concern through the League’s legal mechanism, an 
example of how the imperial internationalist context shaped the discussion of the allegations. As 
the Liberian Consul General in the US put it, ‘the charge of slavery possesses humanitarian 
features and Liberia as a civilised government is too sensitive to attacks of this nature to allow it 
to pass without official notice.’385 Perhaps unintended, the League’s convention created a 
blueprint for the investigation of a humanitarian issue. 
The United States and Liberia accepted the final wording of the terms of reference by the end of 
August and the document was officially completed on 7 September 1929.386 The terms of 
reference specified the scope and limits of the inquiry in Liberia but had comparably little to say 
about the way in which impartiality was going to be ensured. Despite the diplomatic talk about a 
competent commission with unprejudiced views, the official guidelines did not submit how this 
would be attained. In other words, impartiality and competence boiled down to the choice of 
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individual commissioners to participate in the inquiry. The methods of inquiry and all related 
practices were left on an ad hoc basis, not benchmarked by any legal document or an international 
standard. 
The League was informed about the terms of reference shortly after they were agreed in early 
September. In Geneva, the prospect of an international investigation into compulsory labour 
created consternation among the European powers with colonial possessions: they feared that a 
precedent to a general investigation was being created. However, the 1926 Convention had been 
left toothless to enforce such a scenario. Moreover, the terms of reference for the Liberian inquiry 
was left sufficiently vague regarding the involvement of other countries – only the island of 
Fernando Po was explicitly mentioned. This reassured League representatives of Belgium, France, 
Portugal and Spain and they raised ‘no objection’ to Liberia’s decision.387 As foreshadowed in the 
imperial internationalist framework set out in the thesis, it was no surprise that the small, 
independent republic of Liberia, considered a weak state388 in international relations, was the 
only case of an investigation into forced labour. This was at a time when the League experimented 
with new forms of territorial administration but remained highly susceptible to the whims of its 
European constituents, who disposed of extensive colonial possessions.389 
The composition 
The United States and Liberia launched the question of potential nominees for the inquiry 
commission in parallel to the negotiations for the terms of reference. On 22 June 1929, the US 
Secretary of State suggested a three-person team, consisting of a Liberian, an American and a 
European to conduct the investigation. In the same diplomatic cable, it was thought that the 
inclusion of a Liberian member was essential: ‘despite possible obstructionist tactics by the 
Liberian member, the Liberian Government should directly take part in the commission’s 
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investigations, committing itself thus to the commission’s findings.’ In addition, it was specified 
that the Liberian member should have a ‘recognised standing’ and no direct connection to the 
government. The recommendation of the American member would be similar to the ‘type of 
Emmett Scott’, who participated in the 1909 inquiry. Finally, the Secretary of State suggested the 
assistance of the League of Nations in finding a third nominee, to enhance the international 
character of the inquiry. The US Chargé in Liberia was instructed to privately discuss these 
options with the Liberian leadership.390 
The State Department gave the impression that the question of composition was more crucial 
than the legal terms of the investigation: on 12 July 1929, the Secretary of State told the US 
Legation that ‘the important element to be considered is not so much the technical terms of 
reference but rather the actual personnel of the commission to be appointed.’391 The Secretary 
appeared to suggest that competence and personal agency of the chosen commissioners would 
determine the outcome of the investigation. The discussion and choice for the three members 
took places across multiple diplomatic channels and lasted until the end of 1929 – and a minor 
impasse that pushed the final composition into the next year. For reasons of clarity, the selection 
of each member is dealt with individually. From the initial discussions, no strong consideration 
was given to the compatibility of the three commissioner and how they would work together – 
hence each appointment comprises its own context. 
The choice for the Liberian candidate took only a couple of weeks to be officialised. The Liberian 
Government considered to appoint former President Arthur Barclay as their nominee, who was 
seventy-five years old at the time and still working as a company lawyer for the Firestone 
Corporation. Barclay was seen as an erudite man in Liberia, well-connected via marital ties with 
prominent Americo-Liberian families. As uncle of Secretary of State Edwin Barclay, he had a close 
connection with the Liberian Government. While the State Department considered him to be a 
man with the right experience and stature, there was concern over his loyalties – Barclay might 
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refuse a negative report that criticised the Liberian cabinet. In the end, the United States gave no 
objection to the appointment.392 
The appointment of a representative member of the United States took longer to complete. The 
State Department had approached Emmett Scott in the hope he would accept the nomination to 
serve for a second time on a Liberia commission. Nevertheless, Scott repeatedly expressed 
reluctance to accept the position, even though US President Hoover had intervened to request his 
participation.393 Scott cited family life and increased workload as reasons for decline, although 
his eventual refusal may have been because of a previous row with President King.394 Whereas 
there was never an official objection from the Liberian Government, for the State Department it 
was clear Liberia would refuse anybody overtly critical of the country – connected to Marcus 
Garvey or ‘one in sympathy with United States Negro Improvement Association’.395 
Scott refused the offer but provided the State Department with a number of alternative leads. 
Among others, he named Charles S. Johnson, a sociologist, as a person of interest. Scott had 
worked together with Johnson and gave an extensive background sketch in his favour.396 This 
favourably impressed Secretary of State Stimson, who forwarded the application to President 
Hoover for a final decision. At the time, Johnson was thirty-six years old and Head of the 
Department of Sociology at Fisk University, Nashville, with experience working for the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace and the Rockefeller Foundation. His specialism was urban 
and interracial relations and he became renowned for the investigative work that led to The Negro 
in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot, a commission report about the 1919 race 
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riots in Chicago. Johnson possessed neither experience with Africa nor Liberia but had a thorough 
understanding of inquiry into race relations in the United States.397 
The candidacy of Johnson was carefully examined before an offer was extended to him. Secretary 
of State Stimson collected character references of Johnson and the State Department checked 
whether the sociologist had any connections to Marcus Garvey. Trevor Arnett of the Rockefeller 
Foundation described him as ‘well fitted by temperament, training and experience to serve on 
[the] commission to Liberia’.398 After several recommendations by officers of other foundations, 
the State Department felt certain that Johnson would be the most suitable candidate. By the 
beginning of December, Johnson had confirmed to the State Department he was willing to 
participate in the fact-finding commission – only the League had yet to announce its candidate. 399 
The delay in the League-appointment needs to be traced back to the negotiations between the 
United States and Liberia over the summer. Both countries had agreed to involve the League, but 
its exact role was left undefined. The Liberian Government favoured a Spanish national to 
represent the institution, but this was deemed ‘highly inappropriate’ by the Secretary of State 
Stimson due to the conflict of interest over the Spanish-held island of Fernando Po.400 Since the 
United States had no formal diplomatic relations with the League, it was dependent on Liberia to 
extend a formal invitation to its Secretary-General Eric Drummond. Yet, the US had opened an 
informal discussion channel through the American Minister in Switzerland, Hugh Wilson, to 
discuss all requirements.401 For instance, Secretary of State Stimson provided the League with 
guidelines to conduct its search for a suitable candidate, in early September: a national not 
originating from a country that imports labour from Liberia, who speaks English, has the 
qualifications of an investigator, and is familiar with the activities of the League of Nations and its 
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Temporary Slavery Commission. However, the Secretary was careful to stress that it was not an 
imposition of demands: ‘The League, without advice from this Government, should make its own 
decisions.’402 
From the League’s perspective, its main aim was to ensure the presence of an impartial 
commissioner, ‘whose authority was such that he would not in any way allow facts to be 
supressed’.403 Secretary-General Drummond thought it essential to have someone who could 
speak truth in case the investigation was established under false pretences – in order to cover up 
rather than reveal the facts. Drummond preferred to select a man ‘with complementary qualities’ 
to the US nominee, although in reality the discussion revolved around nationality of the future 
candidate. The Secretary-General favoured a small European nation: ‘a Belgian would not be an 
altogether happy choice, and therefore I felt that we should have to try and secure either a Swiss 
or a Scandinavian’.404 US Minister Wilson equally expressed reticence over a national with 
experience of colonial administration and suggested to choose someone of a country with no 
African territorial possessions.405 
The decision to select a League member was put in the hands of the League Council, notably its 
acting President Khan Foroughi and Rapporteur Arthur Henderson. However, most if not all the 
legwork was done by the Mandates Section of the Secretariat. The Mandates Section as choice to 
deal with Liberia was never openly questioned; it was perceived as the most adequate keep track 
of the allegations regarding forced labour as well as other African affairs.406 By 2 December 1929, 
the League Secretariat had settled on Knut Sigvald Meek, a Norwegian judge who previously had 
served as a prosecutor for the Belgian Congo Judicial Court from 1907 to 1915 and was at the 
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time of his nomination serving as a judge at the court of Arendal (Norway).407 Two weeks later, 
Meek’s appointment was officially confirmed and communicated to Liberia and the United 
States.408 
With all appointments in place, the inquiry commission was set to take off in the first month of 
1930 and be inaugurated in Monrovia before the rainy season would begin. In January, however, 
several setbacks pushed the start of the commission back and forced the League to find another 
candidate commissioner. First, the travels of the American commissioner Johnson with 
preparatory visits to Washington, London and Bern, for briefings about the assignment and to 
gather more insight about Liberia, delayed the journey to Monrovia for at least a month. Second, 
commissioner Meek informed the Secretary-General on 27 January 1930 with the unexpected 
news that he would relinquish the position – citing health reasons and the rainy season. The 
Norwegian expressed worries that the heavy rainfall and absence of good infrastructure would 
unnecessarily prolong his stay in Liberia, which appeared to be a valid constraint to the 
undertaking.409 The Secretariat files, however, cast doubt on this explanation: Meek had shown 
concern over the ‘black race’ of the two other commissioners; he feared to be outnumbered in 
case they would come to a disagreement. The Mandates Section decided ‘to make no mention 
whatever’ of the race question, although it would check a future candidate whether cooperation 
with black colleagues would be any issue.410 
The League Secretariat was again burdened with finding a candidate to join the Liberian 
commission, this time at short notice so there would be enough time to visit Liberia before the 
weather conditions deteriorated. Secretary-General Drummond acted quickly to come up with a 
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suitable name, with the help of connections at the African and Anti-Slavery Societies.411 Earlier 
considerations of nationality were thrown overboard, when the League announced that Dr 
Cuthbert Christy, a sixty-six-year-old British doctor, was appointed as the League’s member of 
the inquiry commission. Drummond explained that a ‘choice was made in circumstances which 
did not allow [for] any delay’, although a British national risked being objectionable for the 
Liberians and the United States.412 Christy had worked extensively in Africa, to research sleeping 
sickness in Congo, Uganda, Sudan and Nigeria. Therefore, he was well acquainted with the region 
and its climate. Although he had never visited Liberia, Christy saw no obstacles to work during 
the rainy season.413 Objections by Liberia’s representative Sottile in Geneva were overcome after 
Secretary-General Drummond convinced him that Christy’s ‘impartiality and his particular 
competence for the task’ made him the right man for the job.414 
The composition of the commission was finished, bar the selection of additional staff – notably 
personal assistants and (local) translators that were hired to help the commissioners on the 
ground. Charles Johnson selected John Matheus as his personal secretary, a well-educated forty-
year-old who had studied and travelled abroad and conversed in four different, albeit none of the 
local languages. Johnson knew Matheus well and believed that he had the right character to 
accompany him during the trip. Johnson described Matheus as ‘an easy-going passive man’ who 
would not attempt to control the investigation or raise objections.415 Cuthbert Christy chose a 
man named Major Jackson, a seventy-year old as his personal assistant. Their relationship was 
not marked by proximity and would become dysfunctional after their arrival in Monrovia.416 The 
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appointment of all members had cleared the way for the two foreign nationals of the commission 
and their staff to depart, via separate routes, to Liberia and commence the investigation – by now 
scheduled to start at end of March. Before this phase of the inquiry, it is useful to take a closer 
look at how the appointment process happened. Rather than turn towards dispassionate 
individuals, i.e. nationals of countries with no stake or interest in Liberia, the commission was 
destined to be dominated by interested parties. 
There were notable discrepancies in the selection of the candidates, due to the fact there was no 
single authority put in charge to finalise the composition. Thus, the United States, Liberia and the 
League were largely left to their own preferences to select a suitable candidate: this could be on 
the basis of proximity to the authorities (Barclay), a practical knowledge of inquiries (Johnson) 
or a familiarity with the tropical climate (Christy). Only the American and British commissioners 
received some vetting before their appointment, although they were chosen due to their 
availability rather than a set of rigorous criteria. 
There was no active attempt to balance or find a distribution of competences among 
commissioners. Although three distinct professional types were chosen (a lawyer, a sociologist 
and a medical practitioner), none of the individuals had elaborate expertise on Liberian labour 
relations and international law. The additional staff was only chosen in function of the workload 
and specific requirements – local translation – and did not compensate for any of the deficiencies 
in expertise. 
Although much of the declarative language was coated in terms that referred to competence and 
impartiality, the eventual choices revealed a sense of pragmatism under the constraints of time 
and diplomacy. In the summer of 1929, the United States had vowed to select as its nominee ‘an 
unprejudiced investigator of sound and sympathetic judgment’ but in its choice for Johnson, 
another rationale was clearly kept in mind: a black commissioner would help to stymie future 
criticism, both by the African American press as the Liberian Government.417 As a State 
                                                             
417 Appointment of the International Commission of Inquiry, 1929, vol. 3, FRUS, 301, 306. 
150 
 
Department official disclosed: ‘it would make for a much better impression among Negroes of this 
country if the report were signed by a man of their own race.’418 For instance, when the State 
Department informed the Liberian Government of its nomination, it was careful to stress the fact 
that Johnson was an ‘American Negro’ who had investigated interracial relations.419 Perhaps 
unwillingly, the United States had also chosen someone who would be interested in tense 
relationship between the Americo-Liberian elites and the native population of Liberia. 
In theory, the League was the experienced actor in terms of organising investigations: it could 
rely on precedents set by the Persia inquiry and the Greek-Bulgarian (Rumbold) Commission, 
which is suggested in the preparatory work of selection of candidates.420 Yet, a major constraint 
was the fact that the Liberian case was handled by the Mandates Section, which unlike the Political 
and Social Sections had limited institutional experience with inquiries on the ground. As a result, 
diplomatic considerations were of greater importance than rigorous procedures to ensure 
expertise and impartiality. Early on, the search was centred on the nationality of the future 
commissioner. The Secretariat’s conventional idea of impartiality – small-country and neutral 
representation – was upheld with the appointment of Meek but abandoned in the case of Christy. 
It was a feat of irony that Christy, the chosen commissioner, turned out to be a national of a 
country with major colonial possessions and economic interest in Africa. The radical switch of 
professional backgrounds, between Meek and Christy, furthermore, suggests that ad hoc 
decisions and pragmatism were dominant drivers in the appointment process. Overall, the 
League of Nations played a minor role in the composition of the commission. To the outside world, 
the organisation was keen to stress that its duties ‘in connection with the investigation begin and 
end with the appointment’, as it considered the United States the primary mover behind the 
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investigation.421 Yet, the League, perhaps unknowingly, would take a more sizeable role in the 
following stages of the investigation.  
From an institutional perspective, all three appointments exemplified the lack of a consistent 
procedure in the appointment process – an outcome that fell short of high ideals but was not 
exceptional to (League) inquiries in this period. Rather, appointments were based on 
stakeholdership, personal contacts and the informal advice from professional acquaintances. 
Unexpected obstacles and contingency reinforced a tendency for ad hoc decisions in the process. 
The inquiry 
The imperial internationalist context prefigured in the origins and immediate catalysts that 
contributed to the establishment of an inquiry, namely in the multi-level field of competing 
political interests, the power dynamics that pressured Liberia into acceptance, and the prevalence 
of a civilisational standard that excluded an investigation into other cases of forced labour (in 
territories under imperial rule). Although the United States had shown a desire to expose facts of 
wrong-doing by the Liberian Government, it was led by self-interest and racialised thinking in the 
appointment of its commissioner. Imperial internationalism would also play a role in the inquiry’s 
working conditions, as the following section shows, from the preparation of the assignment, to 
the methods and practices pursued on the ground, but also palpable in the obstacles and sources 
of tension the commissioners encountered in Liberia in the spring of 1930. The unfamiliar but 
politicised environment emerges in stark delineations in the diaries of Cuthbert Christy and 
Charles Johnson, two of the commissioners who wrote extensively about the inquiry, as well as in 
the various correspondence with the League Secretariat and the US Legation in Liberia.422 
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Preparation and arrival 
The appointments of Christy and Johnson already revealed their limited expertise with regard to 
Liberian affairs. Johnson, however, was informed about the inquiry at the end of 1929 and 
therefore was given a lot of time to prepare himself for the assignment. In contrast, Christy’s late 
addition to the team meant he had to leave for Monrovia soon after his acceptance. The Christy 
papers make no indication of a detailed preparation before the mission; rather, his diary suggests 
that most of his understanding of the case was gathered during the assignment. Johnson toured 
the US and Europe to gain access to relevant documents and speak to State Department and 
League officials. His main intentions were to get a better understanding of Liberia’s history but 
also to reflect on the practice of inquiry. During a visit to London he tried to speak to Driedrich 
Westermann, who had documented some of the languages in the region around Liberia. Since 
Westermann was not available, Johnson was told to talk to the Polish anthropologist Bronisław 
Malinowski instead. The anthropologist was no Liberia expert, but Johnson’s recollection of the 
conversation reveals a vexed desire to know more about the characteristics of native Liberians as 
well as ethnographical methods that could be of use during the inquiry.423  
On the surface, the two-week stay in Europe was not fundamental in terms of preparation for his 
travel to Liberia. According to Phillip Johnson, ‘Europe served more as a means for fulfilling 
formal obligations than it did toward collecting any solid information that he could use in 
Liberia.’424 His visit made Johnson familiar with the European view on Liberia and how colonial 
science and related disciplines had approached the question of labour conditions. Bitter Canaan 
and his diary present an image of studiousness and a desire to fill gaps of knowledge. His travel 
to Monrovia was characterised by reading extensively about Liberia, British indirect rule and 
travel accounts of Africa. Johnson also consulted Raymond Leslie Buell’s The Native Problem of 
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Africa, to familiarise himself with many of the claims made concerning present-day labour 
conditions of the natives.425 
Christy arrived in Monrovia at the end of March, several weeks after Johnson and his assistant 
Matheus had made it to the Liberian capital. The American commissioner had made use of his 
time to explore Monrovia’s vicinity and meet members of the American legation, representatives 
of Firestone and the Bishop of the Episcopal Church. In their diaries, both Christy and Johnson 
showed concern with the extreme weather conditions, which were likely to complicate travel in 
the Liberian hinterland. Early encounters between all three commissioners sparked few candid 
observations; only Johnson gave in some detail a description of Christy, as an ‘interesting sort’ 
who was knowledgeable about medicine but with a mind that ‘runs in deep grooves.’426 In an early 
sign of tension, Johnson felt that Christy was quick to draw conclusions on the basis of rumours. 
From his diary, Christy indeed showed an attentiveness towards rumours, although he was quick 
to dispel their authenticity and worth.427 
The first major obstacle presented to the commission was not an internal one, but the 
consequence of political intrigues in Monrovia. The Liberian Government had been divided over 
the inquiry since its inception: cabinet members fearful of the outcome, continued to thwart plans 
to let the investigation run its course. Briefly before the official inauguration, Christy and Johnson 
received from President King a list of suggestions with regard to the constitution and functioning 
of the inquiry commission. For instance, it suggested a ‘rotary chairmanship’, while the 
government would assign a permanent secretary to assist the commission during interviews and 
recording of statements. In case of illness of one of the commissioners, the Liberian Government 
was allowed the right to appoint a replacement. None of the suggestions had been discussed in 
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advance with the United States or the League. Rather, they signified a genuine attempt to hamper 
and even threaten the work of the inquiry.428 
There were other worries that kept the commission preoccupied. Christy and Johnson were 
unsure whether commissioner Arthur Barclay would pursue his assignment as an independent 
investigator or rather act as a representative of the Liberian Government on the commission. 
Johnson noted that the elder Barclay believed that the inquiry would only take two months’ time, 
and that the visitors should only be visiting the ‘interesting hinterland’ afterwards – this was 
meant to limit the collection of witness statements to the capital and coastal region.429 Meanwhile, 
the commission heard that the President was struck by an unknown illness and could not yet 
inaugurate the commission. Johnson professed to his wife that ‘everything conceivable is 
intervening to postpone the formal consultation of the body and beginning of its inquiry.’430 
On 7 April 1930, the ceremony to establish the inquiry commission took place. The event was 
organised with decorum, although Johnson and Christy had been left in the dark about the 
planned proceedings. Both were asked to give unprepared speeches, in which they chose to 
uphold the virtue of impartiality. Christy described the inauguration as ‘the most trying occasion 
I have ever gone through’, while Johnson in his letters sent home already showed signs of 
homesickness and disappointment.431  
The preparatory stage of the inquiry typified different dynamics and tensions that would continue 
to return during the assignment. Barring initial conflicts within the commission, it was evident 
that the American and British commissioners had two very different sets of experiences and 
professional backgrounds and would need to find agreement in how to mediate the investigation 
in light of Liberian interference and the pressure to deliver results to the outside world. 
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Proceedings 
The inquiry proceedings span a period of four months. The inquiry started on 8 April 1930 with 
the first meeting of the commissioners and would last until 8 August, when the final witness 
statements were taken in the capital. The commission organised hearings for witnesses from 14 
to 29 April in Monrovia. Afterwards, they proceeded to different parts of the country, starting 
with Kakata sixty miles south of the capital and Cape Palmas in Maryland County, the 
southernmost part of the Liberian coastal line. Citing his old age, commissioner Barclay opted not 
join the investigation in the interior and stayed behind in Monrovia. Barclay’s part in the actual 
investigation was minor, however, as commissioner he held the power to sign any future report 
or submit his own version of events.432 
In the following months, Christy, Johnson and their staff spent time working in the hinterland, 
visiting places more difficult to reach in order to take statements from people living in the interior 
villages. To cover a wider area, the two commissioners decided to take separate routes and 
document statements from different regions, and then to meet again in Webbo. In early July, they 
returned together to Monrovia, where the final hearings continued for another month. 
Statements were taken from individuals both in the capital and other parts of the country, 
however, in the hinterland the commissioners also organised informal hearings with larger 
groups of people, who expressed their statements through a local spokesperson. In an overview, 
the commission lists 264 separate dispositions, of witnesses including paramount chiefs, sub-
chiefs, natives, cabinet members and public officials of various ranks. These figures were 
identified by the inquiry in their final report for the Liberian Government. 433 
The first meeting of the inquiry commission on 8 April revealed a couple of tensions that would 
continue to haunt the inquiry for the remaining time spent in Liberia. First, there was the matter 
of chairmanship of the commission – a delicate question that also in other inquiries was subject 
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to discussion. The League Secretariat had suggested Christy to refuse the chairmanship of the 
commission so Barclay might need to take the responsibility.434 Before his departure, Christy had 
shown consideration for the Secretariat’s view, however, in the end he accepted the appointment 
and took great pride in its symbolism – articulated in his personal diary. This was also noticeable 
to Johnson, who observed that Christy ‘wanted to call it “President”; then to sign all letters, 
approve all correspondence, write the minutes, lead the expeditions.’435 The relationship grew 
tense over the fact that Johnson was sceptical of any difference in hierarchy and felt that the 
position of chairman should represent no distinction in powers. 
The relationship between Johnson and Christy did not improve over the next weeks, as the 
American became increasingly disconcerted by the views expressed by his British colleague. In 
Johnson’s writings, Christy is depicted as someone who favoured white rule in Africa and thought 
that Liberia was ‘a hundred years’ behind the European nations. Johnson sensed a strong 
difference when it came to the issue of race. At some point, Christy claimed that the Liberians 
would be anxious to talk because they ‘want help and relief and intelligent guidance from 
Europeans.’436 Christy’s diary shows an ambiguous view on the Liberian republic: the British 
commissioner was greatly impressed by its accomplishments over the last century but kept a 
paternal view with regard to its inhabitants and their capacity to compete with the rest of the 
world.437 Whereas Christy reasoned along civilisational lines and seemed open to prospect of 
white supervision over Liberian affairs, Johnson was more favourable towards the ‘experiment 
in Negro self-rule’ and defended the continued independence of the country. With regard to their 
personal bond Johnson wrote in contrasting terms about Christy, describing him at the same time 
as polite, gracious and childish in his manner. In particular, he struggled to tolerate Christy’s 
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reliance on anecdote and travel memory to demonstrate a point, a tendency ‘to apply Congo to 
Liberia, or South America to Polynesia’. 438 A similar contrast is found in Christy’s writings, who 
felt appreciation for Johnson as a companion and a thinker but saw no similarities between 
themselves: ‘Johnson and Matheus are both black men and I find it difficult sometimes to fit in 
with their ways.’439  
The slight strain on the personal bond between Johnson and Christy risked clouding their 
judgement of the facts – particularly when questions of race and Liberian governance were 
addressed. Yet, the inquiry achieved results in the first weeks. In their diaries, both 
commissioners mentioned how evidence was collected through witness statements that helped 
to put the pieces of the puzzle together. The inquiry commission collected statements that 
clarified how government officials instructed the Liberian Frontier Force to raid villages and 
round up able men in order to ship them to Fernando Po. Early on, testimony was collected that 
revealed the participation of important political figures, such as Vice-President Yancy, and 
confirmed many of the alleged labour practices.440 
After 28 April, the two commissioners made their first expedition to the hinterland. The first 
hearings organised in the interior villages provided ample evidence of the difficult living 
conditions of the native Liberians, as well as the decisions of government officials that forced 
villagers to deliver unpaid labour for public purposes. As town chiefs addressed the main 
concerns of the villages, Johnson noted the clear signs of anger between officials and population 
of the hinterland.441 The American commissioner had an eye for the plight of the native Liberians 
and documented their behaviour and the ways in which they responded to the commission’s 
presence. In contrast, Christy was minimal in sharing impressions of what he had seen at the 
hearings, barring a sporadic reference: ‘intimidation, ill treatment and extortion – day after day 
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the same thing’.442 In his diary writings, the British commissioner was concerned primarily with 
the curious and odd of his Liberian visit – he jotted down rumours and strange encounters. 
Next to the diverging experiences of Johnson and Christy, there were multiple concerns that 
hindered the functioning of the inquiry. These ranged from intimidation, suspected poisoning, 
public unrest over rumours, staff issues to the difficult travel conditions, all of which are briefly 
elucidated here because they provide a perspective on the challenges of the assignment. 
First, Liberian officials tried break to the courage of people to go to the hearings and protest. 
Johnson professed that ‘there is evidence that the men are made uncomfortable, fined, ground 
down’ although he observed the impossibility of Liberian officials of stopping the native 
population to turn out and speak.443 
Second, the recurrence of illness kept the commissioners worried. Christy was struck several 
times by an unknown illness for which there was no immediate cause. Johnson showed concern 
for attempts at deliberate infection, for example when an obscure herbalist insisted on him to 
drink a cup of tea.444 
Third, a flow of rumours concerning the commission persisted during the investigation, many of 
which were noted down by Christy in his diary and the subject of correspondence with the 
League: ‘The people live here on rumours which for the most part are groundless. Only three days 
before our return to Monrovia the President himself, we have been informed, told several persons 
that one of the commissioners had been drowned in landing at Marshall.’445 In particular, a 
rumour of Liberia being turned into a mandate was the subject of much speculation. While the 
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League sought to disavow the idea of a mandate, the rumour led to perennial restlessness 
amongst the Liberian population.446 
Fourth, the additional staff failed to live up to the expectations of the commissioners. The Liberian 
Government had appointed a secretary to the commission, Plenyono Gbe Wolo, who was 
perceived by Christy and Johnson as unfit to fulfil any of his administrative tasks. Moreover, 
Christy suspected that Wolo’s sole function was to provide President King with daily reports of 
the proceedings.447 Major Jackson, the personal secretary to Christy, created another staffing 
problem. Jackson was sent home after a month, after Christy had decided his secretary showed 
no aptitude for the job: ‘his deafness and inability to understand the local modification of 
American-English (…) debars him from carrying out his part of the work on the Commission.’448 
Fifth, the minimal infrastructure, the tropical climate and the rainy season presented a major 
challenge to the investigation in Liberia’s hinterland. Much of journey had to be done on foot, as 
frail bridges over rivers could not support a car. Accommodation was scarce so the 
commissioners were left to their own devices. The harsh living conditions of the natural 
environment exacerbated existing tensions within the commission. Particularly Johnson showed 
signs of struggle with a region he was unaccustomed to. His mood soured in the presence of his 
British companion: ‘I fear I have been most glum all day. […] Fed up. When Christy thinks I am 
getting too much attention he tries hard to get it understood that only he knows Africa.’449 
Meanwhile, Christy claimed exasperation over the fact that Johnson and Matheus came to Liberia 
with no suitable equipment: ‘I have had to talk to both Johnson and Matheus how to do things – 
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they literally arrived here with nothing.’ Christy took on the role of seasoned traveller; in his diary 
he mentioned selling equipment and schooling them in using these things.450  
After exploring together for a while, Christy and Johnson decided to take separate roads. Even 
though this was meant so they could visit more villages and speak to a larger number of local 
chiefs, the impression was left that they preferred to work apart.451 This was a strategy that paid 
off in terms of collecting evidence: Johnson and Matheus managed to collect additional evidence 
about the offshore labour shipments. ‘I can now account for 1380 boys recruited by force for 
Fernando Po.’452 In addition, they gathered statements from women that showed how they were 
maltreated and held prisoner by Liberian soldiers – after their men had been taken away for 
labour. ‘The soldiers used us as their wives for nine months against their will, we who had 
husbands and children. They had guns and we could not protect ourselves and our husbands 
could not protect us.’453 The two commissioners met up again in Webbo and shared their collected 
testimonials before setting off to the border with Ivory Coast. The last part of the investigation 
would be concluded at Monrovia, where they would be reunited with Arthur Barclay and planned 
to work on the report. 
Methods and practices of inquiry 
The abundance of personal observations and correspondence left by Christy and Johnson has 
helped to establish a better picture of the people they encountered and the testimonials they 
collected but also contain reflections on their attitudes towards the inquiry and their positions as 
impartial investigators on the ground. These reflections help to build an understanding of the role 
the individual subject plays in fact-finding and how the report-writing has been shaped by their 
personal agency – a key element of the imperial internationalist framework.  
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Johnson showed particular aptitude towards reflection on what inquiry meant and which 
methods should be pursued to fulfil the assignment. In his view, ‘a commission of inquiry and not 
a court; that testimonial evidence was […] only a fraction of factual evidence and usually the least 
convincing of it; that evidence meant documents, observations, the assembling of as many 
elements of a situation as to constitute for any person an objective fact.’454 He claimed that he did 
not possess ‘the prerogative of God in determining who was lying and who was telling the 
truth.’455 As a consequence, Johnson was determined to focus on the collection of facts, through 
different forms of evidence and the triangulation of information, to establish in an objective 
manner what had occurred. His personal writing reads as part account, part methodological 
reflection of his time spent in Liberia. 
In contrast, Christy’s diary offers scant information about his views on the inquiry. Yet, in a letter 
sent to League Secretary-General Drummond, one gets a sense of an approach: ‘I have no personal 
or other reasons for being anything but impartial in this inquiry, and my estimate of the right or 
wrong of any point is pretty securely based on what I have seen during many years in other parts 
of tropical Africa.’456 Whereas Johnson sought for an objective standard to assess facts, Christy’s 
writing rather suggests an approach based solely on his personal experience to judge the merit 
of factual information. 
The writings of Johnson, especially his book Bitter Canaan, offer several examples of how he 
pursued his assignment as a social scientist, of which one or two are relevant to mention here, 
because they altered the way in which the inquiry was conducted. For instance, Johnson 
suggested not to rely on translators appointed by the government or the commission, but to let 
witnesses bring their own interpreters to the hearings. The American commissioner was 
concerned with the reliability of the translation and wished to fend off any accusations of 
partiality. Johnson thought there was an advantage in using external translators, ‘a point that 
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cannot be argued against successfully, because if a man gives false testimony or complains that 
he is misinterpreted it is his own fault’.457 In another example, Johnson is seen to experiment with 
new forms of recording evidence. He had brought a ‘small field machine’ which made it possible 
to make recordings of the witness statements on wax discs.458 Here again, his attempt to records 
the statements on a (semi)permanent carrier displays a need to overcome partiality, the 
imperfections associated with written minutes and the unreliability of witnesses and their 
interpreters. The recorded statements created the possibility to double-check, correct and 
evaluate earlier records. 
More than scientific undertaking, Johnson also saw his stay in Liberia as an opportunity to 
understand the native life in the Liberian republic, an interest which had emerged from his 
sociological research but also during his preparation for the journey and discussions in London. 
In particular, the hinterland held great promise to the American scholar: ‘Only by such direct 
observation and conversations with natives in the setting of their own villages would it be 
possible to apprise the testimony heard in the formal sessions in Monrovia.’459 Prior to the 
inquiry, Johnson had developed his sociological thinking along the lines of the Chicago School, 
with Robert E. Park as a main influence, which combined data collection (of census data, surveys) 
with participant observation in the field to understand the characteristics of African American 
social life in the United States.460 Many of those methodological techniques appear in Johnson’s 
approach to the inquiry, for instance, when taking pictures of local life and taking part in 
celebrations of the population.461 In comparison, Christy showed less inclination to fuse his 
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assignment with reflections on the nature of facts and the role of science in inquiry, except when 
it concerned questions of medicine.462 
Both men aspired to impartiality, at least in a nominal sense, but the source material unmasks 
several limitations to their fact-finding techniques. First, the foreign commissioners did not 
carefully reflect upon the motivations of their witnesses. The testimonies of local chiefs in the 
hinterland against the Liberian Government were not only driven by the labour scandal but by a 
more general disdain of central authority in Monrovia. Seen from an imperial internationalist 
perspective, the interior tribes were still in a struggle with the Americo-Liberians over the 
question who could exert local control and whether the hinterland should be opened to foreign 
trade. Christy did not look beyond ‘native complaints’ whereas Johnson was very appreciative of 
the village populations, perhaps ignoring the power dynamics at play in Liberian politics. 
Second, each commissioner came with a set of personal interests on their journey in Liberia. Given 
the fact that the inquiry was a temporary assignment, the members would soon return to their 
professional context. Johnson collected ideas and materials which would figure in his book Bitter 
Canaan, an attempt to synthesise his anthropological approach to inquiry, whereas Christy used 
his experiences gathered in Liberia to speak before scientific societies after his return.463 In 
hindsight, diverse motivations may have driven Christy and Johnson – apart from the inquiry – 
such as personal fame and financial reward.464 
Third, the members of the commission were perceptive to threats that endangered their 
assignment, ranging from intimidation, interference to rumours, as well as the limitations of 
relying on witnesses. Yet, their own personal biases never received any visible scrutiny. Although 
Christy and Johnson had eye for each other’s stances, they did not reflect how their own opinions 
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were shaped and influenced by pre-conceived knowledge and prejudice. In the case of Christy, 
this is evident from the manner in which he makes judgements: ‘This witness as far as I could see 
has spoken what he thinks is the truth, nothing would shake him (…) I am of opinion that he spoke 
the truth.’ Nothing in the diary suggests that Christy considered any standard of proof. Moreover, 
bias was also palpable in the manner which Christy was himself in a paternal role to the Liberians: 
‘The natives, however, look to me being a white man as their father, talk to me when giving 
evidence and look upon me as the responsible part of the Commission.’ His condescending view 
on the population, and his colleagues, was inseparable from his desire to see ‘white assistance’ in 
Liberia.465 
Personal bias in the case of Johnson comes across as subtler; much of it was related to his 
wellbeing and emotional state, characterised by homesickness. The American was concerned 
about being away for a long period from home, but he was not conscious that his gloom also 
affected his working relationships with Christy and Matheus – which became strained as they 
developed.466 Once, Johnson expressed to a colleague that he is a person ‘who gathers facts and 
leaves it to others to draw conclusions’, however, the Liberian inquiry also demonstrated that 
personal and environmental conditions had an impact on how fact-finding took place.467 
The attitudes towards inquiry and the conditions of fact-finding may not appear to be the most 
decisive factors in the outcome of the investigation. Yet, some of the above-mentioned examples, 
such as Christy’s views steeped in imperial modes and repertoires as well as Johnson’s concern 
for the plight of the native population, had palpable implications for the internal dynamics of the 
commission. Their personal biases and interests provoked disagreement and strained their 
working relationship. These factors resurfaced when the commission had to assess the gathered 
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facts and decide on a common interpretation concerning the root causes of labour scandal and 
possible solutions and recommendations. 
The report 
By the middle of June, preparations were underway that would lead to the final report a couple 
of months later. After their return to Monrovia, Christy and Johnson commenced with the 
organisation of their notes, while the commission still had final hearings with witnesses in the 
capital city.468 With some luck, the American commissioner had obtained papers from the 
customs collector which detailed the number of shipments to Fernando Po – backing up the 
stories of the native chiefs.469 The report-writing presented the commission with a final test to 
bridge divisions and to decide on the delicate matter of forced labour, which had seen 
contestation between domestic political factions as well as international actors. As such, neither 
the internal dynamics of the commission nor the historical context can be left separate when 
considering the analysis and written conclusion of the Liberia inquiry. 
For the first draft of the report, it was clear that Christy and Johnson were set on taking different 
approaches to the task. According to Johnson, Christy had kept his note-taking (apart from the 
diary) to a minimum and chiefly relied on his memory to come up with a draft. In contrast, 
Johnson had intended to use a card system to allow a more systematic organisation of the 
evidence and statements collected in Liberia. A clash of visions soon ensued, and the months of 
July and August were characterised by disagreements. Johnson found Christy’s approach 
‘unwieldy and scattered’ and therefore suggested to let him prepare the notes, so Christy could 
write an initial version of the report. Upon seeing Christy’s draft, the sociologist was extremely 
displeased with his colleague’s working method and vented his anger: ‘hysterical, extreme 
statements in summary fashion, condemning the whole government and calling everything 
slavery, slave dealing, slave traffic, etc.’ Johnson offered to prepare a more detailed narrative that 
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included all the findings, which Christy would work out into the final report. Christy, however, 
felt that Johnson was trying to rush the undertaking so he could take off before the end of August. 
Each of them in their writings sought to present the report-writing as an outcome of their 
individual hard work, rather than a collaborative effort.470 
The commission of inquiry was set to criticise the labour conditions in Liberia, although it would 
refrain from suggesting an overhaul of Liberia’s government. Christy had shown greater 
favourability towards a form of white supervision or even an international authority, such as the 
League, to set Liberia on the right track. This reflected his own views, a belief in the existence of 
a sacred trust with Africa and the good a ‘sympathetic administration’ could bring to Liberia. ‘I 
think the only possible thing to do is to get white administrators in those districts in the interior 
under a white adviser in Monrovia.’471 Johnson, on the contrary, believed that white 
administration would not necessarily herald improvement. He tried to convince his colleague of 
his desire to condemn the present government, rather than the type of government that was in 
place. In a display of nuance, Johnson articulated that the scope of inquiry was limited and 
therefore could not condemn those parts of the state and regions of the country that were well-
functioning. The outcome, in the report, was compromise that focused on the domestic capacity 
for reform but left the door open for external help – by European or American civil servants.472  
Worries remained over the position of Arthur Barclay, who had only participated in the 
commission’s proceedings in Monrovia and had seen few of the findings made by the other 
commissioners. Yet, Barclay’s loyalty to the government withered after he saw the extent of 
evidence collected on labour conditions. One of his grievances was that native Liberians had no 
adequate access to justice in dealing with the authorities. This resulted in the former Liberian 
President agreeing with the report’s findings, rather than to present a minority view.473 Johnson 
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finished the report and submitted the original copy to the Liberian Government on 8 September 
– as had been specified in the terms of reference. He gave another copy to the US Legation and 
also took a copy with him, when leaving Monrovia on 11 September, to present to the State 
Department.474 In addition, Johnson had drafted a supplementary set of observations which he 
also submitted to the Department’s officials, providing more information about key figures and 
describing in detail his working relationship with Christy.475 
The official report of the inquiry commission to Liberia presented a strong condemnation of the 
policies pursued by the Liberian Government, in particular those that had led to the suppression 
and exclusion of the interior population. While no evidence of slavery in the classic sense of the 
word was found, the commission did collect witness statements that indicated the existence of 
domestic slavery and pawning. The commission strongly criticised Liberia in the case of forced 
labour practices for public purposes and the unlawful shipment of labour to the island of 
Fernando Po. Firestone, however, was exonerated from responsibility in the affair. Rather, the 
commission had grounds to believe that government officials, in particular Vice-President Yancy, 
were responsible for the persistence of these conditions of administration. Government policies 
had fostered ‘ill-treatment, extortion and coercion of the natives’, with no access to education nor 
judicial redress.476 ‘Under the circumstances the present situation seems to demand a complete 
and urgent reorganisation of the Government of the Interior if the future stability of the Republic 
is to be secured, or alternatively saved from failure.’477 The report suggested the curtailment of 
public labour programmes, the removal of corrupted district commissioners, a thorough selection 
of new candidates for the civil service, and the possibility of attracting administrators from 
                                                             
474 Johnson, Bitter Canaan, xliv. 
475 The British explorer was presented as dogmatic, although he ‘was amenable to fact and reason, at 
times reversing judgment completely with such facility as to give the impression of instability.’ From: 
Johnson, “Seasons in Hell,” 275. 
476 International Commission of Inquiry in Liberia, 85. 
477 Ibid., 87. 
168 
 
Europe or America. Finally, the commission proposed that all protectionist policies should be 
abandoned, in favour open trade and educative links.478 
When considering the structure and language of the report more closely, three elements emerge 
that shed light on the attitudes of its authors and how these influenced the recommendations. 
First, is the adherence to what is labelled a ‘factual outlay’ of events, which represents the ‘best 
judgment’ of the commission.479 Despite inherent tensions between objective facts and selective 
judgement, the commission was careful to stress its impartial consideration of the evidence, and 
the usage of facts rather than opinions in the establishment of its final conclusions.480 The report 
presented no grounds for doubt, left no alternative explanations but stuck to the adage, ‘to let the 
facts speak for and classify themselves’.481  
Second, the quasi-judicial tone creates the impression of a court hearing and goes back to the 
international origins of inquiry. Johnson’s claim that an inquiry was a fact-finding body, not a 
court, did not find much reflection in the use of judicial language and concepts. For example, 
witness statements had to be started with the sentence ‘This is to certify that’, while in other cases 
people appeared ‘under oath’ and gave a ‘sworn testament’. The disposition of evidence, the 
receipt of testimony and the corroboration (of facts) taken together with phrases such ‘the 
Commission is of the opinion that’, demonstrate a muddled distinction between a judicial court 
and a commission of inquiry – a institutional ambiguity that also characterised inquiries 
organised by The Hague – with the League example taking over some of the (testimonial) powers 
and display of language.482 
Third, the spectres of race and civilisation made their appearance in the report, for instance in 
the representation of a ‘small independent Negro State’ that had closed itself off from ‘the white 
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man’.483 Lines were drawn between the civilised and uncivilised inhabitants of Liberia, visible 
from the distinction between the ‘unsophisticated native’ and the ‘educated Negro’.484 As a 
consequence, the report espoused a view of racial hierarchy between white and black, with an 
extra differentiation in the latter category for the presence or absence of civilisational standards. 
These were views closely associated with Christy, as expressed in his diary and Johnson’s notes. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Johnson never strongly opposed his British colleague and did 
not try to change the overall racialised tone of the report. Johnson as black American was 
concerned with the plight of the native Liberians, yet he did not question the notion of a hierarchy 
and the prevalence of a civilisational standard – for which he was labelled as ‘too conservative’ 
by fellow black Americans.485 
The report of the Liberia inquiry was meant to present the evidence gathered during the 
investigation and sought to underline the fact-finding credentials and imperial character of its 
members. However, a close reading of the proceedings and preparatory stages of the report, 
reveals another story hidden beneath the claims of impartiality and a quasi-judicial tone. 
Although the report presented a lot of detail on forced labour practices, the assignment had been 
characterised by the conflicting views of the commissioners, each of them subject to individual 
bias, emotion and personal interest, as well as a range of external conditions that had shaped the 
investigation. The inquiry was subjected to multi-level forms of political contestation, between 
domestic factions and various international players, over the question whether Liberia was 
capable to execute its reforms of interior administration or required external assistance. 
Aftermath 
Once the official report was communicated, all major stakeholders – United States, Liberia, the 
League of Nations – were expected to respond to the findings and conclusions of the investigation 
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in the nearby future. This section details the range of actions undertaken by all three, in public 
discourse, private statements and diplomatic negotiations, to understand how the commission’s 
work was received and used to serve domestic as well as foreign policy interests. 
The United States was in a position of early access to the commission’s findings because both the 
Legation and the State Department had been provided with the copy of the report – it did not have 
to await the Liberian Government’s official communication. The Chargé in Monrovia and the 
Secretary of State heaped praise on Johnson, for his ‘valuable and unselfish contribution to the 
achievements of that body’.486 According to John Stanfield, the State Department took Johnson’s 
comments seriously and his findings were used in the US policy with regard to Liberia in the 
following years. It is worthy to recall here that the State Department had already collected ample 
information about the allegations, among others via the Patton report of the Episcopal Church. 
Johnson’s report, however, confirmed most if not all of the evidence for the forced labour scheme, 
but also gave the State Department a platform to encourage administrative reform.  
Shortly thereafter, the US would publicly condemn Liberia’s government for the existence of 
forced labour practices encouraged by officials and reach out with an offer to help the republic 
with policy changes. Moreover, the report’s exoneration of Firestone helped the State Department 
to absolve itself of any direct responsibility with regard to perpetuity of labour conditions in 
Liberia. There is no evidence that Johnson had received clear instructions from the State 
Department in late 1929, before his departure to Europe.487 On the contrary, Johnson was little 
aware of the Department’s stance on the matter, nor the diplomatic background that had led to 
the inquiry.488 President Hoover and Secretary of State Stimson may have chosen Johnson 
precisely because they considered he would be amenable to American assistance in support for 
Liberian affairs. By the second half of September, a summary of the commission’s findings and its 
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recommendations was made public in the United States, which led to heated discussion in the 
African American press and provoked a call for a change of government.489 Meanwhile, the US 
Legation was instructed to work behind the scenes with President King and come to a reform plan 
that would be acceptable for his cabinet and could quell the public outrage over the findings.490 
Nevertheless, the inquiry report had left the Liberian cabinet in a quandary. Liberian President 
Charles King expressed ‘mortification’ over the findings of the report, even though he was long 
aware of the complicity of Vice-President Yancy in the forced labour scheme. 491 King was not 
directly condemned by the commission, contrary to Yancy and several district commissioners, 
yet the report confirmed how corruption had festered within his cabinet. For the time being, the 
scandal was still confined to a small number of complicit individuals and King did not face 
immediate criticism for his handling of the matter, because the report had not been published in 
full. The initial response was to cooperate with US officials to work on a reform programme that 
would fulfil the recommendations made by the inquiry. However, disagreement within the 
cabinet and public pressure rendered this plan impossible. To begin with, Secretary of State 
Edwin Barclay put pressure on King not to concede too much on the question of reforms – 
especially when it came to open trade, external advisers and foreign assistance. 492 King had 
watered-down the proposed reforms, a retreat from what he had discussed with the US Legation 
in order to retain full support of his cabinet, but also began to criticise the commission, which 
‘had gone beyond the terms of reference’ and condemned his opponents for deliberately creating 
rumours. 493 
At this point, the State Department lost confidence in King’s management of the scandal. Since the 
Liberian Government had refrained from making the commission report public, the US Secretary 
of State used the opportunity to express his profound ‘shock’ at the revelations: new reports 
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emerged of the Liberian Frontier Forces harassing the native population, for their alleged 
participation in the inquiry.494 The President faced growing domestic opposition. During the 
month of October, a Citizen’s Non-Partisan League was established to start a petition to demand 
King’s resignation. Across the country, mass meetings were held that registered ‘disapproval of 
the many illegal practices discovered by the International Commission to have existed within this 
Republic.’495 By the end of November, the Liberian legislature felt the position of the Liberian 
leadership became untenable and called for the resignation of both the President and the Vice-
President. The eventual decision by King to step down followed a week later on 3 December, one 
day after the resignation of Vice-President Yancy. The State Department would be equally 
dismayed about the person who was expected to assume the presidency: Edwin Barclay, the 
Secretary of State, who was considered by the Department as ‘openly anti-white and opposed to 
the International Commission’s recommendations.’496 The United States’ attempt to exert 
pressure had only won a ‘pyrrhic victory’, according to Ibrahim Sundiata, because the new cabinet 
would be less amenable to a constructive relationship with the United States.497 
Just as before, the League of Nations came late to the diplomatic stage.498 The Liberian question 
could not officially be discussed before the Liberian Government had officially circulated the 
report and the League had distributed copies to its members.499 Yet, Liberian representative 
Sottile did not await the report to give a full-fledged defence of the country at the Sixth Committee 
meeting of the Assembly in September 1930. Therein, he stressed once again his governments’ 
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voluntary decision and as well as the considerable progress made – although this time he did not 
deny the existence of cases of slavery and forced labour. Rather, Sottile suggested again to 
compare the Liberian case with other African countries: ‘Is it really possible to say that there are 
no cases of slavery in any other part of Africa?’500 This question would be raised later again, but 
meanwhile the League Secretariat was in discussion with the United States over a future course 
of action. 
In multiple records of conversation between Secretary-General Drummond and Prentiss Gilbert 
of the US representation in Switzerland, the men discussed the possibility of joint action by the 
United States and the League to impel the Liberian Government to pursue an administrative 
reorganisation.501 In its diplomatic manoeuvres, the League was careful not to undertake 
anything without the explicit agreement of the United States: for instance, at this stage it had 
refused to commit foreign assistance to Liberia, upon request by Sottile, for fear of crossing its 
American partner.502 The League, however, took action in a different regard. It informed Spain of 
the upcoming publication of the report, that might lead to criticism over Fernando Po: ‘there were 
certain passages which would place the Consul, and perhaps the Spanish Government, in a 
somewhat unfavourable light.’503 The imperial internationalist framework aids here to identify 
how power was wielded through the report’s findings to raise pressure on Liberia, although it 
was constrained by political contestation between the United States and the European powers 
(within the League) and the differentiated approaches they would take in the next years. The 
imperial hierarchical nature of the international system materialised in the League’s efforts to 
forewarn Spain. 
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The commission’s findings were only discussed in full at the Council meeting of the League of 
Nations that took place in January 1931, several months after the end of the inquiry.504 Both 
Liberian representative Sottile and Cuthbert Christy were invited to present their views on the 
report. Antoine Sottile informed the Council about the acceptance of the commission’s 
recommendations, the prospect of a reform programme and the changes in government. Sottile 
thanked the commission for its work but made use of the occasion to highlight a number of 
deficiencies of the inquiry. Sottile argued that the commission had regularly overstepped its 
authority and the terms of reference, departed from normal inquiry procedures by letting the 
commissioners work on their own, and it was influenced by opponents of the government. Once 
again, Sottile stressed the voluntary nature of Liberia’s call for the inquiry and asked for 
sympathy, in the light of similar situations that could be found in other African territories. Spain 
was never questioned over the role of Fernando Po and although the suggestion of a general 
commission to investigate allegations had been discussed by the League, the question was not 
pursued due to lack of support from the European imperial powers.505 
Sottile’s main question to the Council related to the nature of the suggestions and 
recommendations given, and to what extent they would need to be seen as an imposition.506 The 
new Liberian Government was fearful of increased international tutelage as a result of the forced 
labour inquiry. Christy’s comments to the Council were brief and stressed both the overwhelming 
evidence contained in the report and the necessity to overstep the terms of reference in order to 
present the ‘conditions of maladministration in the interior of the Republic were at the root of the 
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most of the troubles’.507 The British commissioner believed it was impossible for Liberia to make 
the necessary changes without help from outside. 
The President of the Council expressed urgency regarding the matter and instructed Polish 
Rapporteur August Zaleski to communicate his suggestions before the next session. In his later 
report, the Polish representative expressed that ‘the Council will not leave unanswered the 
Liberian Government’s appeal to its sense of international solidarity’ and suggested the 
appointment of a small committee to help the Liberian Government with the implementation of 
the recommendations. Zaleski noted the ‘special interest’ shown by the United States and 
suggested the country should take part in the meetings.508 The Council accepted the suggestion 
for the committee. In 1931, the committee headed by a French lawyer, named Henri Brunot, 
would advise the Liberian Government on financial and administrative reforms and present a 
final report – similar as was done by the inquiry commission.509 
The Brunot Committee was an attempt to give foreign assistance to Liberia a more technical 
character, under the precept of expertise rather than tutelage. The new Liberian cabinet under 
Edwin Barclay had no desire to see its sovereignty infringed upon; an earlier suggestion by the 
US Chargé in Monrovia to install an ‘international governing commission’ was forcefully 
rejected.510 Hence, the League’s approach of sending another investigatory team to suggest how 
the implementation of administrative reforms could proceed, was a compromise that met less 
resistance by Liberia but could satisfy demands for reform. The State Department assumed that 
the League experts would ‘merely substantiate much of the material already available regarding 
the necessity of reforms’, however, it had lost with King a more reliable interlocutor in the 
Liberian Government.511 The committee focused on ‘sanitation’ measures, rather than the 
implementation of the recommendations made by the original inquiry. Neither the League of 
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Nations nor the United States would be able to influence the West African country much through 
‘international manoeuvres’: they failed to agree on a joint course of action, while the presidency 
of Edwin Barclay (from 1930 until 1944) kept any threats to the sovereignty of his country at 
bay.512 
In the aftermath, Charles Johnson and Cuthbert Christy played only marginal roles. The British 
doctor was critical of the sanitation efforts undertaken by the Brunot Committee, as he 
considered the League had ignored the crux of the problem: ‘two million natives in the interior 
who are ill-treated, that reports of this treatment frequently get out and Commissions have been 
asked for and nothing has happened.’513 Johnson never returned to Liberia, but worked on his 
book Bitter Canaan and corresponded with a number of Liberians, who kept him informed about 
the continued tensions between the government and the hinterland population. On several 
occasions, Johnson took a stance in the debates of the African American community on the 
Liberian question. While W.E.B Du Bois chastised Western imperialism for exacerbating the 
forced labour crisis, Johnson put the blame with the Americo-Liberians who had sought to exploit 
the local population. This confrontation pointed to a larger problem faced by the African 
American community in the US: how to confront social oppression in black-ruled Africa? Liberia 
could no longer be the projection of Pan-African aspiration, nor a successful case of self-
government. The evidence of forced labour and domestic servitude put into question the 
exemplar success of an independent country ruled by black citizens.514 
Conclusion 
The Liberian inquiry was neither voluntary nor instigated by the League of Nations. The 
investigation had come because public allegations and reports had persuaded the State 
Department that action was warranted – in order to maintain its economic presence in Liberia 
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and absolve itself from any responsibility over the forced labour scandal. Although the League 
was absent in the initial stage, its participation was considered to bring impartial guarantees to 
the investigation. The 1926 Convention formed the legal basis upon which international action 
could be justified, however, the League also represented colonial powers – eager not to see the 
scandal extend outside of Liberia.  
Hence, some form of cooperation was found between the League and the United States – the latter 
not a member but cooperative in much of the former’s ‘technical work’ – to gather evidence and 
in turn pressure the Liberian Government into administrative reforms, under the guise of 
Western impartial expertise. Liberia, a state ruled by Americo-Liberian elites with limited 
industry and dependent on foreign investment, seemed set to fracture due to a series of 
contestations: at the domestic level, against its own native population, and at the international 
level, against a coalition of actors that favoured significant change to the way the country was 
administered. 
The significance of this chapter lies in how the multiplicity of political tensions and power-
dynamics came to play out in what was introduced to the outside world as an international fact-
finding mission, put together the United States, Liberia and the League. Its ad hoc instructions, set 
in bilateral negotiations rather than in a public format at the League, were to gather facts and 
present a dispassionate view of the situation. The chosen candidates were mostly unaware of the 
imperial internationalist context that had sparked the inquiry, the result of American pressure 
and the threat of international scrutiny by means of international law. Political fault lines 
touching upon issues of sovereignty, civilisation, race and foreign tutelage, were reproduced 
within the inquiry. 
Cuthbert Christy, a late addition to the team, was a British commissioner steeped in the tropics of 
colonial Africa with an aptitude for racialisation and thinking along the lines of a civilisational 
standard. Arthur Barclay, the Liberian member, was a former Liberian President and insider to 
the Americo-Liberian elite (including those keen to protect their interests in a forced labour 
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scheme). Finally, Johnson as a black sociologist was someone who showed empathy for the native 
cause and Liberian independence but unwilling to overturn the existing hierarchies of 
international relations. The commission was given discretion to formulate its own solutions and 
recommendations and steer the debate on Liberia’s political future. 
The Liberia inquiry held the veneer of impartiality and fact-finding high, even though its work 
was plagued by outside pressure and a personality clash on the team. Despite some of its scientific 
innovations, it was subject to bias, the physical and emotional strain of the undertaking and the 
socio-political mindsets of its protagonists. The report was mired in a quasi-judicial language that 
revealed racialised thinking and idioms of a civilisational standard. Yet, the inquiry laid bare an 
extensive scheme of forced labour exploitation that would result in high-level political 
resignations. In the end, the biggest hurdle for the inquiry was the question, whether the 
administrative changes to end forced labour practices had to be pursued by the Liberian 
Government or with the assistance and ‘sympathetic’ supervision of foreigners. 
A narrative which had the semblance of a classic case of foreign intervention, however, also shed 
light on the complex role played by the League and ultimately, Liberia’s capacity to fend off 
accusations at the international stage through its representation at the League. The Geneva-based 
organisation brought the matter of forced labour and slavery to the attention of its member states, 
although in its search for more transparency and the role of public opinion, its action 
disproportionally affected a weaker state such as Liberia. No inquiry of forced labour in colonial 
and mandated territories was actively considered. The League’s Mandates Section was put in 
charge to follow up on the Liberian case, despite the country’s full membership of the 
organisation. Yet, the League’s action, partly in coordination, partly in rivalry with the United 
States, also foreclosed colonial powers from seizing to exploit the labour scandal to their benefit 
and strengthen an imperial agenda in West Africa. Technical expertise through the Brunot 
Committee rather than paternal tutelage was the outcome, a sign that the League’s use of soft 
power and a civilisational standard also could pacify the renewed scramble for Africa. 
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Although the United States had never favoured direct rule over Liberia – for the most part it 
sought to extend its economic interests to the closed West African economy – its gamble with 
ongoing political pressure backfired in the aftermath of the investigation. With the replacement 
of Charles King brought about through public opposition by the more protectionist Edward 
Barclay, the United States lost its grip over the cabinet. Liberia, meanwhile, held onto its 
sovereignty and League membership. 
  
180 
 
5: The Inquiry Commission for the Manchurian Crisis 
Fact-finding as an interim measure 
‘There has never been so sharp a test for the League - that is,  
for the whole recuperative forces of civilisation.’ 
(Gilbert Murray, “Manchuria and the League”, The Times, 14 October 1931) 
 
Introduction 
A decade into its existence, the League of Nations was confronted with a direct clash between 
China and Japan. The two original members of the League were involved in a long-standing 
conflict concerning Japan’s special interest in the three North Eastern provinces of China, 
comprising the region of Manchuria, and which risked the territorial integrity of the Chinese 
mainland. The Lytton Commission constituted in the wake of the Manchurian crisis, which 
erupted in September 1931 over a railway explosion in Mukden, has entered history as the best-
known example of a League of Nations inquiry, because the crisis threatened peace and the 
regional balance of power. Moreover, it presented the League with the most significant test-case 
for a fact-finding mission and the League’s overall dispute-resolution mechanism enshrined in 
the Covenant. The League took up the task with confidence. According to Frank Walters, after a 
number of minor successes in Europe and West-Asia the organisation ‘had acquired a complete 
mastery of the new technique of international action. The problems of method and procedure, 
which had taken up so much time and trouble in the earlier years, had been solved.’515 
The small-scale incident involving the railway exploited by the Japanese-owned South Manchuria 
Railway Company on 18 September 1931 in Mukden led to repeated hostilities over the following 
months between the Chinese and Japanese armies with material destruction and civilian losses 
in densely populated areas and the creation of a new state of Manchukuo in the three North 
Eastern provinces; it culminated in Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in the spring 
of 1933. Although these events occurred several years before, the Manchurian crisis has been 
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identified as one of the contributing factors to the outbreak of the Second World War.516 Certainly, 
the Sino-Japanese dispute shook the foundations of peace in East Asia but for scholars it also had 
profound ramifications for the League’s international standing. Critics thought the League had 
failed to contain the situation from the start and reproached the inquiry for failing to deescalate 
the conflict. According to F.S. Northedge, the inquiry ‘bore every appearance of being little more 
than an academic exercise and this was reflected in the leisurely way in which the commission 
went about its work.’517 In recent years, international historians have softened their views 
towards the work of the Lytton Commission in particular, but the overall perception still carries 
traces of institutional paralysis and a failure to prevent future war.518 
While a lot of ink has been spilled over the Sino-Japanese dispute519, in the context of the inter-
war crisis of international diplomacy and the coming of the Second World War, few scholars have 
closely examined the significance of the commission as a display of fact-finding in an imperial 
internationalist context.520 By 1931, the League had successfully managed to use fact-finding in 
tense diplomatic environments, where time was of the essence to avoid further escalation, to 
bring disputing countries back from the brink and restore the territorial status-quo. However, the 
situation in Manchuria was infinitely more complex due to local and regional power contestations 
as well as the long history of Western imperial entanglements and continued commercial 
interests. Here, inquiry had to reconcile the ideal of impartial fact-finding with high diplomatic 
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stakes, most notably the absence of will by the major Western powers to confront an increasingly 
confident, regional power set on expanding its empire to the Chinese mainland.  
The current historiography has put great emphasis on Japan’s distinct521 modernisation 
trajectory after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to explain its search for imperial expansion and 
regional hegemony in the early twentieth-century.522 However, Japanese ambitions in China 
should also be regarded from the wider inter-war political context, notably through the lens of 
the international system set up after the First World War with its imperial hierarchies and 
civilisational underpinnings. In 1905, Japan had shaken the beliefs in the supremacy of Western 
civilisation after its victory over Russia; by the inter-war years, Western powers perceived it as 
an imperial power whose regional interests could no longer be ignored – even though Japanese 
appeasement risked their privileged trade access to China. Japan justified its expansion in East 
Asia mirroring the European discourse in its efforts to colonise large swaths of world in the 
preceding decades, namely in the name of the spread of civilisation and the development of 
peoples. Even though the European powers that underscored the League’s authority in the 
resolution of the Manchurian crisis had few doubts about Japan’s blatant expansionist ambitions, 
they were unwilling to directly confront another imperial power over the territorial integrity and 
sovereign rights of a divided China. Repeated appeals by the Chinese representation in Geneva 
would fail to produce an international consensus on how to bring Japan back into the fold. 
As the chapter shows, the lengthy investigation taken up by the Lytton Commission revealed the 
fabricated events at Mukden and Japanese imperial designs through the creation of Manchukuo 
but did little to avoid these changes from occurring in the North East of China. The fact-finding 
inquiry is framed around the history of Chinese-Japanese relations, to ensure an equitable 
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understanding of events that led to the Mukden incident in 1931. The chapter follows a familiar 
structure that focuses on the origins, catalysts, composition and character of the inquiry; it frames 
the practices and obstacles on the ground through personal agency, the League’s institutional 
context, and the multi-level power dynamics emanating from the imperial hierarchies in the 
international system. 
The origins 
In the past, the vast plains of Manchuria523 have exerted a powerful attraction over foreign, 
imperial powers. China’s northernmost territories remained largely undeveloped up until the late 
nineteenth century and provided a strategic location and commercial base for outsiders eyeing 
access to the Chinese market.524 Economic stagnation and military feebleness under the Qing 
dynasty (1636-1912) made the expansion into Manchuria an alluring opportunity for Russia and 
Japan, two rapidly modernising powers in the region. In 1895, after the First Sino-Japanese War, 
Japan forced China to make major territorial concessions after a humiliating defeat: Japan 
acquired the Liaodong peninsula, in the South East of Manchuria, and several islands (including 
Taiwan). European powers, such as Russia, France and Germany, that worried over the possible 
loss of trade access to China, successfully blocked key parts of the territorial grab – Japan was 
compelled to rescind its claim over the Liaodong peninsula.525 
While France and Germany gained minor concessions, Russia benefited the most from the outside 
intervention. It moved into the Liaodong peninsula at the expense of Japan, and shortly thereafter 
started with the construction of a railway line. In 1898, a weakened China was left with no other 
option but to allow a lease (de facto an occupation) of the peninsula and other parts of Manchuria 
of strategic importance to the Russian imperial army. The newly constructed railway line in the 
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South East of Manchuria (also known as the Chinese Eastern Railway) was a source of Japanese 
grievance and later became an important rationale for the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-05. 
After a surprising Russian defeat – the first time a modern European power had lost against a 
‘backward’ nation526 – the Japanese victors won the rights over the leased territory and a 
monopoly to administer the railway line at the Portsmouth Peace Conference. Up until then, 
Manchuria had been a space of repeated foreign contestation, however, now it seemed destined 
to become a vital strategic asset in the hands of Japanese foreign policy-makers.527 
The early twentieth century up until the 1930s saw a myriad of developments instrumental to 
the growing rivalry between China and Japan over the rights and interests in Manchuria. First, 
the Chinese Revolution of 1911 uprooted the imperial dynasty and led to the creation of the 
Republic of China. While the uprising came about as response to the decay under the Qing 
dynasty, factional infighting and warlords severely hampered the modernising efforts and 
territorial unity of the new regime. In Manchuria, the warlord Chang Tso-lin528 became de facto 
the local ruler, although his power was reliant upon the Japanese military– tacit support that 
delivered additional territorial concessions. The turbulences in mainland China, with rival 
governments in Peking and Nanjing as well as autonomous warlords, was a constant source of 
instability and lasted until the late 1920s when the nationalist (Kuomintang529) government in 
Nanjing prevailed over its rivals.530 
Second, the Japanese had major plans for economic development in Manchuria after it obtained 
the lease from Russia. One of the first steps was the establishment of a South Manchuria Railway 
Company (SMR), a semi-autonomous public company (partly run by state bureaucracy) that took 
                                                             
526 Rotem Kowner, “Becoming an Honorary Civilized Nation: Remaking Japan’s Military Image during the 
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905.” The Historian 64, no. 1 (September 2001): 19. 
527 C. Walter Young, “Sino-Japanese Interests and Issues in Manchuria.” Pacific Affairs 1, no. 7 (1928): 1–
20. Eto, “China’s International Relations, 1911-1931,” 84-85. 
528 Also known as Zhang Zuolin (pinyin). 
529 Also known as Guomindang (pinyin). 
530 J. A. G. Roberts, “Warlordism in China.” Review of African Political Economy, no. 45/46 (1989): 26–33. 
Mary B. Rankin, John King Fairbank, and Denis Crispin Twitchett. “Introduction: Perspectives on Modern 
China’s History.” In The Cambridge History of China, Volume 13: Republican China, 1912-1949, Part 2, eds. 
John King Fairbank and Denis Crispin Twitchett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 49-73. 
185 
 
charge of all the responsibilities associated with the management of the railway line. However, 
SMR in many ways emulated the functions of a state in the leased territories (providing security 
through the Kwantung Army531, diplomatic functions, health care and education to workers and 
their families). Manchuria was perceived by the Japanese Government as an important region for 
the country’s future economic expansion: the Manchurian plains could supply Japan with 
agricultural crops and mineral products, but also provide a destination for Japanese emigration. 
Ramon Myers notes that the Japanese Government ‘clearly understood the economic importance 
of Manchuria to Japan's economy and national security at the time the SMR strengthened its hold 
in that region.’532 The railway company, as a modern enterprise and extension of the state, became 
vital to the projection of imperial power over Manchuria: the Japanese ‘responded quickly to any 
external threat that might undermine the SMR'S activities.’533 
Third, the First World War in East Asia acted as a watershed moment in Sino-Japanese relations, 
which steadily deteriorated from this time forth. As foreign powers were preoccupied with the 
war in Europe, Japan saw an opening to try and take the remaining German concessions and 
strengthen its hand in mainland China. In 1915, the Japanese Government presented a 
confidential list of ‘Twenty-One Demands’ to its Chinese counterpart that would solidify Japan’s 
‘special interest’ in China. Manchuria served as China’s bread-basket, but its plains could also 
sustain a Chinese (or Japanese) surplus population in the future. The demands included a 
provision of additional rights for Japanese in terms of travel, residence, and trade, barred China 
from giving concessions to other foreign powers in the future and forced the Chinese Government 
to accept Japanese control over its finances and national security. The ‘Twenty-One Demands’, 
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offered under the threat of military force, would have sealed off China from the outside world by 
creating a Japanese protectorate on the mainland.534  
Chinese negotiators sought to stall the talks with the Japanese and, meanwhile, leaked the list of 
demands to the press in hope of obtaining international support. Although the ‘Twenty-One 
Demands’ were eventually watered down – most levers of Japanese control over Chinese 
administration were removed – China eventually succumbed to the ultimatum and accepted the 
proposed agreement. The 1915 treaty following this accord was heavily criticised by foreign 
powers, particularly the United States and Great Britain, for its attempt to monopolise foreign 
commercial interests in China. Moreover, the negotiations under duress sparked national fervour 
and negative sentiments towards the Japanese among the Chinese population. This hostility 
would provide a salient ground for future protest movements against the Japanese presence and 
boycotts of Japanese goods in China. The 1915 treaty remained a thorn in the side of future 
Chinese governments, as they undertook successive attempts to overturn the agreement. For the 
Japanese, the treaty gave a justification for continued investment in Manchuria – underscored by 
the idea that the region could provide a ‘lifeline’ for Japan. As one Japanese commentator noted 
in 1933, ‘Japan needs to feel politically and strategically secure in her territory [Manchuria] and 
to work out her own economic salvation.’535 
Fourth, the post-war situation initially vindicated Japan’s actions: The United States 
acknowledged Japan’s ‘special interests’ in Manchuria in the Ishii-Lansing agreement of 1919.536 
Moreover, German concessions (in China) were awarded to Japan at the Paris Peace Conference. 
Nish observes that, except for Japan ‘everyone recognised that this part of the Versailles Treaty 
was unsatisfactory; but there was no time for lengthy debate at Paris and the matter was left to 
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post-conference diplomacy and to the newly-created League of Nations’.537 China’s absence in the 
Allied war effort had not helped its case, but in the next years it would try and overturn the 
awarding of concessions to Japan. Both countries became members of the League, but initially no 
steps were undertaken in Geneva to deal with any territorial issues in East Asia. A breakthrough 
came with the Washington Conference of 1922, which partly restored the original German 
concessions to China (Shandong Treaty) and enshrined open door trade access and the territorial 
integrity of China in international law (Nine-Power Treaty).538  
These small Chinese victories had wider ramifications for the East Asia region: although Japanese 
ties to the mainland were recognised, the international treaties concluded at Washington 
essentially created an obstacle to future imperial expansion from the Japanese in what it 
perceived as its regional sphere of influence.539 China received assurances that its territorial 
sovereignty was recognised in international law and would be upheld by the other foreign 
powers, thereby eliminating the possibility of new Japanese demands. Although the conference 
in 1922 brought temporary relief for Sino-Japanese relations, it did fuel a sense of grievance 
among Japanese hardliners who believed that a Western power-dominated international system 
had curtailed Japanese imperial ambitions. Although Japan would present itself as a model 
partner on the international stage throughout the 1920s – inter alia it signed up to the 1928 
Kellogg–Briand Pact for the renunciation of war – part of the domestic population and political 
establishment endeavoured for a more assertive foreign policy.540 
Finally, the decade leading up to the Manchurian crisis saw major upheaval in the domestic 
political situation of China, briefly alluded to in the first point. The Kuomintang Government in 
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Nanking strengthened its hand after an internal party reorganisation and slowly gained control 
over the Chinese mainland during the second half of the 1920s. The unity achieved by the Nanking 
(Nationalist) Government, however, remained largely superficial as several warlords – among 
others Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria – and communist revolutionaries held out against the central 
authorities.541 In 1926, Chang Tso-lin had even tried to proclaim himself leader of the Chinese 
Republic by taking Peking, the rival seat of republican power, much to the annoyance of the 
Kuomintang government. The Northern Expedition, an attempt by Nanking to regain control of 
the northern territories, was led by field marshal Chiang Kai-shek and resulted in the defeat of 
Chang Tso-lin’s army in 1928. Japan played a significant role in this context of internal Chinese 
strife: it tried to extend its influence through the support of Chang Tso-lin by way of the Japanese 
Kwantung army. Even though the Kwantung command was originally a garrison for the leased 
territories in Manchuria, it grew into a sizeable army group with a leadership that acted 
autonomously from Japanese imperial high-command.542 
The Chinese warlord Chang Tso-lin was at the centre of a complex web of intrigues and rivalries 
between Japan and China, as he tried to retain some degree of independence for Manchuria. This 
was suitable to Japan as, according to Young, it had ‘taken a position which clearly [prevented] 
Manchuria from becoming united with the rest of China under the Nationalist [Nanking] 
Government.’543 Yet, Japan’s assertion in the domestic politics of China, through its Kwantung 
military-arm in Manchuria, risked a direct conflict between the two countries. The relationship 
between Chang Tso-lin and Japan was also far from amiable. Within the Kwantung army, some 
were eager to get rid of the warlord and push Manchuria to the brink of chaos. A secret plot by a 
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group of Japanese officers to assassinate Chang Tso-lin was successfully executed on 4 June 1928 
but failed to create a situation of political instability in which the Kwantung army could justifiably 
intervene with force. On the contrary, Chang Tso-lin was quickly substituted by his son Chang 
Hsueh-liang544, who steered Manchuria closer towards Nanking in the subsequent years.545 
The successive developments in the first decades of the twentieth century demonstrate that 
Manchuria served as of the setting for an intense power contestation between local, regional, and 
international actors. Warlords sought to hold off attempts by the central authorities to strengthen 
the unity of the Chinese Republic, while the Japanese expanded their rights and concessions to 
invest, developed infrastructure and cultivated resources with the help and means of the SMR 
and the Kwantung army group. In the meantime, self-interested Western imperial powers held a 
measure of influence over the foreign policy of China, as they continued to maintain ‘open door’ 
trade privileges in return for their support of Chinese territorial integrity.546 Signs of direct 
political contestation between Japan and China, however, became more explicit as the 1920s 
progressed, chiefly because of demographic causes and expanding state control. China’s three 
North Eastern provinces were eyed by both countries as a destination for emigration – the 
Japanese agricultural ‘surplus population’, however, risked being overwhelmed by Chinese 
settlers as part of the ‘Great Migration North’.547 Also, after 1928, Nanking’s attempts to 
reintroduce a central authority in Manchuria, with its powers over taxation and trade, were 
perceived as a threat to Japanese special privileges and existing industrial investments in the 
region. The oversized role and visible presence of the Japanese state in Manchuria was arguably 
the single most important cause of Chinese nationalist agitation in the inter-war period.548  
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In sum, the crux of the disagreement boiled down to two distinctly opposing views on the status 
of Manchuria within the Chinese Republic. Whereas the Nanking Government viewed Manchuria 
as an indispensable part of an undivided China, the Japanese leadership viewed the region as 
historically separate from the rest of China. Therefore, it considered Manchuria could become a 
strategic ‘lifeline’ for the Japanese Empire.  
The catalyst 
By September 1931, the situation in Manchuria had grown dangerously tense. Just a month 
before, official news spread that a captain of the Japanese imperial army, Nakamura Shintaro, had 
been killed in the Western part of Manchuria (Inner Mongolia) in unclear circumstances. 
Nakamura was a member of the General Staff headquarters in Tokyo; supposedly, he had been 
tasked to map the Western border of Manchuria.549 During his incognito travels through 
Manchuria, Nakamura and three assistants had aroused the suspicion of Chinese soldiers, who 
detained all four men on the grounds of irregularities with their passports. Thereafter, it is 
assumed that Nakamura and his team were shot, and their bodies burnt to remove all traces of 
evidence.550 Confusion prevailed when the death of Nakamura became public during the summer 
of 1931, greatly exacerbated by the lack of cooperation between Chinese and Japanese authorities 
to find out what had occurred. Although the supposed Chinese culprits were eventually identified 
and handed over to the Japanese local authorities on 18 September 1931, ironing out the 
diplomatic row, many Japanese (including army officers) resented the slow response to the news 
as well as the ambiguous role played by the Chinese in the whole affair.551 
In this tense political context, any minor incident could easily escalate into a full-blown dispute. 
This would be the consequence of either one side losing its diplomatic self-restraint or another 
seizing the opportunity as a justification for a more forceful response. The events as they unfolded 
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in Mukden on 18 September 1931 can therefore be framed in different ways. An explosion was 
reported near the South Manchurian railroad on the evening of 18 September which provoked a 
military answer from the nearby stationed Japanese Kwantung army. The days following the 
Mukden incident were mired in conflicting reports from both sides; a situation that bared 
resemblance to the deaths of Chang Tso-lin and Nakamura in which there also was uncertainty as 
to what exactly had transpired. The Japanese version condemned the Chinese for blowing up the 
railway and provoking an act of legitimate self-defence by the Japanese garrison. On the contrary, 
the Chinese denied any responsibility in the explosion and indicated they had offered no 
resistance to the Kwantung army. Nevertheless, the facts on the ground clearly showed a 
remarkable departure from previous quarrels: in immediate response to the Mukden incident, 
the Japanese Kwantung army, in what appeared to be an orchestrated movement, captured the 
Chinese barracks nearby and took over the walled city of Mukden. Despite attempts of the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry to stop the operation, local Kwantung army officers took autonomous 
decisions in response to the situation. 552 
In hindsight, it became evident that the Japanese narrative of an explosion was a fabricated story: 
the Mukden incident and the military response had been planned by a group of individuals within 
the Kwantung army – and it is questionable that even the high command was informed in 
advance. The operation undertaken by the Kwantung army was likely an attempt to achieve a 
stronger course of imperial action after a series of minor diplomatic frustrations. Ferrell observed 
that at the time the Japanese army ‘was far from a united, homogeneous group. The young officers 
in the 1920's had begun ever more openly to oppose their conservative superiors’.553 Yet, these 
facts were unknown to the public. As The Times noted on 21 September 1931, it remained to be 
seen ‘whether the Japanese are aiming merely to secure a settlement of their differences with the 
Chinese or whether they contemplate establishing themselves more firmly in South 
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Manchuria’.554 Without question, the Japanese side closed its ranks after the events at Mukden. 
The Japanese Government in Tokyo was eager to defend its special interest in Manchuria at all 
cost, even at the risk of war. The Chinese answer, in response to the orchestrated military action 
of the Japanese, was to make an appeal to the League of Nations.  
These differentiated responses to the Mukden incident showed the power inequality comprising 
the relationship between China and Japan: the former sought help at the international stage, 
whereas the latter preferred to pursue direct (bilateral) negotiations to settle all outstanding 
issues. Upon instruction from Wellington Koo, a veteran Chinese diplomat and participant of the 
Paris Peace Conference, the Nanking Government communicated its appeal not only to the League 
of Nations and its major European members, but also to Washington.555 If Japan had violated the 
terms of the treaties agreed at Washington Conference of 1922, or the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 
1928, then the United States would play a key role in the international response to the 
Manchurian incident. For the US Government, this would turn out to be another moment of closer 
cooperation with the League of Nations: in the next months, the US would send an observer556 to 
the Geneva Council meetings and the State Department would work alongside the League with 
regard to the Sino-Japanese crisis.557 The Chinese appeal to the League occurred under Article 11 
of the Covenant, indicating a threat of war but not yet an irreconcilable rupture of diplomatic 
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relations. Although Article 11 gave the means to both the Assembly and Council to consider the 
question, the Chinese appeal was directed towards the Council for immediate examination.558 
China’s (non-permanent) membership of the League’s Council meant that its representative, 
Arthur Sze, could directly address all members at the emergency sitting of late September 
1931.559 Although the Council had briefly convened on 19 September, neither the Chinese nor the 
Japanese representative held sufficient information at the time to enter a debate about the facts 
of the incident. Several days later, on 22 September, a first discussion was initiated. The Chinese 
representative stressed the actual military occupation of Mukden and other places by the 
Kwantung Army, meanwhile he indicated that both Chinese soldiers and citizens had offered no 
resistance. From the Japanese side, the emphasis lay on the country’s sincere desire to find a 
peaceful way to settle the matter – preferably through direct agreement. Japan’s representative 
Kenkichi Yoshizawa acknowledged it would withdraw its troops as soon as the railway zone and 
its inhabitants were secured. The Council asked for both parties to abstain from new hostilities 
and seek the immediate withdrawal of troops, a position which was laid down in a resolution 
adopted on 30 September 1931. Hereby, the Council relied on the goodwill of both countries to 
restore the peace; it decided to use patience as a course of action. The resolution was an open 
road to another meeting in October, if the situation would warrant it.560 
The situation on the ground in Manchuria rapidly moved beyond the diplomatic goodwill 
professed at the Council meeting in Geneva. In early October, the Japanese Kwantung army 
launched airstrikes on Chinchow561, a regional city far removed from the railway zone. Hence, the 
argument made by the Japanese diplomatic representation in Geneva of security measures to 
protect citizens and investment in Manchuria became difficult to sustain. Also, the aerial bombing 
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campaign, supposedly in anticipation of a Chinese counteroffensive which never materialised, 
had been undertaken without the approval of the high command in Tokyo. At the time, the 
Japanese political and military establishments in the capital were divided over the Mukden 
incident. For instance, the Japanese Government comprised nationalist hardliners in favour of an 
expansionist policy, as well as internationalists advocating a conciliatory tone. Even within the 
Japanese imperial army there were senior commanders who cautioned against anything that 
would provoke a war. However, the Japanese Government felt pressured to publicly back the 
Kwantung in Manchuria – given the latter’s public support. Tokyo backed down and 
communicated to the outside world that anti-Japanese agitation in China had justified the army’s 
actions.562 
On the Chinese side, the Nanking Government felt no desire to engage in a military conflict with a 
superior army force that would also risk the internal stability of the country. For Nanking, the 
communist movement posed a more direct threat than a future Japanese invasion.563 In other 
words, China put its trust in non-resistance and an international resolution of a regional dispute, 
anticipating that Japan was committed to finding a solution – which turned out to be a major 
miscalculation.564 Any hope for an immediate settlement would be shattered over the following 
months, as Japanese advances continued while no enforceable solution was found in Geneva. A 
succession of Council meetings in mid-October, under the presidency of Aristide Briand, led to a 
draft resolution that recalled the obligations under the Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact and 
recommended the evacuation of all troops in parallel to the start of direct negotiations. A counter-
proposal was submitted by Japanese representative Yoshizawa, which sought to delay an 
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immediate troop departure. According to Japan, the withdrawal of troops was conditional on the 
improvement of the security situation. In the previous sessions, the representative had indicated 
the threat of anti-Japanese boycotts and ‘molestation’ of Japanese nationals as reasons to 
maintain a military presence outside of the SMR railway zone. However, all Council members 
(except Japan) voted down the counter-proposal. The Japanese strategy of disregarding the 
majority view had backfired into a strong rejection of its proposal – placing the country in 
diplomatic isolation.565 
The Geneva method of reaching agreement between the two parties had reached its limits for the 
time being. After the October session, the Kwantung army ignored the repeated calls for 
disengagement and withdrawal to the railway zone. A potential breakthrough was not being 
produced in the upper echelons of international politics; rather, it materialised because of the 
League’s work on the ground. Frank Walters, personal secretary to Eric Drummond, was visiting 
China on official Secretariat business at the time of the diplomatic stalemate in Geneva. Although 
there to seek closer cooperation between the League and the Nanking Government on various 
technical subjects, the opportunity arose for Walters to reach out to the Japanese and find out the 
possible ways in which the League could broker an agreement. For instance, one suggestion saw 
Walters act as a League investigator in Manchuria. Although the Japanese rejected the idea, 
fearing anti-Japanese bias after his stay in China, the idea of a type of inquiry was planted. 
Subsequently, Walters travelled to Japan to, firstly, improve the League’s standing with Japanese 
officials – after the defeat of the Council counter-proposal – and secondly, to push for this new 
initiative. In Walters’ thinking, Japan could suggest the establishment of an inquiry commission – 
an idea likely to be accepted by China if the League would insist.566 Inquiry held the prospect that 
two sides might agree on a common position, to find impartial means to address the dispute. 
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The next League Council session, in Paris from 16 November until 10 December 1932, would 
deliver on the initiative for an international inquiry – albeit only after lengthy discussions. In 
truth, the idea of a neutral party (to observe the withdrawal of troops, to assess the damages and 
to address the question of responsibility) had already been tabled by Chinese representative Sze 
on 23 October, but was given no attention in the subsequent discussion about the draft 
resolution.567 Walters’ intervention in Japan in November seemingly ensured that the suggestion 
was brought up again on 21 November, this time by the Japanese representative: ‘the Japanese 
Government considers that the essential condition of a fundamental solution of the question is a 
real knowledge of the situation as a whole, both in Manchuria and in China itself. It is for this 
reason that it proposes that the League of Nations should send a commission of inquiry to the 
spot.’568 The suggested commission would not be made up of neutral observers in the local area 
but instead, should comprise international and impartial individuals.  
In the end, why did the Japanese Government instigate the proposed investigation – aware that it 
might expose the territorial ambitions of its imperial subjects in Manchuria? A likely explanation 
is found in the emphasis the Japanese representation placed on ‘the complete chaos and 
incredible anarchy’ in China.569 Japanese officials considered that an investigation into the origins 
of dispute, with on-the-ground visits to China, would expose the inadequate administration as 
well as acts of hostility and provocation by Chinese citizens. Thus, the Japanese narrative sought 
to display itself as the civilised side of the conflict: a benign force to ward off anarchy and having 
the capacity to bring stability and modernisation in Manchuria. Another possible consideration is 
that the establishment of an international inquiry (rather than the use of local observers) would 
take up several months’ time and thereby relieve the Kwantung army from immediate pressure 
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to withdraw its troops. The Japanese representative had stressed that the commission’s work 
would be separate from any (direct) negotiations between China and Japan.570 
While the proposal to create a commission of inquiry was welcomed by many delegates at the 
Council meeting, it did not meet universal acclaim right away. Chinese representative Arthur Sze 
worried that the establishment of an investigation might distract attention away from the ongoing 
hostilities and Japanese troops in Manchuria. The original Chinese proposal had implied the use 
of neutral observers sourced in the region (from foreign embassies and consulates), which could 
have been set up rapidly. This Chinese anxiety was underscored by the British representative, 
Robert Cecil, who stressed that the safeguarding of peace should be the priority of the Council: ‘it 
would be a complete failure (…) if, during the progress of the work of this commission, hostilities 
continued as they have unhappily continued during the past weeks.’571 In his final remarks on 23 
November, Council President Briand noted that a commission could both deliver ‘valuable 
information’ and ‘tranquilise public opinion’ during its work on the ground. However, many 
questions regarding the inquiry were still to be resolved, ‘a whole series of problems’ that would 
be discussed in the following weeks.572 
One hurdle was the language of the proposal. A Chinese memorandum presented to President 
Briand, emphasised again the importance of ensuring that the inquiry was not an ‘illusory’ 
initiative. According to Chinese representative Sze, the League had already lost valuable time not 
embracing the idea of neutral observers on the ground in parallel to a prompt withdrawal of 
troops (with a fixed time limit). The memorandum affirmed the creation of a ‘neutral’ commission 
to supervise the evacuated territories, and the convocation of ‘a conference of all interested 
parties’ to settle all outstanding questions between China and Japan.573 In its wording, this was 
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slightly but significantly different from the Japanese proposal, which had emphasised an inquiry 
commission, to investigate the dispute rather than observe the withdrawal (with no time limit 
attached), and suggested biletaral negotiations between the two countries.  
Another hurdle was the position of the major powers in relation to the idea of an inquiry 
commission. European imperial powers were distracted by the economic depression and 
therefore happy to accept what was already on the table of the League’s Council. A more forceful 
response against the Japanese occupation of Chinese territory was out of the question: economic 
sanctions would provoke a blowback on trade – a scenario no country was eager to face. Henig 
indicates that also the Soviet Union, as a non-member, would have been reluctant to support a 
stronger League initiative. Despite being ‘fully alive to the threat of Japanese northwards 
expansion in Manchuria’, the famines of the early 1930s made any initiative regarding the Sino-
Japanese dispute beyond consideration.574 
It is also worth recalling here the tangled position of the United States. Previously, US Secretary 
of State Henry Stimson had agreed to send an observer to the Council meetings of the League of 
Nations – in a sign of closer cooperation to tackle the Manchurian crisis. Secretary Stimson made 
this public move without clear backing from President Hoover, who feared upsetting the Japanese 
and thereby disturbing the situation in East Asia.575 The Secretary walked a tightrope between 
engagement and detachment – in a manner emblematic of the Republican administration’s 
overall relationship with the League. American Consul Prentiss Gilbert, and later Ambassador 
Charles Dawes, were instructed to attend Council meetings but not to make any statements in 
sessions; their role was limited to private conversations with representatives of the other powers 
and the President of the Council. Moreover, in a statement to Dawes, Stimson made it clear that 
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the United States would be supportive of a settlement yet retain ‘the full freedom of judgment as 
of its course.’576  
The ambivalence in these signals has led scholars to draw distinct conclusions about Stimson’s 
view on the merits of the League machinery. One author alleged that the Sectary of State ‘vetoed’ 
the idea of an inquiry commission, although it is more likely that, initially, Stimson thought it 
impossible for the Japanese to agree to such a measure.577 In fact, as the hostilities spread to the 
north of Manchuria, around Tsitsihar578, and the Japanese representative committed to the idea 
of an inquiry, Stimson became very ‘hopeful’ about the idea of a ‘full investigation of everything 
on the part of China and Japan.’579 In late November, the United States concentrated their efforts 
on persuading the Chinese to accept the inquiry initiative under Article 11 of the Covenant. The 
US (and the European powers) wished to dissuade the Chinese from making an additional appeal 
to the League under the more forceful provisions of Article 15, which could provoke a discussion 
about economic sanctions.580 In the following weeks, the US Government would become 
preoccupied about the composition of the commission – and whether the presence of an 
American commissioner would be warranted. 
By early December, Council President Briand had drafted with the help of a drafting committee a 
resolution for the inquiry – reflecting the views of the major powers – with the ambition to 
reconcile the different views of the involved parties. In the Council meeting of 9 December, Briand 
reaffirmed the resolution of 30 September that asked for the withdrawal of all Japanese troops to 
the railway zone but refrained from providing a timetable for its execution. Subsequently, the 
draft resolution called for the appointment of a five-member commission to study the situation 
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on the ground ‘any circumstance’ threatening the peace between China and Japan. The two 
countries could appoint an assessor to assist the commission, which effectively barred them from 
sending their own commissioner. In a detailed declaration that followed the reading of the 
resolution, President Briand indicated the ‘purely advisory character of the commission’: this 
explicitly ruled out the commissioners from negotiating a settlement, although they would be free 
to study any question relevant to the situation in Manchuria. In many ways, it was significant for 
the Council President to prescribe ad hoc terms of reference of the commission, rather than rely 
on any detailed blue-print prepared by the League Secretariat. The improvisations made by 
Briand may have been due to the absence of a clear precedent – although Briand had acted as 
Council President during a smaller Greco-Bulgarian dispute in 1925 – or the belief that Manchuria 
presented the League a crisis of a different magnitude.581 
While Briand’s resolution and subsequent declaration offered a clear prescription for the 
character of the commission, it also left room for interpretation in other places. Neither the draft 
resolution nor Briand declaration specified the profile sought for the future commissioners. This 
gave him (in his function as Council President) plenty of discretion in the selection process. 
Interestingly, Briand also refrained from explicitly using the words ‘neutral’ and ‘impartial’ in the 
resolution, despite the weight given by other representatives to these words.582 The draft 
resolution of 9 December was discussed on the following day, as Japanese representative 
Yoshizawa had requested a twenty-hour delay to consult his government on the provisions in the 
document. On 10 December, Yoshizawa opened the discussion and indicated the acceptance by 
his government of the proposal. Chinese representative Sze made several reservations and 
observations about the draft resolution; most notably, he made clear to the Council that China 
would expect first an inquiry and report into the withdrawal of Japanese forces. Despite the minor 
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reservations made by the representatives, the draft resolution was adapted unanimously, 
clearing the path for the constitution of an inquiry commission.583 
Since the context of the 10 December resolution touches both upon diplomacy as well as the 
nature of fact-finding, it deserves additional consideration. The Council’s initiative under the 
leadership of Briand was in fact an effort to deal with two distinct problems simultaneously. First, 
the cessation of hostilities contained in the Council’s (re)affirmation of the Japanese troop 
withdrawal. Second, the lack of reliable information: as Briand noted, ‘sending of a commission 
of inquiry to the spot will enable the Council to continue its endeavours with a fuller knowledge 
of the facts (…) rendered particularly difficult by the inadequacy of our information as to what 
was taking place in these distance lands.’584 The focus on these two problems reveals the 
interaction between knowledge production and decision-making in Geneva. Although fact-finding 
was an important input for the Council’s deliberation, it effectively curtailed the League’s actions 
for the nearby future – as long as the commission did not report back. A hardly affordable delay, 
given the urgency of the situation on the ground. 
The resolution did not explicitly call for an impartial body although it seemed implied in the 
Council discussion after the resolution’s adoption. As the Spanish representative Salvador de 
Madariaga declared: ‘A commission provides guarantees of knowledge and impartiality.’585 But 
how was this impartiality going to be reassured if the composition of the commission was yet to 
be decided? Clearly, it would be up to the chosen commissioners to live up to their role as 
impartial observers, rather than diplomatic representatives, but no guidelines were given to the 
selection of suitable candidates. 
With regard to the overall task, the purely advisory character of the commission created clarity 
by separating the quest for knowledge from the search for political reconciliation. Yet, an 
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independent investigation into all circumstances potentially led the commissioners to uncover 
compromising facts about one of the involved parties. Would the chosen procedure under Article 
11 be sufficient, if the inquiry led to the discovery of breaches of international law? In the Council 
discussion of 10 December, British representative Robert Cecil underlined that the Council’s role 
under Article 11 was one of mediation and persuasion, rather than arbitration and decision – and 
required unanimity of all parties.586 Most probably, the knowledge gained from the investigation 
would make a unanimous agreement hard to achieve. 
The above considerations have led scholars to criticise the League’s action in response to the 
steady aggravation of hostilities after the events at Mukden.587 Could the League have done more 
to achieve its ambitions of restoring the peace in East Asia? In theory, there was scope for a more 
decisive approach to the Manchurian crisis. In the preceding narrative, several alternative 
possible avenues of Council action have been glimpsed, for example the usage of a clear timetable 
for troop withdrawal (with no exceptions given to the Japanese and verified by neutral observers 
who could be sourced from foreign diplomatic representations in China). Another avenue was to 
empower the Chinese representation to appeal to the League’s Council under Article 15 or 16 of 
the Covenant. However, Western imperial powers showed little appetite to push China towards a 
stronger course of action – one that could result in League sanctions against Japan. 
When regarded through an imperial internationalist lens, the diplomatic situation after Japan’s 
conquest of Manchuria, seemed unfavourable to the pursuit of a more decisive role by the League 
of Nations. The collective security system set up in the wake of the Paris Peace Conference was 
entirely dependent on the willpower of the League’s strongest members to use their economic 
and military means to defend the territorial integrity and sovereign rights of its weakest members 
– when confronted with a rising imperial power. In a climate of deepening economic depression, 
no state was eager to take additional risks, especially ones that could hamper trade with East Asia. 
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Even the League’s small member states, keen to condemn the Japanese military occupation on 
Chinese territory, did not demur. Rather, they sided with the limited action taken under Article 
11. In the words of Foreign Secretary John Simon, this was a ‘very imperfect success’ for the 
League.588 Inquiry meant the path of least resistance, a form of international action that relieved 
the major powers from harming their own interests in the immediate future. It appeared that 
truth seeking was the best possible interim measure.  
The composition 
The next hurdle after the adoption of the Council resolution of 10 December 1931 was the 
selection of the individuals to serve on the commission. The resolution left the main initiative in 
the hands of Council President Briand, although he could most likely count on the support of a 
drafting committee and Secretary-General Drummond. The archives of the League Secretariat 
have left no information about the initial steps of the selection process, suggesting that the 
decisions were made in private and left plenty of discretion to the Council President. It is only 
hinted that by late December, during the public announcement of the individuals of the 
commission, Briand had asked five governments (of the major European powers, Great Britain, 
France, Germany, and Italy; as well as the United States) to supply him with the name of a possible 
candidate. In one instance, there is indication that the Secretariat may have suggested two names 
to the US Government, but the overall tendency is that each government had the possibility to 
choose a suitable candidate. In the case of Germany, Briand was offered a choice between three 
possible candidates.589 
In late December, the five appointed members of the inquiry were announced: Lord Victor 
Bulwer-Lytton (Great Britain), General Henri Edouard Claudel (France), Count Luigi Aldrovandi-
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Marescotti (Italy), Major General Frank Ross McCoy (United States) and Doctor Heinrich Schnee 
(Germany).590 After securing the agreement of the Japanese and Chinese Governments, a Council 
communication on 14 January 1932 confirmed the five commissioners. There appears to have 
been no strong pressure exerted by the two countries to reject or change a candidate. The profiles 
and professional background of the chosen candidates present a better picture about what may 
have been the appointment strategy pursued by the Council President, the League Secretariat, 
and the respective governments. Lord Lytton had a wealth of experience in colonial 
administration: he was born in India and later became Governor of Bengal and (briefly) served as 
Viceroy of India. Additionally, he had represented Great Britain in League Assembly Committees 
and was known to be favourable to the organisation (due to his engagement with the League of 
Nations Union). General Claudel was a French army commander, who had served in West Africa 
and led the Colonial Army Corps. In the late 1920s, he had been part of a short mission to Indo-
China and China – of all five he was most familiar with Manchuria.591 
Count Aldrovandi, a Doctor of Law, was the only full-time diplomat on the commission; he had 
been part of the Italian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference and had held consular positions 
in the United States and Latin America. Most recently, Aldrovandi was Ambassador in Berlin but 
had been forcibly recalled by Mussolini – after being held responsible for private documents 
going missing. Another military man, Major General Frank McCoy had been on active service in 
Mexico but most of his career was characterised by various roles as assistant to high-political 
offices (among others, aide-de-camp to US President Theodore Roosevelt and assistant to the 
Governor-General of the Philippines). McCoy served as an aid administrator to Japan after an 
earthquake in 1923 and had also been the President of the 1929 Neutral Commission appointed 
to reconcile Bolivia and Paraguay. Finally, Heinrich Schnee was another Doctor of Law but 
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subsequently went for a career in colonial administration. Since the end of the First World War, 
he had served as a member of the Reichstag and worked as a lecturer in politics.592 
What considerations were decisive in the selection of the five candidates? The choice to have big-
country representation on the commission meant that nationality was perhaps a more important 
factor than technical expertise. However, Secretary-General Drummond thought there should be 
‘a lawyer, a soldier, an engineer and a merchant’, a diverse array of professions which, indeed, 
would find some reflection in the final composition. Arguably, Drummond ‘was trying to set 
precedents for the future in which international and professional criteria would supersede those 
of nation and race’ although in practice this was never achieved during the lifespan of the League 
of Nations.593 Possible evidence that the professional background mattered, can be found in the 
correspondence between national governments and their citizens. A frequent practice was for 
individuals to recommend a person for possible inclusion in an inquiry. For example, Lady Astor 
wrote to the British Foreign Office, suggesting the inclusion of Dame Rachel Crowdy in the 
commission. In response, a staff member of the Foreign Office indicated that the government was 
hoping to appoint a lawyer – although that did not turn out to be completely true – ‘and Dame 
Rachel Crowdy is therefore, I fear, excluded.’594 
Each appointment came about in a slightly different manner. Some were the result of a personal 
recommendation, while others were the outcome of an administrative selection process. For 
instance, Foreign Secretary John Simon was warmly advised by the British representative to the 
League, Robert Cecil, to consider the candidacy of Lord Lytton. Moreover, it appeared that the 
                                                             
592 Letter from Council President Aristide Briand to the Members of the Council on the appointment of the 
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selection of Lytton also came about via the lobbying of his spouse, Pamela Chichele-Plowden.595 
Commissioner Frank McCoy was a late addition to the commission and likely not to have been the 
US Government’s first choice. Nevertheless, the appointment was made upon direct suggestion 
by Secretary of State Henry Stimson. Although McCoy was well known in Japan for his work with 
disaster relief after the 1923 earthquake, he was perceived as unbiased and met the approval of 
the Chinese Government.596 From a list of three German candidates, the Council (and its 
President) considered Dr Schnee to be the best candidate – not because of professional distinction 
but, chiefly, because he was not well-known and therefore acceptable to each side.597 
The commission comprised white, male individuals aged between 55 and 60, with a professional 
background either in politics (administration), diplomacy or the military, often with work 
experience gained in colonial territories. Overall, the composition appears as diverse but 
somewhat inequitable if one takes Drummond’s reflection as yardstick: there is neither an 
engineer (to examine the damage to the railroad and the cities) nor a merchant (in a better 
position to understand the impact of anti-Japanese boycotts). None of the commissioners had a 
deep understanding of the situation prevailing in Manchuria – which was perceived as a plus even 
though this meant a lack of knowledge about the region. While the relative seniority suggests 
these were men beyond the peak of their careers, many had close relations to higher echelons of 
power. The assignment requested a primary allegiance to the League of Nations, although in 
practice they could be perceived as representing the diplomatic interests of Western imperial 
powers in East Asia. No serious consideration was given to the representation of smaller 
countries on the commission or the inclusion of women. The commission was international in 
representation, but questions could be raised over the dominance of big powers (with 
commercial interests in East Asia). This was precisely a regret raised Polish representative 
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Franciszek Sokal to the Council President Briand, mid-January: the absence of other member 
states marked a missed opportunity to ‘secure international co-operation on a broader basis’. The 
Polish delegate felt this ‘should not become a precedent for the future’, although it would continue 
in practice.598 
The appointment of the five commissioners tells only part of the story. The resolution of 10 
December also prescribed the appointment of two assessors, one for each side, to support the 
commission in its work (and supply any official documents requested). It was an unfamiliar599 
move to bring Chinese and Japanese representatives into the commission, thereby creating a 
degree of legitimacy but at the same time restrict their role to one of observers. Since the 
resolution contained no details about the selection and role of the assessors, it was up to the 
League Secretariat to formulate ideas. Deputy Secretary-General Joseph Avenol, tasked to keep 
track of organisational matters concerning the inquiry, suggested to his superior, Eric 
Drummond, that it was evident that the two governments should designate their own assessors. 
Avenol believed that everything should be into place to closely associate them with the 
commission, acting as intermediaries to their respective governments.600  
The assessors selected by Japan and China were familiar with the League of Nations. Yoshida 
Isaburo was a former ambassador and participant of the Paris Peace Conference, who had later 
attended two League Assembly meetings. On the Chinese side, Dr Wellington Koo was an 
experienced politician and diplomat, who served as adviser to Chang Hsueh-liang and knew the 
Manchurian situation well. Although Koo was not affiliated with the Nationalist Government in 
Nanking, he had been instrumental in the Chinese appeal to the League in September 1931. Both 
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would accompany the commission on parts of their visits in East Asia, themselves also supported 
by a small secretariat.601 
One more major aspect in the set-up of the commission was the team of assistants and experts 
the five Council-appointees would have at their disposal. Several staff members of the League 
Secretariat were made available to assist the inquiry for specific tasks: Mr Hans-Ulrich von Kotze 
(International Bureaux) to act as treasurer and handle military questions, Mr Adrianus Pelt 
(Information Section) to address economic questions and organise relations with the press, Mr 
Vladimir Pastuhov (Political Section) for political questions and commission meetings, and Mr 
Ernesto Charrere (Information Section) for issues related to transport. Robert Haas (Head of the 
Communications Section) was designated by Drummond as Secretary-General of the commission 
and would closely cooperate with the commission’s chairman. Since the League Secretariat was 
international in its outlook, the question of nationality was of minor importance – assistants were 
chosen for their expertise and availability. Also, upon request three commissioners were 
accompanied by a personal assistant: Mr William Astor for Lord Lytton, Major Pierre Jouvelet for 
General Claudel, and Lieutenant William Biddle for Frank McCoy. Although Joseph Avenol had 
suggested to Eric Drummond not to agree to private secretaries, ‘to realise greater union and 
unanimity among the commissioners’, the Secretariat compromised on the issue.602 
During its assignment, the commission could make use of several experts to provide technical 
information or background knowledge about the region. Dr Kat Angelino, an expert on Chinese 
affairs, would join the commission from the Dutch Indies and prepare the draft material on the 
history of the dispute. Upon recommendation by Robert Haas, railway expert Colonel T. Hiam was 
brought in from the Canadian National Railways. Other experts helped with translation (G. Moss) 
or provided general advice on Chinese affairs (Professor George Blakeslee; Dr Carl Walter Young). 
Some of these experts, particularly Young, had written strongly-worded pieces about the 
                                                             
601 Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism, 58-59. Appeal by the Chinese Government, 6-12. 
602 Note from Joseph Avenol to Eric Drummond, R1874, LONA. Overview of the Lytton Commission, 1A-
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situation in Manchuria and were therefore viewed with scepticism by the Japanese. However, 
there is no indication of any expert being dropped from the team for personal views regarding 
the dispute.603 
Overall, the inclusion of and reliance on experts suggests the League was aware of the knowledge 
gap of the commissioners. The team assembled around the five investigators brought in a wealth 
of knowledge and a spectrum of viewpoints. It also meant that the League chose to separate the 
roles of commissioner and expert, thereby drawing a line between the political and the 
epistemological role of the investigative body. On the one hand, this confirmed that 
commissioners had been selected with their national rather than professional background in 
mind, on the other hand, commissioners were expected to make major decisions on the basis of 
information provided by the team of experts. As such, they had to rely on their viewpoint and 
judgement: these ‘knowledgeable men’ were indispensable for the investigation on the ground, 
but also employed to draft large parts of the inquiry report and therefore able to structure, select 
and interpret the relevant facts. In the League’s history, the Inquiry Commission for Manchuria is 
the only example to have relied to such a great extent on the provision of additional technical 
expertise, strengthening its fact-finding credentials. 
The commission convened for the first time in Geneva on 21 January 1932. Secretary-General Eric 
Drummond met all the commissioners except for Frank McCoy (who was still in the US and 
therefore US Consul Prentiss Gilbert took his seat) to discuss the terms of reference and all 
matters of preparation before departure. The first agenda item was the designation of a chairman 
for the commission. General Claudel and Gilbert (instructed by McCoy) both spoke in favour of 
Lytton as designated chairman, given his long-standing ‘contact with the League of Nations.’604 In 
fact, the issue of chairmanship appeared to have been settled already before the meeting.605 When 
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Frank Walters wrote to Lord Lytton on 12 January, concerning a short meeting and the provision 
of documentary materials for the commissioners, the assumption was already made that the 
British representative would head the League delegation. In a letter from Joseph Avenol to 
Prentiss Gilbert, four days later, the Deputy Secretary-General denied the decision had already 
been taken yet framed it as a suggestion for consideration by the American commissioner.606 In 
sum, there was no trace of contestation in the designation of the chairmanship, a feat which would 
strengthen Lytton’s authority during the assignment. 
The remainder of the meeting dealt with questions regarding the task of the commission, the role 
of the assessors and whether private secretaries could be employed. Secretary-General stressed 
once again that the commission would not be qualified ‘to intervene directly’ in the dispute, thus 
could take no action regarding a cessation of hostilities.607 Another issue to be resolved was the 
related to the itinerary and the direction of travel. Lord Lytton suggested that a journey via the 
United States would offer benefits in comparison the Siberia-option: the entire commission could 
then meet beforehand and arrive at the same time in Tokyo. Additionally, travelling across the 
Eurasian landscape would make the issue of which country to visit a thorny one – the appearance 
of potential bias – while the journey via the Pacific Ocean would require a stop in Japan first. It is 
noteworthy to underline here how much consideration was given the commissioners to the public 
perception of the League inquiry – the close gaze of the international press would only increase 
these considerations in the following months.608  
Overall, the commission was set to leave for its work on the Manchurian crisis with an adequate 
amount of preparation: The Secretariat had organised meetings with officials who had been 
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exposed to the region, supplied the investigators with relevant books and materials, and had 
worked out a detailed itinerary in advance. It is likely that some of the individual commissioners, 
especially those close to diplomatic and political circles, had been briefed by their respective 
foreign offices, yet there is no indication this was a standard practice.609 The Lytton Commission, 
as it came to be known, would have enough time at its disposal during the journey to the United 
States and then onwards to East Asia to acquaint itself with all matters of the case. Nevertheless, 
the commissioners would be unable to prepare themselves for the rapidly changing situation on 
the ground.  
Kwantung troop advances had continued unabated since December, justified by the (new) 
Japanese Government as a response to ‘the increased activity of marauding bands’ and the 
security risk for Japanese nationals.610 With the occupation of Harbin, Chinchow and threats to 
occupy other Chinese cities (such as Tsingtao611 and Shanghai), the atmosphere at Council 
meetings became increasingly tense.612 Preparations were made in Manchuria for the creation of 
a new state, which eventually was proclaimed on 18 February as the Manchu State (better known 
as Manchukuo).613 Early in January, US Secretary of State Stimson had proclaimed the ‘non-
recognition’ of territorial changes that were the result of military force – although in practice any 
semblance of Chinese administration in Manchuria already had been dismantled.614 In the 
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meantime, the Nanking Government fell twice in the same month, a further sign that the troubled 
Chinese Republic was struggling to maintain unity throughout the country.615  
The inquiry 
A lengthy journey ensued from the Geneva meeting until the start of the Lytton Commission’s 
activities in Tokyo, although this was due to the (maritime) means of transportation. The 
European commissioners departed from Le Havre and Plymouth on 3 February 1932 and arrived 
in New York on 9 February, where the American member joined them. The entire team (all staff 
included, apart from Robert Haas who was already in Shanghai) travelled across the United 
States, towards San Francisco, crossed the Pacific Ocean by boat, to arrive in Yokohama on 29 
February. In this span of time, several developments occurred – some of which would have an 
impact on the itinerary and work of the commission. The situation in Shanghai had become the 
focal point of international attention, after the Chinese boycott of Japanese goods and stores had 
escalated into local skirmishes late January. Shanghai, an international trade city with large 
numbers of French, British, Italian, American and Japanese inhabitants (often labelled together 
as the ‘International Settlement’), was of vital importance to commerce in the East Asia region. A 
local Japanese naval commander responded to the riots on the streets, deploying Japanese 
marines to take control of the situation. This forced the hand of the government in Tokyo to send 
additional military support. Rather than gaining control, the conflict increased in scale. In a 
subsequent act, the Japanese army undertook air bombardments on the Chapei district of 
Shanghai and Nanking, several days later. The major powers, worried about their special trade 
rights in Shanghai, expressed grave concern about the disproportionate Japanese response – 
justified by Tokyo as a measure of protection for the International Settlement. For a moment, it 
appeared a stronger international response could materialise – as Western commercial interests 
risked being affected by the situation. 
                                                             
615 Lloyd E. Eastman, The Nationalist Era in China, 1927-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 14-15. 
213 
 
The Chinese diplomatic response to the Japanese show of military muscle was fairly similar to its 
strategy pursued after Mukden. In late January, the Chinese Republic communicated to the League 
it would make an appeal under Articles 10 and 15. This new appeal confirmed that the territorial 
integrity of China was under threat and there was a severe risk of a rupture between the two 
countries. Two weeks later, on 12 February, the Chinese representative called for Sino-Japanese 
dispute to be moved onto the Assembly agenda – the logic behind this was straightforward: as 
the more representative body, though large and unwieldy, the Assembly could offer a stronger 
condemnation of Japanese military action, especially after the events in Shanghai. The Council 
President agreed with the transfer, noting that the ‘relative powerlessness’ of the League lay in 
its procedure (‘the slowness of which is due to the seriousness and conscientiousness it devotes 
to its task’) and the ‘recurring incidents’ on the ground – making it impossible for the Council to 
end the hostilities.616 Although the Council was free to pursue negotiations between China and 
Japan, the creation of an inquiry had effectively halted any action taken on the issue of Manchuria. 
The Council waited for the Lytton Commission to report back to Geneva before it would consider 
any new resolution – the involvement of the Assembly did nothing to speed up the process. 
The Shanghai incident sparked its own complex diplomatic game – further evidence of the 
intensive political contestation in the international realm over the East Asian crisis – but is not 
the central theme of this chapter. Yet, one development after the incident is of relevance to the 
League inquiry. The Chinese appeal under Article 15 in late January gave additional powers to the 
Secretary-General, to ‘make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration 
thereof.’617 Eric Drummond took up this discretionary role to call upon the governments of Great 
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, to constitute a consular committee in Shanghai made 
up of diplomatic representatives. Their task was to keep track of ‘those events, their causes and 
development’ in the city. In a note from 6 February, the Secretary-General clarified that the 
‘emergency Committee’ was to chiefly collect information but its task would be ‘distinct’ from the 
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Lytton Commission: ‘It would not be expected to travel, nor does its creation in any way affect the 
mandate of the original Commission.’618  
The Shanghai Committee deliberations are not directly linked to the Lytton Commission – the 
final report only briefly referred to its work – but holds pertinence due to the procedure followed 
by Secretary-General Eric Drummond. The League initiative under Article 15 led to the set-up of 
an additional investigation, small in scope but rapidly deployed, which forwarded regular reports 
throughout February (while the Lytton Commission was travelling) to the Secretary-General and 
the League Council. This was an indication that the League machinery could speed up 
significantly, pushed forward by the major powers, in case the ‘gravity of the situation’ warranted 
it.619 The Shanghai Committee was a local body to collect information and report on events, 
supported by a clear mandate and European consular staff. In contrast, the time-consuming 
constitution of the Lytton Commission and the inclusion of a team of experts precluded such a 
rapid response in the case of the Manchurian crisis. Could the overall Sino-Japanese dispute have 
been served better with a different type of inquiry – a priority given to speed rather than its 
diplomatic configuration? The League may have been able to temper Japanese military action in 
a more rapid manner, with consular help, although it disposed of few means to enforce an 
armistice on the ground (for which it was entirely dependent on the major European powers). 
The Lytton Commission officially started its tasks when it arrived on 29 February in Yokohama 
and later that day in Tokyo. The commission’s itinerary included daily conferences with members 
of the Japanese Government in the capital and additional visits to Kyoto and Osaka. In mid-March 
the commission left Japan for Shanghai, a visit which was moved forward in the schedule because 
of the recent hostilities. The inquiry team met with senior figures of the Chinese Government in 
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Nanking in late March, subsequently travelled to Peking and spent the most of April and early 
May working in Manchuria. In late April, the Lytton Commission forwarded a preliminary report 
to the Council, which gave an overview of its activities and information provided by the Chinese 
and Japanese but did not yet include preliminary conclusions. In the next weeks, the commission 
also held meetings with officials of the Kwantung Army and representatives of the new state of 
Manchukuo. Early in June, the commission travelled back to Peking to start on the preparations 
of the report but returned once more to Japan in late June when a new government was brought 
into power. The commissioners wished to learn ‘the present views and policy’ of the new Japanese 
cabinet before its final labours on the inquiry report. The team spent the summer months 
compiling and examining the evidence, writing the various chapters, which led to the definitive 
version signed by all commissioners on 4 September in Peking.620 
The following section touches upon the technical aspects of the inquiry, obstacles faced by the 
commissioners, and its overall progress on the assignment. This is to give an indication how the 
members of the commission worked on the round, given the constraints imposed by the imperial 
internationalist context. The Lytton Commission has often been mentioned in the framework of 
the Sino-Japanese dispute of the 1930s, however, its knowledge production work has generally 
been relegated to a brief paragraph or footnote in comprehensive studies of the period.621  
A first focal point concerns all technical aspects of the inquiry, how the investigation was 
envisioned and put into practice by the Lytton Commission. Lytton’s personal memorandum from 
5 February, presented during his travel to New York, presents some clues regarding the 
commission’s overall thinking about its assignment. For instance, Lytton notes that ‘we are all 
agreed that our object is not so much to arbitrate between China and Japan on the subject of 
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Manchuria, and to assess their respective responsibility for the events of last September, as to try 
and effect, if possible, a durable settlement between these two countries’.622 The commission 
refused the role of a court, as was evident in Lytton’s first declarations to Japanese officials (‘we 
had not come as judges’) and later during his meetings in China (‘the League would endeavour to 
do justice, but reminded them that justice and judgment were not the same thing’).623 Yet, the 
Lytton memorandum did slightly tread upon the path of reconciliation – even though the Council 
President had excluded this task from the terms of reference. After 11 March, when a Special 
Assembly had taken up the task of leading the negotiations in search for resolution of the dispute 
(as well as an end to the hostilities in Shanghai), the commission would continue to show concern 
over the prospect of reconciliation and occasionally transgress into a role of mediator in search 
of a durable peace.624 
The Lytton Commission had no prescribed list of techniques at its disposal to be deployed in the 
inquiry. Both the personal and official League documents make no explicit reference to any 
precedents of League inquiries the commission could follow in Manchuria.625 Similar to other 
inquiries, the Lytton Commission relied on interviews with officials and representatives of civil 
society (businesses, organisations, and private individuals) to establish a chronology of events, 
including the Japanese and Chinese narratives, with all their inconsistencies, and to understand 
what each side was hoping to achieve as a suitable outcome to the dispute. Generally, all 
commissioners attended the interviews, with Lytton asking the bulk of the questions and other 
members (such as Dr Schnee and General Claudel) limiting themselves to a few clarifications. The 
interviews were conducted either in English or with the help of a translator. Although the 
commissioners felt free to pursue their own line of questioning, it occasionally used 
questionnaires prepared and submitted in advance (to the interviewee) to structure an interview. 
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On one occasion, the commission also allowed a small team of staff members and experts to 
question an interviewee.626 
Foreign observers were a major source of information, as the Lytton Commission relied on 
Western journalists and consular staff with local knowledge to triangulate information. For 
instance, on 17 May Lord Lytton met with a journalist from the Journal de Genève, who provided 
him with an insight in the Japanese army’s recent movements and strategies deployed in dealing 
with Chinese rebellions. Lytton chairman attached importance to ‘the help of neutral observers, 
in order to establish the truth’, as he felt that both the Chinese and Japanese side provided a lot of 
incorrect information.627 Another note, from a member of the commission’s staff, stressed how 
the European and American press representatives were vital ‘with their knowledge of local 
affairs’; notwithstanding a few exceptions, these were considered to be ‘objective’ from the 
League’s point of view.628 The reliance on foreign observers accentuated the Western frame of 
analysis, one that did not question certain rights of major powers in China and noted the lack of 
modern conditions in the country, yet, it also helped to triangulate information and rule out 
inconsistencies in information.629 In one example, Lytton professed doubt over the narrative 
given by the Japanese over the events at Shanghai – they alleged an attack by Chinese soldiers in 
plain clothes – stating that ‘their explanation does not fit with other accounts which have been 
given [to] me by eyewitnesses’.630 Also the report presented different narratives, based on each 
side’s version of an event (such as the Mukden incident) before stating its conclusions based on 
the collected information.631  
                                                             
626 Diary entries for 2, 18 and 25 March, as well as 18 May 1932, from: Lord Lytton’s diary of the 
Manchurian inquiry, Box LH27, KHBL. The Section Files of the League Secretariat contain all the 
transcripts of interviews conducted by the commission, and highlights some of the practices pursued on 
the ground. Nish notes that notes that the commissioners relied heavily on their additional staff in the 
latter parts of the assignment, to lighten the burden, see: Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism, 127. 
627 Quote from diary entry for 17 May 1932, from: Lord Lytton’s diary of the Manchurian inquiry, Box 
LH27, KHBL; Appeal by the Chinese Government, 96. 
628 Letter from Mr Pelt to Mr Comert (Information Section), 14 April 1932, S50, LONA. 
629 Appeal by the Chinese Government, 14. 
630 Diary entry for 18 March 1932, from: Lord Lytton’s diary of the Manchurian inquiry, Box LH27, KHBL. 
Briefly after his arrival, Lytton showed a lack of appreciation for the Japanese, their lack of truthfulness 
statements and their imitation of a ‘Western style’. Diary entries 1 and 3 March 1932, from: Ibid.  
631 Appeal by the Chinese Government, 67-70. 
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Overall, the Lytton Commission gathered and analysed a wealth of documentation in preparation 
for its study. The scale of the undertaking is most pronounced when it pertains to the 
correspondence of private individuals and organisations (mostly from China), close to two 
thousand letters, telegrams, and petitions, which were translated and analysed by a team under 
the supervision of G. Moss. The intention was to understand the attitudes of the Chinese people 
towards their government and the League. One report ‘verified intelligence concerning the action 
of Japan in Manchuria’ while another explained in detail how the team had created a sample and 
applied measures to avoid bias in the conclusions.632 For the Lytton Commission, the translated 
correspondence gauged public opinion – perhaps more than a source of information or truth – 
and concluded there was a widespread Chinese condemnation of Japanese actions in Manchuria 
and little support for the creation of the new state of Manchukuo. 
A second focal point addresses the obstacles the Lytton Commission faced, ranging from internal 
factors (between the commissioners) to the environment in which it operated. From the outset, 
there is no major clash of views or struggle for supremacy that appears from the source material. 
Lord Lytton was unanimously chosen to lead the inquiry and there is no trace of a strong 
opposition to his leadership. Available personal recollections paint a pleasant atmosphere in the 
early days of the inquiry. Travelling to Japan, chairman Lytton noted ‘We have got to know each 
other quite intimately on this ship and I like them all.’ With limited leans to measure the strength 
of the relationships between commissioners, however, the mention of conversations and dinners 
sheds some light on personal ties. Lord Lytton spoke highly of General McCoy, a tactful and 
experienced American ‘most useful to me’, while he also made regular mention of Aldrovandi and 
Schnee as interlocutors. General Claudel arguably kept more distance towards from other 
commissioners, although there are no signs of discontent. Rather, as Dr Schnee noted, General 
Claudel’s lack of proficiency in English (the lingua franca within the team) made informal 
                                                             
632 Report of analysis of 350 letters or telegrams addressed to the Inquiry Commission for the period until 19 
July 1932, S38, LONA. Report concerning 1550 letters and petitions addressed to the Inquiry Commission, 19 
June 1932, S40, LONA. 
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meetings feel cumbersome – thus, he often kept to his himself together with his private 
assistant.633 
For the time being, the main challenges posed to the commission’s work in East Asia were of an 
external nature. One of those were the attempts at intimidation by the Japanese, especially when 
it came to the Chinese assessor (Dr Wellington Koo) who accompanied the commission during its 
travel in mainland China and Manchuria. Although the League had called upon both countries to 
do everything possible to facilitate the work of the commission, the Japanese police kept strict 
surveillance of the Chinese assessor while in Manchuria.634 Chinese attempts to influence the 
commission were less obvious, although newspapermen were keen to extract personal views of 
the commissioners.635 Although the commissioners were conscious of maintaining a level of 
secrecy when it pertained to the investigation, they maintained good relations with the press – 
given the international public interest. A staff member of commission observed that Lytton 
always took journalists ‘extremely seriously’, maintaining a close relationship without giving 
away too much.636 
Other impediments were smaller in nature, but equally had an influence on the daily work of the 
Lytton Commission. One such example was the vast amounts of information made available by 
the disputing countries. Both the Chinese and Japanese side rarely made a distinction between 
                                                             
633 Quotes from notes for 13 and 25 February 1932, from: Lord Lytton’s notes and letters sent home, Box 
LH27, KHBL. Heinrich Schnee, Völker Und Mächte Im Fernen Osten. Eindrücke von Der Reise Mit Der 
Mandschurei-Kommission (Berlin: Deutsche Buchgemeinschaft, 1933), 11-13. Count Aldrovandi left no 
personal recollections regarding the other commissioners in his diplomatic papers. 
634 In his diary, Lytton referred in several instances to the difficult conditions for Dr Koo but also the 
general atmosphere towards the Commission (‘the Japs are very suspicious (...) we are treated practically 
as prisoners (...) The behaviour of the Japanese military here is really absolutely incredible. I shall be glad 
to get out of [Manchuria].’); diary entry for 28 April 1932, from: Lord Lytton’s diary of the Manchurian 
inquiry, Box LH27, KHBL. This was confirmed by Dr Schnee, who felt the Japanese presence ‘at every turn’ 
when visiting Mukden; Schnee, Völker Und Mächte Im Fernen Osten, 95. Appeal to the Council by the 
Government of China 21 September 1931 and further information communicated by the Chinese 
government, 1A-31334-31334, R1862, LONA. 
635 Lord Lytton, often serving as spokesman to the local and international media, stressed that the 
Commission ‘cannot express an opinion on these points (…) until they have presented to the Council of 
the League their report.’ See: Record of interview with leading newspapermen, 1 April 1932, S30, LONA. 
636 Letter from Mr Pelt to Mr Comert (Information Section), 14 April 1932, S50, LONA. The Lytton diary 
avoids talking directly about the contents of the inquiry, although Lord Lytton was more outspoken in his 
letters sent home. 
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information and propaganda, a blurring of lines which did not aid the commission in its 
compilation and analysis of the evidence. Notably, the Japanese assessor Mr Yoshida provided the 
commissioners with documents that claimed the study of anti-Japanese sentiment in Chinese 
schools and the prevalence of piracy in China. For Lytton, much of this was ‘wholly false’ although 
he observed that both sides were well versed in lies.637 Communications from the Chinese 
representation were slightly different in character, in the sense that the innumerable reports and 
memoranda created a sense of information overload – rather than provide a concise overview of 
happenings. In sum, the extensive League files in Geneva suggest the Lytton Commission had to 
work itself through a wide range of documentation – a time-consuming affair.638  
In addition, the regular travel from February to September put heavy physical strain on the 
commissioners. Diary entries often reveal the long distances covered by the commission, a 
schedule packed with formal meetings, and some frustration with the weather and the effects of 
the environment.639 Similarly, illness could not be avoided. In Lord Lytton’s diary, there is a gap 
during the summer months when he stayed due to a fever in a German hospital in Peking for 
several weeks – while Count Aldrovandi temporarily took over the function of chairman. Later 
reports have claimed that Lytton was the victim of a Japanese ‘cholera plot’, however, this has 
been disputed for lack of evidence.640 One final impediment that has been alluded to before, is the 
rapidity of developments on the ground – upon which the Lytton Commission had little or no 
influence. Without a strong international response, the presence of a League inquiry did nothing 
                                                             
637 Letter from Lord Lytton to his wife, 24 March 1932, from: Lord Lytton’s notes and letters sent home, Box 
LH27, KHBL. Diary entry for 24 March 1932, from: Lord Lytton’s diary of the Manchurian inquiry, Box 
LH27, KHBL. Section files containing Japanese propaganda, S33, LONA. 
638 The Chinese communications to the League and Lytton Commission comprises several boxes (R1862-
64). See: Appeal to the Council by the Government of China 21 September 1931 and further information 
communicated by the Chinese government, R1862, LONA. 
639 Diary entry for 10 May 1932, from: Lord Lytton’s diary of the Manchurian inquiry, Box LH27, KHBL. 
Schnee’s monograph (Völker und Mächte im Fernen Osten)) is a detailed account of all the travel, visits and 
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touristic purposes). 
640 “Japanese Prince tells of ‘horrible’ war crimes.” The Daily Telegraph, 7 July 1994. A response from 
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draw conclusions as to the source of the infection. Documents regarding the alleged ‘cholera plot’, KHBL. 
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to inhibit continued Japanese presence in Manchuria, nor the establishment of the new state of 
Manchukuo. In this sense, the commission did not play a significant role in moderating the 
behaviour of the belligerents. Rather, it was forced to consider the changes in territorial 
sovereignty and overall power relations in East Asia – as a return to the status quo ex ante became 
a virtual impossibility.641 
The third focal point addresses how the Lytton Commission overall progressed during its travels 
in East Asia and contextualises the conclusion of the assignment – just before writing the final 
report. The source material suggests that the team formed its views after initial visits to Tokyo 
and Nanking: at the outset, the commissioners were somewhat persuaded by the Japanese 
arguments that self-defence and security measures were required to protect Japanese rights in 
China, however, the talks with Chinese representative and exposure with the local conditions in 
the occupied region of Manchuria had led to a shift away from the initial view.642 Additionally, 
there was growing scepticism about the insincerity of Japanese accounts of events as well as 
confusion about the ultimate imperial aims in Manchuria – although the commissioners 
continued to see all parties in the conflict without taking a public position yet. Overall, the Lytton 
Commission showed growing concern about any practical solution that might arrive from its 
work, even though they were regularly warned by foreign consular staff about the risk of 
overreach with their efforts. The commission was instructed to collect facts, for some diplomatic 
observers this meant providing the raw material but leave it to public opinion to draw 
conclusions. The inquiry, however, would be instrumental to framing the information gathered 
on the ground and what view it chose to highlight in the conclusions. In May, after a couple of 
months of work, the commission’s chairman remarked that ‘the composition of the picture [was] 
                                                             
641 This was an obvious problem, as the Covenant precluded any territorial changes. Yet, it seemed Japan 
was not willing to settle for anything less than that (and would not be satisfied with a simple return to the 
status quo ex ante, when it had special rights), see Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism, 108. 
642 Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism, 142-143 
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already complete’, regarding the essential facts; there was also no sign of disagreement over the 
major points concerning the Mukden incident and the creation of Manchukuo.643 
When did the Lytton Commission determine its investigation should end? There were several 
factors that contributed to the decision, in early July 1932, to retreat with the entire commission 
to a suitable location (Peking) where they could work on the report. In Geneva, it was always 
anticipated that the Lytton Commission should finalise its work and present the report before the 
summer. This, however, had proven difficult to achieve after the initial visits to the major cities of 
China and Japan, with an extensive tour in Manchuria. Both the Secretariat (for financial reasons) 
and the Special Assembly (concerned by time) had pressured the commission to prepare its final 
report by mid-September.644  
The delays of the inquiry were partly caused by factors the Lytton Commission had no control 
over, such as the assault on Japanese Minister Inukai and the instalment of a new cabinet. From 
the viewpoint of the commission, the change of administration meant that it would be necessary 
to ascertain whether any change of viewpoint on Manchukuo could occur in the coming months. 
Therefore, the commissioners made a final visit to Tokyo to speak to the new Prime Minister 
(Admiral Saito), Foreign Minister (Count Uchida) and War Minister (General Araki) – some of 
whom they had spoken to before.645 The Lytton Commission remained hopeful there was scope 
for reconciliation and wished to see whether the Japanese cabinet was open to a compromise 
solution. Nevertheless, Count Uchida made it clear that the government had made up its mind 
about the recognition of Manchukuo – which would formally take place in September 1932 – and 
                                                             
643 Diary entry for 24 March 1932, from: Lord Lytton’s diary of the Manchurian inquiry, Box LH27, KHBL. 
Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism, 136, 143. This is also visible in the last interviews, conducted 
in July 1932, which are of a less factual nature and more about an attempt to find a compromise with 
Japan, see: Record of interviews with Count Uchida, General Araki and Mr Yoshizawa, S32, LONA. 
644 Expenses of the Inquiry Commission, 1A-33027-33829, R1874, LONA. Note on the convocation of a 
Special Assembly Session, 2 October 1932, 1A-31334-39362, R1873, LONA. 
645 For example, the commissioners had had private meetings with Count Uchida in May 1932 – when the 
latter was still serving as president of the South Manchurian Railway. 
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was ‘not prepared to consider any alternatives.’ For Lytton, this was the watershed moment that 
marked the end of the commission’s work in Japan.646 
The report 
The drafting of the final report commenced around the middle of June 1932, several weeks before 
the final talks in Japan. For this assignment, Lord Lytton had put together a Drafting Committee, 
comprising himself, Professor Blakeslee and Robert Haas. The three men compiled several notes 
and suggestions into one draft, which were then discussed within the commission in the following 
weeks. The outline that was completed by the middle of June, contained an outline for all chapters 
except for a final one – a chapter on recommendations. Lytton ‘decided that it would be wiser for 
us to go to Japan with our minds quite open on the subject of recommendations’, only writing a 
memorandum on a ‘suggested line of approach with the Japanese.’647 At this point of the inquiry, 
Lytton (in his capacity as chairman) kept the report-writing separate from the commission’s 
decisions-making process regarding the major issues of the dispute. As private documents of 
several commissioners reveal, there was a strong reliance on the experts to prepare the chapters 
of the report – the task was effectively outsourced while the commissioners retained the ability 
to make final changes. Moreover, Lytton’s diary suggests regular consultation with his team of 
experts on a range of technical and legal issues – a further sign perhaps that the commission 
lacked the necessary background knowledge to do the bulk of the writing.648 
Therefore, the minutes of the Lytton Commission for the second half of June 1932 contain few 
traces of substantive discussion about the contents of the draft chapters. In a meeting on 23 June, 
the chairman explained that the draft report ‘was merely intended as a framework’ and no final 
decisions had yet been taken. Moreover, ‘the experts’ would provide detailed drafts to help the 
commission with its deliberation over the next months. Generally, the minutes demonstrate that 
                                                             
646 Diary entry for 12 July 1932, from: Lord Lytton’s diary of the Manchurian inquiry, Box LH27, KHBL. 
Record of interviews with Count Uchida, General Araki and Mr Yoshizawa, S32, LONA. 
647 Quotes from diary entry of 18 June 1932, from: Lord Lytton’s diary of the Manchurian inquiry, Box 
LH27, KHBL. 
648 Lord Lytton’s diary of the Manchurian inquiry, Box LH27, KHBL. Also see: Minutes of Meetings of the 
Inquiry Commission, S50, LONA. 
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the meetings took the character of a technical discussion rather than exchange of big visions 
regarding the dispute, with the commission reading and commenting on the work of the draft 
committee. Likewise, Lord Lytton’s diary shows no indication of any disagreement, although 
other sources spoke of frictions regarding matters of work and conclusions.  
Ian Nish, relying on sources close to Major General Frank Ross McCoy, stressed in his work that 
other commissioners may have been displeased with Lytton’s micro-management over the draft 
report (using the smaller Drafting Committee), especially when he was bedridden in Peking.649 A 
main point of contention was the disparate views on how to treat Japan in the report. Lord Lytton 
was in favour of a strong condemnation of Japan – especially after the recognition of Manchukuo 
– while General Claudel appeared to accept the Japanese occupation as a necessary condition for 
a settlement.650 A former aide-de-camp of Major General McCoy described how the American 
commissioner served as a mediator between his British and French colleagues, possibly avoiding 
a minority report written by Lord Lytton.651 Possibly, McCoy was crucial in preparing a statement 
on Manchukuo that was acceptable to all commissioners, although there is no evidence in the 
private papers of other commissioners to confirm his mediating role. 
All the commissioners of inquiry signed the final report on 4 September, thereby agreeing on the 
wording chosen with regard to the Manchurian crisis. The report was an elaborate piece of work: 
it covered not just the events at Mukden and the hostilities during the subsequent months, but 
also the history of Manchuria, the Japanese presence in the region and to some degree also the 
triangular relations between China, Japan, and Russia.652 As previously mentioned, the 
commission did not see itself as having a prosecutorial role and expressed no desire to make 
judgements. Although traces of this attitude are visible in the report, the commissioners 
nonetheless decided to establish what they considered ‘the truth regarding past events in 
                                                             
649 Nish, Japan’s Struggle with Internationalism, 163-164. 
650 Minutes of Meetings of the Inquiry Commission, S50, LONA. 
651 Bradshaw, ““Frank Ross McCoy and the Lytton Commission,” 13. 
652 Interestingly, the importance of the Soviet Union has been overshadowed in the recent historiography, 
even though it was considered as an essential factor to understand the Manchurian crisis at the time. 
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Manchuria and to state it frankly.’653 In other words, the Lytton Commission felt confident enough 
to express in its report that the Japanese measures in response to the Mukden incident ‘cannot be 
regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence’ and the state of Manchukuo could not have been 
formed without ‘the presence of Japanese troops and the activities of Japanese officials’.654  
However, the commission was also at pains to point out the deficiencies in the Chinese 
administration, its lack of modernisation and effective state institutions, and assigned some 
responsibility to the Chinese Government for the damage done to Japan through economic 
boycotts. Despite a degree of balance in the report, the questioning of Japanese plans and actions 
in Manchuria was by far the most significant opinion expressed – although it fell short of 
attributing fully-fledged guilt. To question most of the Japanese narrative of events, the 
commission cloaked the report in a scientific language that made regular reference to ‘the 
evidence received from all sources’, ‘neutral observation’, which further demonstrated the 
inquiry’s ‘thorough consideration’ and ‘mature study’ of the subject.655 
It is noteworthy how the Lytton Commission communicated the conclusions of its inquiry to the 
League of Nations and the public. First, it put the emphasis on the collective work of the Lytton 
Commission (‘our own study’, ‘our work’, ‘our own convictions’), thereby removing any trace of 
disagreement which may have arisen in the previous weeks. This was arguably done on the 
initiative of Lytton, who was always keen to stress the notion of ‘we’ and the collective work of 
the team in his notes – even though some commissioners may have played a more limited role.656 
Second, rather than keep its entire assessment for a final chapter, the commissioners decided to 
deal with the most sensitive topics within their separate chapters. In a final chapter, the 
commission only set out a list of recommendations and solutions which the Council and/or the 
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Assembly could take into consideration. While the commissioners were conscientious it was not 
their primary function to do this, they tried ‘to provide sufficient material to enable the League of 
Nations to settle the dispute consistently with the honour, dignity and national interest of both 
the contending parties’, in reference to a future reconciliation process.657  
In Lytton’s writings, it is evident that in his view the purpose was not simply to criticise each 
country for its deeds, nor make any deliberate judgement (unless necessary ‘to the establishment 
of the truth’), but to recommend a procedure in which the interests of both countries could be 
secured, as well as the restoration of peace: 
‘I suggested that when dealing with certain facts we should give our opinion of them in 
the chapters where the facts were recorded, and that when we came to the end – the only 
pages which some people would read – our last chapters should deal only with the future, 
and contain not criticisms and judgments, but only suggestions of what we thought 
possible for the restoration and maintenance of peace.’658 
Lord Lytton showed acute awareness of the risks that came with leaving the most sensitive 
matters until a final chapter – as commentators would seize upon the most contentious points to 
condemn either country for its deeds. The commission’s departure from this usual format could 
be perceived as a softening of its stance on the dispute or as carefully thought-out decision to 
retain the nuance of the entire report. As the report pointed out, the issues were ‘exceedingly 
complicated, and only an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as well as of their historical 
background, should entitle anyone to express a definite opinion upon them.’659 It was precisely 
the complexity of the situation, no simple case of territorial violation but an impenetrable web of 
imperial interests and sovereign rights, that laid bare the limits of the League and its Covenant in 
dealing with an unprecedented dispute. 
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The question of whether the Lytton Commission compromised its stance in light of its (minor) 
internal differences is one that preoccupied contemporary observers and scholars for many 
decades. According to Basset, in early press coverage the report received ‘diverse and fluctuating 
interpretations’, as journalists were selective in the observations they picked and retained for 
their verdict. 660 His analysis of British newspapers showed a strong condemnation of Japan in the 
popular press, while the quality newspapers painted a more nuanced picture, praising the 
commission’s unbiased and impartial tone. Although some observers questioned the report’s 
gentle stance on the case of Japanese aggression, most tended to focus on the recommendations 
that were included in the final chapter. In contrast, the scholarship of international history has 
generally focused on the commission’s findings rather than its proposed solutions – arguably with 
the advantage of hindsight. Although one contemporary scholar noted that the findings were lost 
in a ‘mass of detail’, recent views have chiefly stressed its merits.661 Whereas Northedge labelled 
it as an ‘academic exercise’ (in the pejorative sense), both Ian Nish and Zara Steiner have 
underlined how the report was a matter of compromise, to enable the League still to negotiate a 
solution between the countries.662  
In general, few scholars have considered the report through a civilisational lens, despite the 
frequent references to development and modernisation. For instance, the report welcomed 
foreign influence in China as a means to create ‘more modern conditions’.663 China was 
encouraged to keep its territory open to trade with the civilised states of the West – in the form 
of international settlements. The first chapter detailed the ‘lawless conditions’, due to rebellions 
and banditry, that had encouraged Japan to take additional security measures in the run-up to the 
Mukden incident.664 Therefore, the extensive privileges of foreign powers (including but not 
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limited to Japan) were rarely if ever questioned, even though they ran counter to the ideal of 
national self-determination and territorial integrity professed after the First World War. 
However, as the Sino-Japanese dispute demonstrates, this weakened the territorial sovereignty 
of independent states against the expansionist ambitions of imperial powers. 
Aftermath 
All commissioners returned home shortly after the Lytton report was signed. One copy of the 
report was delivered by the French and German commissioners to the League Secretariat by the 
end of September, whereas other copies had been left behind in China and Japan to be made 
available to the countries’ representatives once the League had arranged the report’s publication. 
The diffusion of the printed reports on the first day of October marked the beginning of a 
painstakingly long process, which included the study of the report by all League members, and 
extensive discussion in the Council (November), the Committee of Nineteen (December) and the 
Special Assembly (December-February). This section focuses on the impact of the inquiry: it 
depicts the unfavourable diplomatic environment for international action, following the report, 
which permitted Japan to hold on to its territorial gains.665 
Almost one and a half months elapsed before the League’s Council started its consideration of the 
Lytton report. This was the consequence of a Japanese request to postpone an immediate 
discussion, so the country’s representation would have time to study the report, consult its 
government and forward its observations to Geneva. The official deliberations started on 14 
November, when Council President Eamon de Valera made an opening statement and gave the 
floor to the representatives of China and Japan to state their observations – in the presence of the 
other Council members and the full Commission. Although a Special Assembly had seized the 
initiative on the Manchurian crisis earlier in the year, de Valera had indicated that the Council still 
had the right to call for a discussion of the report – before relinquishing the issue. De Valera’s 
                                                             
665 Steiner (The Lights That Failed) provides a detailed overview of the international context, whereas 
Walters, Housden and Northedge are useful sources for the proceedings and responses by the major 
powers. 
229 
 
brief opening statement praised the value of the report, but also touched upon the procedural 
process of the commission’s work: ‘I could wish that the method of procedure for the setting up 
of such Commissions might be improved in the future and that the lengthy negotiations which 
preceded the appointment of the present Commission might thereby be avoided.’666 This was an 
honest assessment that showed awareness on behalf of the Council about the limits of the 
League’s inquiry technique, even though the suggestion would remain undelivered in the future. 
During multiple sessions in November the Japanese and Chinese representatives took turns and 
gave detailed statements on the Lytton report. Each statement commenced with praise for the 
commission’s extensive work and report, before moving to more substantial criticisms – often 
disguised as observations. The Japanese representation left little doubt about its displeasure with 
the inquiry’s conclusions regarding Japanese military action and its presence in Manchuria. 
Representative Matsuoka denied that Japan ever had designs in Manchuria, noting it had acted 
out of self-defence and had no hand in the independence movement – a complete denial of the 
commission’s view.667  
The Chinese representation (led by Dr Wellington Koo) vehemently opposed the image of China 
that was drawn by its Japanese counterpart; it defended the Nanking Government’s response to 
Japanese military action and criticised the Japanese treatment of the commission during its 
assignment. Neither side expressed any form of responsibility regarding the causes of the dispute, 
even though the report had been at pains to stress the errors made by both the Chinese and 
Japanese. The wealth of facts was not enough to create a consensus over the narrative of events, 
as each representation claimed to possess the final truth.668 China and Japan refused to move even 
an inch closer on the issue of Manchuria. Publicly, the Chinese (Nanking) Government remained 
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in a state of denial over the state of Manchukuo: although it was worried about the fait accompli 
on the ground (including the lack of international willpower to change it) it stuck to the view that 
Manchuria was still an integral part of China. 
After the observations of the Japanese and Chinese representatives the Council agreed to defer 
the general debate about the report to a future session of the Special Assembly. The Council’s 
deferral of the discussion to the Assembly suggested a reluctance to act – in line with its decision 
to organise a time-consuming inquiry. Yet, there was pragmatic reasoning behind the deferral. 
Czechoslovak representative Edward Beneš expressed the general view that a transfer of the 
entire matter to the Assembly ‘will not deprive us of an opportunity of making these 
observations.’ It was felt that a deferral was the best means to avoid duplicating the debate, yet 
in practice it also extended the period before any decision would be taken.669 
 In the meantime, the international context showed no sign of producing a consensus on how to 
deal with the Sino-Japanese dispute. The US Secretary of State had hoped for a more forceful 
intervention by the Council, rather than a deferral to another League body. In his recollections on 
the report, Stimson said that ‘I do not believe that any impartial reader can peruse its pages and 
not be convinced that Japan has violated her obligation’ to respect the territorial integrity of a 
fellow League member.670 Stimson wanted a strong League voice that would coordinate its 
actions with the US and collectively uphold the non-recognition of Japanese territorial expansion 
in Manchuria (under the guise of the Manchukuo state). The major European powers, however, 
favoured a form of reconciliation with Japan. Arguably, this meant to avoid any red line or forceful 
condemnation of Japanese action that could damage commercial relations with the predominant 
economic power of East Asia. Also, the novelty of the situation brought a great deal of uncertainty, 
as to how Japan would respond to strong League action, especially in an area it considered as one 
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of vital national interest. In contrast, smaller states appeared keener to uphold the League’s 
principles – even if this meant punishing one of its founding members. The Assembly was to be 
the diplomatic arena in which one approach would prevail over the other. 
The Assembly’s Committee of Nineteen, a committee set up to keep track of new developments in 
the Sino-Japanese dispute and decide on any procedural matter, agreed to put the discussion of 
the report immediately on the agenda of the next plenary meeting without advance deliberations. 
On 6 December, the Special Assembly reconvened to hear the first speeches of the Chinese and 
Japanese delegates, largely along similar lines as weeks before in the Council, followed by 
observations of other League members during the general debate. Smaller member states showed 
a preference to uphold the international obligations of each state, whereas major powers 
favoured a conciliatory tone – particularly towards Japan. The Special Assembly agreed to a 
resolution that effectively sent the issue back to the Committee of Nineteen, which was asked to 
make proposals based on the facts contained in the report.671 
The Assembly procedure was a time-consuming process. John Simon, the British Foreign 
Secretary, hoped this would create the opportunity to invite the United States and the Soviet 
Union to cooperate with the League, in finding the means to reconcile the two opposing countries. 
In practice, Japan’s stubborn attitude regarding self-defence (with new attacks early January in 
the province of Jehol672) and Manchukuo did little to defuse the tense atmosphere. In its 
proceedings in the following months, the Committee of Nineteen could only conclude that 
reconciliation was futile and move forward to prepare a report that upheld the findings of the 
Lytton Commission and sought to condemn Japan’s violation of Chinese territorial sovereignty.673 
The Committee of Nineteen adopted the commission’s findings without any modifications, 
although it put aside the recommendations proposed in the final chapter of the report – written 
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by the commissioners in a spirit of reconciliation. Generally, it took a clear stance on Japan: the 
country was found responsible for the crisis which had erupted after the events at Mukden. The 
Committee’s report recommended troop withdrawal, a return to Chinese sovereignty of the 
territory, and the opening of negotiations. On 25 February 1933, the Assembly adopted the 
Committee’s report almost unanimously – only Japan dissented. Approximately one month later, 
the representative of Japan gave formal notice of his country’s intention to withdraw from the 
League of Nations. In other words, Japan turned towards isolation at the international stage by 
leaving the political order that was created after the First World War – its departure a significant 
blow to the reputation of the League.674  
How did the commissioners look back on the action taken by the League of Nations? 
Commissioner McCoy had few doubts about Japan staging the Mukden incident to justify a 
military intervention in Manchuria. His views on the subsequent actions by the League are not 
known, although he supported US Secretary Stimson’s policy of non-recognition and his desire to 
see a forceful collective response to Japanese actions – which was achieved with the Assembly’s 
final resolution although this contained no practical means to punish malignant behaviour.675 
According to Nish, Dr Schnee was critical of the report itself, although this claim cannot be 
substantiated from his published writings.676 Lord Lytton’s views on the aftermath of the 
commission’s work are well known, since he produced several speeches and written pieces that 
provided commentary on League decisions. For example, in 1935, Lytton expressed misgivings 
about the Committee’s failure to take the recommendations of the inquiry seriously: 
‘It has never gone beyond the first 8 chapters of our Report, except by appointing a 
Committee to conduct negotiations which in fact they never have conducted. The League 
has done nothing but condemn. It has not even discussed any possible solution. It has 
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offered no help. It has made no representations. (..) In short, the League has not yet 
succeeded because it has not yet tried.’677 
Lord Lytton, though unwavering in his support for the idea of the League, showed general 
disappointment over the League’s handling of the Manchuria issue. In his lifetime, he never 
publicly questioned the facts that were produced in the report (‘I have nothing to add to it’), nor 
the compromises that may have been made to achieve consensus.678 Lytton only expressed regret 
that more could not be done to persuade Japan to remain a member of the international 
community and achieve Sino-Japanese reconciliation. Stronger action, with the initiative of the 
major powers, could have persuaded Japan. In 1936, he voiced the view that the League’s failure 
was only to blame on ‘the absence of will on the part of the principal Powers concerned to take 
the necessary action’.679 Imperial calculations, from Japanese expansion on the Chinese mainland 
to a lacklustre response from the Western imperial powers regarding a decisive change in the 
power status-quo in East Asia, conditioned the origins and aftermath of the Manchurian crisis. 
Conclusion 
How did inquiry, the technique heretofore ‘mastered’ by the League of Nations, fare in a conflict 
of unprecedented scale? For the Lytton commission, the Council mandate offered a clear 
separation of its fact-finding mission from the negotiation towards a reconciliation of the 
disputing parties. However, the purely advisory character of the commission was hard to achieve 
in practice, as the desire to put a stop to hostilities often dominated the minds of the 
commissioners – rather than the original task to investigate all the aspects of the dispute. By mid-
1932 the situation in Manchuria had changed to the extent that no involved party could really 
imagine a return to the status quo ante, making the question what happened in the past not as 
relevant as what to do in the future. For this reason, the commissioners opted for a report that 
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emphasised the outline of a future reconciliation in its conclusion, rather than an attribution of 
guilt. Although Lytton held truth seeking in high esteem, in reality it was limited by a team of 
commissioners that reflected a Western imperial balance of power, i.e. the exclusive 
representation of large (mostly European) states with economic and political interests in the East 
Asia region. Although the commissioners served as individuals rather than representatives of 
their countries, a tense international situation meant that the line between personal judgement 
and national interest could be blurred. Similarly, the unequitable composition and lack of on-the-
ground knowledge made the Lytton Commission reliant on its League staff and a team of experts, 
but also framed the analysis along the Western-centric lines and a civilisational dimension. 
Overall, the inquiry relied on a team of experts and collected a wealth of facts that helped to gauge 
Chinese public opinion and documented how the Japanese-led state of Manchukuo had no 
popular support. 
The Lytton Commission overcame institutional restraints, which could have produced personal 
rivalries or led to a disagreement over the final report. All commissioners were unanimous in 
their decision to have Lord Lytton as chairman, hence the inquiry never experienced an open rift 
of leadership. There were signs of minor disagreements over how Lytton ran the inquiry – 
especially the secluded drafting of the report – and the predominance of his views embedded in 
the chapters. It never amounted to a lasting conflict, yet there is the suggestion that the 
commission nearly fell apart over the treatment of Japan in the report. However, compromise was 
reached that preserved the unanimity among all commissioners, an agreement over the contents 
which did not waver as the years passed and the members reflected on their participation in the 
inquiry. Personal agency had given a strong impetus to a successful conclusion of the undertaking, 
a desire to let the facts speak for themselves and to inform the decision-making process. The 
report, in its attempt to strike a balance between the two parties but state the facts where there 
was certainty, did provide the League of Nations with the required knowledge to act on the 
situation which had developed in Manchuria. 
235 
 
The Lytton Commission’s limited impact, therefore, stems to a large extent from imperial 
internationalist context in which the findings where produced. The wealth of information dug up 
during the inquiry quickly became politicised by the involved parties – eager to hold on to their 
narrative of what had transpired and the current situation on the ground – but also faced a bigger 
challenge in the limited support expressed by the major powers to act upon the general findings. 
Therefore, the League’s capacity to address the Sino-Japanese dispute over Manchuria was 
severely constrained by power contestation and competing interests at both the local, national 
and international level. The internal instability of the inter-war Chinese Republic and the strategic 
importance of Manchuria for the Japanese Empire brought the two powers in a direct 
confrontation, symbolised in a series of skirmishes and minor incidents in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s.  
Manchuria, as other sites of inquiry, was also a region of significant imperial contestation, 
between powers seeking to preserve their special economic interests, and a new, rising imperial 
power set on challenging China’s territorial integrity and its open door trade policy. The interests 
of larger powers muddled the picture, as good relations with Japan were weighed against 
continued access to China; in practice, it caused delay and precluded a strong intervention after 
the Mukden incident. While small League members were ready to speak out against violations of 
international law, overall the League was impotent when it wished to exert political pressure. 
Sanctions transpired when the Manchurian plains were already lost to the Chinese Republic. 
Moreover, the non-membership of the United States and the Soviet Union complicated the 
international coordination of action on the two disputing countries. The course of events after 18 
September 1931 removed all scope for moderation and compromise between China and Japan – 
with no path of return to the status quo ex ante. The international context of global economic 
depression was not favourable to bold action. 
As such, the League’s biggest fact-finding mission up to this moment did not produce a political 
catalyst that could uphold the principles enshrined in the Covenant. The ideal of fact-finding and 
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impartial knowledge that could decide a dispute and punish transgressions of international law, 
in practice only aided to delay the political decision-making process. Seen from the imperial 
internationalist angle, this was not a surprising but rather an intentional outcome, produced the 
political and institutional context. There was no willingness for a direct imperial confrontation in 
East Asia, which could have been provoked by a forceful mandate from the start (under Article 
15) or a rapid verification of facts (through a consular committee). Rather, a lengthy investigation 
served as the best interim solution to a dispute without a clear outcome – one that postponed the 
question how to deal with Japanese imperial ambitions in its region. League members were not 
ignorant about what was occurring in Manchuria, as Japanese ambitions quickly became evident 
through its military actions but opted for a slow verification of facts.680  
Building momentum for an international response, therefore, was an intentionally slow process. 
Although the League’s action culminated in the Assembly’s resolution which adopted the report’s 
facts (not its recommendations) and placed the bulk of the responsibility on Japan for provoking 
the Manchurian crisis, it was long overdue and effectively paralysed the institution. A direct 
confrontation was avoided but Japan’s decision to withdraw from the League in 1933 effectively 
took away the means of the international system to uphold the order in East Asia it had 
established after the First World War. Without a stronger League of Nations and concerted 
international action, it prefigured an entire region conceding to Japanese hegemony. 
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6: The Inquiry Commission for the Chaco Dispute 
Reconciliation over truth 
‘The Chaco War was perhaps the clearest of all cases in which the world’s will to peace 
could easily have prevailed if it had been concentrated in a single institution, but was 
doomed to failure by its fatal dispersal.’  
(Francis P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 1952) 
 
‘In this part of the world, time, money, distance, and, indeed, all the little accuracies  
on which civilised people rely as a matter of course, mean nothing whatever.’  
(Julian Duguid, Green Hell: Adventures in the Mysterious Jungles of Eastern Bolivia, 1931) 
 
Introduction 
In 1932, journalist Clarence Haring remarked in World Affairs that for Latin America most of its 
international conflicts ‘have been caused by border disputes.’681 Haring made this observation 
largely because of the Chaco War, fought by Bolivia and Paraguay over the possession of a 
territory of thick vegetation and grasslands known as the Chaco Boreal. Since the early nineteenth 
century, the two countries had made rival claims for the ownership of the Chaco Boreal and 
subsequently failed to agree over a definitive border between them. Embers of conflict simmered 
for over a century but erupted into a full-blown war in 1932. The Chaco War lasted until 1935, 
after the exhaustion of all military options. A succession of army campaigns had put a strain on 
logistical and financial capabilities, although the cessation of hostilities was brokered by the other 
American states. A peace treaty was signed in 1938. 
In May 1933, the League of Nations became closely involved with the regional conflict, when the 
Council of the League resolved to send an inquiry commission to the disputed area, tasked to find 
an arrangement which could lead to a cessation of hostilities and to prepare for an arbitration 
agreement that would settle the conflict. Earlier attempts to improve relations between Bolivia 
and Paraguay, over the Chaco dispute were handled by the adjacent American states (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, and Peru) and the United States. In 1928 the League’s Council had established a 
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Committee of Three to keep track of developments in the dispute, but it delegated the initiative 
of negotiations to the states in the Western hemisphere, due to their proximity and interest.682 
The background to the League’s direct involvement in 1933, through an inquiry commission, will 
be explored in more detail in this chapter, but it is essential to clarify here how the Council was 
acting in the Chaco dispute because of precedents set elsewhere. At the same time, it constituted 
the last example of the League’s use of inquiry in international politics. 
The American states neighbouring Bolivia and Paraguay had attempted to settle the question 
through the format of a conciliation commission, after several eruptions of violence in 1927 and 
1928. The Conference of American States683 ordered the establishment of a neutral body (with 
representatives of the United States, Cuba, Mexico, and Uruguay) to find a solution to the long-
standing dispute. The creation of such a commission was facilitated through international law, 
via a 1923 treaty on the prevention and avoidance of conflicts between the American states. This 
treaty was the outcome of a previous Conference of American States but was also preceded by 
multiple attempts at concluding reconciliation agreements for the Western hemisphere.684 The 
treaty was meant as a fail-safe option in case of war mobilisation. Bolivia and Paraguay were 
signatories to the 1923 treaty and therefore were obliged to respect its contents: the first article 
stated that a controversy ‘shall be submitted for investigation and report to a Commission’ in case 
it was impossible to settle it via diplomatic channels.685 The Conciliation Commission released its 
report in 1929, suggesting a plan for arbitration of the ‘fundamental question’ of the division of 
the Chaco.686 However, the arbitration process was never initiated because the two countries 
declined to follow the proposed procedure.  
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Failure of mediation by the American states created the opportunity for an alternative approach. 
The League of Nations had gained experience with territorial disputes as well as armed conflicts 
in Europe. During its first decade of existence, the League had successfully dealt with territorial 
disputes and sovereignty questions in Europe, although in Manchuria it had been unable to 
restore the status quo ex ante. The League’s Council, under the presidency of Mexican 
representative Francisco Castillo Nájera, concluded in 1933 that Article 11 of the Covenant could 
be invoked, as the threat of war between Bolivia and Paraguay ‘was a matter of concern to the 
whole League’ and action could be undertaken ‘that may be deemed wise and effectual to 
safeguard the peace of nations’.687 The Chaco dispute resembled the Manchurian case because of 
its regional scope and challenging political context – comparative aspects which are explored in 
this chapter.  
The League’s Council could rely on its Covenant as well as multiple institutional precedents to 
frame its direct intervention in the matter of the Chaco Boreal, with the despatch of a League 
commission. From November 1933 until March 1934 the Chaco Commission operated in the 
region, its members travelling between the capitals of Latin American states, visiting the Chaco 
Boreal, including the military front, with the aim of bringing about a cessation of hostilities and 
finding a solution to the territorial question. In this task, the commission experienced several 
obstacles, related to its internal dynamics and the external political context, which will be 
identified in detail in this chapter. These relate to the politicised composition of the commission, 
its internal disagreement, but also the lukewarm support or even institutional rivalry from the 
American states and the intransigence of Bolivia and Paraguay. Moreover, the Council’s broad 
mandate and remote support equally impeded the working conditions of the League’s 
representatives. Whereas imperial entanglements were less perceptible in this context, 
international hierarchies, expansionist ambitions and civilisational discourse frequently surface 
in the empirical fabric of the chapter, thereby showing the main tenets of the thesis’ imperial 
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internationalist framework. The Chaco Commission returned to Europe after it was unable to 
secure its objective of bringing about a permanent solution to the conflict; it presented a report 
that reflected on its unsuccessful efforts to the Council of the League of Nations. 
The Chaco War has received considerably less attention than the events that took place in Europe 
and East Asia during the 1930s, despite its importance for the Western hemisphere.688 For a long 
time international historians have perceived it as a remote conflict of a limited scale, and have 
treated it in a separate literature.689 Only recently, scholars have made efforts to connect the inter-
war internationalism with Latin America’s diplomatic context.690 Many accounts of the Chaco War 
favour the military side of the conflict, overshadowing the role of the League of Nations.691 The 
latest research compendium regarding the Chaco War deals with fascinating aspects related to 
environment and nationalism, in an attempt to broaden the perspective, but overlooks the Chaco 
Commission.692 Inter-war observers693 exhibited a greater interest in the League’s efforts: one 
observer, Ronald Stuart Kain, thought that the Chaco was far from a remote, regional conflict; 
rather, it offered a valuable lens to evaluate the workings of the League as part of an international 
dispute resolution mechanism.694  
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At the time of the Chaco War, observers came to divergent conclusions regarding the impact of 
the Chaco Commission, ranging from ‘the story of failure’ to the recognition that the 
commissioners had produced a report of ‘extraordinary importance’.695 Much of this binary 
analysis, which can also be perceived in the overall League historiography, was based on a limited 
understanding of the internal dynamics of the Chaco Commission – beyond its formal 
characteristics – and how it interacted with the multi-level nature of the context of the conflict, 
comprising rival actors and bodies, regional interference, foreign (economic) interests in an 
underdeveloped region, and a contested League authority in the Western hemisphere. The focus 
of this chapter is on the commission’s work on the ground and how it was constrained by personal 
agency, institutional limitations and the interests of competing powers.  
As with the previous case-study chapters, the League’s involvement in the region is approached 
from the perspective of the Chaco Commission, to create a multi-level frame of analysis. As such, 
the on-the-ground practices of the Chaco Commission during the inter-state dispute are turned 
into a microcosm of the international peace system during the inter-war period – the 
Commission’s limitations as a reflection of the League’s inability to uphold collective security in 
Latin America. For instance, the chapter specifies how the League Council’s broad mandate for 
the Commission echoed an indecisiveness as to the means to settle the dispute, which left the 
commissioners with unclear guidance but a lot of personal agency to pursue their task. The 
League’s selection of commissioners, on the basis of nationality rather than expertise, shifted the 
attention towards diplomacy and political interest rather than impartial methods and fact-
finding. Moreover, the absence of a united front supporting the Chaco Commission was the result 
of insufficient cooperation between the League with the Latin American bloc as well as non-
members (such as the United States). 
The Chaco dispute saw interaction and contestation between actors at multiple levels, namely the 
local, the domestic and the international. Competing personal views, palpable political rivalries, 
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nationalist agendas to gain electoral success, regional interests that sought to delay a resolution, 
and parallel hierarchies of the American states and the League of Nations, duplicating peace 
efforts, were interacting forces which all had an influence on the working conditions and the 
practices of the Commission. Scholars have generally focused on one level of interaction and 
conflict, while forsaking the interconnections with other factors, occurring at different levels.696 
In a multi-level analysis, the incapacity of the League Commission is explained and contextualised 
not just by its own actions but also by the character of the Bolivian-Paraguayan conflict, a 
civilisational dimension that runs through the attempts to expand into the underdeveloped Chaco 
Boreal, as well as the deficiencies in international peace machinery in Latin America that failed to 
impede the successive outbreak of hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay. To the extent 
possible, the chapter pursues relevant traces to other incidents, such as the Manchurian crisis and 
the Leticia dispute, which are mentioned in the source material. Due to their temporal proximity 
and a similar involvement of the League of Nations, these references will be highlighted whenever 
relevant.697  
The origins 
The dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay finds its origins in the volatility created after the 
abandonment by the Spanish Empire of its colonies in Latin America, in the early nineteenth 
century. The decolonisation process complicated inter-state relations, due to absence of fixed 
boundaries between the newly created political entities. Over the course of the century, the 
independent countries of Latin America fought both legal and military battles over the division of 
the vast territorial spoils. The Chaco Boreal is a lowland space north of the Rio Pilcomayo and to 
the west of the Rio Paraguay, that is part of wider natural region named the Gran Chaco. The 
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Boreal became a contentious issue in the second half of the century, after an 1852 treaty signed 
between Paraguay and Argentina recognised the former country’s claims over the territory, 
including both river banks of the Rio Paraguay, to the dismay of Bolivia. Before, neither country 
had made an outspoken assertion over the Chaco Boreal, which was still a scarcely populated and 
economically underdeveloped territory. One American journalist considered it a ‘little-known 
wilderness, with serious defects as a field for either agriculture or stock raising.’698 However, the 
risk of Bolivia losing its access to the west bank of the Rio Paraguay, and an ability to navigate the 
main waterway in the region, led to a series of legal claims and assertions of sovereignty in the 
following decades.699 
The existing tension over the Chaco Boreal, i.e. the question where to situate the border between 
Bolivia and Paraguay, was exacerbated by inter-state war and the rivalling claims of other 
neighbouring states concerning the Gran Chaco (that includes the disputed Boreal). Due to its 
large size, the Gran Chaco stretches across multiple Latin American countries. A war fought in the 
1860s between Paraguay and the Triple Alliance consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay – which 
left Bolivia out of the diplomatic picture – and resulted in a bilateral negotiation between 
Argentina and Paraguay that carved up portions of the Gran Chaco region. Part of the territory 
under negotiation, the Chaco Boreal, was not immediately recognised by either party but 
submitted the United States President for arbitration – a right constituted under the Monroe 
Doctrine.700 Bolivia, not part of the negotiation process, was unable to submit her own claims for 
the Chaco Boreal in the arbitration procedure. As a consequence, Bolivia was left empty-handed 
when the US Government decided in 1879 that Paraguay was entitled to the disputed region.701 
While Bolivia refused to acknowledge the US-made decision, Paraguay considered it as a right to 
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lay claim over the entire Chaco Boreal. To make matters worse, in 1884 Bolivia was forced to 
concede defeat in the War of the Pacific and lost its coastal department to Chile. Now a landlocked 
country, the prospect of reliable access to a major waterway became a pressing concern for 
Bolivia.702 
The last decades of the nineteenth century saw new developments in the Chaco Boreal dispute. A 
series of diplomatic initiatives was undertaken to find agreement between Bolivia and Paraguay, 
although in practice chiefly reinforced the status quo. No effort was spared to negotiate and draw 
up treaties but, as Ricardo Yegros observed, the problem came down to a ‘series of lamentable 
agreements and initiatives that never reached fruition’.703 Treaties failed because one or other of 
the parties refused to implement them, as political compromise over the Chaco Boreal proved to 
be impossible. According to the military historian David Zook, there was ‘no well-defined, 
generally accepted doctrine on either side’ concerning the problem, which raises the question 
why the two countries were so eager to preserve their claims over the sparsely populated 
region.704 Their reluctance to compromise contradicted a decade-long history of disinterest in the 
development of the region.  
Of late, Bolivia and Paraguay had considered the potential gains that came with the development 
of the Chaco Boreal and the spread of civilisation. Paraguay began with the sale of lands in the 
Chaco Boreal to pay off debts from the war with the Triple Alliance. Bolivia’s desire to have a 
viable port on the west bank of the Rio Paraguay became increasingly important, although the 
landlocked country had not undertaken any major attempt to develop the infrastructure of its 
hinterland. Both countries supported the influx of minority groups (such as the Mennonite 
community) and the settlement of religious missions – each side in a covert attempt to extend 
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control.705 While some have pointed out the role of ‘national pride and prestige’ in this period, the 
Chaco dispute was mostly a diplomatic and legal battle which saw neither armed conflict nor 
strong public passions.706 
The twentieth century brought a more eventful period, characterised by three significant 
processes, namely the militarisation of the diplomatic game, thriving nationalist passions in the 
domestic arena, and the internationalisation of the dispute. First, both sides sought to extend 
direct control over parts of the Chaco Boreal through repeated military advances and the 
construction of defensive forts. Although described as a ‘stop and go process’, the continued 
advances effectively militarised a hitherto diplomatic pursuit via peace treaties (all of which 
failed), generating the risk of an armed confrontation.707 Second, the question of the Chaco Boreal 
transformed itself in an issue of national sovereignty, where hardened positions proved popular 
with the public – of which domestic politicians eagerly took advantage. By the inter-war years, 
neither Bolivia nor Paraguay was ‘willing to recede a hair's breadth from its extreme position (…) 
for fear that any concession will bring upon its head the wrath of the carefully fostered nationalist 
and chauvinist sentiment of its people.’708 The discovery of oil in the 1920s raised the stakes for 
complete control over the Chaco Boreal, as each country hoped to profit from a sudden boom in 
oil revenues and attract commercial investment. Bolivia as well as Paraguay gradually moved 
towards a position of exclusive sovereignty over the territory.709 Third, the steady deterioration 
in Bolivian-Paraguayan relations strengthened the calls for an external intervention of an 
international body. Neighbouring countries had supported several botched attempts at a peace 
treaty in the early twentieth century. When a minor military incident with the capture of a 
Paraguayan patrol in 1927 was followed by an attack in 1928 on a recently constructed 
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Paraguayan fort, by a forward deployment of Bolivian troops, a full-blown mobilisation for war 
was only averted due to the mediation of the American states.710 
The eruption of war over the Chaco in 1928 was put to a halt with the help of the Pan-American 
Union: since the previous century it hosted the Conference of the American States, with the 
purpose of bringing all the political entities of the continent closer together. As mentioned before, 
the Conference of American States of 1928 tried finding a way out of the dispute with the 
appointment of a conciliatory body that would ascertain the views of Bolivia and Paraguay and 
propose a possible settlement. The American states not directly concerned with the dispute, such 
as the United States and Mexico, had an interest in avoiding war in their hemisphere: the eruption 
of a Bolivian-Paraguayan war risked involving the neighbouring states, and thus a repetition of 
the nineteenth century alliance wars. The Conciliation Commission, however, was unable to 
achieve anything more than a superficial and temporary reconciliation – including the restoration 
of diplomatic relations. It failed to encourage Bolivia and Paraguay to accept a proposal for a 
permanent settlement of the Chaco Boreal dispute through arbitration.711  
The proposal fell into the water because the countries disagreed over two contentious points. 
First, Bolivia and Paraguay could not agree whether a security agreement, guaranteeing an 
armistice and providing safety measures on both sides, should go in advance of the arbitration 
procedure. Paraguay stated that security guarantees were a precondition to start any judicial 
arbitration, whereas Bolivia favoured to negotiate an armistice and arbitration agreement in 
parallel. Second, the two countries were unable to agree which area should be subjected to a 
future arbitration process: Paraguay considered that all of the Chaco Boreal should be scrutinised 
by an arbitration court, whereas Bolivia argued that only parts of the region should be arbitrated 
that had not been settled by older treaties – in the nineteenth century. For both points, the fixed 
positions of the two countries pitted them against each other and left limited room for a 
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diplomatic compromise – inflexible stances that would continue to haunt all negotiations over the 
next years.712 
Previously, historians considered that the failed attempt at conciliation was either due to foreign 
oil interests or the deliberate scheming of the neighbouring countries towards conflict.713 Marxist 
interpretations have sought the origins of the Chaco War in the role played by economic 
imperialism, each side backed by rival foreign oil companies that provided funds for increased 
military expenditure. However, as Bridget Chesterton notes, there is little evidence in the source 
material that lends credibility towards this interpretation.714 Diplomatic documents used in this 
chapter contain no direct traces of corporate interests playing a substantial role in the conflict, 
although there were certainly foreign economic stakes tied to the development of the Chaco.715  
In contrast, recent historiography and diplomatic cables reveal that the role of the neighbouring 
countries, Argentina and Chile in particular, is more ambiguous than assumed. As Paraguay 
developed closer relations with Argentina after the Triple Alliance War, it became dependent on 
exports towards its richer neighbour and access to the harbour of Buenos Aires. Equally, Bolivia 
was forced to rely on Chile for access to the Pacific Ocean, binding the two countries closer 
together. In turn, Argentina and Chile encouraged each side to keep a firm position in the dispute. 
The two neighbours showed no resolve to help end the dispute, because they benefitted from the 
ongoing turmoil – a distraction for its poorer, but potential economic rivals in the region. In other 
words, the underlying game of allegiances and regional influence complicated the nature of 
negotiation process, as no earnest pressure was mounted on the belligerents. Each time an excuse 
was found to postpone an accord.716 
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Given the severity of the situation and the probability of international contestation over the Chaco 
Boreal dispute, it is surprising to note that the League of Nations did not directly intervene in 
1928 with the application of Article 11, as it would do in 1933. As one contemporary noted, ‘the 
Latin American nations save Ecuador eventually joined the League of Nations’, giving the 
organisation near-universal adherence to the Covenant in case of a regional dispute.717 It was well 
placed to act, and at least in some Latin American capitals the perception held that the League 
could be a more disinterested and neutral mediator than the Pan-American Union. The fifty-third 
session of the Council in December 1928 closely followed the events as they unfolded, yet it 
restricted its actions to a call to its two members to uphold the Covenant and use pacific means 
to settle the dispute.718 The circumscribed communication by the Council was a consequence of 
the fact that the Western hemisphere, acting through the Pan-American Union, had seized already 
the initiative with the formation of a commission, comprising American neutrals, to start 
conciliatory proceedings – the preferred course of the United States as a non-member of the 
League. According to Stephen Duggan, the American states acted in their traditional way ‘of 
solving purely American problems by means of American agencies’, thereby leaving the League 
on the side-line.719 At the time, Bolivia and Paraguay had not yet sought the aid of the League, and 
the Council appeared at ease with yielding the initiative to the Pan-American Union and thus 
limiting its role to the exchange of information.720 A League Council-established Committee of 
Three, consisting of Guatemala, Spain and the Irish Free State, was tasked to follow the 
developments.721 
The inability of the Conciliation Commission to find common ground between Bolivia and 
Paraguay after the 1928 incident proved to be a replay of past episodes. Although the fragile 
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status-quo over the Chaco Boreal was upheld, peace between the two neighbours hung by a 
thread. In 1931, a Commission of Neutrals (composed of Columbia, Cuba, Mexico, the US and 
Uruguay) undertook an attempt to sign a non-aggression pact. However, disagreement over the 
duration of such a pact dragged the discussions into the next year and eventually broke down 
with the onset of hostilities. Historians agree that in the aftermath of the breakdown of the Pan-
American-backed conciliation, ‘war was inevitable’, although this view too easily overlooks the 
absence of pressure put on the two countries to settle their differences.722 While the neighbouring 
states had on several occasions formally supported the reconciliation process, they were 
incapable or unwilling to diffuse the increasingly hostile rhetoric between Bolivia and Paraguay. 
Argentina and Chile held off from retaining pressure on their neighbours, since the lingering 
conflict was not perceived as an immediate threat to regional stability. This ambiguous role of 
support complicated any chance of successful intervention a neutral mediator, or even the direct 
cooperation between international agencies, suggesting that the time was not yet ripe for 
concerted action towards ending the territorial dispute. 
The catalyst 
Hostilities in the Chaco Boreal broke out in June 1932, when a Bolivian detachment attacked a 
Paraguayan fort raised near Lake Pitiantuta, one of the few strategic water resources in the Chaco 
region. The Bolivians were unable to hold the fort for a long period: after a week, a Paraguayan 
retaliation forced the attackers to flee. The Bolivians assumed they had the ‘upper hand in any 
war with Paraguay’, but the unexpected defeat at Lake Pitiantuta came as a shock to the 
government in La Paz.723 Nevertheless, plans were made for a series of attacks on Paraguayan 
forts in the next months. While the war between Bolivia and Paraguay was not yet officially 
declared, because of the recent hostilities both countries mobilised their population for war and 
gave up all diplomatic attempts at reaching a peace accord. The Bolivian army tried multiple 
advances in the months following June 1932, aiming for the possession of well-located 
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Paraguayan fortresses, but Paraguay successfully repelled each attempt to gain a territorial and 
strategic advantage. A renewed Bolivian offence took place at the end of 1932, that exerted strong 
pressure on the Paraguayan army but produced nothing but a stale-mate between the two 
belligerents. By 1933, few military gains were made, and the initiative was shifting in favour of a 
Paraguayan counter-offensive. The start of hostilities in June 1932 until December 1933, when a 
temporary armistice was reached, marks the first phase of the Chaco War.724 
Shortly after the outbreak of the hostilities in 1932, the Chaco War was hailed as ‘a foolish if not 
a disastrous’ idea by Haring in World Affairs, as he believed the belligerents did not have the 
financial resources to sustain a drawn-out military conflict.725 The incomprehension over the 
reasons behind the outbreak and continuance of war point to the complex motivation of each 
country. As mentioned before, the tendency towards hostility was partly driven by nationalist 
passions, the gradual militarisation and internationalisation of the conflict. Also, the Bolivian 
belief that its chances were favourable in a war against Paraguay played a part in the events of 
June 1932. However, the outbreak of war was different from earlier eruptions of hostilities: 
previous scuffles did not degenerate into a full-blown military encounter.  
What explains the start of the Chaco War in 1932? A major reason for war can be found in the 
domestic politics of Bolivia. The volatility of world markets in the aftermath of 1929 had created 
a major economic crisis in the country, due to sudden decrease in exports of metals and the 
subsequent collapse of the mining industry. The Republican Party in power since 1931, led by 
Daniel Salamanca, was keen to shift the focus from economic and political troubles to the Chaco 
question. According to Herbert Klein, Salamanca and his Bolivian Government elaborated ‘the 
most ambitious and expensive scheme for military penetration of the Chaco’, marking a switch 
from a defensive to an offensive attitude.726 Hence, the hostilities in 1932 were not an accidental 
encounter between troops as had occurred before but rather part of a deliberate attempt to 
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escalate ‘a typical border incident into a full-scale war to the surprise of even the Paraguayans’.727 
Salamanca ignored the advice of his military command and wagered a conflict in the hope that his 
belligerent position against Paraguay would deliver him strong national support. While Paraguay 
was at the time more concerned with the cost of economic depression and thus reluctant to 
respond to the Bolivian threat, the June attack on a Paraguayan fort was perceived as a 
provocation and could not be left unanswered.728 
The international response to the initial June attack followed a similar pattern as with previous 
clashes, when the first initiative came from the American states. The Commission of Neutrals 
which was overseeing the negotiations for a non-aggression pact (started in 1931), tried to curtail 
the clashes near Lake Pitiantuta from developing into a war over the Chaco Boreal. Throughout 
the month of July, the commission advocated a policy of restraint and suggested to the 
governments of both sides to produce a report on the events that had occurred nearly two month 
earlier.729 The commission could not immediately respond to the resurgence of hostilities, as 
there was a delay in the receipt of news about the incident: neither Bolivia nor Paraguay had been 
willing to inform the outside world – likely out of fear to wreck the negotiations of the non-
aggression pact.730 However, any attempt at reconciliation was now doomed, as the belligerents 
disagreed both on the conditions of a cessation of hostilities and the facts which had occurred in 
June. The reports that Bolivia and Paraguay had submitted to the Commission of Neutrals, 
presented contradictory statements, and offered no basis for agreement about the facts in order 
to proceed to arbitration. Rather than relying on the despatch of neutral investigators to the 
Chaco to establish the facts, the Commission of Neutrals was relying on a diplomatic process for 
reconciliation. 
Subsequently, the Commission of Neutrals worked on a plan for the cessation of hostilities, which 
would bring both sides back to their positions before the June clashes. However, due to the 
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Bolivian Government’s intransigence in accepting this original status, the commission adapted its 
initial plan and proposed a cessation of hostilities based on existing positions. This would 
effectively lock in the recent Bolivian advances, to the dismay of Paraguay. The vacillations in the 
proposals of the Commission of Neutrals were unacceptable for the Paraguayan Government, led 
by the recently elected Eusebio Ayala. The Paraguayan President preferred a plan for a 
demilitarised zone which would create additional security for Paraguayan outposts. By now, the 
Commission of Neutrals no longer had the appeal of impartiality to both belligerents.  
The outbreak of the Chaco War in the following months was partly orchestrated by domestic 
politics, but the mistakes made by the American neutrals in the early weeks of the conflict had 
exacerbated the differences between the two sides and did not aid to diminish the hostilities. 
Time passed relentlessly, with Bolivia and Paraguay mobilising their populations for war. As 
Ronald Kain observed, ‘the facts concerning the preliminary clashes at Lake [Pitiantuta] could 
undoubtedly have been ascertained within a few days had existing peace machinery provided for 
the immediate despatch of neutral investigators to the spot.’731 However, the Commission of 
Neutrals failed to intervene immediately after the initial clash and afterwards opted for a strategy 
of diplomatic pressure rather than fact-finding on the ground. Perhaps, an inquiry into the June 
attack, detailing Bolivia’s offensive attitude and the Paraguayan retaliation, could have exposed 
political decisions and provided the basis for international action. However, the Commission of 
Neutral’s reconciliation plans were easily side-lined by power politics; each time the belligerents 
disputed the terms of reference of a future agreement. 
By the autumn of 1932, the Chaco War was well under way, with repeated clashes between the 
belligerent armies. Paraguay still pursued a strategy of limited reprisals against Bolivian 
advances, for reasons of appearing as innocent before international observers. The Commission 
of Neutrals continued its efforts to bring about a cessation of hostilities, with new proposals that 
overturned the conditions of previous ones, and the suggestion of talks in Washington. These 
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repeated attempts at mediation did not dent the repeated clashes on the ground between the two 
armies. A final commission proposal was presented on 15 December 1932 but rejected by 
Paraguay because it left Bolivia in a more advantageous position. Although the commission had 
the support from the American states, its latest plan had floundered and the neutral states 
decided to leave the initiative to the neighbouring countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru). 
During the first months of 1933, these states proceeded with their effort, which resulted in a 
conference in February and a proposal named the Act of Mendoza.732  
The Act of Mendoza was a proposal drafted by the Foreign Ministers of Argentinian and Chile that 
envisioned a final cessation of hostilities and comprehensive arbitration with regard to the 
border dispute. This proposal largely reflected the Paraguayan view, although neither side was 
completely at ease with the proposal. Meanwhile, public pressure hard mounted on President 
Ayala to ask the Paraguayan Congress to declare a state of war with Bolivia – a possible point of 
no return for the Mendoza Act. Neither of the two belligerents was eager to fully cooperate with 
the neighbouring countries, Paraguay had minor reservations whereas Bolivia showed no 
inclination to consider the Mendoza Act. Both were unwilling to give up the chance of military 
success by returning to the ex-ante territorial status. Bolivia resented the diplomatic pressure 
after its recent gains, while Paraguay wished to extend security guarantees for the Chaco Boreal 
in the hope of preserving a strategic advantage.733 
Since 1928 and during the first phase of the conflict, the League of Nations had stood on the side-
line of events, leaving the initiative to the Commission of Neutrals and finally the neighbouring 
states. The Council of the League had wished to avoid the ‘duplication of jurisdictions’ and 
supported the existing negotiations and the agreement for the Act of Mendoza in February 
1933.734 What caused the Council to become directly involved in the Chaco crisis was the 
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declaration of war by Paraguay, which took place on 10 May 1933. Shortly thereafter, Bolivia (and 
later Paraguay) appealed to the League and declared a desire to invoke Article 16 of the Covenant, 
which stipulated action to be taken in case a member had committed an act of war against 
another. The Committee of Three, instructed by the Council in 1928 to closely follow 
developments in the Chaco, had prepared a report for the members of the Council which 
suggested invoking Article 11 of the Covenant: this prescribed a milder procedure than Articles 
15 and 16, leaving the League free to choose which action ‘may be deemed wise and effectual to 
safeguard the peace of nations’.735 
The Committee of Three proposal asked for the cessation of hostilities and the submission of the 
dispute to arbitration. The Committee of Three would commence negotiations in Geneva but 
suggested the despatch of an impartial commission, if it would fail to negotiate any arrangement 
for the cessation of hostilities. This impartial commission was suggested to be tasked with finding 
a permanent settlement, and upon the Council’s request to make an inquiry into all aspects of the 
dispute. The Council formally adopted the committee’s proposal (and the Chaco Commission’s 
future mandate) on 20 May 1933. The machinations of peace had so far been slow, due to different 
international jurisdictions in relation to the conflict, but an official declaration of war by Paraguay 
was taken as a signal for the League to take the matters in its own hands.736 
In practice, there were multiple grounds which facilitated the League’s take-over of the initiative 
from both the American neutrals and the neighbouring states. The repeated failures of the 
American states to push for a breakthrough in the negotiations had created a sense of gloom with 
the neutral American states. In a letter to President Roosevelt, dated 9 June 1933, the US Secretary 
of State suggested it would be better that the Commission of Neutrals (including the US) withdraw 
from any new initiative and leave the Chaco ‘entirely in the hands of the League of Nations’.737 
The Secretary of State felt that the Latin American states were too deeply involved, and the United 
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States should seek to ‘get out of the matter gracefully’. His desire for an American retreat was 
chiefly because of the perceived role played by Argentina, ‘which is not a neutral and has openly 
supported Paraguay’, and would not tolerate the success of the League’s initiative: ‘failure, 
therefore, of such efforts is almost assured.’738 Leaving the initiative to the League, despite the 
risk of failure, would at least save the United States from losing face.739  
It is highly unlikely that the Council was aware of either the reasons of the US retreat (and the 
Neutrals) or the regional configuration and its deep political entanglements that underpinned the 
Chaco Boreal dispute. The resolution of 20 May makes no reference to the neighbouring countries 
in the procedure for the settlement. The League could, however, not remain a bystander: 
Secretary-General Drummond professed there was ‘no alternative but to act in this matter’.740 The 
long duration of the conflict and the failure of all efforts did not bode well for the international 
peace machinery, and the League’s reputation was on the line. Perhaps the organisation wished 
to recoup prestige after the Manchurian crisis, although there was no public mention of this in 
Geneva.741 More recently, from late 1932 until early 1933, it had successfully mediated in the 
Leticia territorial dispute between Colombia and Peru, which resulted in a peacekeeping force 
observing the peace while territorial control was handed back. The final agreement of the Leticia 
dispute occurred in parallel with the Chaco Council resolution; it emboldened the League to take 
the lead in another Latin America dispute. However, due to its long history and many 
international interventions, the Chaco dispute was an infinitely more complicated task – almost 
of similar proportions to the Manchurian crisis.742 
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The magnitude of the Chaco War was the first of several obstacles the League had to face. In its 
first decade of existence, the peacemakers in Geneva had settled a minor border dispute (Greece-
Bulgaria) and successfully dealt with a few thorny territorial issues (Mosul, Åland Islands). 
However, these had often been disagreements of small member states, which accepted the 
League’s authority and decisions through the application of the Covenant. Moreover, these 
disputes had shown little evidence of foreign entanglement – the risk of neighbouring and great 
power interests interfering with the peace-agenda. On the surface, Latin America’s location in the 
Western hemisphere and the influence of Pan-Americanism made it seem peripheral to European 
affairs, yet, this overlooks the multifaceted demographic, economic and political ties that had 
formed over the previous decades and centuries. Because of colonial heritage and recent 
emigrations, Spain and Portugal had kept a close relationship with Latin America. Britain had its 
economic interests (investments in petroleum), whereas France was conscious of Latin America’s 
political role, as a sizeable voting bloc in the League. In contrast, fascist Italy had fewer ties but 
increasingly sought overtures to the sub-continent, in an effort to raise its political profile 
abroad.743 
A second obstacle had to do with the long history of negotiations, which had revealed certain 
imperfections of previous attempts. The Chaco dispute’s historical origins and the gradual build-
up of political tensions made a clear-cut and speedy resolution difficult to achieve. Also, the 
involvement of other Latin American states could either help or obstruct a League-led peace 
process. Certainly, regional interests were also bound to clash with any palpable role played by 
the European powers. In sum, the weight of diplomatic history made the manoeuvring space 
small from the start, as many formats and proposal had been tried and each of them had failed. 
The Bolivian and Paraguayan disagreements over the procedural order for a future dispute 
settlement and the area to be arbitrated were contributing to the diplomatic stasis.  
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Third, the League had only played a marginal role in the conflict and there disposed of limited 
knowledge about past negotiations and the facts on the ground. Expertise on the Chaco dispute 
was in short supply in Geneva: apart from the Committee of Three and the Political Section of the 
Secretariat, there were few clusters in the organisation closely studying events in Latin America. 
The remoteness of the scene also meant that the League had no representatives on the ground, 
which could have acted as direct observers to the unravelling military conflict. In other words, a 
detailed inquiry of the facts would have been a possible step for the League before it got closely 
involved in the matter. However, the Committee of Three reasoned differently: it primarily sought 
to safeguard the peace – as prescribed by Article 11 of the Covenant.744 
The Committee’s report and the Council resolution were characterised by a disposition towards 
a grand solution for the Chaco, that would consist of agreements bringing about an armistice and 
international arbitration by an independent authority, rather than a limited fact-finding mission. 
The resolution of 20 May stipulated multiple elements – an armistice, negotiations as well as 
general conciliation – without a specific chronological order: this was meant to give the 
commission more discretion ‘in the light of the situation it will find on the spot and with a view 
to ensuring a rapid and permanent settlement of the dispute’, although the decision-making 
power remained in the hands of the Council.745 Yet, the door was left open for a fact-finding 
mission, since the resolution foresaw an inquiry into all circumstances of the dispute ‘at the 
Council’s request’, including the parts played by the two belligerent countries.746 
The consequence of the Council’s decision was that the Chaco Commission’s mandate mixed up 
the idea of inquiry with conciliation – to find an agreement between the parties rather than simply 
to gather the facts of the dispute. The Chaco Commission was to take a more participatory role 
instead of one limited to fact-finding and observation: it was meant to speed up the cessation of 
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hostilities and act as an interlocutor between two parties.747 In this sense, the Council reproduced 
the diplomatic format that had been tried before by the American neutrals, however, this time 
with a composition chosen by the League. Inquiry was left in the background, as possible 
alternative if reconciliation would fail, but its status was unspecified (‘at the Council’s request’) 
in relation to the other tasks. Could the Chaco Commission steer Bolivia and Paraguay towards a 
compromise but also retain its impartial character if an inquiry into events was required? 
The Chaco Commission’s ambiguous mandate was unclear as to the primary function of the 
Commission and the extent of its discretion; for this, it was also criticised by the Bolivian 
delegation. The Committee of Three met with the Bolivian representation on several occasions 
during June 1933, to clarify the Council’s resolution and the function of the Commission. Bolivia 
expressed its doubts over the lack of a clear, chronological procedure and the duplication of 
conciliation efforts in Geneva and on the ground in Latin America.748 In comparison to other 
inquiries, including those analysed in the previous chapters, the Chaco Commission’s mandate 
was distinct because it clearly favoured reconciliation over fact-finding. Perhaps this is because 
of the nature of disputes, where peace is the ultimate goal, although a similar reasoning was 
absent in the Manchurian dispute. Likely, the mandate was the League’s attempt to take a more 
pro-active stance in another major regional dispute, in the hope to find a solution before the 
military status-quo would be overturned. 
The composition 
Given the attempt to reconcile the two parties, the composition of the Chaco Commission was of 
paramount importance to the fruitful completion of the tasks set out by the Council. By now, the 
League had gained some experience with the set-up of inquiries, after several political and other 
commissions in the 1920s and the Lytton Commission for Manchuria. In theory, the peace 
organisation could fall back on a learning curve of fact-finding and reconciliation which would 
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prove handy for a remote territorial dispute which had now evolved into a full-blown war.749 In 
practice, no task was ever the same, and assigning the right people to the commission would 
constitute a challenge for the Council. What personalities and professional backgrounds were 
required to act as a bridge between the two countries? After the May 20 resolution, it took several 
months until July before the selection process was finalised.  
In a first stage, the Leagues Council instructed the Committee of Three to come up with a list of 
names for the Chaco Commission. The Committee of Three chose to invite only large member 
states, Great Britain, France, Spain, Italy and Mexico, to suggest a couple of suitable names. The 
reason for doing so is left unspecified, but most likely the committee (comprising Guatemala, 
Spain and the Irish Free State) wished to give representation to all major European powers – but 
also Mexico as an American neutral. Unlike earlier selections made by the Secretariat, a 
preference for small, neutral countries was abandoned in favour of political balance – a sign the 
League had become more conscious of major diplomatic interests. Based on the suggestions 
received from the countries, the Committee of Three made an initial selection of candidates. From 
correspondence with the Italian Foreign Ministry, it can be ascertained that the Committee of 
Three prepared the selection, but Council President Nájera designated the final composition. Five 
persons were officially chosen on 19 July 1933: Count Luigi Aldrovandi-Marescotti (Italy), 
Ambassador Dr Julio Álvarez del Vayo (Spain), Major Raul Rivera Flandes (Mexico), Brigadier 
General Alexander Robertson (British) and General Fagalde (France).750 
The five men designated by the Council to constitute the Chaco Commission all had a long record 
of public service: either they were or been senior military officers (general and major) or they 
                                                             
749 Yet, the only reference made to the Lytton Commission is with regard to the legal procedure and 
expenditure. There is no indication of a blueprint or best practices followed by the League’s Secretariat. 
Chaco Commission: Expenses, 1-5435-5740, R3635, LONA. 
750 Overview of the commission that will be established for the Chaco, 19 July 1933, in private papers of 
Luigi Aldrovandi-Marescotti, Busta 24, ASD. Chaco Commission: Composition: Correspondence and other 
documents, 1-5435-5435, R3635, LONA. Álvarez del Vayo. Julio. Embajador de España, in private papers of 
Dr Julio Álvarez del Vayo, (10)61 54/18450, AGA. Due to their diplomatic postings and personal writings, 
Álvarez del Vayo and Aldrovandi-Marescotti have produced most archival materials on the Chaco 
Commission. The inquiry is reconstructed with their documents as well as the League Secretariat files. 
 
260 
 
worked in diplomatic circles (as former ambassador) for their respective countries. The selection 
of diplomats and military officers reflected a two-fold aim: on the one hand, to gain an 
understanding of the operational dynamics and strategic aims of the Chaco War, on the other 
hand to have people that could work towards the reconciliation between Bolivia and Paraguay. 
With its choice for large-country representation, military-strategic knowledge and diplomatic 
experience, the committee had favoured a team that could focus on questions of war and peace, 
rather than to conduct a fact-finding mission. The absence of academics and persons with a 
private-sector professional background were indicative of the fact that scientific credentials and 
to some degree the impartiality of the Chaco Commission were of lesser importance. The 
inclusion of Count Aldrovandi, who had also taken part in the Lytton Commission, created 
continuity. However, the mandate and nature of the task turned out to be different.751 
The Chaco Commission was an international representative body. This meant that all its 
members, who had served for several decades as representatives of their respective countries, 
had to replace their national hat by a neutral one, albeit for a limited period of time. To what 
extent was it possible and feasible for a former ambassador or military commander to separate 
the national interest from the League’s agenda? Since the commission was a time-limited body, 
commissioners were expected to return to their normal functions. Information gained on the 
assignment could be of diplomatic or economic significance, be used to further foreign policy 
objectives or the experience could be beneficial to a person’s career. This tension was not unique 
to the Chaco Commission but perhaps exacerbated by the sensitive diplomatic nature of the 
assignment. Moreover, the political context of the mid-1930s also meant that political differences 
between countries were more outspoken and had ramifications for the dynamics of the 
Commission. For instance, how would a representative of fascist Italy (Aldrovandi) cooperate 
with a Spanish socialist (Álvarez del Vayo)? In short, the professional background, personal 
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experience as well as a combination of political views and national interests would have an impact 
on how smoothly the commission could operate on the ground. 
The League designated a group of staff to support the commissioners with their ground work in 
Latin America. The reason behind this was the fact that few commissioners were acquainted with 
the (legal) methods and peace machinery of the League, as well as the history of the Chaco Boreal 
dispute. In the 19 July session, the Council President Nájera announced that the commission was 
to be accompanied by a political counsellor of the League’s Secretariat, Henri Vigier (France), who 
had followed the developments in the Chaco region. In addition, two other counsellors were 
mentioned, Julian Noguiera (Uruguay) from the Information Section and Guillen-Monforte 
(Spain) from the ILO752, as well as a female secretary named Olga Belloche (France). It was 
uncommon for women to be selected to participate in League inquiries, but Belloche was a 
shorthand typist working for the Political Section and therefore chosen to accompany the 
commission. These appointments would aid the commissioners with the organisation of the 
travel to and within Latin America, as well as provide support during the execution of the inquiry. 
The legal and institutional expertise brought with the Commission could be decisive, as the 
counsellors generally drafted proposals and advised the commissioners on which type of legal 
mechanisms could be used in the case of a dispute.753 
By the end of July 1933, the selection of the team was completed, and it appeared the commission 
was ready to depart for Latin America.754 However, early August news arrived that took the 
League by surprise: the neighbouring countries would undertake one last attempt to end the 
hostilities and prepare an arbitration agreement. The Council saw no other option but to 
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temporarily postpone the commission’s despatch, even though a delay could put the participation 
of some members in jeopardy. Both Secretariat files and the diplomatic documents of Count 
Aldrovandi provide evidence of the exasperation arising from the decision of the neighbouring 
states: the League was left ‘in the dark’ by the neighbouring states but Frank Walters, head of the 
Political Section, tried to reassure the Italian member about the future departure of the Chaco 
Commission.755 The League was eager to keep the plan of a commission on the table, yet it had 
grown frustrated about the lack of consultation of the neighbouring states.756 The League had 
tried to steer the actions of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru via its Council resolutions but in 
practice could do little more than wait for the outcome of the new negotiations. This was a striking 
example of the fraught and politicised relationship between the League and the American states, 
unable to agree which agency had the final authority over the conflict. Strategic delay had also 
characterised the Manchurian inquiry – although this time it served neighbouring interests rather 
than the European powers. 
The latest peace attempt by the neighbouring countries took several months but no significant 
gains were made. The initiative was abandoned by October 1933, because Bolivia and Paraguay 
had failed to reach consensus on a chosen approach to end hostilities and delimit the Chaco Boreal 
zone for future arbitration.757 Once again, the initiative shifted to the League of Nations, and 
preparations were made for a quick despatch of the Chaco Commission. In the meantime, General 
Fagalde of France had withdrawn and was to be replaced by a man of similar experience: Henri 
Freydenberg, a divisional general of the French army. The final composition of the commission 
made no longer mention of an extensive support staff (including a shorthand typist), apart from 
Henri Vigier of the Political Section. The commission would work on the ground aided by a small 
team composed of Vigier and Dr Juan A. Buerro, acting as a secretary and judicial counsellor. In a 
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previous career, Buerro had served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Uruguay and knew the 
intricacies of Latin American politics well.758 
The European commissioners left for Latin America on the 18 October 1933 and would arrive 
two weeks later in Rio de Janeiro. What reasons did they have to participate in a complex 
undertaking, which had already been delayed and was bound to be troublesome due to the 
precarious relationship with the neighbouring countries? In his memoirs, Álvarez del Vayo briefly 
elucidated his personal reasons to take the assignment: after a period serving as Spanish 
ambassador in Mexico he perceived the work for the League as a useful escape from ‘new 
Rightists [sic] government in Spain’.759 Álvarez del Vayo was a socialist who resented the 
monarchy and its right-wing supporters. The extended visit to Bolivia and Paraguay would also 
allow him to learn more about Latin America and its civilisational ties to Europe. Álvarez del Vayo 
added that he thought it important that ‘Spain should participate in the effort to re-establish peace 
between two countries of her own blood’, revealing a wish for peace as well as a distinct Spanish 
interest in the former colonial empire.760 Count Aldrovandi gave no explicit motivation for his 
participation in the commission. In a telegram sent to the Foreign Ministry he revealed that the 
work for the League ‘regretfully’ postponed his next assignment as ambassador, although he 
wished to contribute to the commission’s difficult task.761 
While not all members of the commission have left traces of their intricate motivation behind, one 
may gather from the two examples that the participants believed something could be gained from 
this episode, either personal or professional, and would influence their future career paths. 
Serving for several months on the Chaco Commission could be a transformational experience. But 
would all career calculations rhyme with the task’s requirements? The resolution of the Chaco 
dispute may not have been the only concern of each commissioner. 
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The inquiry 
The work of the Chaco Commission lasted from early November 1933, when it was officially 
established in Montevideo762, until the beginning of May 1934, when a final report was submitted 
to the Council of the League of Nations. The commission’s activities in large part consisted of 
travel around several Latin American countries, to speak to the representatives of the two 
belligerent countries and to consult with the neighbouring states on the best procedure forward. 
Both Bolivia and Paraguay assigned an assessor to the commission, which helped to clarify the 
positions of each country and keep track of commissioners’ movements. Just before the official 
start, the commissioners had met with the Foreign Minister of Brazil, to learn more about the 
obstacles which previous mediators had faced. In the following months, the visits to Asunción and 
La Paz would be alternated with talks to representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. The 
commission had travelled first to Paraguay in November, because of an early invitation by 
Paraguayan President Ayala. In December, the Chaco Commission ventured into Bolivia, to speak 
to the Bolivian President Salamanca. In large part, the group of commissioners relied on talks 
with high-level elected officials, such as the President and Foreign Affairs Minister, to ascertain 
each country’s views and red lines regarding the Chaco dispute.  
To recall, the crux of the disagreement had hitherto revolved around Paraguay’s desire for 
adequate security guarantees before a limited form of arbitration, whereas Bolivia favoured the 
arbitration of the entire Chaco Boreal in parallel to a cessation of hostilities (i.e. one could not 
precede the other). The commissioners combined high-level meetings with an occasional visit to 
the front-line, where the military members of the team could ascertain the logistical proceedings 
of the conflict. The commission was unable to visit the entirety of the Chaco Boreal, and focused 
on the front-line and the places where Bolivia could potentially gain access to the Rio Paraguay. 
For most of these on-the-ground visits, especially those pertaining to military and geographical 
aspects, one or two commissioners would take responsibility of the task. The commission also 
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experimented with simultaneous negotiations in both capitals, thus dividing the team in two, to 
sustain diplomatic pressure and manoeuvre room for a compromise.763 
The Chaco Commission presented a first proposal to both sides on 12 December 1933, which 
presented a number of security guarantees as well as a draft agreement for arbitration of the 
Chaco Boreal. Two major events marked the weeks around the presentation of the proposal. One 
was the Pan-American Conference (3-26 December) which took place in Montevideo, to which 
the commission was officially invited. This Conference of American states closely followed the 
work the League’s commissioners; the conference provided a platform to bring representatives 
of Bolivia and Paraguay around the same table to discuss the draft proposal. A second event was 
the armistice in late December 1933, after a series of Paraguayan military gains, which created 
the opportunity to extend the temporary cessation of hostilities and create the time for 
undisturbed discussions. After the Pan-American Conference, the commission continued its work, 
by sending a smaller delegation to Asunción to persuade the Paraguayan Government to extend 
the peace. The commissioners achieved a temporary extension of the armistice until 6 January 
1934 but made no progress with the negotiation based on its draft proposal.  
The Chaco War officially resumed after the elapse of the armistice, which compelled the 
commission to inform the Council and await new instructions. On 20 January 1934, the Council 
extended the commission’s mandate, asking it to study all aspects of the problem and do whatever 
it takes to end the hostilities, which led to a new round of contacts with the belligerent 
countries.764 At this stage of the Chaco War, the belligerents had reached stale-mate and were 
unable to make major territorial gains. A second, slightly amended peace proposal was finally 
presented in February 1934. When both sides rejected the new proposal, the commission decided 
its task could not be continued and planned for a return to Europe. The commission’s secretary 
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Buerro was instructed to stay behind and report on any new events, while the commissioners 
met in Geneva to prepare a final report for the Council.765 
The facts of the laborious work of the Chaco Commission over the span of six months are briefly 
presented here in a chronological order to facilitate an elaboration of some of the themes which 
emerge, the practices pursued by the commissioners, the intricacies of the assignment and the 
variety of factors that influenced the outcome of the inquiry. The May 1934 report of the Chaco 
Commission presents a more detailed overview of the same chronology. The focus in this section 
will be on the aspects outlined in the introduction, namely the internal dynamics that go beyond 
its formal characteristics, as well as the constraints imposed by the tense political environment. 
The following paragraphs will address the following topics: the role of personalities, the 
diplomatic context and the character of inquiry, the external factors that influenced and inhibited 
the work of the commission, and the final report as a reflection of the commission’s choices, 
practices, and limitations on the ground. 
A tale of two rivals 
The work of the Chaco Commission was just underway when the first obstacle emerged in the 
form of the chairman election. In the first meeting, which took place in Montevideo in early 
November 1933, the commissioners had to choose among them one person who could take up 
the chairmanship of the commission. Although this was a common practice for League 
commissions, the election process was often complicated: the most experienced candidate would 
not necessarily stand the best chance, as political calculations and national interest could gain the 
upper hand. This was the case with the Chaco Commission.  
From the chosen commissioners, Count Aldrovandi was the most senior diplomat. He had 
participated in the Paris Peace Conference and had held several positions as ambassador in the 
previous years. His closest rival for the position, Álvarez del Vayo, was younger and relatively 
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inexperienced in comparison. In an Italian press article, it was suggested that the chairmanship 
was most likely be ‘entrusted to the representative of Italy’.766 However, the rather 
straightforward issue of seniority does not take any political context into account. As Álvarez del 
Vayo notes in his memoirs ‘Mussolini’s advent to power Italy had embarked on a policy of 
enhancing her influence in Latin America and wanted at any cost to have that post. England and 
France were determined that Italy should not have it.’767 In the election of chairman, the Spanish 
representative gained support of the French, British and Mexican representatives, receiving 
enough votes to claim the chairmanship. For Aldrovandi, this meant a reputational blow, which 
haunted him for the duration of the task. He thought the Spanish representative in a capacity of 
chairman was a ‘very unhappy’ choice, because he was a man ‘devoid of sympathy’ – a quality 
Aldrovandi considered as a requirement to negotiate an agreement.’768 
Indeed, chairman Álvarez del Vayo showed little sympathy, most of all for his Italian colleague. 
The Spanish commissioner believed that the lost election would turn the Italian into an obstacle 
for the Chaco Commission’s work.: ‘Aldrovandi remained, assuming an elegant and disdainful 
attitude toward the commission and its work.’769 Influenced by the lost election, Aldrovandi 
would display a negative bias towards most of his colleagues in his personal writings. The Italian 
diplomat described his rival Álvarez del Vayo in terms of deficiencies when it came to his 
personality and manner.770 Nevertheless, there is little evidence that suggests deliberate sabotage 
of the commission’s assignment. Throughout the commission’s work, Aldrovandi showed 
dedication to the cause: he raised suggestions to break moments of gridlock, questioned 
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undertakings which would have no desirable effect, and favoured a continued study of the 
conflict.771  
Apart from the personal rivalry between Álvarez del Vayo and Aldrovandi, other dynamics were 
at play. For instance, Aldrovandi pursued detailed correspondence with the Italian Foreign 
Ministry, which continued throughout the assignment. Aldrovandi perceived his representative 
role not just as one for the League but also for Italy. As a diplomat, he considered how Italian 
interests could be advanced in Latin America and to what extent the Chaco Commission could 
help to achieve this goal. Aldrovandi aimed for collaboration with his British colleague, as ‘the 
traditional Italian-British friendship, most recently confirmed and strengthened, could be taken 
care of and developed at a later stage.’772 From time to time, Italian interests surfaced in 
discussions: for instance, Aldrovandi wondered whether Italy and England should have 
‘observers [at the Pan-American Conference] in Montevideo’.773  
There is no evidence that Álvarez del Vayo engaged in similar terms the Spanish Foreign Ministry. 
Rather, the Spanish Foreign Ministry relied upon its Latin American legations to provide news on 
the commission’s work.774 It is rather unlikely that Aldrovandi’s continued correspondence with 
his Foreign Ministry had a significant impact on the work of the Chaco Commission. Yet, it 
counteracted the principle that commissioners were acting as representatives for the League. 
Moreover, Álvarez del Vayo had asked for total secrecy – which therefore was not upheld in 
practice.775 Aldrovandi’s approach signifies the careful balance he had to uphold as a diplomatic 
of his country – furthering national interests – which perhaps created tensions with his 
colleagues.  
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The Secretariat files suggest that the League was kept in the dark regarding the internal dynamics 
of the Chaco Commission. The personal writings of Álvarez del Vayo and Aldrovandi, however, 
paint a picture of a distinct rivalry. The feud between the two commissioners over the 
chairmanship was exacerbated by growing factionalism within the commission. Álvarez del Vayo 
had befriended his French colleague Freydenberg – both united in their antipathy towards 
Aldrovandi.776 From the minutes of meetings and Aldrovandi’s diplomatic cables it can be 
ascertained that the chairman often relied upon his French colleague Freydenberg and 
occasionally the League’s counsellor Henri Vigier to push through proposals. For example, the 
commission disagreed over the importance of the armistice that was in place since December 
1933. Álvarez del Vayo and Freydenberg were eager to steer the commission towards the 
formulation of a peace plan – rather than to focus on the armistice as a point of departure for 
renewed negotiations. Aldrovandi and his British colleague Roberts had reasoned in favour of an 
extended armistice – but failed to persuade the rest of the commission. As a consequence, the 
commission let the armistice expire without any final action.777 
Did the Chaco Commission do everything possible to uphold the peace between Bolivia and 
Paraguay, perhaps the most important of their tasks as identified by the Council? After the 
armistice lapsed, a couple of days later, the calls within the commission to report to the Council 
and terminate the assignment grew louder, even though no tangible result had been achieved. 
Throughout this period, Aldrovandi had demonstrated strong willingness to continue the 
commission’s work and extend the period of negotiations and inquiry.778 Yet, in his role as 
counterweight to the chairman, the Italian diplomat stood little chance to alter the odds. A less 
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hostile personal environment would have been more fruitful for an open discussion about the 
different paths the commission could take. In reality, a non-cooperative spirit took hold and 
commissioners kept to themselves. 
Agency played an important role: Álvarez del Vayo and Freydenberg had persuaded the Chaco 
Commission to focus their energies on a peace plan. What may have motivated them to give up 
the idea of an armistice, that would have reopened the prospect of negotiations? In his memoirs, 
Álvarez del Vayo alluded to the impossibility of reaching a settlement: ‘It was hopeless to attempt 
to negotiate peace if the governments became pacific only when they faced defeat and belligerent 
whenever they won a battle.’779 While this was a significant factor that drove the Spanish 
commissioner towards a conclusion of the assignment – in the form of a proposed agreement to 
restore the peace – other reasons were at work.  
First, a contributing factor was the desire to return home and resume professional activities. 
Álvarez del Vayo was recently elected and wished to take up his seat in the Spanish Parliament. 
Likewise, Henri Freydenberg expected a promotion upon his return, and Juan Buerro was 
promised an ambassadorship to Buenos Aires.780 In other words, several commissioners had 
started reflecting about the aftermath of their temporary assignment – which made the continued 
stay in Latin America seem more of a nuisance than honour. 
Second, it was also the nature of the conflict which led Álvarez del Vayo to believe that continued 
negotiations would be to no avail. The Spanish commissioner perceived the Chaco War chiefly 
through an economic lens, i.e. the dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay was being fought over 
the presence of oil in the ground. In his analysis, Álvarez del Vayo considered that most Latin 
American border disputes in recent years (for example, Leticia) were sparked by foreign agents, 
such as Standard Oil. He was sceptical about the prospect of a solution for each individual conflict 
and would rather emphasis the possibility of an economic conference to settle all resource-
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related disagreements. However, this offered no immediate prospect for a resolution of the 
dispute.781 
The Chaco Commission was not exceptional compared to other commissions, in being inhibited 
by personality clashes as well as the time-limited nature of the assignment. However, the Council 
mandate and appointment process had created additional tensions, insofar that reconciliation 
was more important than truth seeking, and national interests prevailed over subject expertise. 
Personal agency on the commission decisively shifted the interpretation of the mandate towards 
the formulation of a peace plan that stood no chance of success. All things considered, it turned 
the Chaco Commission into an exercise of international diplomacy, instead of a fact-finding body, 
with internal dysfunction as the result. 
All what it takes 
Doubtless, the fraught relations within the Chaco Commission had an impact on the body’s 
functioning during its assignment. Nevertheless, personal tensions were exacerbated by the 
conditions in which the commissioners had to operate, namely the ambiguity created by the 
Council’s mandate and myriad interpretations the commission could give to it – which in turn 
would determine the working methods on the ground. As mentioned before, the Council of the 
League of Nations had suggested both a participatory and observatory role, which allowed for 
direct negotiations but could be expanded into an inquiry – if the Council so desired.782 While the 
cessation of hostilities was arguably the primary task of the commission, a variety of approaches 
could be pursued to achieve this outcome. The commission could identify the views on both sides, 
start direct negotiations or gather the relevant facts from both sides which in turn could inform 
the Council about a future decision-making process. In case a permanent settlement could not be 
achieved, the Council had the discretion to ask the commission to perform a comprehensive 
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inquiry into all aspects of the dispute – including the question of responsibility for the break-out 
of the war.  
The trouble in interpreting the Council’s broad mandate found its reflection in the discussions 
between the commissioners: they extensively debated the aims of the task and the means to fulfil 
them. In December 1933, after initial meetings with Bolivia and Paraguay, chairman Álvarez del 
Vayo set out a three-step strategy: first, to attempt at transactional deal through negotiations. In 
case of failure, the second option consisted of an arbitration plan (i.e. submission of the dispute 
to The Hague’s Permanent Court of International Justice), and if this would not materialise a final 
option would be a report that presented the commission’s work, the main facts of the dispute, 
although leaving out the question of responsibility. This question was seen by Álvarez del Vayo 
as too sensitive – following discussions with the belligerent countries and representatives of the 
neighbouring states – because it risked turning the peace-process into an argument of which 
army carried out what actions. 783 
Álvarez del Vayo’s three-step strategy was conventional in the sense that it followed the pattern 
of negotiations pursued by the American neutrals and neighbouring countries. No new elements 
were offered in the plan to reconcile and bridge the differences: it assumed under the present 
conditions a compromise could be found between Bolivia and Paraguay. This, however, was a 
misreading of the nationalist fervour that had taken hold in both countries and the fundamental 
differences of views regarding the security context (i.e. guarantees sought by Paraguay) and the 
future arbitration plan (i.e. a limited rather than comprehensive agreement for Bolivia).784 The 
chairman’s strategy contained no immediate way to overcome these demands. The Chaco 
Commission started its assignment with optimism and was lauded for its initial efforts. Yet, the 
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rejection of an initial proposal in December 1933 tempered the expectations and turned Álvarez 
del Vayo pessimistic about the future.785  
The Chaco Commission’s communication with the League’s Council and the latter’s new 
instructions were meant to break the deadlock which had arisen by January 1934. The Council 
communication sent out on 20 January did not alter the mandate; it simply suggested to the 
commission to do whatever it takes to end the conflict. Although it was left open in the original 
mandate, now the Council stated in clearer terms that a ‘study of all the aspects of the problem 
and the practical possibilities of a solution’ was requested.786 Arguably, this restored the function 
of inquiry for the commission – in practice, it added to the complexity of the assignment. From 
now on, it was presupposed that the commission should pursue both reconciliation and inquiry 
– despite the inherent tension between these participatory and observatory roles. Nevertheless, 
as the previous section explained, Álvarez del Vayo and Freydenberg had settled already on the 
idea of a peace plan that would be acceptable to both sides.787 Even though such an initial peace 
proposal had been rejected in December, the commission stuck to its approach. A political 
compromise including an arbitration agreement was difficult to achieve, without pressuring the 
two belligerent countries into acceptance. Yet, the commission showed neither a strong 
inclination towards a radically different type of negotiation, nor an aptitude for inquiry.788  
The Chaco Commission’s attitude towards inquiry is best exemplified when looking at the 
discussions of the question of responsibility – actions of Bolivia and Paraguay which had triggered 
military altercations. The Council had indicated that a failure to achieve a lasting armistice did 
not preclude an investigation into the origins of the dispute – and potentially designate 
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responsibility for unjustified aggression. Originally, fact-finding was meant as a back-up plan and 
up until January 1934 it was still a matter of discussion for the commission. However, two months 
later it became clear there would be no detailed inquiry, nor a concrete investigation into 
responsibility. In a telegram dated 14 March 1934, Italian representative Aldrovandi confirmed 
that there was ‘no talk at all’ about an inquiry and the responsibility question.789 Henri Vigier, 
who was put in charge of drafting the peace proposal, had prepared a document which ‘concluded 
on the inappropriateness of the investigation into aggression’, reflecting the wish of the ‘majority 
of the Commission’ to depart from Latin America.790 Aldrovandi ‘concluded that those had to be 
the instructions from Geneva’, although nothing in the Secretariat’s correspondence suggests this 
was the case.791 Rather, the Council had supported the idea of an inquiry – in case no conciliation 
between the two countries was found. The League Secretariat had no premonition about the 
commission’s desire to depart, of which it was informed by mid-March 1934.792 
Why was this episode key to the overall undertaking? It showed that the Chaco Commission’s 
primary concern had been and continued to be about the reconciliation between the two parties, 
instead of a fact-finding investigation. This was partly a matter of principle: in Álvarez del Vayo’s 
correspondence before the assignment, he clearly believed that the commission’s work was a 
matter of ‘arbitration of the conflict’ between the two republics.793 Eventually, this became and 
remained the prevailing view among the commissioners – despite the Council’s overture towards 
inquiry in January 1934. For another part, it was a pragmatic outcome as the majority of 
commissioners had grown weary of their assignment and were pleased to return the initiative to 
the League’s Council. 
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Could a detailed inquiry, including the question of responsibility, have made a significant 
difference? By the spring of 1934 it was clear that no prospect of reconciliation existed, and other 
means of dispute settlement had to be sought. Of the commission, most notably Álvarez del Vayo 
was persuaded that an inquiry into responsibility could further damage the relations between the 
two countries, in case they had to make attributions of guilt. Instead, he wanted a balanced 
approach that evaded any thorny issues, to enable a future reconciliation between Bolivia and 
Paraguay. Álvarez del Vayo felt this would create an ‘impression of total impartiality’ with regard 
to the two countries; however, in his desire not to favour one country over the other, he turned 
the principle of impartial fact-finding into a diplomatic balancing act.794 
An inquiry could have taken different forms: either as an overview that established the most 
important facts and events of the dispute or a detailed exposé that could shed light on the 
preconditions and actions that provoked a military confrontation – such as the political and 
military decisions taken by the leaders of both countries. Although an inquiry could have 
highlighted responsibility, by no means was it tasked to render a judgement, designate an 
aggressor or take any political decisions. Although it was expected to give each side a fair hearing, 
an impartial inquiry was not predestined to be balanced in its observations, if the facts of the 
Chaco dispute revealed major discrepancies in actions between the two countries (for example, 
the Bolivian turn towards an offensive strategy in the early 1930s). The misreading of the 
assignment meant that inquiry as a form of truth seeking was never given a fair chance by the 
majority of the commissioners. 
Aldrovandi’s papers evoke his role as favourable to the inquiry-approach – likely driven by his 
rivalry with Álvarez del Vayo. Yet, the Italian commissioner had previous experience working on 
a League inquiry – his views therefore are relevant to understand the wider context. In his 
writings, Aldrovandi compared the Chaco case with the Manchurian crisis from a couple of years 
before: ‘the task of [the Chaco] Commission was much more difficult. It was more extensive than 
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that of the Commission for Manchuria.’ Despite the challenges presented by the situation, he felt 
that the chairman had made a mistake to focus on reconciliation. He believed that a ‘collective 
body’ as the Chaco Commission was more suitable for an investigation, because its membership 
gave ‘plurality and greater guarantee of impartiality. When I worked on the Manchurian 
Commission, we arrived at a conclusive judgment about the attacker’.795 Aldrovandi arguably 
ignored the different views and compromises that characterised the Lytton Commission’s work, 
but he identified the fact that there was a stronger adherence to the fact-finding nature of 
assignment, or ‘the merit or the courage to present to the League the elements to assert its 
authority and render any possible sanctions.’796 The Lytton Commission had arrived at an 
unambiguous view of the events that had transpired in Manchuria, which helped the Council (and 
Assembly) to reflect on a satisfactory decision rather than seek another round of negotiations. 
Such a view seems less attainable in the case of the Chaco Commission, which only prepared to 
report on the failure of its negotiations. 
From red lines to institutional rivalry 
The personal rivalry between Álvarez del Vayo and Count Aldrovandi, the Council’s broad and 
changing mandate as well as the departure from the inquiry-format, in favour of reconciliation, 
were major characteristics of the Chaco Commission. Personal agency was conducive to the 
troubles encountered during the assignment. Even if the internal commission and League 
dynamics had lent themselves to a more cooperative and inquisitorial approach, the Latin 
American political context and geographical environment created additional obstacles. Political 
contestation was not only rife within the Chaco Commission but also at a domestic level between 
Bolivia and Paraguay, and at the international level between the American states and the League 
of Nations, a sign of the power politics and hierarchies that constituted the inter-war imperial 
internationalist system.  
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First, the long history of the Chaco dispute gives weight to the fact that the two belligerent 
countries were skilful at the avoidance of compromise. They had mastered the politics of 
postponed negotiations and aborted agreements. They took positions, drew out red lines which 
allowed no room for negotiations. Given that both sides had contradictory conditions and did not 
agree on the zone to be arbitrated, no immediate compromise was possible. In fact, the two 
countries assumed the rightful ownership over the entire Chaco Boreal (in the words of the 
Paraguayan President, ‘to colonise the Chaco’), rather than claiming a division.797 They reverted 
their policies or offended their counterpart when it suited then, to make any agreement 
impossible.798 At one point, Frank Walters complained of the ‘violent’ language employed by both 
countries in their private and public correspondence with the League.799 In this diplomatic stale-
mate, the only ‘resolution’ was through military advances. Hence, for Bolivia and Paraguay war 
held the prospect of total victory while negotiations could only lead to compromise. Peace would 
only be decided when the financial cost became intolerable or all military options were exhausted. 
Second, the duplication of initiatives created an institutional rivalry which hindered rather than 
strengthened the international system. The neighbouring states obstructed the despatch of the 
Chaco Commission, which postponed the start of the task with several months. During the Pan-
American Conference of December 1933, Uruguay tried to come up with its own solution to the 
problem – despite the ongoing work of the commission.800 The duplication of initiatives created 
confusion and gave the belligerents the excuse to doubt the League’s authority or resort to a 
different platform for negotiation. The US Government closely followed the proceedings, despite 
its self-professed disinterest, and was keen to underline the success of the Pan-American 
Conference in the lead up to the armistice, even though this had little to do with the temporary 
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halt to hostilities.801 Moreover, the behaviour of the neighbouring countries was questionable at 
most. In his memoirs, Álvarez del Vayo noted that ‘Argentina had attempted the simultaneous 
exploitation of both disputing countries’ whereas the Secretariat mentioned ‘continued Brazilian 
intervention’.802  
Hierarchies and the desire to obtain greater control in the region mattered a great deal: regional 
powers were reluctant to see an end to the dispute and the League’s commission achieving 
success in bringing about a peace agreement. The rivalry was exacerbated by the fact that the 
Chaco Commission was operating far away from Geneva. The League had no proper diplomatic 
representation in the region, communication with its commission was irregular, and it had no 
executive arm to offer immediate guidance in case of difficulties. In comparison, the American 
states had extensive diplomatic representation in the region and were more aware of what was 
happening in Asunción and La Paz.803 With the Council being remote and a perceived limited 
authority in the region, the Chaco Commission was left to its own devices to find a suitable 
approach. All what was left were the facts and the truth, but most commissioners thought it wiser 
to stick to reconciliation efforts. 
Political contestation for power encapsulated all levels of decision-making and influenced the 
Chaco Commission’s work on the ground. Yet, some of the challenges also had to do with the 
nature of the work. The commissioners spent half a year away from home, on an intensive 
assignment which required meetings with government officials and visits to Chaco Boreal – 
known for its uninhabited character. The commission was subjected to taxing weather conditions, 
including the high altitude during its visits to La Paz. Sustained travel in the same group made the 
assignment more difficult to tolerate. Although a division of labour and the conduct of private 
meetings created time for recreation, the commission virtually spent half a year on the job. The 
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physical aspect and bodily experience of the commissioners equally deserves attention, apart 
from the traditional factors which shaped a long and strenuous conciliation process. The temporal 
dimension to the assignment contextualises the desire of some commissioners to wrap up the 
work and depart for Europe, eager to commence the next chapter of their professional careers. 
The report 
A duty of responsibility? 
After four months of residing in the capitals of Latin America, the commissioners departed for 
Europe, destined to work on a final report in Geneva. Over a series of meetings, taking place 
between April and May 1934, they carefully finalised the main facts of the dispute and their 
version of events as they had unfolded in the last months. The Chaco Commission’s report was 
completed 12 May 1934 and shortly thereafter presented to the Council for consideration. 
Álvarez del Vayo recalled it was ‘fighting report rather than a formal diplomatic document’, 
adding that it was ‘written in the conviction that the best way to serve the League was to force it 
to act in defence of the Covenant rather than to hide behind an innocuous compromise.’804 The 
Spanish chairman thought it important to underline the importance of peace and the need for a 
definitive settlement of the long-lasting conflict, even though this desire to reconcile was at odds 
with his belief in a ‘disinterested study’ of the Chaco dispute.805 How impartial was the final report 
and to what extent did it aspire to goal of a detailed inquiry? Three elements emerge from final 
document, which are relevant to understand the commissions’ conduct regarding the Chaco 
dispute: a civilisational and economic frame on the question of foreign interests, a strong 
adherence to balance, and a shirking away of the question of responsibility. 
First, the report highlighted how the Chaco region had escaped the spectre of civilisation for 
several centuries, despite Spanish colonisation efforts and later attempts to develop the economic 
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potential of the Boreal.806 The report professed that the origins of the dispute did not lie in the 
disagreement over certain legal titles (of ownership), but ‘that superficial appearance economic 
interests played a decisive part.’807 The hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay – two civilised 
nations whose ‘own blood’ linked to Spain – was to be seen as a problem of economic 
development and the role played by foreign capital.808 This emphasis on the economics could be 
traced back to Álvarez del Vayo’s thoughts on the issue: he considered it crucial to see the Chaco 
War as a ‘result of conflicting capitalist interests’ and had insisted with his colleagues on 
‘investigating and reporting the proportion of foreign capital invested in the Chaco’.809 To recall, 
Álvarez del Vayo believed that all Latin American disputes were rooted in the meddling behaviour 
of foreign (economic) actors.810 Economics was the primary lens through which the (socialist) 
chairman of the Chaco Commission perceived the conflict, yet, this side-lined the political climate 
of the 1920s, during which both Bolivian and Paraguayan politicians sought electoral success via 
an aggressive, chauvinistic discourse.811 
Second, the Chaco Commission was careful to uphold a balanced attitude to the dispute, namely 
by giving the sense of an equal treatment of the two countries. The report is structured towards 
achieving this aim: in the chapters, the views of Bolivia and Paraguay are presented along-side 
each other, without any trace of a weighing of the facts. Each case of ownership over the Chaco 
Boreal is presented as equal (‘In the eyes of Bolivia’; ‘In the eyes of Paraguay’) and there is no hint 
of evaluation of the righteousness of these claims.812 Were the countries right to build fortresses 
in the Chaco Boreal and advance their troops? Which political decisions had led to the outbreak 
of the war? While the report appears balanced towards the belligerents, there was no critical 
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attitude towards the claims of the two countries – which would have strengthened the 
commission’s role as impartial actor. The commission strived for an equal treatment of Bolivia 
and Paraguay, thereby renouncing one aspect of its task: to consider whether the facts of the 
dispute were equal and whether any of the belligerents carried a greater responsibility in the 
provocation of war. In the end, the commission’s view was that both parties ‘must bear the entire 
responsibility for the failure’ to achieve peace, but this was a preservation of balance and hardly 
the result of an impartial evaluation of facts. Bolivia and Paraguay were called to adhere to the 
principles of the Covenant but did not provide an answer as to which of its articles were breached 
by them. 
Third, the matter of balance inherently linked with the question of responsibility, as the 
evaluation of facts implied a consideration of possible acts of aggression which brought about the 
eruption of the Chaco War. In the initial meetings to draft the report the Chaco Commission 
appeared reluctant to make mention of responsibility. Álvarez del Vayo preferred to put the 
emphasis in the report on the final proposal which was made to the belligerents, i.e. ‘the best 
possible’ solution available to them.813 In other words, the report became a justification of the 
commission’s actions, rather than a detailed overview of the facts found on the ground. 
Aldrovandi raised the question of responsibility in the meetings and persuaded his colleagues 
that it should be studied ‘in more detail’ in the report.814 Despite the chairman’s view that the 
responsibility question did not have ‘the character of an essential thing’, the Commission would 
address it in a separate chapter.815 
In the final report, the Chaco Commission addressed the question in the fourth chapter – in the 
form of a justification why the commission avoided of any reference to the question of 
responsibility. It clarified that the restoration of peace was paramount to the region and an 
inquiry could have been detrimental to the peace process. The report added that such an inquiry 
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would be difficult and ‘further embittering the polemics on the subject of violations of 
international law.’816 The minutes of meetings show that the Chaco Commission wished to argue 
that it neither had the mandate nor the capacity to complete a full inquiry. This reasoning was 
questionable at most, as the Council had specified that an investigation was a desirable outcome. 
In other words, the commission had refused adherence to this aspect of its assignment. The 
commission could only supply the Council ‘with a detailed and reasoned opinion on the conditions 
in which such an inquiry could be carried out.’ 817 
The Chaco Commission signalled no desired to take up this role. Oddly enough, the commissioners 
had gathered a wealth of facts that could have paved the way for an inquiry and a comprehensive 
understanding of the origins of the Chaco War. Herein exists a contradiction that was 
strengthened by the language of the report: on the one hand, the report stated that an inquiry, i.e. 
‘the trouble of sifting the records or collecting evidence’ would be a ‘tragic error’ in the pursuit of 
peace, on the other hand it still presented its report as ‘frank expression’ which had followed ‘an 
impartial and conscientious inquiry into the development of this conflict upon its actual scene’.818 
Which version was true? There had been no inquiry, since Álvarez del Vayo told his colleagues to 
let the Council know it was ‘not opportune for the time being’ to open an investigation into the 
question – until the restoration for peace was impossible.819 The full account of the negotiations 
and discussions have shown that there at least was an opportunity for the Chaco Commission to 
inquire into the origins of the dispute – if it so desired and if no peace could be obtained. There 
was no fundamental obstacle in the Council’s resolution that obstructed the assignment, nor did 
the commission lack the necessary factual information to consider the main characteristics of the 
dispute. The commission, at least a majority of its members, had chosen to act differently. Two 
years before, the Lytton Commission had set a precedent: in a situation where reconciliation was 
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difficult and the results of an inquiry would also have considerable political ramifications, it still 
chose to offer the Council an investigation of all facts related to the dispute. The Chaco 
Commission abandoned its assignment after an agreement between the countries proved 
unlikely. As a consequence, the League’s engagement with Latin America fell short of a major 
breakthrough: its commission had neither achieved peace, nor provided illumination over of the 
Chaco War’s origins. In effect, it signalled the end of the League as a significant mediator on the 
international stage. 
Aftermath 
The Chaco Commission left Latin America without a peace agreement to end the hostilities 
between Bolivia and Paraguay. Its final task was the submission of a report to the Council of the 
League of Nations. The commission’s activities on the ground were discussed in two sessions, 
held on 17 and 31 May of 1934. How did the League’s Council respond to the activities pursued 
by the commissioners as well as the findings presented in the report? On the surface, there was 
praise for the Chaco Commission’s labours in Latin America. The Council President expressed 
gratitude to the commission for its ‘dedication and impartiality’.820 Similar statements were given 
by representatives of France, Italy, and Great Britain, which emphasised the strengths of the 
report, the impartial approach, and the sincerity of the peace proposals. In public, there was no 
critique on the commission for its failure to reconcile the views between Bolivia and Paraguay 
and its abandonment of a detailed inquiry. Privately, there were grievances within the Council 
and the Secretariat about the fact that the assignment had taken up valuable time during which 
the Council could not explore alternative means of dispute settlement.821 
The most stringent criticisms of the Chaco Commission’s efforts originated from the two 
belligerent countries. Bolivia and Paraguay underlined the ‘honourable efforts’ of the 
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commission, yet, quickly seized the opportunity to question the choices made by the League’s 
representative body. Bolivia was careful to highlight the importance of the League, the Covenant 
and the commission’s dedication to the cause of peace, emphasising the latter did not fail in its 
work, but it questioned much of the peace formula proposed by the commissioners. From the 
Bolivian perspective, the commission had given in to Paraguayan pressure by considering the 
impact of recent military gains.822 Paraguay, on the other hand, provided a more extensive 
questioning of the commission after some words of praise, chiefly by stressing to the Council the 
commission’s failure to discuss the question of responsibility in the report. It also criticised the 
fact that the commission had exceeded its mandate by trying to impose a judicial solution to the 
conflict.823 In fact, both Bolivia and Paraguay had desired the idea of an inquiry – if it meant 
absolution and vindication of one over the other – rather than a form of political compromise. The 
Paraguayan representation summarised the Chaco Commission’s work in the following manner: 
‘[It] attached more importance to the rejection of its peace proposals than to the outbreak of the 
war.’824 
Of course, the criticisms of Bolivia and Paraguay should be seen as part of a long-standing 
diplomatic game where a policy of intransigence was seen as more favourable than a cooperative 
attitude towards peace. The Chaco Commission, in its incapacity to cease hostilities and fulfil its 
assignment, was an easy target for complaints. By no means would a detailed inquiry have meant 
a magical solution to the Chaco War – its conclusions could have easily been disputed by either 
country. Yet, at least an inquiry held the prospect of creating a different dynamic from previous 
negotiations, a more reliable narrative of what had transpired, which could have been be the basis 
                                                             
822 Memorandum from the Bolivian Government on the Report of the Chaco Commission, 23 May 1934, 1-
5435-7455, R3636, LONA. 
823 Observations of the Paraguayan Government on the Chaco Commission’s Report, 9 July 1934, 1-5435-
7455, R3636, LONA. “Dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay. Council Meetings held on 18 May 1934.” 
League of Nations Official Journal 15 (July 1934): 748-762. “Dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay. 
Council Meetings held on 31 May 1934.” League of Nations Official Journal 15 (July 1934): 770-782. 
824 Chaco Dispute: Report and Observations of Governments, R3635, LONA. 
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for an international decision-making process on how to pressure one or both countries towards 
a peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
Overall, the Council discussion was an opportunity for the belligerents to express their views on 
the Chaco Commission’s handling of its task. There was no elaborate discussion nor strong 
engagement from other representatives in the matter. The Council did not seize the opportunity 
to begin a sustained discussion about the purpose of a commission, the obstacles it had faced and 
how its work could be strengthened in the future. The lack of a comprehensive debate was 
perhaps the outcome of limited knowledge about the conditions on the ground and the 
complicated regional diplomacy, but also revealed an unwillingness to learn lessons from this 
experience and improve its dispute-settlement mechanism. A touch of superficiality was common 
to Council meetings: the public sessions created the perception of open and transparent 
diplomacy, but arguably revealed little of what was happening behind closed doors. Yet, it was 
most significant that the Council took no initiative to extend the work of the commission, nor 
established a new body to search for a peaceful resolution of the Chaco War. Upon suggestion of 
the British representative, the discussion turned towards the question of arms exportation – and 
whether it should be permitted to countries involved in an armed dispute.825 
The idea of a weapon’s embargo had been privately raised already in 1933 as a means to starve 
the belligerents of the logistical means to continue hostilities over the Chaco Boreal. However, the 
reconciliation efforts of the Chaco Commission had delayed any active consideration of a ban on 
the sale of arms.826 With the commission’s report out of the way, the Council could seek an 
agreement among its members to cut off the supply of weapons to the belligerent countries. In 
June 1934 a succession of Council meetings were organised to discuss the political support of 
other countries, the conditions under which it would apply and how it would be communicated.827 
                                                             
825 Minutes of a Secret Council Meeting, 1 June 1934, R3615, LONA. 
826 There were also legal questions over the unanimity rule and the basis upon which it could be applied 
against both or one of the countries, if necessary (given the fact that the neighbours had declared 
neutrality in the dispute): Chaco Dispute: Arms embargo, notes of Secretariat, 1-343-5612, R3616, LONA. 
827 Chaco Dispute: Council Proceedings, Legal Committee, Minutes of Meetings, 1-343-11423, R3615, LONA. 
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In parallel, Bolivia appealed to the League under Article 15 – which foresaw a more detailed 
investigation and a referral to the Assembly.828 The outcome, however, changed little to the 
dynamics of the Chaco War: the prohibition of the sale of arms and munitions of war saw 
numerous evasions (via third countries), whereas the additional League procedures only 
duplicated existing efforts to resolve the conflict.829 Privately, Walters from the Political Section 
indicated to the Council President Nájera that the key for any real progress lay with the 
neighbouring states.830 
How did the Latin American countries respond towards the League’s efforts at dispute-
settlement, including the role of the Chaco Commission? For instance, the views articulated in US 
diplomatic cables, concerning Latin American states, were blunter in comparison to the lofty 
wording presented at the Council’s meetings. The general perception was one of failure: The 
Foreign Minister of Chile was ‘outspokenly unimpressed’ with the commission’s peace formula, 
while the Argentine government expressed its negative attitude and was ready to prepare a new 
initiative from the neighbouring states.831 Brazil and Peru were less outspoken but only gave 
lukewarm praise to the commission’s work. Those countries most sceptical of the League’s work 
also happened to be those neighbouring countries with high-stakes in the Chaco Boreal dispute. 
Overall, there had been a reluctance of the American states to support the League’s efforts would 
continue to influence the diplomatic efforts at peace for the remainder of 1934.  
In one instance, Secretary-General Joseph Avenol (succeeding Eric Drummond) discussed with 
the US Consul in Geneva the possibility of a new committee to consider the question. Avenol’s 
suggestion was met with no enthusiasm: the US Consul ruled out participation of his country in 
the committee and thought the League was better to ‘avoid [an] additional loss of prestige.’ This 
                                                             
828 “The Covenant of the League of Nations,” Article 15. 
829 Discussion at the 15th Session of the Assembly, September 1934, 1-343-13363, R3618, LONA. Chaco 
Dispute: Appeal to Article 15 of the Covenant by the Government of Bolivia, 1-343-11725, R3617, LONA. 
830 Chaco Dispute: Correspondence with the Governments of Peru and Colombia, 1-343-11937, R3617, 
LONA. 
831 Quotes from telegrams dated 27 and 28 February 1934, in: The American Republics, 1934, Volume 4, 
FRUS, 59-60. 
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reflected the Secretary of State’s desire to assist ‘the more hopeful procedure’ of the American 
states, which suggested a limited involvement of the League.832 Equally, the Brazilian Foreign 
Minister thought that ‘interjection of the League can only serve to deter a solution.’833 The 
pendulum of international initiative was swinging back towards the Western hemisphere. 
For a brief while, Bolivia continued to engage with the League’s peace machinery via Article 15 of 
the Covenant, whereas for Paraguayan cooperation had effectively ceased with the Chaco 
Commission’s dissolution. The refusal of Paraguay to work together with the League was publicly 
condemned – the country was labelled ‘an aggressor’ and in response it resigned from the 
organisation. The measure was symbolic, as by this time the League had already lost both the 
initiative and the authority to resolve the conflict. In the meantime, a renewed effort by the 
American states showed more promise. In 1935, Bolivia and Paraguay accepted a proposal to 
participate in a peace conference, that would last more than three years but led to a lasting 
accord.834  
What where the conditions of this breakthrough? By then, the two belligerent countries had 
started to feel the financial exhaustion of their long military campaigns. Neither Bolivia nor 
Paraguay was in a position to achieve a clear victory. Apart from the domestic context, the 
international dynamics had also changed. With the League out of the picture835, responsibility had 
returned to the American states to impose a solution on the belligerents. Contrary to previous 
negotiations, the American states seized the authority to arbitrate the border and establish a joint 
commission that would demarcate interests and negotiate economic and commercial 
                                                             
832 Communication from the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State (August 27, 1934) from: 
The American Republics, 1934, vol. 4, FRUS, 70. 
833 Communication from the Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State (September 25, 1934) 
from: The American Republics, 1934, vol. 4, FRUS, 81. 
834 Conflicto entre Bolivia y Paraguay (1933-1936), in papers related to Latin America, (10)13 51/16138, 
AGA. 
835 There was no League involvement with the peace conference that had started in 1935. See: Chaco 
Dispute: Control established by the Buenos Aires Conference, 1-343-29242, R3619, LONA. 
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conventions. Peace was found because of war fatigue at home, and a sufficient amount of 
international pressure to see an end to the war.836 
Conclusion 
When Álvarez Del Vayo recollected his thoughts in his memoir The last optimist, he felt sure that 
the Chaco Commission’s final peace proposal ‘would serve in the not-distant future as the basis 
for a definitive settlement of this insane conflict. And that, in fact, was the case.’837 This was the 
chairman’s personal reading of the subsequent events, which led to the 1938 peace agreement. 
Few would have agreed with his observations. The utility of the League’s commission and its 
methods of dispute settlement were not universally recognised. In contrast to Álvarez del Vayo, 
Chile’s Minister of Foreign Affairs believed it had been a form of ‘expensive political tourism.’838 
How to explain such wild variations in views of the commission’s work in the Chaco Boreal 
region? This chapter has demonstrated that the despatch of a group of international 
commissioners with the aim to end hostilities cannot simply be seen through the binary of success 
or failure. The complexity of the historical context at local, domestic, and international level 
reveals several factors which influenced the outcome of the commission’s work. 
The Chaco War was long in the making. For decades, the dispute remained within the confinement 
of regional diplomacy, as Bolivia and Paraguay bickered over a suitable compromise and regularly 
sought the help of other American states. Fuelled by domestic politics and public pressure, the 
foreign policy positions of the two countries gradually hardened: a minor legal issue became a 
concern over national sovereignty. Instead of exerting pressure, the neighbouring states kept an 
ambivalent attitude towards the conflict which hindered efforts towards a peaceful resolution. 
The good offices of the American states brought no resolution to the problem, only an endless 
                                                             
836 Leslie B. Rout ed., Politics of the Chaco Peace Conference, 1935-39 (Austin: Institute of Latin American 
Studies, University of Texas Press, 1970). Óscar Javier Barrera Aguilera, La Guerra del Chaco como desafío 
al panamericanismo: el sinuoso camino a la Conferencia de Paz de Buenos Aires, 1934-1935.” Anuario 
Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura 38, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 179–217. Chaco Dispute: 
Conclusion of the Peace, 1-343-18460, R3619, LONA. 
837 Álvarez del Vayo, The last optimist, 258. 
838 Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Count Luigi Aldrovandi, 10 October 1933, Busta 22, ASD. 
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series of unratified treaties. The League of Nations was slow to get involved: it left the initiative 
to regional players when violence erupted in 1928. Although the Covenant provided the 
international legal framework for the League to assert its authority in the Latin American dispute, 
the unwritten rule was that the American states should take the lead. In practice, the League had 
no final authority regarding disputes in the Western hemisphere, which entailed a duplication of 
agencies and institutions as part of the international peace system. Only after the official 
declaration of war in 1933 and the repeated failure of a solution through the good offices of the 
limitrophe states, did the League seize its chance. The mandate set for the Chaco Commission in 
May 1933 was broad and did not favour one particular approach to address the conflict. This left 
a vacuum to be filled by the chosen members for the commission. 
The Chaco Commission met a series of obstacles during its assignment. The selection of a group 
of international commissioners was perceived to give the assurance of impartiality, even though 
the candidates were chosen for their nationality. There were no formal selection criteria, but in 
practice the Council opted for a commission composed of senior diplomats and military men. The 
commission constituted only a temporary assignment in the careers of the chosen men. Personal 
rivalry crept up immediately after the establishment of the Commission in Montevideo. This 
contestation at a personal level made consensus on the optimal approach to the conflict 
impossible to achieve. The Council had given the commission a lot of discretion from the start, 
which in turn meant limited guidance on how to execute the assignment. The commissioners 
stuck to an often-tried method of reconciliation, whereas inquiry as a technique was overlooked. 
Yet, rivalry at different levels had created obstacles for the League’s investigative body. Bolivia 
and Paraguay had shown complete intransigence over the diplomatic reconciliation process. The 
belief held that only military advances could settle the Chaco question. There was no room for 
common ground or any form political transaction between the two belligerents to fairly divide 
the Chaco Boreal region. The Chaco Commission lacked the essential aid of the neighbouring 
states: they delayed the start of the investigation and had only provided lukewarm support on 
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the ground. The Pan-American Conference tried to undercut the League’s initial peace initiative. 
The neighbouring states responded with scepticism to the commission’s final proposal. In this 
chapter, the contestation at different levels cannot be seen as separate factors. It should be 
considered as a whole: it was precisely the interaction between local, domestic, and international 
factors which created the unfavourable conditions for the inquiry commission. 
Thus, no singular cause explains how the Chaco Commission was beset by difficulties right from 
its establishment, although the thesis’ imperial internationalist framework helps to understand 
how an effective inquiry never materialised. The Council’s broad mandate, the national and 
regional interests, the duplication of conciliation efforts through rivalling political hierarchies, 
the civilisational lens, and the interpersonal relationships, each of these can be traced back to 
institutional, contextual and personal elements identified in the overall argument of the thesis. 
The League’s final major international commission turned out to be quite different from what was 
anticipated, despite the many precedents set in the previous years. Reconciliation was favoured 
at all cost over truth by the commission, deliberately avoiding any sense of objective fact-finding 
or inquiry into the origins of the dispute – perhaps a reflection of how much the political situation 
of the 1930s was different from the preceding decade. The commission’s supposed impartial 
detachment was a matter of language; in reality, the investigation was driven by a desire to 
balance the two countries’ views. At times, the final report seems to embody a multitude of 
contradictory positions: an impartial attitude but vigilant towards peace, a desire to collect all 
facts but a refusal to draw conclusions. 
Difficulties had beset previous League commissions, mostly originating from the institutional 
setting in which they were set up and the political context in which they operated. However, there 
were developments that supported the conclusion that an international organisation could play 
a role in dispute-settlement, by way of fact-finding missions. Inquiries into illicit opium 
production and forced labour had raised international attention to problems with ramifications 
beyond a country’s borders. The Lytton Commission in Manchuria had pursued a fact-finding 
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mission and presented a clear assessment of all the facts of the conflict between China and Japan. 
The League had experimented with new ideas of peace-keeping in the Leticia dispute, which 
resulted in a successful resolution between Colombia and Peru. In contrast, the Chaco 
Commission refrained from embracing the inquiry technique or other options. Fact-finding was 
never the primary goal for the commissioners sent to Latin America; perhaps, the sense that 
knowledge production could improve the conduct of international politics had got lost in the 
tumult of the early 1930s. The Manchurian crisis had vindicated the League’s critics who 
considered that power and diplomacy mattered more than facts and international cooperation. 
The Chaco Commission chose to reconcile. There was no genuine fact-finding mission that could 
be of value to the League’s political decision-making process. After the Chaco Commission’s 
report was submitted and discussed, the Council started its discussions about the next step, 
without taking guidance from its own commission. The actions of the Chaco Commission in Latin 
America had provoked no immediate consequence. By then, the League had already become an 
insignificant political player for the Chaco dispute – as the initiative switched back to 
neighbouring states – and arguably for most of the world. 
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7: Conclusion 
 
‘Has experience strangled hope? (- you ask.)  
Nay, rather hope now waves her wings triumphant over all.  
Come what may, we win, whoever loses.  
Every dream is assured of soberest fulfilment.  
Our ignorance is now confirmed by knowledge.’ 
(C. Walter Young, The League’s view of the Manchurian issue, 1933) 
 
During a speech given before the Anglo-American association in Peiping839, in the immediate 
aftermath of the Manchurian crisis, the scholar Carl Walter Young argued that the League of 
Nations’ use of the inquiry technique had been ‘necessarily slow’, when considering the gaps in 
the Covenant for situations without any clear precedent, as well as the technical challenges which 
invariably presented themselves in the preparation and actual investigative work on the 
ground.840 Young felt that events only started to move, without delay, once the Council and 
Assembly had been resolved to act on the findings of the Lytton report. Although the Manchurian 
case had been the most significant test for the League, a sense of bewilderment with Geneva’s 
unhurried methods and machinations was not exceptional: in its years of existence, Young was 
far from the only contemporary observer who grappled to distil a purpose to the League’s 
investigative commissions in international politics. 
The League of Nations depended on the inquiry technique to rationally resolve a myriad of 
international issues. This dependence had sparked from a more general aspiration to transform 
international politics through new forms of diplomacy and expert knowledge that could bring 
overall benefit to humankind. In practice, these high aspirations clashed with the context in which 
inquiry was established and developed within the League of Nations, as a fact-finding technique 
to investigate and produce recommendations on a wide range of international issues. The thesis 
settled on imperial internationalism as a historical framework to situate and explain the inquiry 
                                                             
839 Peiping or Beiping are alternative transliterations for the city of Peking (Beijing) in this period. 
840 The League’s view of the Manchurian Issue: speech by C. Walter Young before the Anglo-American 
Association at Peiping (China), 17 March 1933, Victor Bulwer-Lytton Manchurian/LN Files, Box LH27, 
KHBL. 
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phenomenon at the international level; it focused on how the investigative technique was adapted 
from a domestic context (as a flexible tool under state authority, also used by colonial authorities) 
and evolved in multiple ways at the international level (in many cases, part of a court system and 
embedded in international law) to uphold political and institutional status-quo that characterised 
the post-Versailles international system. This system was based on imperial hierarchies that 
linked to extensive political and economic interests and a standard of civilisation that was 
employed to guide the development of the non-Western world under ‘enlightened’ tutelage and, 
almost exclusively, white and male expertise. 
The ‘why’ of inquiry suggests there was a desire to find greater means of detachment in the 
conduct of international politics, to depoliticise the process in which facts were gathered and 
would inform the decision-making process between member states of the League of Nations.841 
However, this aspirational agenda fell short in the practical use of investigative commissions to 
resolve inter-state disputes and cross-border issues. This is best exemplified by the fact that 
inquiry was kept throughout its life at the League as a flexible, ad hoc technique, with unwritten 
procedures and a timetable that allowed for diplomatic contingency and frequent delay. 
Moreover, investigations were marked by a preference to consider only countries and regions of 
the world that were deemed of not (yet) having reached the threshold of civilised society, or those 
that risked overstepping the boundaries of what was acceptable – a challenge or undermining of 
the post-war imperial status quo. Whereas mandated territories under the League had their own 
mechanisms for supervision and verification, the inquiry technique covered independent and 
sovereign nations: they were members of the League organisation but also perceived as on the 
brink of chaos or on a pathway to development but in need of guidance and reform.842 
                                                             
841 A similar evolution towards detachment and depoliticization can be traced in the development of 
international law: Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia the Structure of International Legal 
Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Also see: Norbert Elias, “Problems of 
Involvement and Detachment.” The British Journal of Sociology 7, no. 3 (1956): 226–252. 
842 International supervision of the mandated territories is extensively covered in international law as 
well as Pedersen’s recent monograph (The Guardians) although other forms of fact-finding and control 
have not been scrutinised to the same degree – for the link between international administration and a 
civilisational standard. 
294 
 
The rich empirical fabric of the thesis demonstrates that inquiry did not have to be ‘necessarily 
slow’ but was conditioned by its institutional milieu, multi-level power dynamics and the political 
context. Inquiry served as a means to buy additional time during diplomatic crises or raise 
pressure on countries to enact legal and administrative reform. As such, the aspirational agenda 
of inquiry did not often go beyond lip service at the League’s political bodies and the hierarchical, 
power constraints placed upon international organisation during this period. However, the thesis 
has equally sought to identify shimmers of ‘progress’ in the use of fact-finding missions to bring 
a greater degree of accountability and fact-based discussion in international politics. Many of 
these examples were visible in the agency of individual actors, such as commissioners who 
pursued novel investigative methods and reflected on facts and their verification, as well as small, 
sovereign states who sought to defend their rights diminished by extensive foreign and 
international tutelage. 
The overall picture that arises from the four case studies, covering different themes and regions 
of the world, is one that strengthens the thesis’ original resolve to view the League’s inquiries as 
one and the same phenomenon. Despite the thematic discrepancies, all investigations organised 
under the auspices of the League followed a process that was similar in nature: at the beginning, 
a fact-finding missions would be provoked by a legal or diplomatic catalyst (a dispute or 
discussion at the international level), resulted in the selection of a multinational team, chiefly 
comprising European men of stature, that made an extensive visit to the concerned region to 
conduct interviews, gather factual data, but also relying on Western experts on the ground – 
identified as dispassionate sources of information. Whereas the League’s Secretariat was more 
closely involved in technical issues, such as health, opium and human trafficking – leading to more 
active considerations of qualifications and expertise of the commissioners – in general all 
inquiries were characterised by their flexible, ad hoc nature, at which political considerations 
determined the terms of reference and the composition of the team, with no evidence of a distinct 
learning curve or methodological development throughout the inter-war years. 
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Inquiry as a League phenomenon, however, was bound together by function, context and 
scientific attitudes; the latter held by investigators but also embedded in the structures of the 
organisation.843 Its function extended beyond fact-finding in a narrow sense of the word: the 
presence of an inquiry commission on the ground often had to serve diplomatic purposes – either 
to reconcile hostile partners, over Manchuria and the Chaco, or sustain international scrutiny on 
an issue with cross-border ramifications, such as forced labour and illegal opium production. 
There was also a performative aspect to inquiry: commissioners were the League’s 
representatives on the ground, and a palpable sign of the organisation’s capacity to act in 
international politics.  
In practice, diplomatic exigencies served a different aim from fact-finding, which limited the 
capacity of the investigative team to gather facts and determine the truth – especially when truth 
precluded a compromise and peaceful resolution of a conflict. In most cases, fact-finding 
presented a softer face of foreign tutelage, first through its recommendations identified in the 
report, but second in the prospect of additional expertise that could be brought in to enact 
administrative reforms and develop the economy. Inquiry held the prospect of replacing direct 
intervention by major powers by more subtle means of influence – yet this meant inquiry was 
never free from instrumentalisation for political aims: either providing the time to conjure up a 
diplomatic response or to extend Western interests, in the form of beneficial trade relations and 
turning international scrutiny away from colonial administrations. 
The context in which the League organised its inquiries was characterised by a multi-level field 
of competing powers, contestation and rivalry palpable through local, domestic and international 
frames of analysis. The dense empirical documentation explored for this thesis, ranging from 
League reports, minutes and notes, to diplomatic and personal correspondence covering a large 
number of countries and individual commissioners, shows the constraints imposed on inquiry 
                                                             
843 Or, as Bentley Allan has argued, a distinct scientific cosmology of ‘evolutionary developmentalism’ that 
was at the heart of international organisation in this period, and was inherently linked to the colonial 
project, imperial hierarchies and the use of a civilisational standard to condition and influence the 
behaviour of states. Allan, Scientific Cosmology and International Orders, 181-183. 
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that were determined by internal feuds within investigative teams, concerning the chairmanship 
or the overall approach to the assignment, domestic confrontations between social groups and 
political factions, and an intense competition between countries, large and small nations, as well 
as international organisations, over matters of sovereignty and the appropriate authority to 
intervene. Tension arising at one level also had repercussions for other levels and its constituting 
political actors, most of all visible in how commissions were met by uncooperative attitudes, 
actors and countries unwilling to accept or support the findings of the final report and seeking to 
steer the investigation and decision-making process to the most beneficial outcome. 
Finally, the scientific attitudes conveyed by the League’s investigators were marked by relative 
unity in their ideological underpinnings, namely a belief that the international system established 
after Versailles was largely just and fair, despite its imperial hierarchies and power inequalities, 
a sense of duty of the Western (chiefly European) world to interfere with the rest, a ‘sacred trust’ 
to teach sound administration and economic development beyond the mandated territories.844 
Civilisational language did not just appear when inquiries engaged with the African continent or 
Central Asia but also framed the approach when dealing with the domestic chaos in China, 
Japanese imperial aspirations, and the ‘undeveloped’ green lowlands of the Chaco Boreal. While 
commissioners displayed scrutiny for the quality and prejudices of their local (non-Western) 
sources, no such active reflection extended to their personal biases, namely their ‘civilised’ 
mindsets, construed around imperial idioms, modes and repertoires, and occasionally examples 
of racialised language. The standard of civilisation, which implied decency and restraint, was 
perceived as complementary to new forms of international ‘technical’ work, fact-finding, and 
foreign assistance overseeing administrative changes and economic reforms, which in reality 
sought to extend Western political and economic reach into the domestic affairs of sovereign 
nations. 
                                                             
844 In the past, the ‘sacred trust’ has been exclusively applied to the historiography of the League 
mandates system but similar forms of civilisational discourse appear in other spheres of the 
organisation’s activities. For a discussion about the fuse between imperialism and internationalism 
through mandates see Callahan’s A Sacred Trust. 
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What impact did inquiry have on the development of international organisation and its aspiration 
to rationalise and improve inter-state cooperation? Both historians and international legal 
scholars have tended to frame the debate around the binary of success and failure, or the question 
‘what difference it made’.845 At first sight, this frame seemingly leads to the conclusion that 
inquiries were powerless in relative terms, in the sense that they failed to speak truth to power, 
were mired by institutional ambiguity and diplomatic compromise, in the end, with their 
conclusions ignored by decision-makers. The imperial internationalist framework, however, 
shows that they served different, sometimes disparate interests: inquiries allowed to focus and 
sustain public interest and even outrage over countries that risked stepping out of line; moreover, 
they provided the major powers and architects of the League with a safety valve, that allowed 
them to sidestep a direct response or questions of intervention, but did enough to preserve the 
semblance of a working international system.  
Following this line of interpretation, inquiries showed indeed some promise as a technique to 
manage a complex, multi-level field of power dynamics, as they maintained the imperial and 
civilisational underpinnings of the international system, but allowed for nominally transparent 
and more egalitarian forms of public discussion on international issues.846 For small countries, 
this meant an opportunity to defend their reputation and protect their sovereign rights through 
a diplomatic representative in Geneva, rather than the force of arms. Inquiry’s unquestioned role 
in the fabric of international organisations today, suggests it has served these interests with a 
relative degree of success.847 
                                                             
845 For recent examples, see the 2019 symposium 'International Commissions of Inquiry: What Difference 
Do They Make? Taking an Empirical Approach' in the European Journal of International Law. 
846 For the importance of power and the relationship between imperialism and internationalism, also see: 
Patricia Clavin, “Intro: Conceptualising Internationalism Between the World Wars.” In Internationalism 
Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements between the World Wars, ed. Daniel Laqua (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2011), 4-6. 
847 For this reason, long-term studies of the inquiry phenomenon are a fruitful avenue of future research. 
For example, see Lori Allen’s examination of inquiries in Palestine during the twentieth century: Allen, 
“Determining Emotions and the Burden of Proof in Investigative Commissions to Palestine,” 385-414. 
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Until recently, the development and continued appearance of inquiry commissions at the 
international level was not considered as a research subject in its own right. In both political and 
historical terms, limited attention was given to the underlying rationale of truth seeking, as a form 
of knowledge production, in the power-denominated structures of international society. The 
thesis situates its overall contribution in linking the subject of international inquiry with the 
League of Nations’ history and providing a conceptual framework that explains how investigative 
commissions constituted a palpable part of a complex interaction between agents and institutions 
at the local, domestic and international level. The imperial internationalist framework comes to 
fruition in the densely mapped precursory stages, investigative modalities and aftermath of 
inquiry; it reveals an often-used technique that neither led to a ground-breaking transformation 
of international politics, nor was bent entirely to the will of imperial powers. 
In using inquiry commissions as a microcosmos to study and conceptualise inter-war 
international politics, this thesis has also sought to make wider contributions to international 
history and the scholarship on international organisations. First, it has pursued an understanding 
of the League of Nations, its nature and functioning, not dependent on archival materials from 
one sphere of its activities but based on a wide range of evidence for multiple sections and 
involving a great number of League officials and country representatives. From the outset, the 
thesis’ intention was to identify structures and processes related to knowledge production that 
underscored a supposedly diverse range of practices at the organisation.848 As such, the thesis 
has sought to combine a more holistic perspective, built around the League’s scientific cosmology, 
with analysis of events at the granular level, i.e. through the diverse empirical resources that 
comprise inquiry commissions. 
Second, the choice of case studies has contributed to a truly ‘international’ history of the period, 
one that shifts and scatters points of gravity away from Geneva, despite extensively mining the 
                                                             
848 Here the thesis has sought inspiration in a growing IR literature that links the production of 
knowledge by international organisation with wider material and ideological structures. See: Guevara and 
Kostić, “Knowledge Production in/about Conflict and Intervention,” 4. 
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organisation’s archives for source materials. The thesis provides evidence of the importance to 
study other regions during the inter-war period, beyond the main preoccupations of Western and 
European politicians, but which had a clear impact on international relations. For example, the 
Liberian case should be understood as a crucial stepping stone in the League’s dealings with the 
Italian invasion of Abyssinia, a conflict that was marked by a direct, militarised form of 
humanitarian imperialism.849 The Chaco War was by far the biggest conflict in the Western 
hemisphere and had political and economic ramifications that reached beyond the time-frame of 
the thesis. Similarly, the East Asian conflict over Manchuria was perhaps the most defining 
moments of inter-war international history, one that put initial optimism surrounding the League 
into question. The opium question in Persia indicates that interconnected issues related to trade 
and people became an increasing concern for states, as global developments that escaped efforts 
to control them at the domestic level.  
In each of the case studies, the political power and economic preponderance of the United States 
cannot be overlooked, despite its ‘isolationist’ stance towards the League of Nations. In the 
establishment of inquiry commissions and working on the ground, no such absence was felt. 
Rather, the United States played a fundamental role both in the League’s fact-finding missions as 
in more diplomatic terms, providing financial means or raising pressure on the concerned 
countries. As such, inquiry commissions have shown to be a useful microcosmos to grasp the 
central tenets and complexity of the inter-war international system, with its imperial legacies, 
changes in the balance of power, frequent clashes and competition for greater political and 
economic influence, sometimes to the detriment of sovereign rights.850 
A final contribution and wider significance of the thesis can be identified in its attempt to position 
inquiry within a long-term history of international organisation, with attention to the role of 
                                                             
849 Amalia Ribi Forclaz. Humanitarian Imperialism: The Politics of Anti-Slavery Activism, 1880-1940 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
850 This micro-cosmos has thus served to give a less ideational and more empirical insight in the imperial 
internationalist argument put forward by Mark Mazower in No Enchanted Palace and Governing the World 
and recently in the work by Jerónimo and Monteiro: Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo and José Pedro Monteiro, 
Internationalism, Imperialism and the Formation of the Contemporary World (New York: Springer, 2017). 
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knowledge production as a functional component and process in its overall development. 
Collecting all the world’s information and finding means to produce expert knowledge became a 
central preoccupation of early twentieth-century organisations – particularly the League of 
Nations – and has continued unabatedly for its twenty-first century successor(s). During the 
League’s lifetime, extensive efforts were made and resources committed to the gathering of 
statistical data and detailed information on individual countries, subsequently published in 
reports, yearbooks and analyses; these efforts and resources were driven by a conviction that 
reliable knowledge would improve decision-making and bring a sense of accountability and 
justice to societies.851 Knowledge was crucial to the idea of global governance and a vital 
component in the development of international order. Yet, this thesis confirms that knowledge 
production in its myriad forms is neither neutral nor fully independent and requires a study of its 
context and ideological underpinnings.  
The study of the League’s inquiry commissions has chiefly been within the scope of international 
history, although the thesis has sought to bring insights from International Relations and related 
social sciences into the fold. The project was built around the empirical materials that comprised 
the commissions and stuck to an inductive approach that allowed the exploration of different 
literatures and eventually one framework to address the rationale behind the League’s use of the 
inquiry technique. Limitations are prevalent because of the detailed emphasis on the inquiries 
and its members, both with regard to their actions and thoughts, which due to constraints in time 
and resources, could not be expanded to all stakeholders involved in the four case studies. 
Although not every actor and institution has been given an equal amount of detail, it should be 
sufficient to provide a comprehensive depiction of the political and institutional context and 
reinforce the narrative of the thesis. Another limitation, perhaps, is the choice of inquiry case 
                                                             
851 For one French statistician, ‘a precise knowledge of the economic and social condition of peoples, their 
strength and productive power, would be the best guarantee for universal peace, as it would prevent the 
practice of underhand economical struggles which often are a prelude to political conflicts.’ Source: 
Lucien March, “International Statistics and the League of Nations.” Quarterly Publications of the American 
Statistical Association 17, no. 133 (March 1921): 629. 
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studies that had to be made. The thesis has pursued a case study selection that covered multiple 
times and a longer time-frame, although it acknowledges that a choice of different examples might 
have brought up new elements and distinct frames of analysis. Nevertheless, the yet uncharted 
materials of other inquiry commissions point to the additional gains from future research, that 
could cover both League examples as well as inquiries in more recent periods. 
A future research agenda could cover a longer period of time, but continue to address questions 
of function, purpose and their ideological underpinnings, through the granular fabric provided by 
inquiry commissions. Particularly, questions concerning the standard of civilisation, its workings 
beyond areas of League activity directly concerned with mandated territories, point to fruitful 
synergies between international history and process sociology and valuable insights in the 
entanglements of imperial projects, knowledge production and the development of international 
organisations.852 Moreover, the imperial internationalist framework in which inquiry took shape 
at the international level and its subsequent development at the UN and non-governmental 
organisations, shows the importance of questioning the impartial and depoliticised credentials of 
international investigation. Whether as subject to an ideological conflict that pitted liberal 
democracies against communist states during the Cold War or in the context of the post-colonial 
world that became a ‘governable object’ for Western actors involved in policy formulation and 
knowledge production, inquiries have seemed to play a controversial role within international 
organisation.853 Pitfalls in their establishment and functioning, notably the many unfixed rules of 
procedure and lack of standardisation, have had repercussions for their transparent and 
impartial credentials – problems which are only being tackled in recent times.854  
Many of the contemporary characteristics of inquiry at the international level – UN-investigations 
of human rights violations being the most palpable examples – can be traced back to the League, 
                                                             
852 For instance, see Andrew Linklater’s Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems. 
853 Markus Hochmüller and Markus-Michael Müller, “Encountering Knowledge Production: The 
International Crisis Group and the Making of Mexico’s Security Crisis.” Third World Quarterly 35, no. 4 
(April 2014): 708-09. For the Cold War context, see: Lieblich, “At Least Something: The UN Special 
Committee on the Problem of Hungary, 1957 – 1958.” 
854 Mendez, “Commissions of Inquiry: Lessons Learned and Good Practices,” 47-54. 
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and some scholars have stressed the ‘foundational’ nature of the organisation in bringing a 
technocratic approach to the world of inter-state politics.855 However, tracing the evolution of 
international governance cannot be separated from the political structures, power relations and 
scientific attitudes that comprised the time period; identifying these contexts and ideological 
underpinnings are crucial both to understand contemporary challenges to fact-finding missions 
and to identify improvements to existing practices.  
                                                             
855 ‘The men and women who worked for the League’s various technical committees and organizations 
extended the League’s work into a wide array of international social and humanitarian areas. Through 
their work, these bureaucrats and reformers created a form of functional internationalism that outlasted 
the League and helped to shape the work of the United Nations after 1945.’ From: Gorman, The 
Emergence of International Society in the 1920s, 12. 
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Note on Spelling 
 
Because many of the events described in this thesis are set in the early twentieth century, there 
are a couple of marks with regard to spelling and the transcription of names. The League of 
Nations used inquiry and enquiry interchangeably to denote its investigative commissions (in the 
French translation of reports it used enquête). In the thesis, inquiry is consistently favoured over 
enquiry, as the former is commonly used to denote an investigation whereas the latter implies a 
general ask or question. Names of people and places have been kept as they appeared in the 
source material or were transliterated in the period. For instance, Persia is used instead of Iran 
and the Wade-Giles romanisation is preferred for Chinese names of individuals and cities, such as 
Chiang Kai-shek, Nanjing and Peking. In case of confusion, the modern (pinyin) romanisation of a 
name or word is added in the footnotes.  
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